

دار الفاروق

# Salâh ad-Deen al-Ayubî

VOLUME ONE

Crusades prior to the Rise of the Ayubid State



صلاح الدين الأيوبي

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الدار العالمية للكتاب الإسلامي

INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC PUBLISHING HOUSE

IN THE NAME OF

**ALLAH**

THE ALL-COMPASSIONATE, ALL-MERCIFUL

*Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi*

**Volume One** Crusades prior to the Rise  
of the Ayubid State

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## About the word *Lord*

The word *lord* in English has several related meanings. The original meaning is 'master' or 'ruler', and in this sense it is often used to refer to human beings: 'the lord of the mansion' or 'Lord So-and-So' (in the United Kingdom, for example). The word *Lord* with a capital L is used in the lexicon of Islam to refer to the One and Only God-Allah. In Islam, there is no ambiguity about the meaning of this word. While it is true that one may occasionally use the word *lord* (whether capitalized or not) to refer to a human being, in Islamic discourse the reference of this term is always clear from the context. Whereas for Christians, Hindus and other polytheists, the word *Lord* with a capital L may refer to Allah, to Jesus or to some imagined deity, for Muslims, there can be no plurality of meaning. Allah alone is the Lord, and the Lord is Allah — not Jesus, not Rama, not any other being.

The Editor

## Publisher's Note

All praise and thanks belong to Allah alone, the One, the Almighty, and All-Merciful. Blessings and peace be upon Muhammad (SAAW), the last of His Messengers and his family, his Companions and all those who follow in his footsteps until the end of time.

The renowned contemporary Arab historian of Islam, Dr. ' Ali M. Sallabi, puts his heart and soul as well as his profound knowledge and analytical abilities into the research, writing and production of his books in Arabic. It is undoubtedly a no less difficult task to render the voluminous texts of his work into English. The end result is a fascinating biography of a man who looms larger than life throughout history, yet who remains largely unknown to people outside the Arab world. Dr. Sallabi's meticulous research has effectively filled that gap in our knowledge. His work is more than just biography, as the reader will see. This three-volume work has been made more useful to the reader in this English edition through the addition of a map, a timeline, a list of the dynasties of the period, and a comprehensive Glossary. It is our pleasure to present the first unabridged English translation of *Salah ad-Deen*.

May Allah bless the efforts of all who contributed to the production of this book, and may it be acceptable to Him.

Muhammad ibn ' Abdul Muhsin Al Tuwaijri Managing Director  
International Islamic Publishing House Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

## Translator's Foreword

As history repeat itself? A saying of 'Umar, the first liberator of Jerusalem, suggests that it does. He said that the latter generations of this Ummah would not prevail except by means of that by which its first generations prevailed.

If we try to prevail by any means other than Islam, Allah will cause us to suffer only more humility and defeat. The Companions and the early generations of Islam prevailed by means of Islam. At a time of decline, Salah ad-Deen understood that this was the way to restore the glory of this nation.

In this book, Dr. Sallabi discusses the conflict of civilizations between the Crusaders and Islam. He discusses the Crusades; the moral standards, ethics and character of Salah ad-Deen, and his support of the revival movement that was aimed to bringing Muslims back to the true path of Islam by establishing many schools; and how he held the scholars in high esteem and included them in his inner circle. He devotes an entire chapter to the battle of Hattien and the liberation of Jerusalem, and the causes of victory in that decisive battle.

He goes on to discuss the Third Crusade and the reaction of Western Europe to the liberation of Jerusalem and the general mobilization that took place in Christendom. Finally, he describes the death of Salah ad-Deen, how the people were affected by it and how even European historians praised his justice, strength and tolerance, and regarded him as the greatest character of the Crusade era. His life still inspires the Muslims with his heroic character and exploits which will bring back to life the glories of the past.

It is important for anyone who wants to gain an historical perspective on present-day events to read this book and understand the life and times of Salah ad-Deen.

Nasiruddin al-Khattab Toronto, November 2009

## Introduction

All praise be to Allah, we praise Him and seek His help, guidance and forgiveness, and we seek refuge with Allah from the evil of our own selves and from our bad deeds. Whomever Allah guides no one can misguide, and whomever He sends astray no one can guide. I bear witness that there is none worthy of worship other than Allah alone with no partner or associate, and I bear witness that Muhammad (SAAW) is His slave and Messenger.

**O you who believe! Fear Allah as He should be feared, and do not die except in a state of Islam [as Muslims] with complete submission to Allah..’** *(Qur'an 3: 102)*

**O humankind! Be dutiful to your Lord, Who created you from a single person, and from him He created his spouse, and from them both He created many men and women, and fear Allah through Whom you demand your mutual [rights], and [do not cut the relations of] the wombs [kinship]. Surely, Allah is Ever an All-Watcher over you.)** *(Qur'an 4: 1)*

**O you who believe! Keep your duty to Allah and fear Him, and [always] speak the truth. He will direct you to do righteous good deeds and will forgive you your sins. And whosoever obeys Allah and His Messenger, he has indeed achieved a great achievement.** *(Qur'an 33: 70-71)*

O Lord, to You be praise until You are pleased, to You be praise if You are pleased, and to You be praise after You are pleased. This book is a continuation of previous books studying the period of the Messenger (SAAW), the era of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, the era of the Umayyad ('Umawiyah) state, the era of the Seljuks, the era of the Zangid state, the Almoravid (Murabitoon) and Almohad (al-Muwahhidoon) states and the era of the Ottoman state, of which have been published so far: *The Messenger (SAAW)'s Biography, Abu Bakr, 'Umar ibn al-Khattdb, 'Uthmdn ibn Affdn, Ali ibnAbi Tdlib, al-Hasan ibn Ali, Mu'dwiyah ibn Abi Sufydn, 'Umar ibn Abdal-Azeez, Fiqh al-Nasr wa at-Tamkeen fil-Qur'an al-Kareem*

(Understanding the means of victory and divine support in the Noble Qur'an), *ath-Thimdr az-Zakiyah lil-Harakah as-Sanoosiyah* (Achievements of the Sanoosi movement), *Sultan Muhammad aUFatih, Shaykh Abd al-Qddir al-Jeeldni, Imam al-Ghazdli, Haqeeqat al-Khildf bayn as-Sahdbah* (The true nature of the disagreements among the Companions), *Fikr al-Khawdrij wa ash-Shee'ahfee Meezdn Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jamd'ah* (Kharijite and Shiite thought measured against the standards of the People of the Sunnah<sup>2</sup> and the Community), *al-Wasatiyah fil-Qur'an al-Kareem* (The path of moderation as described in the Noble Qur'an), and *Aqeedat al-Muslimeen fee Sifdt Rabb il-Alameen* (Muslims' belief in the Attributes of the Lord of the Worlds). I have given this book the title of *Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi: Destroyer of the Fatimiyah state and Liberator of Jerusalem*. This book may be regarded as an important link in this series on the Crusades, of which has been published so far *al-Saldjiqah wa az-Zinkiyeen* (The Seljuks and the Zangids) and which we ask Allah, by His most beautiful names and sublime attributes, to make this work sincerely for His sake and to make it beneficial for His slaves, and to accept it and bless it, and to bless us with a good and sincere intention for His sake, and to help us to complete this encyclopedia of history that we are striving to produce.

This book discusses the conflicts between the Crusader venture and the Sunni Islamic course of action. Volume I gives a summary of the Crusades which preceded the establishment of the Ayubid state and discusses the historical roots of the Crusader movement, such as the Byzantine-Islamic conflict at the beginning of the Islamic state, Islamic Spain in Andalusia, the nature of the Crusader movement which was led by Urban II, the movement to encircle the Islamic world which was confronted by the Ottomans, and the new colonialist movement. I refer to the most important reasons and motives for the Crusade, such as religious, political, social and economic motives; the change in the balance of power in the Mediterranean, in Sicily, Andalusia and North Africa; the request for help from the Byzantine Emperor to the Pope; the character of Urban II, his comprehensive plan for the Crusade, his propaganda campaign and organised way of thinking. I discussed the beginning of the First Crusade and their strategies following occupation; the emergence of the resistance movement during the Seljuk era; the actual participation of the scholars of jurisprudence and judges in the field of Jihad<sup>3</sup> and their encouraging fighting in the battlefield; and the role of poets in the resistance movement. I give biographies of the Seljuk leaders of Jihad who

came before Imad ad-Deen Zangi and their efforts in confronting the invasion such as: Qawwam ad-Dawlah Karbooqa, ruler of Mosul; Jekermish the emir of Mosul; Suqman ibn Anaq, ruler of Mardin and Diyarbakr; Kilij Arslan the emir of the Seljuks of Rum; and Sharaf ad-Dawlah Mawdood ibn at-Tuntigin, ruler of Mosul, whose Jihad campaigns are regarded as the harbinger of the campaigns of Imad ad-Deen Zangi. I point out the obstacles to the Jihad movement during the era of the Seljuk emirs, among the most significant of which were: the Batinis, who proved their complete enmity towards the leaders of the Islamic Jihad during that era, and it was as if their poisonous daggers were paving the way for the Crusaders to establish themselves in Syria and Mesopotamia at the expense of the Muslims. Thus the events of history prove that the leaders of the Islamic Jihad in that era sometimes had something in common, namely martyrdom. Previously, Sharaf ad-Deen Mawdood was assassinated, and now we see Ak Sunqur al-Bursuqi meeting the same fate. That is all reflected in the fact that the conduct of the Nizari Ismailis at that time was one of the most dangerous obstacles faced by the Jihad movement against the invaders, because the presence of two enemies at the same time meant that the Sunni Muslim leaders were faced with great difficulties in defending the beliefs and religion of the Ummah.<sup>4</sup> I highlight the efforts of Imad ad-Deen, by means of which he managed to achieve a great deal of his plans and to carve out for himself a special position in Islamic history as a brilliant politician, a capable military man and a conscientious Muslim who understood the danger posed to the Muslim world by the Crusaders. He managed to shape historical circumstances to serve the Muslims' interests, by uniting the Muslim forces after putting an end to the causes of division and disunity, and uniting the separate cities and emirates within the framework of a single state. He managed, by means of his ability, to make the best of the potentials available to him in order to achieve his twofold program of forming an Islamic front and striking the Crusaders. The conquest of Edessa in 539 AH is regarded as one of the greatest achievements of Imad ad-Deen.

The fall of this city into Muslim hands brought about a violent reaction in Western Europe and provided a motive for sending a new crusade quickly, after its fall instilled fear in people's hearts. Its fall came as a warning of destabilisation in the structure of the Crusader entities in the Near East. Noor ad-Deen and Sayf ad-Deen Ghazi, the sons of Imad ad-Deen, stood up to the Second Crusade against Damascus and achieved a great victory, along with the people of Damascus, against the Second Crusade.

Noor ad-Deen succeeded in making the most of the circumstances which followed the failure of the Second Crusade, in order to unite Syria under his leadership, this time at the expense of the ruler of Damascus. Then he successfully resumed his Jihad against the Crusaders, which encouraged other Muslim forces, such as the Seljuks of Rum, the Artuqids and the Turkmen to go ahead and confront the Crusaders, especially in Edessa and Antioch; they even joined forces so that Noor ad-Deen Zangi was able to unite all of Syria under his leadership, from Edessa in the north to Hawran in the south. First a united Islamic state was established, centred on Damascus. This was the first step towards forming a front that stretched from the Euphrates to the Nile, and which did indeed stand up to this Crusader danger. I discussed Noor ad-Deen's way of dealing with the Fatimid (Fatimiyah) state; the roots of the Ismaili (Isma'eeli) Shiite sect and the Fatimid state; their abhorrent deeds in North Africa, such as their advocates exaggerating about 'Ubayd-Allah al-Mahdi, oppression and injustice, their refusal of religious verdicts according to the *madh-hab*<sup>5</sup> of Imam Malik, the abolition of some Sunnah practices that are based on well-established and well-known texts, banning gatherings, destroying the books of Ahl as-Sunnah, banning Sunni scholars from teaching, the abolition of sharia<sup>6</sup> laws and waiving obligations, forcing the people to break the fast before sighting the new moon, removing the relics of the Sunni caliphs and bringing their horses into the mosques. I speak about the methods of the Maghrebis in opposing the Fatimid state, such as passive resistance, resistance on the basis of argument, resistance in writing and the role of the Sunni poets. I explain how the Fatimid state in North Africa declined and how it moved to Egypt. I mention the efforts of the Nizami schools in the Sunni revival movement and confronting Shiite thought; the efforts of Imam al-Ghazali in defeating the Shiite in argument; and Noor ad-Deen's three military campaigns against Egypt. I discussed the abolition of the Fatimid caliphate, the gradual



abolition of sermons given in the name of the Fatimid caliph, and the lessons to be learned from the demise of the Fatimids in Egypt and the methods used by Salah ad-Deen to put an end to the Fatimid madh-hab and legacy, such as: humiliating the Fatimid caliph al-'Adid; how he undermined the position of the Palace of the Fatimid caliphate; how the citywide sermons were stopped in the Mosque of al-Azhar; abolishing the teaching of Fatimid thought; destroying and burning the books of the Shiite; abolishing all sectarian festivals of the Fatimids; erasing the symbols and currency of the Fatimids; preserving the members of the Fatimid house; weakening the Fatimid capital; the Ayubid revival of the issue of the Fatimids' false claim of descent from the (Messenger's (SAAW)'s family; and continuing to pursue the remnants of the Shiite in Syria and Yemen. I mention the conquests made by Salah ad-Deen at the time of Noor ad-Deen Zangi; Jihad against the Crusaders and expelling them from Muslim lands; and the actual account of the alienation between Salah ad-Deen and Noor ad-Deen.

In Volume II, I talk about the establishment of the Ayubid state, mentioning the origins of his family, his birth and childhood; when the Ayubid state began; the character and ethics of Salah ad-Deen, such as his piety and worship, his justice, his courage, his generosity, his concern and forbearance, his habit of keeping away from anything that could undermine his dignity, his patience and seeking reward with Allah, and his sincerity; the official doctrine of the state; the Ayubids' efforts to build Sunni schools on a large scale, such as al-Madrasah as-Salahiyah, Madrasat al-Mash-had al-Husayni, al-Madrasah al-Fadiliyah, Dar al-Hadeeth al-Kamaliyah and al-Madrasah as-Salihiyah; their academic efforts in Syria and Mesopotamia; the main elements of the Sunni ethos at the time of the Ayubids, such as the glorious Qur'an, Hadith of the (Messenger (SAAW), the basic principles of Sunni belief and the schools of fiqh; the Ayubids' concern to protect the Hajj routes and the two Holy Sanctuaries; and the Ayubids' efforts to combat the Shiite sect in Egypt, Syria and Yemen. I speak of the high esteem in which Salah ad-Deen held the scholars, including the scholars of jurisprudence, such as al-Qadi al-Fadil, who played a great role in the chancery (diwan al-insha'); the development of Salah ad-Deen's army; his putting an end to the Fatimid opposition and reorganising administrative affairs in Egypt; his efforts to revive the Sunnah in Egypt; his Jihad against the Crusaders; his use of his literary skills in the service of Islam; and his keenness to unite the

Muslim world. Al-Qadi al-Fadil was the official spokesman of Salah ad-Deen both internally and externally. According to Ibn Katheer, he was dearer to the Sultan than the latter's own family and children. The Sultan pointed out his status when he said, "Do not think that I took control of the land by means of your swords; rather it was by means of the pen of al-Qadi al-Fadil."

Al-Qadi al-Fadil reached a position of high status in the state. He was Salah ad-Deen's right-hand man, as he made him his vizier and consultant, and did not issue any orders except after consulting him; he did not take any decision that was not based on his opinion and he did not rule concerning any case without consulting him. This scholar was one of the scholars of revival, and the Ummah is in the greatest need of such men. His life story tells us the importance of becoming involved and active in public affairs or social or governmental matters, the importance of acquiring experience and of achieving distinction in the performance of one's work, adhering to the way of the People of the Sunnah and cooperating with one's brothers in firm belief, and using one's abilities and potential to serve the Sunni mission. He helped Salah ad-Deen to choose the ideal Sunni leadership and to draw up practical plans, and he did not withhold any opinion, suggestion or experience from Salah ad-Deen. The life story of this man is like a course for understanding the aims of the Sharia, examining all sides of an issue, and studying the rise and fall of states. He left behind a method of dealing with the Shiite and the importance of dealing with masses who followed this sect on the basis of fairness, loving good for them, not shedding their blood, and striving to educate them. In contrast, force was used only against conspirators and military groups and those against whom nothing but force would be to any avail, such as the Fatimid state in Egypt. He took part in setting up the plans, means and methods to put an end to it politically, militarily and intellectually. I also highlight the efforts made by Abu at-Tahir as-Salafi and Abu at-Tahir ibn ' Awf al-Maliki in serving Islam in Alexandria. Salah ad-Deen was keen to visit them and learn from them. I speak of al-Faqeeh 'Eesa al-Hakari and his support of Salah ad-Deen in his role as vizier; how he wrote about reconciliation between Noor ad-Deen and Salah ad-Deen; his role in the treaty with the people of Mosul; his success in carrying out the special missions that were entrusted to him; his courage in war; and his leadership on the battlefield. I also present a biography of al-Imad al-

Isfahani, the Qadi, imam, great scholar, mufti and vizier, and I highlight his efforts in the service of the Sunni Islamic endeavour.

To sum up, the scholars and scholars of jurisprudence occupied a great position and were held in high esteem by Salah ad-Deen, who showed a great deal of love, care, respect and appreciation in both tangible and intangible ways. I discuss the economic reforms and his interest in agriculture, commerce and industry; how he abolished levies and limited income to legitimate sources; how he built hospitals, khanqahs (Sufi houses) and inns in remote areas far from the cities and on the roads connecting cities, to serve wayfarers and travellers; his interest in social reform and fighting deviant beliefs and traditions and bad morals. I make reference to his reforms in infrastructure and administration and I explain the military systems of his reign, such as the development of military fiefs and *diwdn al-jaysh* (the government department in charge of the army); uniforms of the troops; logistics and mobilization; auxiliary groups such as the engineers and medical corps; the organisation of the mail system and intelligence; how the affairs of war and peace were run; prisoners of war; general staff; plans and methods of fighting, such as rapid warfare; plans for troops to fight in turns; demolishing cities; securing the roads; fortifying the border cities, citadels and fortresses; making the most of the fighting season; treatment of prisoners of war; treaties between Salah ad-Deen and the Crusaders; weapons of the Ayubid army; the Muslim navy; and the role of the Maghrebis in Salah ad-Deen's fleet. I also described his efforts to unite the Muslim front and the attempts of the Ismaili Shiite to eliminate him by means of assassination, but their attempts failed, by the help of Allah, to Whom be praise; Salah ad-Deen's style of discipline; his relationship with the Abbasid caliph, the Byzantine state and the Crusaders before Hattin; and how he organised administrative and military affairs before that decisive battle.

In Volume III, I discuss the battle of Hattin, the liberation of Jerusalem, and the Third Crusade. I start by describing the battle of Hattin and the beginning of the Muslim attack, Crusader losses, and the causes of victory in the battle of Hattin by following natural laws, such as the laws of preparation, cause and effect, and taking a gradual approach. I also speak of Salah ad-Deen's farsightedness, political acumen, great sincerity towards Allah, application of the laws of Allah in his state and the blessings thereof: how he gained power in the land and prevailed over his enemies by the help

of Allah; security, stability, glory, honour, victory and conquest; the effect of justice on achievement of victory; preparation of a fighting generation in which were the attributes required for victory; his good relationship with Allah and the way he would turn to Him after making preparations; the success of the intelligence network; reactions of the Muslim world and Crusader world to the battle of Hattin; conquests on the coast before the conquest of Jerusalem; consequences of the battle of Hattin, such as its being a decisive battle; the importance of geographical awareness in understanding and managing the conflict; and cumulative efforts in achieving major victories for nations. I also discuss Salah ad-Deen's military plan for the liberation of Jerusalem, such as the media angle; mobilising the troops and general mobilisation; sieges, fighting and decisive attacks; negotiations followed by the handover of Jerusalem and the liberation of the holy city; Salah ad-Deen's fulfilment of his promises; his mercy towards prisoners, old men and women, and the wives and daughters of the slain; his respect for the Christians' feelings; fulfilling promises, seeking thereby the pleasure of Allah; his overwhelming humane feelings and spirit of sublime chivalry; and how he followed the example of the Rightly Guided Caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khattab (may Allah be pleased with him) when he conquered Jerusalem during his caliphate. The beauty of Islam became apparent to westerners from the conduct of Salah ad-Deen in peace and in war, his respect for freedom of opinion and belief, and his adherence to lofty, humane values and the sublime teachings of Islam.

I discuss Salah ad-Deen's reforms in Jerusalem, how he sent delegations with the glad tidings to all parts of the Muslim world, his difference of opinion with the Abbasid caliph and the presence of the scholars at the conquest of Jerusalem and elsewhere.

I also mention some of the lessons to be learned from the liberation of Jerusalem, such as: the importance of devoted scholars in waking up the Ummah; raising the new generation with sound Islamic beliefs; explaining the concept of loyalty to Allah and His Messenger and the believers; unity of the Ummah; clear Islamic vision of the nature of the battle; having a long-term strategy; the need for human resources with great knowledge to comprehend the actual situation; the importance of the Ummah repenting, turning to Allah and keeping away from sin. There is no way to liberate Palestine and the occupied Muslim lands except by Jihad for the sake of

Allah in the broadest and most comprehensive sense, which means engaging on all fronts: political, media, spiritual, academic, strategic, military and so on.

I discuss the Third Crusade and the reaction in Western Europe to the liberation of Jerusalem, in terms of the general mobilisation that took place that resulted in this Crusade, in which kings, princes and Christian clergy took part. The German Emperor, the King of England and the King of France all took part in that Crusade, but it did not achieve its goals, first by the grace of Allah and then due to the efforts of Salah ad-Deen and the Muslim Ummah that rallied around him, in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, the Maghreb and elsewhere. I speak of the nature of the negotiations between al-Malik al-'Adil, the brother of Salah ad-Deen, and Richard the Lionheart, the King of England, which lasted for 15 months and involved 42 meetings before culminating in the treaty of Ramleh. This Crusade was characterised by a large degree of understanding with the Muslims. Both sides were in close contact with one another, and it went beyond that to the suggestion of a treaty, and the sending of fruits and ice to Richard the Lionheart during his illness and sending Salah ad-Deen's personal physician to treat him. The effects of this interaction on the lives of the Franks were as follows:

- ❖ They transmitted from the Muslims a large amount of science and knowledge which was new (to the Europeans) at that time. They wrote books about it which contained a great deal of innovation and invention, and set out laws concerning the sciences.
- ❖ They transmitted from the Muslims many new handicrafts and arts, such as the manufacture of textiles, metalwork and glasswork. They also transmitted from them the art of architecture. This had a profound effect on the artistic, commercial and industrial life of Europe.
- ❖ Western civilisation was influenced by Islamic civilisation to such an extent that the former began to flourish. Islamic civilisation helped it to emerge from the sea of savagery and darkness that prevailed at that time. The Orientalists admitted this fact before Muslim historians spoke of it.

I mention the sickness and last days of Salah ad-Deen, and that one of the religious scholars stayed with him and recited the Qur'an over him. When the reader reached the verse in which Allah says, *iLd ildha ilia Huwa* (none

has the right to be worshipped but He)! In Him is my trust' (*Qur'an 13:30*), Salah ad-Deen smiled and his face lit up, and he surrendered his soul to its Creator, glory be to Him. He did not leave behind in his stores any gold apart from one dinar and a few dirhams.<sup>9</sup> He did not leave behind any house, property, farm, garden or any kind of wealth or property.

People were moved by the death of Salah ad-Deen. Even European historians prayed for mercy for Salah ad-Deen and praised his justice, strength and tolerance. They regarded him as the greatest character of the entire Crusader era. And the life of Salah ad-Deen will, by Allah's leave, continue to offer to the Muslims the example of his resolve, which may bring back to life the brilliance, delight and beauty of those glorious days of the past, and highlight to coming generations of Muslims the importance of bringing the great mission of Islamic civilisation completely under the banner of the People of the Sunnah and the Community. With the death of Salah ad-Deen, one of the brightest chapters of history ended, in which human society had seen a brilliant man of the likes of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood ash-Shaheed. He had no interest in amassing wealth, he was never attracted to power, and he never diverted from his greatest aim, which was to cleanse the Muslim lands of the Crusaders, to impose defeat upon them and make them go back whence they had come.

One of the important lessons of this book is to understand the conflict in courses of action at the time of Salah ad-Deen. There were three ventures in constant conflict and at the peak of the conflict was the Crusader mission which had been led by the church from the time of Urban II, the Rafidi Shiite venture led by the Fatimid state in Egypt, and the true Islamic endeavour, the banner of which was carried after Noor ad-Deen by Salah ad-Deen. The core issues on which the People of the Sunnah were focusing at the state and local levels were enhancing the Sunni identity, reviving true Islam in people's hearts, confronting and refuting the specious arguments of the Shiite and preparing the Ummah to resist the Crusaders. These fundamental issues were interconnected and were being dealt with at the same time; the liberation of Jerusalem and defeat of the Crusaders in the battle of Hattin only came about after the Fatimid state had been quashed, both politically and militarily. It was preceded by ideological, intellectual, educational, historical and cultural victories for the Sunni madh-hab.

Those who were able to liberate Jerusalem and capture other cities, citadels and fortresses from the Crusaders were those who were distinguished by their sound Islamic mission. They understood the dangers of the endeavours of those groups that espoused esoteric interpretations alien to Islam, resisted them with complete resolve and determination. Any nation that wants to revitalize itself and rise again must revive its historical memory and learn lessons from history which may benefit it in the present and help it to plan for its future.

Reading history gives the researcher, commander, leader, king or president an idea of the lives of those who went before. Awareness of history bears fruit by enabling people to change the reality of the present and plan for the future. Without this it is impossible to advance; there will never be a revival among those who do not understand or learn the laws of Allah and the lessons to be learned from history.

Resurgence in general terms requires the tools of the pen and the tongue. No revival effort in history has ever succeeded without the strength of words written by pens or spoken on the tongue, expressing sincere hearts which call for it and propagate its principles among the people. Producing useful books on this topic is essential in the world of conflict, debate and argument, which comes under the heading of the law of 'checking one set of people by means of another'<sup>10</sup> in ideas, beliefs, culture and methods. This comes before checking one set of people by means of another in a political or military sense. Any ambitious, expansionist political program requires beliefs and ideas to motivate it: the pen is what begets the sword, the tongue is what begets the spear and the book is what begets battalions.

*The Encyclopedia of the Crusades (Mawsoo 'ah al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah)* — of which *as-Salajiqah wa 'Asr ad-Dawlah az-Zinkiyah* (The Seljuks and the era of the Zangid state) and this book have been published so far — answers many of the questions that have been asked locally, regionally and internationally. This era of history offers convincing historical evidence that Islam is able at any moment, when intentions are sincere, faith is true, commitment is responsible, intelligence is aware and there is understanding of the laws of revitalization and of building civilisations and states, to reclaim its leading role in forging civilisations and bringing people out from the confines of their societies to the justice of Islam.

I completed this introduction on the 15<sup>th</sup> of Sha'ban 1428/28 August 2007, at 4 pm after 'asr<sup>11</sup> prayer. Praise be to Allah first and last. I ask Him, may He be glorified and exalted, to accept this work, open people's hearts to benefit from it and to bless it by His grace, bounty and generosity.

**Whatever of mercy Allah may grant to people, none can withhold it; and whatever He may withhold, none can grant it thereafter. And He is the Almighty, the All-Wise** *(Qur'an 35: 2)*

Upon completion of this book I cannot but stand with a humble heart before my Almighty Creator and my most generous God, acknowledging His grace, favour and generosity, and denying any power or strength on my part, turning to Him in all my actions, in life and in death, for Allah my Creator is the most generous; my generous Lord is the only helper; my Almighty God is my only source of aid. If He forsook me and left me to my mind and soul, and left me to the pen that is between my fingers, my mind would have become dull, my memory would have gone, my fingers would have frozen, my emotions would have dried up, my feelings would have stagnated and my pen would have failed to express anything.

O my God, You know that everyone of whom I have spoken in my book had a story and a reason for me to speak of them. You know that I am eager to revive their stories as a means of supporting Your religion and to obtain thereby Your good pleasure, O Most Generous of the generous. O Allah, guide me to that which pleases You, open my heart to it, and keep me away from that which does not please You and divert it from my heart and my thinking. I ask You by Your most beautiful names and sublime attributes to make this work of mine for Your sake only and make it of benefit to Your slaves; to reward me for every letter that I have written and place it in the scale of my good deeds, and to reward my brothers who helped me to complete this humble effort, which were it not for You, would not have been produced and propagated among people.

We hope that every Muslim who reads this book will not forget in his or her supplications its author, who is in need of the pardon, forgiveness, mercy and great pleasure of his Lord.



***O My Lord! Grant me the power and ability that I may be grateful for Your favours which You have bestowed on me and on my parents, and that I may do righteous good deeds that will please You, and admit me by Your Mercy to the company of Your righteous slaves.***

*(Qur'an 27: 19)*

I close this book with the words of Allah:

***O Lord! Forgive us and our brethren who have preceded us in faith, and do not put in our hearts any hatred against those who have believed.***

***Our Lord! You are indeed full of kindness, Most Merciful.'***

*(Qur'an 59: 10)*

Glory and praise be to You, O Allah, I bear witness that there is none worthy of worship other than You, I seek Your forgiveness and I repent to You, and the end of our supplication is: Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds. The one who is in need of the pardon, forgiveness, mercy and pleasure of his Lord..

## **Ali. M. Salabi**

May Allah forgive him, his parents and all the Muslims. I would be happy to receive readers' comments on this book and others, and I request my fellow Muslims for pray for me in absentia and with all sincerity to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds, so that we may uncover the facts and continue our efforts in the service of our Ummah's history.

# **PART ONE**

## **CRUSADES PRIOR TO THE RISE OF THE AYUBID STATE**

## CHAPTER I Historical Roots of the Crusades

It is worth mentioning that the Crusader wars between the Muslims and western Christians and others did not start at the end of the fifth century AH, and they did not end in the seventh century AH. These campaigns were actually part of a series in a lengthy conflict that began with the emergence of Islam<sup>12</sup> and continued, off and on, in almost all eras from the emergence of Islam until modern times. It is possible to divide this period into five phases of this ongoing conflict. Whenever the conflict cooled down during any of these phases, it soon reignited in the next phase, where it was no less vicious and violent, sapping Islamic energy and resources across vast swaths of land.<sup>13</sup> These phases are as follows:

### The Byzantines

The origins of the Byzantine anti-Islamic movement go back to the time of the Messenger (SAAW) (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) himself. From the year 5 AH, in the battles of Dumat al-Jandal, Dhat as-Salasil, Mu'tah and Tabook, and ending with the campaign of Usamah ibn Zayd (may Allah be pleased with him and all the Companions), the Byzantines realized the new danger coming from the south, especially after the emerging Islamic state managed to free a number of Arab tribes in the north of Arabia from their former Byzantine masters. Whether the Byzantines were moving against Islamic forces on their own initiative or as a reaction against Muslim movements, the ultimate conclusion is that this state began to realize, more and more, the extent of the new challenge and began to prepare to stop it. It is true that on some occasions these preparations were not at the right level, which may have been due to lack of precise information on which the Byzantine leadership based its plans, but the outcome was that the fire of conflict broke out and intensified immediately after the death of the Messenger (SAAW) and after Islamic forces started pouring into the lands under Byzantine control.<sup>14</sup> The Byzantines were expelled from their possessions in Asia and parts of Africa at the hands of the Rightly Guided

Caliphs. During the subsequent period, which witnessed many attacks and counterattacks carried out by the Byzantines on land and sea, most of which ended in failure, the Byzantines soon retreated as a result of the persistent pursuit of the Umayyads,<sup>15</sup> starting with Mu'awiyah, the founder of the Umayyad state, and the era of 'Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan and his sons, especially al-Waleed and Sulayman. This is discussed in detail in my book *Ad-Dawlah al-'Umayyiah* (The Umayyad State).

This active pursuit of the Byzantines continued after the Umayyad era, in Syria, Egypt and North Africa. They withdrew completely from North Africa and vast areas of the Mediterranean, and were confined to Anatolia and their possessions in Europe itself. With the passage of time, the danger of counterattacks grew less, because they were concentrated along a line stretching across Anatolia and the Euphrates Valley, rarely able to penetrate any deeper due to the alertness of the Islamic leadership, who fortified the borders and also launched ongoing attacks against the Byzantine state, penetrating deep in the direction of Constantinople itself. This did not leave the Byzantine Emperor, in most cases, any room to broaden the scope of his counterattacks, except at the beginning of the fourth century AH, when the Abbasid state had grown weak. The emergence of the Seljuks then gave a new impetus to the Islamic Jihad movement; during the reign of the Seljuk sultan Alp Arslan they were able to inflict a crushing blow to the backbone of the Byzantine forces in the battle of Manzikert (463 AH). That victory spelled the end of the challenge posed by the Byzantine state and its counterattacks, and it remained ineffectual until it fell, many centuries later, to the Ottomans.<sup>16</sup> I have discussed this in detail in my book, *Ad-Dawlah al-'Uthmdniyah: 'Awdmil an-Nuwould wa Asbdb as-Suqoot*.<sup>11</sup>

## The Spanish

From the earliest stages the Andalusian arena witnessed persistent counterattacks from the north, where the Spanish had fortified themselves in areas of rugged terrain. These attacks resulted in a bitter conflict throughout which the Umayyad leadership confronted these counterattacks for nearly three centuries, during which they contained the threat and forced the enemy to retreat to northern pockets in the Iberian Peninsula. There were two bursts

of renewed Islamic energy, the first of which was at the hands of the Almoravids (*al-Murabitoori*) who came from Morocco,<sup>18</sup> and who achieved a magnificent victory at the battle of Sagrajas (az-Zallaqah) against the Spanish Christians in 479 AH. The second came at the hands of the Almohads (*al-Muwahhidoon*) who came after them and succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat on the Christians in the battle of Alarcos (al-Arak) in 591 AH.<sup>19</sup> Thus Islam was able to survive in Andalusia by confronting challenges and resisting Spanish counterattacks on an almost equal footing, and this continued for almost four centuries.<sup>20</sup> But the Muslims there soon became exhausted and ever more weakened by division and bloody conflicts among themselves. This tipped the balance in favour of the Christian leadership, which was ultimately able to bring down the last Islamic government there, the Kingdom of Granada, which fell in 897 AH. Soon after that, under the leadership of Ferdinand and Isabella, came the worst massacre in human history, when the state, church and Inquisition joined forces and were able, by methods which showed no respect to human — let alone religious — values, to destroy the Islamic presence in Andalusia and erase it from the map of Spain, and to assimilate the Muslim masses by force into a society that claimed to be Christian in religion, culture and conduct.<sup>21</sup>

## The Crusader movement

The Crusader movement was a reaction against Islam by the Christians, the roots of which go back to the emergence of the Muslims from Arabia, when they confronted the Byzantine state. This movement developed like a living entity over centuries, hardly emerging from one phase before it entered another. The period between 488 and 690 AH (1095-1291 CE) was only one of its stages. The fact that this phase is so prominent that it almost outshines all other stages is due to many complex and interconnected factors, which a researcher may find in the motives and reasons that led to the onslaught of the huge waves of Crusades at that time.<sup>22</sup>

Historians agreed to use the word "Crusades" or "Crusader" to apply to the entire Crusader, colonialist movement that was born in Western Europe and took the form of armed attacks against Muslim lands in Syria, Iraq, Anatolia, Egypt and Tunisia, in order to eradicate Islam and Muslims and take back Jerusalem. The roots of this movement are to be found in the religious, social, intellectual, economic and political conditions that prevailed in Western Europe in the eleventh century; it harnessed religion as the fuel to achieve its aims.<sup>23</sup> Crusader attacks are nothing new, they are not a strange or exceptional phenomenon; they are the rule, and anything else is the exception.

Hence we say that limiting the time scale of the Crusades to the period between 588 and 690 CE is a mistake, as Professor Sa'eed 'Ashoor states:

It is not based on a solid foundation or on any comprehensive study of the Crusader movement, but it is (the result of) taking a partial view of the movement and failing to examine its roots and origins on the one hand, and its consequences and legacy on the other.<sup>25</sup>

The Islamic resistance to this invasion was a brilliant indication that faith was still alive in the hearts of Muslims, sometimes at the level of the leadership, and at the level of the masses most of the time. This era produced mujahideen<sup>26</sup> who reached a high calibre of efficiency and capability; these mujahideen spread along all fronts and resisted the invaders at every turn. Throughout two centuries they never gave up their resistance, never accepted the status quo or laid down their weapons. They were constantly prepared, at any moment, to leap upon their horses and rush to meet their goals. Jihad is not created by wishful thinking, and the mujahid does not operate in a vacuum; it is great historical challenges that make Jihad and motivate the mujahideen, and instil in the Muslim fighter a spirit of heroism, sacrifice and martyrdom.<sup>27</sup>

## The Crusaders outflanking manoeuvres

Soon after Europe had crushed the Islamic presence in Spain, the leaders of Spain and Portugal, followed by Britain, Holland and France, began their well-known historical manoeuvres to outflank the Muslim world, via their operations in Africa and Asia. This evolved into the colonialist movement that the Muslim world would subsequently suffer from, and which continued for decades after the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate. The Mamluks in Egypt and Syria had run out of steam; the discovery of a new sea route around the Cape of Good Hope had dealt a crushing blow to their trade, which was the backbone of their financial strength. The Ottomans were concentrating their efforts on penetrating Europe from the east, and they did not have the territorial connections to enable them to stop the outflanking manoeuvres when they started; it was only after many decades that they took action to confront this situation. Nevertheless, Muslim populations and local leadership fought vigorously in the areas under attack, and set a great example of long-term resistance against the aggression. They inflicted huge losses on the invaders on all fronts and along the coasts where the invaders sought to get a foothold.<sup>28</sup> The Ottomans managed to save the Islamic world from the Spanish-Portuguese invasion which had threatened to strangle Muslim trade. When the Iberians tried to gain control of the coast of Muslim Morocco, the Ottomans hastened to seize control of all of North Africa except Marrakech; they were able to confront the Spanish all along the coasts and islands of the Mediterranean and push them back. Thus the Ottoman navy managed to keep the coastal regions of the Mediterranean for Islam and the Muslims. The Ottomans also managed to gain control of the coast in East Africa and areas on the northern coasts of the Indian Ocean at the beginning of the eighteenth century, which alarmed the Europeans. Ahmad ibn Sa'eed (1740) managed to stand up to them in Oman, where the Portuguese lost any hope of regaining control of the region. After the fall of Andalusia, Oman was the strongest Arab power; its revival lasted from 1000-1250 AH. Oman controlled the coastal fortresses of the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Gulf and East Africa as far as the Cape of Good Hope. Within a few generations the Omanis became masters of the three great seas; they had a huge fleet that defeated the Portuguese fleet and expelled it from all the ports in India, Persia and Africa. The English could not tolerate this naval power which

threatened their possessions in Asia and Africa. For eighty years they tried to weaken it and destroy it, and the British fleet bombarded its cities.<sup>29</sup>

## Colonialism

The next European counterattack came at the hands of the colonialist forces which were pushed by the Industrial Revolution to seek fresh pastures in the Old World. They sought markets for their goods, sources of raw materials, and a supply of cheap human labour. This took the form of slaves taken by force from Africa and transported across the sea in a process that remains a dark stain on the history of the conflict between Europe and the East, to which huge numbers of Muslims in Africa fell victim. This wave which was led by Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Italy, and Germany to some extent, continued until the early decades of the twentieth century. The Muslim world was its primary victim; in fact it was its only victim if we exclude small areas inhabited by non-Muslim majorities. Its economic goals, driven as they were against a Crusader background, were expressed in more than one incident, and offered evidence in more than one case. British Prime Minister William Gladstone expressed it clearly when he addressed Parliament, holding a copy of the noble Qur'an in his hand, "So long as this is in the hearts and minds of the Egyptians, we will never be able to defeat them."<sup>30</sup>

When the British crusader general entered Jerusalem in victory after the First World War and was received with great honour by the allies of the British, he could not conceal his crusader resentment against Islam and the Muslims; he expressed his joy and happiness as a victorious crusader leader who had conquered Jerusalem and Palestine and brought it under the crusader British Mandate, saying,

"Now the Crusades are over."<sup>31</sup> With this statement he declared that the aim of the Crusades, to occupy Jerusalem and impose Crusader authority on it and on Palestine had been achieved. He was stating that the Crusades, which continued for two centuries, during which Jerusalem and Palestine were occupied in 492 AH and liberated by the Muslims in 583 AH, had not achieved their goal until the First World War. The Crusaders achieved their goal when they took over Palestine and Jerusalem. The French crusader



general went to the tomb of Salah ad-Deen in Damascus where he said at the graveside, "Now we have come back, Saladin."<sup>32</sup>

The Crusades continued and did not stop. Britain gave a homeland to the Jews in Palestine, where a Jewish state was established. They took the necessary administrative and military steps to establish this state, training the Jews in the use of weapons and arts of war, and supplying them with weapons; they even gave them some of the British army's weapons, specifically when Britain announced the end of the British Mandate in Palestine on 15<sup>th</sup> May 1948. They even handed over many Palestinian cities and towns to the Jews, who announced the establishment of the Jewish state, but at the same time they forbade the Muslim Palestinians to train in the use of weapons or to keep weapons, and they inflicted unjust punishments on any Palestinian who kept weapons or military equipment. Execution was a common punishment; thousands of Muslim mujahideen were hanged on the gallows of the British crusaders during that period, and tens of thousands were thrown into prison.<sup>33</sup> These events coincided with the colonialist movement and were closely connected to the Christian missionary movement, both Protestant and Catholic, the centres of which were spread throughout the length and breadth of the Muslim world. These missionaries paved the way for colonialism by means of their various activities; they also enjoyed a lot of help and advantages under colonialist authority.

But this colonialist counterattack did not happen peacefully and the Muslim peoples did not bow to the force of the invaders; they rolled up their sleeves and resorting to the strength generated by faith, they were able by means of their sacrifices, fearlessness in the face of death and desire for martyrdom, to resist the invasion despite the fact that they had no material or military resources. They achieved amazing feats that astounded the western colonialists and interrupted the flow of their plans for conquest, inflicting disastrous defeats on them and blocking their way with barbed wire and mines. Not only that, the response to the Christian colonialist challenge brought about authentic Islamic movements which were forged in a tough Jihad environment and were aimed at dealing with the enemy and liberating the land, the faith and the people. They produced examples of resistance action which were acknowledged by the Westerners themselves — before any Easterners — and which filled many bright pages of history.<sup>35</sup> By way of

example only, as we cannot list everything, we may mention the resistance of Muhammad 'Abd al-Kareem al-Khattabi in Morocco; 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri and the Association of Muslim Scholars (*Jam'iyat 'Ulamd' al-Muslimeen*) in Algeria, which was led by 'Abd al-Hameed ibn Badees and Muhammad al-Basheer al-Ibraheemi; Umar al-Mukhtar in Libya; and other liberation movements which deserve greater sincere, honest efforts to research and write about them. The Ummah is in the greatest need of such serious studies. The Crusades have not ended and will never end; what is happening in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine tells us that.

## CHAPTER II The Most Important Causes of the Crusader Invasion

During this period, Western European society was dominated by local conflicts and wars between feudal princes, which helped to exacerbate the worsening social and economic situation in Western Europe.<sup>36</sup> The conflicts between the two heads of the Western Christian world at that time — the pope and the emperor — also had a great effect on the course of European events. The papacy had reached a high level of power and influence during this period, which had opened the door to it becoming an international power in the sense that the pope was officially the spiritual leader of all Christians, in the East and in the West equally.<sup>37</sup> However, there were ongoing conflicts between the two churches, the Eastern Orthodox and the Western Catholic, each of which insisted that its point of view should prevail and that it should have the upper hand over the other. Hence when the idea of a crusade was suggested to Pope Urban II (471-491 AH/1078-1097 CE), he saw it as a great opportunity to put an end to the dispute between the two churches and to dominate the Eastern Orthodox church and incorporate it into the Western church under his leadership, on the basis that this would all be done under the cover of fighting the Muslims, protecting the Byzantines and 'taking back' the holy lands in Palestine.<sup>38</sup> This was in addition to many other aims that the papacy wanted to achieve through carrying out a holy war, such as putting an end to the power and influence of the feudal lords in the West and at the same time putting an end to ongoing feudal wars by diverting those energies and exploiting them in a conceited holy war that might create opportunities for petty rulers to enjoy a better life in the east without disputes.<sup>39</sup>

Opinions differ as to the nature of the crusader movement and its hidden motives. Some think that the motive was materialistic; others think that it was the offspring of the zealotry and religious fanaticism that were common in Europe during the Middle Ages, and that the true motive behind these wars was in fact religious fervour mixed with other aims, such as the desire to establish new kingdoms and acquire great wealth. The majorities of historians, both classical and contemporary, regard these wars as religious

wars, and believe that the religious factor was the primary motive behind them, with the aim of taking back the supposed sepulchre of Christ and the holy lands from the Muslims. Others regard that as one of the manifestations of economic and colonialist expansion in the Middle Ages. In fact the Crusades were the result of the interaction of all these factors, because they were undertaken for political, economic and social reasons, and used religion both as fuel and as a means of concealing the motives mentioned.<sup>40</sup> It is impossible to underestimate the religious factor in these wars in any way. There follows a detailed discussion of the motives and causes:

## Religious motives

The religious motive was the primary motive that drove the Crusader masses into battle. The symbol of the Crusades, which demonstrates the importance of the religious aspect, was the cross which they put on their weapons and luggage when they headed for Palestine in particular.<sup>41</sup> A religious revival movement had appeared in Western Europe in the tenth century, and reached its peak in the eleventh century, strengthening the position of the papacy and stirring up religious fervour in the people's hearts. The church exploited this fervour, finding an external outlet for it. When the idea of a crusade emerged, the churches took Western Europe as a vast arena in which to exploit this suppressed energy and raging fervour.<sup>42</sup> This was done in the name of saving Jerusalem from the 'infidel' Muslims.<sup>43</sup> The most famous of those who adopted the call for a crusade was Pope Urban II, who is regarded as being primarily responsible for propagating the war against the Muslims and inciting the first campaign against Greater Syria. Circumstances were ripe, so he hastened to hold a meeting in the city of Clermont in France. The meeting lasted for ten days and was attended by more than three hundred churchmen,<sup>44</sup> as well as princes from different parts of Europe, envoys of the Byzantine Emperor and representatives of the Italian city-states. The pope was able to stir up the fervour of his audience and the cry reverberated through all sectors of society: "*Deus vult* (God wills it)!" Those present hastened to take the cross as a symbol.<sup>45</sup> The Pope also pointed out what he called the 'Islamic danger' that was threatening Europe from the direction of Constantinople; he declared that the Christians in the East were suffering from Muslim oppression, and that churches and monasteries had been

destroyed; he urged his listeners to take revenge on the Muslims.<sup>46</sup> In fact, what the Pope said about the Eastern Christians being persecuted were false claims; such persecution is not in accordance with the spirit of Islam or the nature of its message and the care that it shows to Christians.<sup>47</sup> One of the slogans of this war was that the Christian pilgrims had been subjected to persecution and aggression en route to Jerusalem just before the Crusades began. This was also a false claim.<sup>48</sup> A prominent European historian says that isolated cases of persecution to which Christians were exposed in Muslim lands, especially in the Near East, cannot be taken as a valid reason for the Crusader movement under any circumstances, because Christians in general enjoyed a good share of religious and other freedoms under Muslim rule. Not only were they allowed to keep their old churches, they were also allowed to build new churches and monasteries, in the libraries of which they collected theological works of all sorts.<sup>49</sup>

The claims of churches and monasteries being destroyed or confiscated were not based on any evidence; they were just rumours, a fact which highlights the role of false propaganda in opening up this front against the Muslims. A particular incident in a particular village may have played some propaganda role, but that cannot be taken as the norm of Muslims' interactions with Christians and their churches in Muslim lands.<sup>50</sup> More than one fair-minded historian has confirmed that the Christians who were subjected to Seljuk rule were much better off than their brethren who lived in the heart of the Byzantine Empire itself. There is no evidence that the Seljuks persecuted the Christians in the east.<sup>51</sup> Nevertheless, the pope's calls reached a fever pitch of hatred, with no rational thought about negative consequences of his imprudent call. Otherwise, what did it mean when he said to his followers: Go and annoy the barbarians, rid the holy land of the infidels and take possession of it for yourself, for as the Bible says, it is flowing with milk and honey?<sup>52</sup> The pope promised the masses who took part in the war that the sinners among them would be spared punishment and they would be exempted from taxes; he also promised that the church would look after their families in their absence.<sup>53</sup> Perhaps another factor that may be included under the heading of religious motives is the fact that news of miracles and wonders, propagated by the church, had become widespread in the west; there was a prevalent belief that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent, and it was essential to persist in seeking forgiveness for sins and doing good deeds before he arrived; there was also a notion that the holy land should be

regained before the return of Christ.<sup>54</sup> The Pope realized that this intense religious fervour would not last for long, so he called for vows and prayers to be offered in the Church of the Resurrection and he announced that the curse (the sword of vengeance) would come upon everyone who was seized by cowardice and weakness or who turned back on his heels.

The Pope threatened to excommunicate everyone who did not respond to the church's call to head towards the Muslim lands;<sup>55</sup> he shrewdly exploited emotions and feelings to achieve his plans. The church was influential because of the power that it had over people's hearts in Western Europe at that time, which made his call to arms successful, with the result that people came out in crowds, heading in a wave of successive Crusader campaigns towards the Islamic East.<sup>56</sup> We should not forget the hatred that the Crusaders had towards Islam and the Muslims, because Islam has taken from them lands that had been under their control and liberated slaves who had been suffering under their domination; it took away possessions that had been in their grasp, hence grudges started to smoulder in their hearts and the fires of enmity flared up, and they began to seek opportunities to regain what they had lost and avenge themselves against those who had brought them low and torn apart their kingdom.<sup>57</sup> The famous Orientalist Prince Leone Caetani (1869 — 1926 CE), who gave most of his wealth to write the history of the Islamic conquest movement in his book *Annali dell' Islam*, explains to us the reason for this hatred of Islam and Muslims in the introduction to his book, where he says that he only wanted to understand through his work the extent of the "Islamic catastrophe" that took away from Christianity millions of followers all over the world who still follow the religion of Muhammad (SAAW) and believe in him as a Messenger.<sup>58</sup>

Allah, may He be the Exalted, says:

**‘Never will the Jews nor the Christians be pleased with you [O Muhammad (SAAW)] till you follow their religion. Say: Verily, the Guidance of Allah [Islamic monotheism] — that is the [only] Guidance. And if you were to follow their desires after what you have received of knowledge, then you would have against Allah neither any protector or guardian, nor any helper.‘** (*Qur'an* 2: 120)

**And they will never cease fighting you until they turn you back from your religion [Islamic monotheism] if they can. And whosoever of you turns back from his religion and dies as a disbeliever, then his deeds will be lost in this life and in the hereafter, and they will be the dwellers of the Fire. They will abide therein forever.** *(Qur'an 2: 217)*

## Political motives

The kings and princes who participated in the Crusader movement were striving for political aims which they could not hide, either before their arrival in Syria and Palestine or after they settled in those lands. The feudal system was inherently connected to land, and the bigger the fiefdom and the larger the amount of land, the higher a prince's status in society rose. Under this system, the biggest problem faced by princes and knights was not having any fiefdom or land, for they were then regarded as unimportant and having no influence. Many knights and princes were left without land, because one of the basic principles of this system was the law of primogeniture, in which only the oldest son inherited the fiefdom. When the owner of a fiefdom died, the land passed in its entirety to his oldest son.<sup>59</sup> This meant that the other sons were left without any land, which was a loathsome situation in a feudal society. This led landless knights and princes to seek ways of overcoming this obstacle, by finding an heiress to marry, or by means of aggression and war aimed at acquiring land. The Crusader movement opened a new door to this group of princes and knights; they answered the pope's call and hastened to take part in this movement in the hope that they would succeed in establishing principalities for themselves in the East, to compensate for what they lacked in the West. As for the knights and princes who owned fiefdoms, they found that taking part in the Crusader movement gave them a good opportunity to attain higher glory and greater status.

In our study of sources on the Crusades, we saw that the ambitions of the princes in the first campaign were manifested in many political ways. They started to divide the booty when they were still on their way, before they had actually acquired the booty. We shall see, by Allah's leave, how conflict between them occurred outside Antioch, because each one of them wanted to seize it; how those who managed to make some gains for themselves on the road were content with that and gave up participating with

the other Crusaders in the march on Jerusalem, which was the original goal of the campaign. Disputes often arose among them — after they settled there — concerning the rule of a principality or who would take control of a city. To no avail, the papacy tried to intervene to resolve the disputes among princes or to warn them that the Muslims surrounded them and that their duty as Crusaders was to cooperate in order to ward off danger from themselves. But these calls fell on deaf ears, because the aims of the princes were selfish and political. They were not greatly concerned about the approval or wrath of the pope; in fact some of the princes did not hesitate to make alliances with neighbouring Muslim forces against their fellow Crusaders, which indicates that the religious motives of those princes were often weak when they conflicted with their political motives.<sup>60</sup> As for the Byzantine Emperor Alexius, he did not object to the aims of the campaign leaders, because if it were possible for the Byzantine state to regain the possessions that had been lost as the result of Turkish raids, then he would have some Christian principalities on the border as a buffer zone, and Byzantium would have the right of sovereignty over them. In order to guarantee this, the emperor tried to extract an oath of loyalty from the Western princes. Thus the interests of both Christian sides in launching a war of aggression against the Muslim lands came together, and in fact it is very difficult to separate the material factors from the spiritual ones which motivated the Christians to launch the Crusades. Poverty and the desire to accumulate wealth, along with the spirit of adventure, were factors which created a suitable atmosphere for war, but these factors only appeared as the result of what really provided the impetus for this 'holy' war and liberation of this land: religious zeal.

It is clear that the idea of war stemmed from papal policy, the policies of the Byzantine state, and the Islamo-Spanish wars. One of the factors which made it easy to declare war on the Islamic East was the regular fighting in which the Spanish and French engaged against the Muslims in Andalusia; this fighting had taken on the quality of holy war, both on the part of the Muslims, when the Almoravids (al-Murabitoon) in the Maghreb launched a religious Jihad, and on the part of the Christians who were living in the atmosphere in which the Crusader campaigns against the East were launched. Even the great historian Ibn al-Atheer adopted a comprehensive view of the external danger and regarded any aggression against any part of the Muslim world, whether in the East or in the West, as "a small tributary of the same



great river"; it was organised foreign aggression against the greatest civilized power of the Middle Ages, namely the Islamic state.<sup>61</sup>

This is from one angle. From another angle, this historian clearly explains the reasons for the success of this three-pronged attack (in Andalusia, Sicily and Syria/Palestine), which was aimed at exploiting the divisions and attitudes of self-interest that affected the Muslim rulers of the time, for they had lost the spirit of initiative which distinguished the early rulers and Muslims who had built the Islamic state.<sup>62</sup>

It was clear to any observer that the Western church was eager to expand its feudal lands and gain control of the Eastern churches, in addition to its desire to launch a war against the Muslims. One of the facts of religious fanaticism was the existence of religious groups that were directly connected to the church and which were highly effective in those wars, such as the Knights Hospitaller who were committed to defending Crusader possessions in the East and protecting the holy places. They had a direct connection with the Pope, and one tenth of the income of the churches in Jerusalem was allocated to helping them to fulfil their so-called religious mission. There were also the Knights Templar, who took as their headquarters part of the Temple of Solomon (Sulayman, peace be upon him) in *al-Masjid al-Aqsa*<sup>63 64</sup>

The papacy and clergy had the power to influence, pressure and threaten anyone who did not carry out the wishes of the church, by issuing a decree of excommunication, which implied that they would be denied blessing in the hereafter, as they claimed, and were not to be obeyed in this world either.<sup>65</sup>

## Social motives

European society in the Middle Ages was governed by a distinct class system, dominated by the clergy and a warrior class composed of noblemen and knights.<sup>66</sup> The peasant classes formed the majority, but were oppressed. They laboured hard to meet the needs of the first two classes. The European peasant had no control of his destiny; he was required to fulfil many commitments to his feudal lord. The Pope was aware of the situation of the hard-working peasants, so he promised to annul their commitments to their masters and tempted them with the good things of the Islamic East.

Thousands of peasants were living a life of misery under the feudal system; they built for themselves hovels of tree branches covered with roofs of mud and straw, with no windows or furniture. Anything that the peasant acquired was regarded as the private property of the feudal master, and he was deprived of any personal possessions.<sup>67</sup> The peasants were weighed down with numerous commitments of service to their feudal masters, in addition to being deprived of whatever they produced. Thus we can see the extent of the misery in which most of the people of Europe were living in the eleventh century CE. Hence when the call for the Crusader campaign came, many in this population found an opportunity to free themselves from a harsh life filled with humiliation, and they took the danger of participating in this campaign very lightly, in comparison to the life they were living. If they died during this campaign, they would have salvation, and if they survived they would have a life that was better than the way they had been living.<sup>68</sup>

The church knew how to play with their minds and instil grudges in their hearts against Islam and the Muslims. They tricked them into believing that they were going to liberate Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre, and that they would be blessed by the Lord and by the Pope. Hence there was nothing to deter them from slaughtering and killing; killing a Muslim was something pleasing to God, for which the Crusader would be rewarded on the Day of Judgement.<sup>69</sup>

## Economic motives

Avarice for the good things of the Islamic East was the strongest motive for the Crusades, after the religious motive. Pope Urban himself expressed in his sermon the importance of the economic motive with regard to the situation in Europe at that time. He said:

Do not let anything hold you back...because the land that you are residing in now, which is surrounded by sea and mountain tops, is too small for its many inhabitants. It is virtually unable to supply them with enough food, and because of that you are slaughtering and devouring one another. Jerusalem is a land without equal in its crops and produce; it is a veritable paradise of delights.<sup>70</sup>

Historical documents indicate that the economic situation in Western Europe at the end of the eleventh century CE was very poor. France itself suffered a severe famine just before the first Crusade. Hence the ratio of French people who took part in it was far greater. The crisis was so severe that people resorted to eating grass and fodder, but this war opened a new door to those starving people, offering them the chance to escape from their difficult situation. This explains the many incidents of plunder and robbery perpetrated by the first campaign against the Christian peoples whose lands they passed through.<sup>71</sup> A large number of merchants from Italian, French and Spanish cities also took part in the Crusade for purely exploitative purposes, aiming to seize control of the trade routes for Eastern goods that were a source of great wealth for those who dealt in them. Hence their fleets played an active role in seizing the main centres in Syria. The Genovese helped the Franks seize Antioch in 490 AH/1097 CE, and two years later the Venetians helped the Romans seize Jerusalem. The first and last aim of these communities was profit and material gain. Their concern with the religious motive extended only so far as it would help them to achieve their aims. It is sufficient for us to note that the slogan of the Venetians, for which they were known at that time, was "Let us be Venetians first, then let us be Christians."<sup>72</sup> Hence the Italian Republics (Genoa, Pisa, and Venice) made contracts with the Crusader rulers in the East which granted them important economic advantages.<sup>73</sup>

## Tipping the balance of power in the Mediterranean

In the middle of the 5<sup>th</sup> century AH (11<sup>th</sup> century CE), the balance of power tipped in favour of Western Europe, the centre of the Crusade movement. The weakness of the Byzantine state and the heavy blow it had suffered from the Seljuks made it hasten to seek help from Western Europe. At the same time, the instability of the Muslim governments in the western part of the Muslim world, especially in Andalusia and Sicily, in turn facilitated the emergence and increase in strength of their enemies. These changes in the balance of power prompted Western Europe to offer the Christian monarchs of Spain help and every means of support in their conflict with the Muslims of Andalusia. This in turn prompted the Almoravids and the Muslims of Sicily to seek help from North Africa, all of which led to a new phase in the Crusader movement in which it took on a distinctly international character.<sup>74</sup> The papacy supported this war with its approval, advice, propaganda and moral support. This was a Crusade which preceded the call of Urban II for the Crusader campaign to the East in 488 AH/1095 CE.<sup>75</sup> North Africa is counted as one of the theatres of war for the Crusades, as the North African front was an arena in which hostile Crusader forces were active for many centuries. That is represented in the many campaigns which were launched against the region one after another. The Crusaders did not run out of steam and failure did not weaken their resolve. Just as the Muslim lands of the Maghreb were the first to feel the sting of European colonialism, so too the lands of the Western wing of the Muslim world, including North Africa, were the first to experience the first strikes by the Crusaders. The reason for that is due to a number of geographical and historical factors, among the most important of which was their proximity to Western Europe, which was the centre of the Crusader movement, and the relatively good knowledge that the Europeans had of the political, economic and social situation of the Muslims in this region due to the ease of communication between both sides. In addition, the Europeans felt intense hatred towards the Muslims of the Maghreb,<sup>76</sup> especially since the latter shouldered the burden of Jihad in Europe more so than other Muslims, and the Europeans sensed that these people would pose a real danger to them if they became united behind dedicated leadership. For all these reasons,

Europe was plotting against the Muslims of this region and preparing to pounce on them; they were just waiting for the right opportunity. This long awaited opportunity began to present itself in the mid 5<sup>th</sup> century AH (11<sup>th</sup> century CE), when the Western wing of the Muslim world was afflicted with division which sent it into a downward spiral. The situation of their brothers in the East was no better. This division and disunity is the main reason for the calamity that befell the Muslims in the East and the West alike. How closely today resembles yesterday. **Division among the Arabs and Muslims was, and still is, a wide-open door through which their enemies are able to strike them in their own homelands.** Thus the Crusader forces launched huge campaigns, striking the Muslims on three fronts simultaneously: in Andalusia, Sicily and North Africa.<sup>77</sup>

## Andalusia

From the middle of that century, the Andalusian front witnessed a considerable level of activity which was represented by the launch of a strong and sustained attack by the Spanish Christians, led by the Kingdom of Castile, against the Muslims of Andalusia. Muslim cities and citadels began to fall into Christian hands one after another. They achieved victories over the Muslims in numerous battles, victories which were crowned by the fall of Toledo in 478 AH, at the hand of Alphonse VI, King of Castile. This disaster alarmed the entire Muslim world. Because of this ongoing pressure from the Christians of Spain, the Muslims of Andalusia sought support from the Almoravids of North Africa. They sent message after message to this young North African force seeking their help, and when their leader, Yoosuf ibn Tashifeen, had finished off the armies that were threatening his own state in North Africa, he crossed the sea to Andalusia with a huge army, and met Alphonse VI in the battle of Sagrajas (al-Zallaqah) in 479 AH, where the Almoravids and the Andalusians (who were more of an auxiliary force) achieved a great victory — a shining page in the history of Islamic Jihad. The Muslim victory in that battle stemmed the tide of Christian expansion for some time, until circumstances were ripe for it to begin again.

## Sicily

On the Sicilian front, the emergence of the Normans as a new force in international politics was what led to the balance of power in the Western Mediterranean tipping in favour of Christian forces. As soon as these newcomers found a foothold in the south of Italy and Robert Guiscard, one of their greatest leaders, obtained the recognition of Pope Nicholas II at the Council of Melfi in 1059 CE, he announced his project of directing a blow against the Muslims of Sicily. He was aiming to appease the papacy, which thought that this would achieve its Crusader aims on the one hand, and divert the Norman threat from its own possessions on the other. The papacy thus encouraged this venture, and as proof of its support and encouragement, the Pope sent to Guiscard a 'holy banner', by the blessing of which Guiscard and his troops might attain victory over the Muslims; he stressed that the hoped-for victories for the sake of Christ were more important than sending gifts to Rome. The island of Sicily was captured in 484 AH, during the reign of Roger I; his forces then pounced on Malta and occupied it in the following year, and began watching for an opportunity to attack North Africa.<sup>79</sup>

## North Africa

The North African front faced its own share of Crusader aggression at that time due to the actions of a newly-emerging force: the Italian city-states. These city-states took advantage of the disappearance of the ancient naval powers, represented by the Islamic and Byzantine fleets, from the waters of the Mediterranean. Their presence had faded away at the beginning of the century due to both states being distracted by internal problems. The city-states' fleets began to patrol the Mediterranean waters, close to the European shores at first, for fear of the fleet of Muhajid al-'Amiri, ruler of Denia, which managed to make them freeze their activities for a while, but as soon as the city-states were able to neutralise that danger in the middle of the century, they began to sail the waters of the whole Mediterranean, east and west. These city-states put their naval forces at the service of the Crusader's aims from the beginning, in order to achieve some gains of their own. With the encouragement of Pope Leo IX, a coalition from Genoa and Pisa seized the

Muslim island of Sardinia in 442 AH/1063 CE, during which they destroyed its walls and port, and seized a great deal of booty. As these fleets took part in action on the Sicilian front, they were also involved on the Andalusian front, where they played a role in pursuing the Andalusian Muslims by sea, and took their share of booty. A naval siege was imposed on Almeria until the city paid an enormous ransom of 113,000 gold dinars; Valencia was also forced to pay a ransom of 20,000 gold dinars to save itself from pillage.<sup>80</sup> The fleet also attacked the Balearic Islands on several occasions.

As a result of this, the Italian naval forces gained control of the Mediterranean waters, which motivated them to embark on further campaigns. They directed their activities against North Africa, which still retained some naval power, to prevent it from offering help to their brethren in Sicily and elsewhere on the one hand, and to achieve the goals of the Crusader movement in North Africa on the other. A huge naval force, composed of the fleets of Genoa and Pisa, supported by a group from the city of Amalfi and another military force that was supplied by the Pope, launched an attack on the city of al-Mahdiyah in 480 AH/1087 CE, two years after the capture of Toledo and shortly before the complete takeover of Sicily. They succeeded in capturing al-Mahdiyah, with the exception of its citadel. Al-Mahdiyah remained under the fleet's control until its ruler, Tameem ibn al-Mu'izz, paid the coalition forces a huge monetary ransom and made a deal with the conquerors, in which Tameem pledged never to intercept Italian ships in North African waters; he also granted them some commercial concessions in his country, as we shall see below.

From the above it is clear that these Crusader attacks directed by the papacy on the western part of the Muslim world from the mid 5<sup>th</sup> century AH (11<sup>th</sup> century CE) broke out on three fronts, of which North Africa was one. These attacks were just one facet of the Crusader movement, and confirm that the Crusades started in North Africa before the Crusader march to the East. This fact validates Ibn al-Atheer's observations concerning the events of 491 AH<sup>81</sup>, as it is clear from the text mentioned that these events were connected, that the force controlling them was one, and that they represent the beginning of the wave of Crusades at that stage of the Crusader movement. Ibn al-Atheer note.

The Frankish state emerged, began to consolidate its power and marched towards the Islamic lands, seizing some of them, in 478 AH. [The Franks] seized Toledo and other cities in Andalusia...then in 484 AH they headed towards Sicily and seized it...they headed towards North Africa, where they seized some regions and some regions were wrested from them. In 490 AH, they set out for Syria.<sup>82</sup>

Even though most of the Crusader forces headed towards the East, that did not erase the idea of occupying North Africa from their minds. Norman hopes of capturing it remained until that was achieved during the reign of Roger II, when most of the coastline, from Tripoli in the east to the city of Tunis in the west was seized in 543 AH/1148 CE. The Crusader wars raged on the North African front at the same time as they were raging on the eastern front. The Norman presence remained there until 'Abd al-Mu'min ibn 'Ali, head of the Almohad (al-Muwahhidoon) state, drove them out of their last stronghold, al-Mahdiah, in 555 AH/1160 CE.<sup>83</sup>

At the time when there was a tilt in the balance of power in Muslim North Africa, we see that that this contributed to the Islamic resistance in the East, during the reign of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood Zangi and Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi, as will be explained below.

## **The Byzantine Emperor seeks help from Pope Urban II**

The Byzantine Emperor Alexios Komnenos (1081-1118 CE) sought help from Pope Urban II against the Seljuks. This plea for help was not the first of its kind, for it was preceded by a plea for help from the Emperor Michael VII to Pope Gregory VII, after the battle of Manzikert (463 AH), as mentioned above.

It is well known that launching a war against the Turks was one of the aims behind the Byzantine call for help. Anatolia was regarded as more important than Jerusalem to the Byzantine state,<sup>84</sup> hence when the Byzantine capital came under threat from the Seljuks, the Emperor had no choice but to seek help from the west in return for uniting the eastern and western churches. Pope Gregory VII sent a satisfactory



response to Emperor Michael VII, which was based on both Christian brotherhood and political motives, because whatever army he was going to mobilize would put an end to the division between the two churches and increase papal influence in the east as well as the west. However, the war that broke out between Gregory VII and the Emperor Henry IV (the Holy Roman Emperor) prevented him from going ahead with his plan. When the Emperor Alexios Komnenos succeeded Michael VII, he sent a letter to Pope Urban II and to the senior feudal lords in 478 AH, calling on them to send help to save their brethren in the east and to protect Constantinople against the Seljuk threat.<sup>85</sup> Alexios was hoping that the west would send him some mercenary troops, but Urban II did not want to put himself at the service of the Byzantine state, rather he wanted the papacy itself to take charge of offering help to the Christians in the east. This change of approach led to the Latin Christian world mobilizing a huge army, rather than sending mercenaries who would be subject to the whims and desires of the princes. This action of the Pope in response to the request of Emperor Michael VII shows the importance of innovative thinking, making the most of opportunities and using available means to serve their plans. We should learn a great deal from this lesson and apply it to Islamic endeavours. This difference in thinking caused a great deal of trouble from the outset, which soured the relationship between the Byzantines and the Crusaders. What is proven historically is that the one who was primarily responsible for the establishment of the Crusader movement was Pope Urban II. He is the one who proclaimed these wars<sup>86</sup> and was supported by the church in the west. All contemporary Latin historians attribute to him the main role in launching the Crusades.<sup>87</sup>

## **Pope Urban II and his comprehensive plan for the Crusade campaign**

Urban II was born in 427 AH/1035 CE in Chatillon-sur-Marne. His name was Otho de Lagery and he studied under St. Bruno of Cologne, founder of the Carthusian Order. In 461 AH/1068 CE, he became a monk in the monastery of Cluny, near Macon, and joined the service of the influential pope at that time, namely Gregory VII, who had a strong belief in the superiority of the papacy over the empire. Odo was appointed cardinal-

bishop of Ostia in 473 AH/1080 CE, and he served the church in Germany during the period 477 AH/ 1084 CE — 478 AH/1085 CE. He supported, in a legitimate fashion, Pope Gregory VII during his conflict with the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV. Urban II was also connected to the synods (church councils) in Saxony which were held in 478 AH/1085 CE. When Pope Victor III died on 16 December 1087 CE in Monte Cassino, *Clement III* seized control of Rome, then Urban II was elected Pope after a lengthy delay in Terracina, which is south of Rome, near Gaeta. He took on the (papal) name of Urban II (481-493 AH/1088-1099 CE).<sup>88</sup>

We may note from the biography of this man that he was characterized by his great energy and the tight control that he exercised over all the regions that were subject to the influence of the "mother church". His attitude towards Spain illustrates an important dimension for us. This Pope supported the war against the Muslims. When the Spanish managed to subdue some areas that had been previously been under the control of their enemies, the Pope hastened to bring them under the influence of the Church of Rome. Undoubtedly in his support of the war against the Muslims, Urban II was following in the footsteps and following the teachings of Pope Alexander II. This confirms for us an essential fact, which is the existence of an ulterior strategy that the papacy in Rome was carefully executing in the eleventh century CE/fifth century AH, regardless of changes and successions of popes. The most important feature of this strategy was expansion of the influence of the Roman Church, unification of the churches, and fighting Islam wherever it was found, on the basis that it was a bitter enemy which must be confronted and defeated at any cost.<sup>89</sup> It may be noted that through the repeated Byzantine cries for help, despite the preoccupation of those who came before Urban II with many other matters, the opportunity came to this Pope, at the Council of Piacenza in Italy in March 1095 CE (488 AH), when he decided to respond to the call of Emperor Alexios Komnenos (474-512 AH/1081-1118 CE). However, at the Council of Piacenza the Pope failed in his call to launch a Crusade against the Muslims in the East.<sup>90</sup>

## Urban II holds a church council in southern France

Despite the failure of the Council of Piacenza, the Pope did not abandon his stubborn resolve to achieve his goal by all possible means. He went to his original homeland of France to find the support he needed to make the plan he had in mind succeed. This choice is indicative of his particular intelligence, because the conservative and traditional region of southern France was a geographical point of contact with the war that the Spanish had launched against the Muslims in Spain, in addition to the fact that merely suggesting the idea on French soil made immediate success a possibility, because France was the original homeland of the Pope, and he knew the lie of the land, especially since it also had its own history with Islam, namely the battle of Poitiers, which is known to the Muslims as *Baldt ash-Shuhadd'* (114 AH/732 CE), in which the Muslims were defeated and the expansion of Islam was halted and prevented from going beyond the Pyrenees. By analyzing the speech that the Pope delivered at the Council of Clermont we will understand that all these aspects were present in the mind of this sharp-witted, strong-willed man who had been raised in the strict Carthusian monastic order. Whatever the case, the Pope headed towards Clermont in southern France and held a church council there. On the tenth day of the council, which dealt with numerous issues of concern to the church, the Pope delivered a speech of utmost importance to his audience. That occurred on 27 November 1095 CE.

### Pope Urban II's speech

The speech that was given by Pope Urban II at the religious council in Clermont in 488 AH/1095 CE had a profound impact on the Christians who had gathered for this council. It inflamed their zeal and affected them in a way which the historian Gustave le Bon described in his book *La Civilisation des Arabes* as an acute fit of insanity.<sup>91</sup> The Pope said:

'O race of Franks, O race chosen and beloved of God, from the confines of Jerusalem and the city of Constantinople a horrible tale has gone forth, namely that an accursed race, a race utterly alienated from God, has transgressed and spread evil in that land, the land of the Christians in the East. They have overturned the holy altars, plundered the churches and

destroyed them and burned them. They have led away a part of the captives into their own country, and a part they have destroyed by cruel tortures. They have defiled the holy places with their uncleanness. The kingdom of the Greeks (Byzantines) is now dismembered by them and deprived of territory so vast in extent that it can not be traversed in a march of two months. On whom therefore is the labour of avenging these wrongs and of recovering this territory incumbent, if not upon you? You, upon whom above other nations God has conferred remarkable glory in arms, great courage, bodily activity, and strength to humble the hairy scalp of those who resist you. Let the deeds of your ancestors move you and incite your minds to manly achievements; the glory and greatness of Charlemagne, and of your other kings. Let the holy sepulchre of the holy Christ, our Lord and Saviour, which is possessed by unclean nations, especially incite you, and the holy places which are now treated with ignominy and irreverently polluted with their filthiness. Let none of your possessions detain you, no solicitude for your family affairs, since this land which you inhabit, shut in on all sides by the seas and surrounded by the mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; nor does it abound in wealth; and it furnishes scarcely food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you murder one another, that you wage war, and that frequently you perish by mutual wounds. Let therefore hatred depart from among you, let your quarrels end, let wars cease, and let all dissensions and controversies slumber. Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest that land from the wicked race, and subject it to yourselves. Jerusalem is a land fruitful above others, like another paradise of delights. The great city which is situated at the centre of the world is calling for your help; get up and save it! Undertake this journey willingly for the remission of your sins, with the assurance of the imperishable glory of the kingdom of heaven.<sup>9</sup>

These inspiring words spoken by Pope Urban II had a profound effect on the hearts of the Christians who were gathered there. After the Pope had finished his speech, the people present were reported to have shouted as one man: "God wills it!"<sup>93</sup>

Hardly had Urban II finished his speech but Bishop Adhemar de Monteil stood up and bowed before the Pope, and sought his permission to join this holy campaign. This moving scene stirred the hearts of the people present, who rushed in their hundreds to bow before the Pope like Adhemar,

with unprecedented zeal. They took up the cross and all swore to save the holy city.

A contemporary historian, Robert the Monk, commented on this:

What a large number of people, of all ages, from all classes, took up the cross during the Council of Clermont, and swore to save the Holy City. Their number reached three hundred thousand.<sup>94</sup> As a result of Adhemar's zealous attitude, Urban II appointed him as his personal representative and deputy to make it clear to all that the campaign was under the auspices of the church, and under his direct supervision.<sup>95</sup>

## Conclusions to be drawn from Pope Urban II's speech

Dr. Muhammad M. 'Awad has undertaken in-depth research on the Crusades, making use of European source documents. He analyzed the Pope's speech based on the texts of four contemporary historians, namely Fulcher of Chartres, Robert the Monk, Guibert de Nogent and Balderic of Dol. It is thought that Fulcher of Chartres was one of those actually present at the Council of Clermont. Generally speaking, it is possible to compare the texts that are narrated in the books of these four historians in order to discern the essence of what the Pope declared in his famous speech. By comparing these texts, Dr. 'Awad reached the following conclusions:

**a)** The Pope addressed his words to the Frankish race in order to focus on the ethnic or racial dimension. He explained that God had favoured them with the location of their land and their Catholic faith, and he tried to highlight the historical dimension by referring to the glories of Charles Martel and Charlemagne, and the great services they had rendered to Christianity, in a manner that reflected the importance of this historical imperative in the formation of this great historical phenomenon.<sup>96</sup>

**b)** The Pope pointed out that there was regrettable and disturbing news coming from the east, which said that an accursed race, a race that was utterly alienated from God and had never turned its hearts and souls towards God<sup>97</sup> (meaning the Seljuk Turks) had slaughtered the eastern Christians and

turned the churches into stables for their horses, and that the blood of those Christians was crying out to the Christians of the west to save them from the oppression of their 'infidel' enemies. The Pope strove to stir up his listeners' greed for the wealth of the east. He explained that land in Western Europe, especially in France, had become too small for its population, and asked the people to go to the East, to the land of Canaan which was flowing with milk and honey. This makes it indubitably clear that there was an economic dimension to the Crusades, and that it was clearly proclaimed from the outset.

c) The Pope promised that whoever took up arms and headed towards the east would be forgiven his sins; in other words he was offering them the forgiveness of the church. If a man was martyred in pursuit of this goal, then he would be regarded as one of the righteous Christian martyrs. All of this points to an important incentive during an era in which religious fervor and emotion were prevalent in the Christian European world.

d) The Pope referred to Jerusalem as an earthly paradise in the centre of the world, which had witnessed the birth of Christ and been purified by his death. He told his listeners that it was calling upon them to save it from the control of its infidel occupiers. I would like to affirm here that this city represented a prominent idea of central importance, in order to stir up the religious sentiments of the Pope's audience. In most of the texts that have come down to us concerning this speech, we find that Jerusalem occupies a prominent and pivotal place, which is quite logical on the basis of its status and religious significance. It also represented the collective dream of Christian pilgrimage at that time.

e) The Pope was eager to support his speech with a number of Biblical texts in order to stir up the religious sentiments of his listeners or perhaps to lend sanctity to his speech, especially since the phrases of the Bible were part of the common European consciousness at that time, for example the texts from the Gospel of Matthew which say: "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me" [Matthew 10:37]<sup>98</sup> "And he that taketh not his cross, and followeth after me, is not worthy of me." [Matthew 10:38]<sup>99</sup>

f) Pope Urban II had a certain order of priorities. This Pope was very skilful in presenting some of his ideas whilst at the same time concealing

others. He focused on the issue of Jerusalem so as to present a single path on which the West could march without hesitation and a single goal that he could present to his contemporaries through the oneness of the religious institution that was propagating it, as represented in the papacy. To this aim, no mention was made in his speech of his great ambition to unite the churches and subjugate the church of Constantinople to the control of the mother church in Rome. Similarly, no mention was made of the goal of Christianisation, which was a major aim of the papacy by means of the proposed enterprise. The reason for this covertness may be that the papacy realized that there were priorities in presenting the enterprise that should not be overlooked, and that the unity of the Christian world depended on not listing and announcing too many goals at once, lest that lead to confusion from the outset. It may be noted here that the language used by the pope in this speech was aimed at concealing other goals. After the enterprise succeeded and the main religious Christian symbol, namely Jerusalem, was captured, we find — in examples that are too numerous to mention — the other goals expressed clearly and frankly. This clearly indicates that this influential religious establishment decided to achieve its aims step by step and not all in one go. This is what was most cunning about the entire enterprise, in my view.<sup>100</sup> This idea was never far from the mind of Pope Urban II, because he was the engineer of this project and its main sponsor. In fact, the speech that the Pope gave at the Council of Clermont was of great historical importance. We have never heard before in the history of mediaeval Europe of any speech that was as expressive of its era as this speech, or of any speech that motivated the European masses to move from their original homelands to the east at such a level as contemporary sources tell us happened. Hence we cannot regard it as being an ordinary type of speech, rather it is more akin to a declaration of a mediaeval "world war" on the part of western Europe against the Muslim east. This is not an attempt to exaggerate or pass unfair judgement; rather it is on the basis of historical evidence of what took place subsequent to this speech. It was reported that immediately after the Pope had concluded his speech, the people shouted with one voice, "God wills it!" This was the Christian call to fight Islam and its followers. They took the cross as their symbol; hence they were called Crusaders (ultimately derived from the Latin word for cross, *crux*)<sup>01</sup>

g) Pope Urban II focused on presenting an enterprise that held universal appeal. He managed to unite all the peoples of Europe in this general enterprise despite the fact that these peoples' languages, local customs and interests differed greatly. But the idea of the crusades which united the masses of Western Europe could not have succeeded if it had not been in harmony with the social dynamics; this harmony between thought and reality, between the moral justification for the war and social dynamics, is what created the ideology that motivated the European masses to act within its framework. At the popular level, the people's way of thinking in Western Europe in the eleventh century was in line with papal policy and the idea of holy war to some extent, because a religious revival had begun in Europe at the beginning of that century. At the end of the first millennium after Christ, there was in Western Europe a wave of guilty feelings and a desire to repent. The sense of sin was particularly profound in western Christians. In fact anyone who reads the sources of eleventh century Western European history will not be able to overlook the persistence of people in that era in seeking to guarantee for themselves forgiveness for their sins. This stemmed from millennial feelings that controlled people's consciences and minds, and the expectation that Judgement Day was at hand. Itinerant preachers spread throughout Western Europe, urging people to renounce the world, repent, and imitate the life of poverty led by the disciples. In the midst of all this religious fervour that dominated western societies, feelings of hatred and fanaticism towards the followers of other religions, and even against the followers of churches other than the Catholic Church, were prevalent. There is strong evidence of this in the epic poem called the *Chanson d'Antioche*, which truthfully reflects the spirit of vengeance that was widespread in Catholic society against the "doomed idolaters" — as they called them. This poem not only regards the Muslims as a nation that is hostile to Christ, but this description is applied to all of those who do not believe in the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Thus it represents popular European thought in the eleventh century. This popular thinking was itself one of the features of the general ideology that produced the Crusader movement. The success of Urban II is reflected in the fact that his speech in which he called for a crusade was like a focal point in which all the ideas which represented the ideological framework of the social dynamics of the west were combined, despite the differences in languages, customs and traditions. Thus the response of the masses to the Pope at Clermont was not merely a reaction to



his eloquence; it was an expression of the listeners' joy at an enterprise which touched on their hopes. The holy war served as an astonishing cover under which everyone could proceed to secure the achievement of their worldly dreams and hope of salvation in the hereafter. We could quote dozens of phrases which appear in the historical sources and contemporary literature which describe the Crusaders as "knights of Christ", "men of Christ", "those who form the army of Christ", "the holy people", "the people of the Lord". These are all expressions which indicate that the idea of a Crusader war was well entrenched in people's minds, and that they were fully convinced that by taking part in this campaign, they were not doing so in response to any person, not even the Pope himself, but they were obeying the Lord.<sup>10</sup>

## The Pope's consultation following his speech

Urban II met with the Christian clergy and consulted them about mobilizing official and popular resources in order to attack the Muslims. He met with his bishops, and as a result of this consultation meeting, they issued the following decrees:

- ❖ Anyone who had committed a punishable crime could be spared the punishment if he took part in this holy war.
- ❖ All wealth, whether land or possessions, that the warrior left behind when he went to the holy land would come under the protection of the church during his absence, and would be returned in full when the warrior came home.
- ❖ Every participant in the campaign must wear the sign of the cross.
- ❖ Anyone who took up the cross must fulfil the promise to travel to Jerusalem. If he changed his mind, he would be excommunicated.
- ❖ Every city that was saved from the "infidel Muslims" was to be returned to the Church.
- ❖ Every individual must be prepared to leave his homeland on the Feast of the Virgin.
- ❖ The armies should meet in Constantinople.

The Pope sent his bishops with these decrees, to convey them to the kings of the Christian world and the princes in the west.<sup>103</sup>

## The Crusader propaganda campaign

The speech of Urban II ushered in a new phase of great importance, namely the phase of Crusader propaganda. This was propaganda based on the movement of individuals to numerous locations, addressed to different sectors of society, and which played an effective role in the success of this enterprise. It may be noted that propaganda for the first Crusade, in particular, were made with the utmost brilliance and precision from the time this speech was given. To this end an army of preachers was mobilized whose aim was to expand the call to people of different mentalities so as to address all sectors of European society, each according to its mentality. After the Council of Clermont, Urban II travelled to the cities of Tours, Bordeaux and Nimes, and he spent nine months promoting this new enterprise.<sup>104</sup> He also sent numerous letters to promote the Crusader cause, including those that he sent to all the Christian believers in Flanders, Bologna, Besalii, Sardinia, Roussillon, and Empurias. It may be noted that these letters cannot be separated from the role of the Pope in the Council of Clermont, as they were indeed a continuation of his role as propagator of the Crusades.<sup>105</sup>

## The organised mentality of Urban II

It may be noted that the letters sent by the Pope to promote his Crusader enterprise offer us a number of details which do not appear in the speech of Clermont, including his approval of the role of the papal legate Adhemar, Bishop of Le Puy, and the obligation to obey his commands as if they came from the Pope himself. It was also stated that monks and priests were not permitted to go to the East unless they had permission from their bishops, and the abbots of monasteries were also forbidden to go; this was aimed at avoiding rebellion and chaos. We should realize that the extant documentary sources show us the precise, organised mentality of Urban II. Hence we see that he had a comprehensive vision of the Crusader enterprise — at that early stage at least — and he was very keen to advise those who were going to take part in the journey to the east of the necessity of blind obedience to his commands and the commands of their direct supervisors.

We also sense that the Pope insisted on the idea of uniting the Christian world. It is as if what was happening to the Christians in the east — according to the biased claims of the Europeans — was a matter of the utmost concern to the inhabitants of Western Europe, and that the help of the Franks and others for the eastern Christians was an important part of their duties as Christians.<sup>106</sup> Whatever the case, the natural outcome of the organizing, planning and propaganda role played by the Pope and senior clergy was the commencement of the Crusades. What helped them with this enterprise was choosing the right time for war.

## Peter the Hermit

Peter the Hermit was moved by the speech of Pope Urban II, and he had a powerful impact on people. He rode a donkey, travelling from one city to another. He travelled barefoot, wearing coarse clothing. The historian Robert the Monk said concerning him: This Peter was the pioneer of the Crusades. He superseded the priests and bishops in piety, and refrained from eating bread and meat; rather he lived on fish and did not permit himself more than a little ale and coarse food.<sup>107</sup> Despite the rough appearance of Peter the Hermit and his dishevelled state, he had a strange power that stirred the zeal of men and women and attracted the masses to him. He was able to attract nearly fifteen thousand followers among the poor who followed him from one country to another with great fervour, despite the fact that most of them did not know anything about the use of weapons or horsemanship, nor had they ever taken part in battle before. But they were influenced by the impassioned words of Peter the Hermit and his appearance, which made them rush to follow him with overwhelming enthusiasm without thinking of any other possibilities. His fiery speeches were accompanied by weeping, wailing and heaping curses upon the 'infidels', and the promise of the Lord's forgiveness for those who were marching to save the sepulchre of Christ; his imaginative eloquence stirred people's hearts.<sup>108</sup> We would like to point out that the preachers who played a role similar to that of Peter the Hermit in propagating and promoting the Crusades numbered in the hundreds and thousands.<sup>109</sup> People were moved by these preachers. The historian Balderic, who lived at the time of these events, noted that some of the Christian masses drew the sign of the cross on their chests using branding irons, in an outward show of their zeal and to delude others that this sign had come to them by miraculous means.<sup>110</sup> Thus they all began preparing to go to the holy places in Palestine after hearing these words, and most of them sold their possessions in order to equip themselves for the journey, hoping to erase their sins and earn God's approval. Parents were happy to see their children leaving and wives rejoiced when they saw their husbands preparing to set out. This universal zeal was unprecedented and their conviction of the lightness of their cause was strong.<sup>111</sup> As great as the joy was of those who left their countries to join the first Crusade, the regret and sorrow of those who did not go out on that campaign was just as great.<sup>112</sup>

## The Muslims are unaware of what is being planned for them

The Islamic state at the time of the Umayyads had an intelligence system that was able to penetrate the ranks of their opponents on both the local and international levels. The spies of Mu'awiyah were able to penetrate the Byzantine court. I have discussed this topic in my book about the Umayyad state.

When it comes to the Abbasid state, however, we do not see in the Islamic sources any record of any fiery speech delivered by the Abbasid or Fatimid caliphs in reaction to the speech of Urban II, or at least sense that the Muslims were aware of what had occurred at the Council of Clermont and afterwards. Perhaps the reason for that has to do with the fact that both the Abbasid and Fatimid states were preoccupied with the conflict between themselves, and the attempts of each to overpower the other and gain dominance. They remained profoundly unaware until the first Crusader campaign actually reached Syria.<sup>113</sup> This may be supported by what is mentioned by Ibn al-Qalanisi, in which he states that news of the Crusade did not reach the Muslims in Syria until 490 AH/1097 CE. He writes, "News concerning this plot against Islam arrived and caused great anxiety and fear."<sup>114</sup> Despite that, the only Muslim reaction which appeared just before the Crusaders reached Syria came from the Seljuks in Asia Minor, when they managed easily to destroy the first part of the Crusader forces (which was a campaign of the masses known as the 'people's crusade'), as well as defending their possessions in Asia Minor,<sup>115</sup> as we shall see below, *in shd' Allah*.<sup>116</sup>

The Crusaders were moving under qualified leadership, with a clear goal, great energy and careful deliberation, using the power of rhetoric to influence people and using various factors — economic, social and religious — to motivate the people of Western Europe.

The spiritual status of the Pope was also effective in motivating armies to move eastwards. The Pope mobilized all available resources for this enterpr

## CHAPTER III The Beginning of the First Crusade

After the speech of Urban II at Clermont in France, in which he called for a crusader war, he ordered his clergymen to go back to their countries and preach war, and they made great efforts in doing so. The natural outcome of the propaganda campaign launched by the Pope and those whom he trusted was the launch of the First Crusade, which had two parts: (i) the campaign of the masses and (ii) the campaign of the princes. The First Crusade, in both aspects, attracted a great deal of unprecedented attention from contemporary historians, whether they were Latin, Byzantine or Muslim, as well as from modern historians who specialize in the study of the Crusades. The reason for that may be the serious consequences that resulted from that campaign in particular, as it led to the establishment of Crusader principalities in the east, some of which lasted as long as two centuries.<sup>117</sup> The Crusader campaign was successful to a large extent in establishing four Latin principalities:

1. In the headwaters of the Euphrates, at Edessa
2. In northern Syria, at Antioch
3. On the Syrian coast, at Tripoli
4. In the heart of Palestine, at Jerusalem.<sup>118</sup>

In addition there were four major seigneuries: Sidon, Jaffa, Ascalon and Galilee; and twelve smaller territories that were given to their owners by the Crusader kings in return for their loyalty and obedience. These were: Arsuf, Hebron, Darum, Caesarea, Nablus,

Bethsan, Haifa, Toron (Tibnin), Baniyas, Hasankeyf, Lod and Beirut.<sup>119</sup> It is worth mentioning that this success was due to a number of factors, including the following:

- Lack of political unity in the Muslim world
- Contest for power within the Seljuk dynasty
- Presence of the *Rafidi*<sup>120</sup> Fatimid state

- ❖ The role of the Christians who were living in Greater Syria
- ❖ The attitude of some of the Arab emirates towards the Crusader attack
- ❖ The role of the unorthodox Rafidi Batini Ismaili movement in putting obstacles in the path of the Jihad against the Crusaders
- ❖ The spread of the unorthodox Shiite doctrine and speculative theological ideas Shiite Rafidi and Batini ideas
- ❖ The decline in economic prosperity prior to the Crusader attack
- ❖ Weakness of the Byzantine state
- ❖ Military experience of the Frankish knights
- ❖ Continual European reinforcements for the Crusader campaign
- ❖ Political tyranny and its effects on religion and life
- ❖ Preoccupation of the Muslim scholars with arguing over minor issues of fiqh

These causes have been discussed in detail in my book *Dawlat as-Saldjiqah wal-Mashroo<sup>1</sup> al-Islami li Muqdwamat at-Taghulghul al-Bdtini wal-Ghazw as-Saleebi*.<sup>121</sup>

## Crusader strategy after occupation

The occupying Frankish forces which were able and made plans to live in a strange environment had no choice but to adopt a number of strategies that could be developed further, in order to maintain their occupation for a long time. These strategies included the following:

**a)** As much as possible, and by all available means, maintaining one of the most important means of their success, which was keeping the surrounding Islamic forces divided as much as possible, because that would cancel out the possibility of the Muslims confronting them with one united force. For that reason they strove continuously from the outset to occupy regions of strategic importance, which served the purpose of isolating the Islamic regions and preventing the Muslim forces from uniting. This involved occupying Edessa (in Arabic, ar-Ruha) so as to prevent contact between Iraq and Syria; later on they took control of southern regions of Syria such as Kerak (in present-day Jordan) and ash-Shawbak (also in present-day Jordan, known to the Crusaders as Montreal or Mons Regalis) with the aim of preventing communication between Egypt and Syria. This approach made use of the geographical features of the land. On the human level, the Crusaders were eager to support ethnic and sectarian divisions in the surrounding Muslim areas, using a carrot-and-stick approach and a policy of forming alliances with some groups against others, which was aided to a large extent by the hostility that existed between Shiites and Sunnis. They were also aided by the presence of Christian minorities, some of whom the Crusaders were able to exploit by forming alliances with them, and conspiring with them against the neighbouring Muslims.

**b)** The occupying Crusader forces concentrated on regions which guaranteed secure communication with their headquarters in Western Europe. Hence they focused on occupying the Levantine coast in order to secure that, and they avoided seizing interior regions as much as possible for fear of losing this advantage, and so that they would not be besieged by Islamic forces, based on the assumption and fear that these forces might unite later on, which would put them in jeopardy and lead to their defeat.



c) The Crusader forces strove to form treaties with other forces that would be able to help them at various stages, either because of the latter's enmity towards the Muslims around them or because of their desire to gain economic advantages. In this context we may note these treaties began with Byzantium, then with some of the Italian city-states, and finally the possibility of forming alliances with the Mongol forces,<sup>122</sup> which posed the greatest danger to the Islamic regions.

d) From the outset, the Crusader forces in the Muslim east were eager to find a solution to the demographic problems that they faced in the east, in contrast to Muslim density. The Crusader forces dealt with this problem in different ways and by different means, which were open to development, depending on the circumstances. For example, they followed a policy of killing or expelling Muslims in the regions that they occupied, then they followed different methods at subsequent stages to preserve the Muslim population if that served their interests. At the same time they worked to attract migrants to the regions under Crusader dominance, either from Western Europe or Armenia, or from Christian communities in the Islamic regions. They also resorted to militarising Crusader society so as to create a society of all groups and classes that would be able to offer military service to deal with the demographic shortfall. Nothing is more indicative of that than the fact that religious groups in Crusader society at all stages were the most well-trained and equipped in the military field, such as the Knights Templar and Hospitaller.<sup>123</sup>

e) The Crusader forces built military fortifications based on their own experience or by imitating the expertise that they found in the Muslim regions. Attention was paid to making these fortifications like "early warning systems" that were able to keep watch on Muslim movements, so great care was taken in selecting locations opposite important Muslim gathering places or in areas that could threaten Muslim interests, such as those that were built near trade routes.

**f)** The Crusaders relied, as they learned from their experience of war with the Muslims, on using methods of rapid warfare. This did not require large numbers of troops, and at the same time was aimed at specific targets within a carefully selected time frame, such as attacking agricultural areas at harvest time, which did not require a large military force, but at the same time was capable of inflicting a great deal of harm on the Muslims.

**g)** The Crusaders also adopted a policy of making truces and offering some concessions to some Muslim groups so that they could focus on fighting other Muslim groups. This policy was successful during the period of Muslim division. It even led to them choosing to interfere in favour of one side against another, either as the result of a Crusader offer of help or a request for help on the part of one or other Muslim side.

**h)** The Crusaders resorted to various means to keep the spirit of war strong in Western Europe, so as to guarantee the continuation of Crusader campaigns and to offer help and support to the Crusader entities in the east. They paid a great deal of attention to keeping communication channels with Europe open, which guaranteed human reinforcements and continual material supplies. The kings of Europe felt a great responsibility towards the Crusader kingdoms in the east, and they were committed to supporting and defending them.

**i)** With the passage of time, the Crusaders adopted a strategy based on the idea that guaranteeing their presence in greater Syria depended on seizing control of Egypt or eliminating it from the conflict by whatever means necessary. Thus we see that some later Crusader campaigns were directed primarily against Egypt. Researchers of the Crusades have found that they achieved some successes in this regard, taking advantage of the hostility that sometimes arose between the rulers of Egypt and certain Syrian regions.

**j)** Some Crusader parties resorted to carrying out military attacks with the aim of striking at Muslim morale and threatening Muslim holy places, as happened in the case of expeditions in which some forces aimed to transgress against the holy places in the Hijaz. They also targeted some essential economic and religious facilities, as when they threatened trade routes and hajj caravans. On some occasions this role was played by the principalities of

Kerak and Montreal (ash-Shawbak), which belonged to the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem.

The Crusader kingdoms, the papacy that supported them and some of the clergy and thinkers worked to develop new strategies as a result of the failure of the military strategy, using methods other than military ones. This was based on the propagation of Christianity and the call for increased missionary activities among Muslims. We are not discussing the success or failure of this strategy; rather our concern is to point out that this was one of the alternatives that the Franks tried to use in order to achieve their goals.

The Crusaders presented themselves as defenders of Christianity in the east, regardless of their sectarian differences, so they were portrayed as having come to save Byzantium from the Muslim Seljuk danger. They also depicted their march to the Islamic regions as having the aim of liberating the eastern Christians from the Islamic yoke, guaranteeing as a result that they would help the Armenians and Syrians as they began to take control of Muslim regions. But this was a temporary strategy which began to diminish with the passage of time.<sup>124</sup> Moreover, they formed alliances with deviant Islamic sects such as the *Bdini*<sup>125</sup> movements.

Although these strategies were followed, in general, by all the Crusaders, that did not prevent some commanders from following some temporary strategies that were specific to particular circumstances, which means that some of these principalities probably adopted policies that went against the general principles. From examining these strategies it seems to us that the success of the Muslim forces in resisting the Crusader threat may be measured by the extent to which they adopted strategies and used means that put mitigated the danger posed by the crusaders' strategies, either by adopting opposing strategies or by preventing the Crusaders from implementing their strategies in actuality. This may be noted from the development of Muslim reactions to the Crusader challenge, starting at the time of Imad ad-Deen and Noor ad-Deen Zangi, up to the time of Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi and finally the achievements of the Mamluk state. But it should not be understood from this that this development in the Muslim reaction during the time of the Zangids, Ayubids and Mamluks always took place within a positive framework. Rather, what happened sometimes was that the Muslim side, or some of its forces or individuals, contributed to the success of the Crusader strategies.<sup>126</sup>

## Resistance movement during the Seljuk period

The shock of the fall of Jerusalem woke many Islamic scholars, judges and rulers from their slumber, and they realized the seriousness of the invasion after it began to threaten their existence and position in the cities of those lands, above and beyond the threat to Muslim lands and Islamic beliefs. Hence the Islamic scholars and judges of Syria, in Damascus, Aleppo and Tripoli, hastened to seek help from the central authorities in Baghdad and the local rulers, knowing that they possessed the military strength that was capable of confronting this invasion.<sup>127</sup> But the response of the Islamic scholars and judges of Syria to the Crusader invasion was not limited to seeking help and support; it went further than that and included many other means, such as writing treatises about Jihad against the invasion, so as to prepare an intellectual framework and educate the Muslims in general, as it attracted a great deal of attention from the Islamic scholars and scholars before and during the Crusader invasion. The need of the hour was for an intellectual mobilization that would spread Islamic teachings. This became essential at a time when Syria was involved in political, sectarian and military conflicts — conflicts which are reflected in the history books about the Islamic east. As a result, many biographies of rulers, king and ruling families were written, as well as books about conflict with the Crusaders. Hence a number of Islamic scholars and judges hastened to enlighten Muslim societies, and from their works we can see that there were two groups. The first group focused on writing and preaching in a traditional manner, explaining issues and principles of Islam to the people. The second group focused on urging the people to fight and writing about the topic of Jihad; they urged Muslims to get involved because they were aware of the general weakness of the Muslims' faith and their negligence concerning matters of religion. Hence many books were written before and during the Crusader invasion of the Levant. What concerns us here is the books of the Islamic scholars who urged an Islamic Jihad and sought to mobilize Muslims and teach them about their religion so that they could resist that invasion.<sup>128</sup>

Among the most prominent of these Islamic scholars was:

## **The juristic scholar 'Ali ibn Tahir as-Sulami (431-500AH/1039-1106 CE)**

His full name was Ali ibn Tahir ibn Ja'far al-Qaysi as-Sulami ad-Dimashqi ash-Shafi'i. He was a Syrian scholar who as a result of that invasion became a preacher and promoter of Jihad, giving speeches and lessons in the mosques, travelling from one mosque to another throughout Syria and Palestine. His efforts are embodied in his book, *Al-Jihdd*, which he wrote following the fall of Jerusalem in 492 AH/1098 CE, and in one of his speeches in which he urges the Muslims to wage Jihad against this invasion.<sup>129</sup> In the first chapters of his book, al-Sulami focuses on a number of important circumstances and issues which Syria and the Muslim world were facing at that time. He starts with a discussion of the general Crusader policy which targeted Andalusia, Sicily and Syria; he was also the first to point out the unified goal of the Crusader wars encompassing their attacks on Andalusia, Sicily and Syria, an idea which was adopted and developed further by subsequent historians. Ibn al-Atheer wrote:

The Frankish state began to grow stronger and set out for the Muslim world, capturing some of it in 478 AH, when they seized Toledo and other cities in Andalusia. Then in 484 AH they targeted the island of Sicily and gained possession of it. In 490 AH they set out for Syria.<sup>130</sup>

As-Sulami realized the weakness and division of the Muslim world, and that its disunity, not the strength of the Crusaders themselves, was the main factor for the success of the Crusaders in both the western and eastern wings of the Muslim world. He focused on the political divisions in Greater Syria in particular, because he lived there and was pained by what he saw of its people's reluctance to engage in Jihad.<sup>131</sup> As-Sulami reminded the Muslims of the idea of continuing Jihad at times of war and of peace, as part of a general policy that the Muslim rulers and caliphs should adopt as an essential condition of a successful confrontation: every year, the Muslim ruler should lead an expedition outside the Muslim territory, not to satisfy greed or to seek booty, but to protect the Muslim land from the aggression of non-Muslims and to make them realize and fear Muslim strength on a

continual basis, as an embodiment of the idea which in modern times is described as 'taking the war to the enemy in his own land'.<sup>132</sup> As-Sulami reminded the Muslim rulers that this invasion was not only aimed at Muslim lands and faith, it was also aimed at removing them from power and expelling them from the land that was under their authority; his aim was to stir them up and urge them to engage in Jihad.<sup>133</sup> He asked the common folk to support their rulers and leaders in Jihad, as they were following the example of the righteous Muslim predecessors in confronting this turmoil, and by this to expel the Crusaders.<sup>134</sup> Anyone who reads as-Sulami's book about Jihad will immediately understand the depth of the pain and suffering felt by this Muslim scholar who saw the sanctity of Jerusalem being violated and transgressed. Hence the first thing he urged was rescuing Jerusalem from the hands of the invaders:<sup>135</sup> "Strive, may Allah have mercy on you, in that Jihad, so that you might be victorious by means of Allah's support."<sup>136</sup> As-Sulami is regarded as the first to have realized the importance of a united Jihad between Syria, Iraq and the cities of Asia Minor, before the Muslims united against the Crusaders under the leadership of the Zangids and Ayubids.<sup>137</sup> In this field he is regarded as one of the pioneers. As-Sulami called upon Muslims to purify their souls and reform themselves, because this is the basis of Islamic unity, and to resolve to persist in fighting this invasion.

Give precedence to Jihad over your own ego before Jihad against your enemies, for your egos are more harmful to you than your enemies. Force your ego to refrain from what it is doing in disobedience towards its Creator, then you may gain what you are hoping for in terms of (Allah's) support against them.<sup>138</sup>

The Crusader invasion of Syria from as-Sulami's point of view did not come out of nowhere; he realized that the Muslims were weak because they were not adhering to the religion of Allah. Hence he strove to advise them to turn back to Allah and purify their souls, to come back to the Book of Allah (the Qur'an), to give up the sins that they had been committing and to take steps towards Jihad:

Let your aim in your Jihad be to please your Lord and to defend yourselves and your brothers, so that Allah may grant you reward for your

Jihad. But that cannot be achieved while we watch the progress of the Crusader invasion, in which they have captured many cities, unless we hasten to confront them and protect the cities that have not fallen into their hands. Mobilizing and heading towards the cities that they have captured from us is nothing less than a war in which we are defending ourselves, our children, our wives and our wealth, and guarding the land that is still in our hands.<sup>139</sup>

As-Sulami's call to the Muslims was a general call to unite the Muslim forces: Syrian, Mesopotamian and Egyptian. He advised them to follow a methodology of purifying their souls, forgiving one another and embarking on Jihad so that they could achieve their goal of defeating the invaders, as he thought that if the Muslim rulers could not forget their grudges and differences then they were still following a path of *jdhiliyah*<sup>140</sup> and were not following the wise saying which stemmed from their (Islamic) heritage: "At times of hardship, grudges disappear."<sup>141</sup>

In many places in his book *Al-Jihdd*, as-Sulami urged, incited, exhorted and warned, and he addressed the rulers in particular regarding the necessity of Jihad in the speeches and lessons that he delivered in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus and in the cities of Syria and Palestine.<sup>142</sup> He did not omit any minute detail that had to do with Jihad, but he discussed it. We may note that in his book as-Sulami discussed and highlighted the divisions and splits in the Muslim East, especially in Syria, which had weakened and fragmented the Muslim forces and had weakened the belief in the obligatory nature of Jihad, which is something that the invaders took advantage of. He dealt with this problem by discussing the importance of purifying the soul, returning to adherence to the religion of Allah, setting things straight with one another and embarking on Jihad to confront the invasion; he pointed out that this could not be achieved unless the Muslim forces were united. Hence his book *Al-Jihad* spoke in general terms: it was not addressed only to specific political leaders or certain groups in Syria, for example; rather it was in accordance with a clear Islamic vision that was based on strong and authentic references in the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and in books of biography and military campaigns of early Islam, connecting its subject matter with the Crusader threat to Syria. The way in which he compiled information and quoted it in the right context is indicative of the extent of his far-sightedness and deep insight.<sup>143</sup>

Our research has shown that the first call to Jihad was not issued by the rulers; instead it came from the Muslim scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and the *ulema*,<sup>144</sup> from teachers, scholars, jurists and writers. As-Sulami is regarded as one of the first to urge a Jihad; he was part of the current of popular Islamic resistance which was supported by Islamic scholars and judges.<sup>145</sup> As-Sulami wrote his book at an early stage in this war, which is indicative of his intelligence and acumen in understanding the complex problems faced by Syria. Even though general circumstances were not conducive to the success of his call to Jihad at that early stage in particular, his book was a contribution to paving the way for the Zangid and Ayubid phases. Professor Ramadan Husayn ash-Shawish undertook a study and commentary on as-Sulami's book *Al-Jihad*, which he presented as a Master's thesis at Al-Fatih University in Tripoli (Libya) in 1992 CE.<sup>146</sup>

## Islamic scholars and judges participate in physical Jihad

One of the most prominent examples of an Islamic scholar's participation in the regular army and on the battlefield, so as demonstrate the ideal state of belief in Jihad and defending one's land and oneself, was that of Abu Muhammad 'Abdullah ibn Mansoor, who was known as Ibn Sulayhah, the judge (*qadi*) of the fortress of Jablah, who became the ruler of that fortress after the death of his father Mansoor in 494 AH/1100 CE. He had great military experience because he loved the soldierly life, and had chosen his troops and proven his good character.<sup>147</sup> The talents of this ruler-judge were manifested when the Franks besieged the fortress of Jablah in an attempt to capture it in 494 AH/1100 CE. Initially he used what is now known as psychological warfare, when he came up with a brilliant plan to spread fear in the ranks of the Frankish forces. He pretended that the Sultan Barkiyaruq was headed towards Syria,<sup>148</sup> coming to his aid, which made the Franks worry, and fear spread throughout their ranks and caused them to withdraw. When the Franks realized that this was really a trick, they came back and besieged the city again. But the judge repeated his trick in a different manner, spreading a rumour among the Crusader ranks that this



time the Egyptians were coming to fight them and help him, so they ended their siege of the fortress.<sup>149</sup>

It seems that the Franks did not have sufficient information about the state of the fortress or of the number of troops that the qadi had, otherwise they would not have abandoned the siege on these two occasions. The Franks quickly realized that this was a case of psychological warfare, and what the aim of it was, and they returned and besieged the fortress for a third time, in Sha'ban<sup>150</sup> of 494 AH. But the qadi realized that the Franks had figured out his old tactics, so he resorted to a new way of resisting the Franks. He worked out a deal with the Christians who were in the fortress, agreeing that they would send a Christian delegation to the Franks to work out the terms of surrendering the fortress to them, in which the Franks would send some of their knights to take over the fortress; they were to send three hundred of their most prominent and bravest knights. The Franks agreed to that, but it appears that Ibn Sulayhah had set a trap for them.<sup>151</sup> The Frankish warriors kept climbing up the rope, one by one, and every time one of them reached Ibn Sulayhah, who was on top of the wall, he killed him, until he had killed them all. The next morning, the Muslims threw the heads of the Franks down to the Crusaders below.<sup>152</sup> The Crusaders were very upset about the trap that had been set for them by the qadi of Jablah, and the success that the qadi had achieved, so they decided to take the fortress by any means.,

They built a wooden tower and used it to destroy one of the towers of the fortress, but with his quick wits and cleverness the qadi could see that the danger was imminent so he did not slow down or surrender, but he hastened to put in motion yet another brilliant plan, similar to those that had already caused losses to the enemy more than once. He made holes in the walls of the city, and it seems that these holes were in the rear wall; this was so that the army would be able to exit through these holes.<sup>153</sup> Al-Qadi Ibn Sulayhah and his army came out to fight the Franks and then pretended to flee from them, thus tricking the invaders. The Franks did not realize what was happening, so they hastened to pursue the Muslims as far as the gates of the city, at which point the Muslim army took the opportunity to come out through those holes and come at the Crusaders from the rear; they attacked the Franks from behind and defeated them.<sup>154</sup>

Al-Qadi Ibn Sulayhah must have had some knowledge of the arts of war and Islamic military methods. The art of psychological warfare was nothing new in the Islamic military heritage at the time of the Crusades, because such methods had been used by the Messenger (SAAW) in the Battle of the Trench in 5 AH, when he dug the ditch and defeated the confederates, and in the Battle of Mu'tah in 8 AH, when the commander Khalid ibn al-Waleed ((RA)‘’) turned the battle around from defeat to victory against the Byzantines by using psychological warfare, stirring up the dust with the horses' feet to make the Byzantines think that reinforcements had come to the Muslims, so that they fled in defeat and the Muslim army was able to withdraw from the battlefield without incurring any other losses. Psychological warfare was also used in many other battles, including the Battle of Yarmook in 13 AH, when Khalid ibn al-Waleed divided his troops, putting the right flank on the left and the rearguard in the front, a military tactic which fazed the huge Byzantine army completely and led to their defeat.<sup>155</sup>

## Scholars and judges urge fighting on the battlefield

One of the most prominent of such figures was al-Qadi Abul-Fadl ibn al-Khashshab, the Qadi of Aleppo, whose exploits in this field were famous. When the Crusader siege of Aleppo intensified in 513 AH/1119 CE, al-Qadi ibn al-Khashshab came and urged the people to fight, riding on his mount with his spear in his hand, delivering an eloquent speech which motivated and stirred them. The people wept and felt great respect for him, and they sallied forth to fight the invaders.<sup>156</sup> Although the people of Aleppo were able to save their city that year, the Crusaders did not hesitate to try again to take Aleppo, in 518 AH/1124 CE, when they destroyed all the villages around Aleppo so that they would not be able to offer any support to the city. The Franks camped in Harran and then marched towards Aleppo from the direction of Mashhad al-Jaff, from the north. Al-Qadi ibn al-Khashshab played a role in encouraging the people to fight the invaders, and in encouraging Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqi, the ruler of Mosul, to join the fight, as will be discussed below, in sha' Allah, when discussing the role of the Seljuk rulers in Mosul, Damascus and elsewhere in warding off the attacks of the Crusaders.

## Poets and their role in the resistance movement

Some poets played a major role in encouraging the Muslims and describing the situation of the Ummah and the nature of the Crusader invasion which had occupied their land and transgressed people's honour. One of the most famous of these poems was that of al-Qadi al-Harawi, which was also attributed to Abul-Muzaffar al-Abyurdi, which begins with the words:

*We mixed blood with our flowing tears and there was no room left to apportion blame. The worst weapon for a man is flowing tears, when the flames of war intensify by the sword.*

At the beginning of this ode, he clearly states that the people were weeping so intensely that blood flowed from their eyes, because their weeping was so intense and ongoing, and that they had wept until there was no energy left to blame anyone. But he soon realized that weeping, no matter how intense, not avail anything in battle, and nothing could intensify the fire of battle except the sword:

*O people of Islam, there lie ahead of you events which will bring low those who are high.  
Are you sleeping with a sense of security and joy,  
Living a life of softness and ease?  
How can your eyes have their fill of sleep  
when there are events which are awakening every sleeper?  
When your brothers in Syria cannot even nap  
Except on the backs of horses or in the bellies of vultures?  
The Byzantines are humiliating them whilst you  
Live a life of luxury like a man averse to combat.*

Here the poet is addressing those who have stayed away from fighting alongside their Muslim brothers in Syria. He begins this portion of his poem with a heated call to the Muslims, 'O sons of Islam, wake up from your sleep, for this invasion is coming to you and it will bring low your elite.' Then he wonders about them and their sleep: how can they sleep peacefully, enjoy a life of luxury and feel safe, when not far away terrible things are befalling

their 'brothers in Syria' and they cannot find even a few moments in which to take a nap in their houses; most of the time they are on horseback, fighting, or the decree of martyrdom has overtaken them and they are snatched by the vultures, as they have no one to bury their bodies, or they may fall into the hands of their Frankish enemies and be humiliated. 'But it seems that you are enjoying a life of ease and are either surrendering or allying yourself with your enemy.'

*How much blood was shed and how many young Muslim girls were killed whilst trying to cover their beauty with their hands out of shyness.*

*Silver swords turned red and spearheads dripped with blood In the midst of stabbing and striking which made the heads of young boys turn grey.*

*These are such battles that those who keep away to remain safe and sound will regret it bitterly.*

*The hands of the polytheists have unsheathed the swords, but they will be sheathed again-in their own chests and skulls.*

*And you can almost hear him who is buried in Taybah (Madinah), calling out in the loudest voice, O Family of Hishdm!*

In these lines, the poet depicts the ferocity of the battles which took place between the Muslims and their Frankish enemies, in which the blood of many Muslims was spilled and women's seclusion was transgressed upon, but they could not find anything with which to protect their chaste bodies except their arms, which they held up out of shyness and fear. These battles grew intense, with a great deal of killing, until the edges of the swords and spears appeared to glow red hot, and children's hair would turn grey because of the horrific scenes of stabbing and striking that they saw. Then he again alerts those who stay behind, and warns them that they will regret not participating in these battles, warning again of their dangers and mocking the enemy by saying that the sharp swords that they have unsheathed will come back to them, buried in their own chests and skulls. In the final lines, he reaffirms how terrifying these wars are by saying that the (Messenger (SAAW), from his tomb in Madinah, is summoning the Arabs and Muslims, not only the clan of Hisham, to help in the fight against the enemy.<sup>157</sup>

## Seljuk leaders of Jihad prior to 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi

It is a well known fact in the history of the Crusades that the Islamic Jihad against the Crusaders in the Muslim East first emerged in Mesopotamia, which is the region between the Tigris and the Euphrates, close to Syria, including Diyar Mudar and Diyarbakr (in Turkish, Diyarbakr). It is called *al-Jazeera*<sup>158</sup> in Arabic because it is located between the two rivers of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The Mesopotamian region is noted for its fresh air, suitability for agriculture and abundant crops. In it there are many great cities, strong fortresses and citadels.<sup>159</sup> Among the reasons why the resistance movement first emerged in the Mesopotamian region are the following:

a) Mesopotamia was the first region in the Muslim East to be touched by the fire of the Crusader menace, when the Crusaders seized Edessa and established the first of the Crusader kingdoms there in 490 AH/1097 CE. The inhabitants realized the danger posed by the Crusader penetration into their country, which led the Muslims to think seriously about attacking the Crusaders.

b) The character of the Mesopotamian region had been shaped in the early days of Islam, because it was located on the edges of the Byzantine state, which posed a great danger to the Muslims during the days of the Umayyad and Abbasid periods. Hence it became the first line of defence on the Muslim borders against the Byzantines. After the Crusader invasion, Mesopotamia faced the Crusader Kingdom of Edessa, which posed the greatest danger to the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad.

c) In the second half of the fifth century AH (eleventh century CE), Mesopotamia witnessed the appearance of the Seljuk Turks who were famous for their love of raising horses and their adventurous spirit, as well as their great zeal for Islam; they were new converts to the faith, and adhered to the Sunni school of thought. The Seljuk Turks in Mesopotamia supplied new blood and were very eager to engage in Jihad for the sake of Allah, unlike the other Muslim forces in the Muslim East whose religious enthusiasm had grown weak and whose fighting spirit had diminished.<sup>160</sup>

e) The Mesopotamian region was rich in resources because of its abundant supply of water and fertile land, including vast areas of arable land and grazing which was essential for horses and livestock. This made it possible to provide the mujahideen with a practically limitless supply of food and weapons. Another great advantage was the natural fortifications enjoyed by the major cities and citadels of Mesopotamia, such as Mosul, Amid, Mardin, Hasankef and so on, in which the Islamic Jihad movement against the Crusaders started. These cities, which were distinguished by their unique geographical fortifications, made invading the region by force a very difficult task; therefore it became safe from Crusader counterattack. It is not farfetched to suggest that the leaders of the Islamic Jihad movement must have fully understood what great danger the presence of the Crusader kingdom of Edessa in Mesopotamia represented to their positions, and that they had a well-founded fear of a possible Crusader advance to the south, which would be aimed at destroying the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad.<sup>161</sup> Hence it comes as no surprise that the idea of Islamic Jihad first emerged in the region of Mesopotamia, with the aim of wresting Edessa from the hands of the Crusaders.<sup>162</sup>

## **Kerbogha, regent of Mosul, engages in Jihad**

The idea of an Islamic resistance began to take practical shape in 491 AH/1097 CE, when Qawwam ad-Dawlah ('Founder of the State') Kerbogha, the regent of Mosul, started to gather whatever troops he could with the aim of preventing Antioch from falling into Crusader hands. Kerbogha, however, soon stopped en route and besieged Edessa for three weeks, thus giving the Crusaders ample opportunity to do their utmost to capture Antioch, which they succeeded in doing. If Kerbogha had gone directly to Antioch, Yaghi-Sayan (its ruler) would have handed the city over to him and the situation of the besieged would have been different,<sup>163</sup> but Kerbogha lifted the siege of Edessa when he heard that Antioch had fallen into Crusader hands. He crossed the Euphrates into Syria and stopped in Marj Dabiq, where he met Daqqaq ibn Tutush, the ruler of Damascus, Dhaheer ad-Deen Tughtegin, the *atabeg* (regent) of Daqqaq, Janah ad-Dawlah Husayn, the ruler of Horns, Arslan Tashi the ruler of Sinjar, Suqman (in Turkish, Sokmen) ibn Artuq the ruler of Jerusalem, and other rulers who resembled them in exemplary

character and ability, according to Ibn al-Atheer.<sup>164</sup> These rulers joined together under the leadership of Kerbogha, who led them towards Antioch in 491 AH/1097 CE, where the citadel was still in Muslim hands. They drew close to the city and intensified the siege until the condition of the Crusaders changed and deteriorated, and they found themselves besieged from within and without. They faced severe hardship due to lack of food, which forced them to eat carrion and leaves.<sup>165</sup> This motivated the Crusaders to send a delegation to Kerbogha, asking him for safe passage so that they could leave Antioch, but Kerbogha refused and said to them, "You will only leave by the sword."<sup>166</sup> This led one of the Christian clergy, whose name was Peter Bartholomew, to fabricate the story of the 'Holy Lance', which raised the Crusaders' morale and led them to rally around their leaders. Their resolve to march towards the Muslims and exit through the gate in scattered groups was strengthened until they had all come out, then they marched towards the Muslims, strong and in great numbers, and the Muslims broke ranks and scattered.<sup>167</sup> Thus in 491 AH/1097 CE Kerbogha failed in leading the Muslim alliance through which he wanted to prevent Antioch from falling into Crusader hands. Historians have listed the reasons why Kerbogha failed to prevent Antioch from falling into the Crusaders' hands at the time when the Crusaders had reached a state of weakness and decline inside the city. Among the most important of these reasons are the following:

- a) What the Frankish historian mentioned about Kerbogha, ruler of Mosul, having wasted three weeks during the siege of Edessa, which enabled the Crusaders to take over Antioch and take precautions against a sudden attack, whether it was to come from the Muslims who were in the citadel of Antioch or from their brethren in Syria or elsewhere.<sup>168</sup>
- b) Lack of harmony among the troops of Kerbogha, who were composed of Arabs, Turks and others, combined with what Daqqaq, ruler of Damascus, did to foment division between Arabs and Turks.
- c) Lack of a clear military plan on Kerbogha's part. Perhaps the clearest explanation of this is Kerbogha's lack of desire to allow his men to strike a decisive blow against the Crusaders when they were emerging in small groups from Antioch. That is because, as appears to be the case, Kerbogha was afraid that if he did that, he would only be destroying the vanguard of the Crusaders' army.<sup>169</sup>

Kerbogha's poor treatment of the other rulers who were with him was one of the reasons for his defeat. He began to look down on them, thinking that they would stay with him in this situation, which led to them feeling offended by his attitude.<sup>170</sup>

**d)** The Crusaders' morale was lifted after hearing the story about the 'Holy Lance'; in addition, before Kerbogha arrived at Antioch, the Crusader leaders corresponded with Daqqaq, the ruler of Damascus, and told him that their aims went no further than regaining the lands in Northern Syria that had been in Byzantine hands.<sup>171</sup> This does not rule out the proposition that Kerbogha's attempt to prevent Antioch from falling into Crusader hands was the starting point for the initiative of an Islamic Jihad against the Crusaders and that it highlighted to the Crusaders the extent of the Muslims' strength when they were united. It also demonstrated the right way for subsequent Muslim leaders who took it upon themselves to raise the banner of Islamic Jihad and complete the mission after him. This fact may be proven by noting that Imad ad-Deen Zangi lived under the care of Kerbogha after his father died.<sup>172</sup> However, Kerbogha, ruler of Mosul, died in the city of Khawa in Azerbaijan in 495 AH/1102 CE, during the conflict between the sultan Barkiyaruq ibn Malikshah and his brother Muhammad ibn Malikshah. Thus Mosul lost one ruler who was not distracted by the existing conflict among the Seljuks from working on reviving the idea of Islamic Jihad against the Crusaders.<sup>173</sup>

## **Jekermish and Suqman join forces in Jihad**

The death of the atabeg of Mosul, Kerbogha, made the situation very precarious and led to the outbreak of civil war, because Kerbogha had appointed as his heir Sunqurjah, who was one of his commanders, and ordered the Turks to obey him. However, Moosa at-Turkmani, his representative in Hasankeyf (Hisn Kayfa), disputed with Sunqurjah after he was summoned by the prominent figures in Mosul, and he managed to kill his opponent and take over in Mosul as the deputy of the sultan Barkiyaruq.<sup>174</sup> Shams ad-Dawlah Jekermish (Chokurmish), the ruler of Jazeerat Ibn 'Umar, made the most of the opportunity given by the chaos and intervened in these internal disputes. He marched to Nusaybin and captured it. Moosa fled to Mosul and fortified himself there, where Jekermish



besieged him for a lengthy period. Moosa had no choice but to seek help from Suqman al-Artuqi in Diyarbakir, offering to give him Hasankeyf and ten thousand dinars in return for his help. Suqman accepted this offer and sent military help. Jekermish was forced to end his siege of Mosul, but when Moosa came out to meet Suqman, some of Moosa's own slaves killed their master en route, so his army scattered and Suqman quickly returned to Hasankeyf and captured it, whilst Jekermish went on to Mosul and entered the city, where he was welcomed by its inhabitants.<sup>175</sup>

Jekermish became the ruler of Mosul from 495-500 AH/1101-1106 CE, where he formed an alliance with Suqman ibn Artuq, the ruler of the Artuqids in Diyarbakir. Together, they aimed to block the advance of the Crusaders eastwards towards the heart of Mesopotamia, for following the swift victories that the Crusaders had achieved they were resolved to capture Harran, which lay at the crossroads of the routes to Iraq, Mesopotamia and Syria, and thus take advantage of the conflicts among the Muslim rulers. In addition to that, taking over Harran would sever communications between the Muslims in Persia, Iraq, Mesopotamia and Syria, and give the Crusaders the opportunity to attack Mosul, secure Edessa and gain control over the Mesopotamia region. All of these factors had a decisive impact: Jekermish and Suqman had to forget all their previous disputes and work together to stop the Crusader advance.<sup>176</sup>

## **The Battle of Balikh (the Battle of Harran)**

Jekermish and Suqman sent word to one another, calling for a meeting to tackle the issue of Harran, and stating that each was offering himself for the sake of Allah and His reward. Each accepted the invitation of the other, and they met at al-Khaboor at Ra's al-'Ayn, where they reaffirmed their alliance and set out with ten thousand Arab, Turkish and Kurdish horsemen to besiege Edessa before others could attack them. When Baldwin II, ruler of Edessa, heard news of this mobilization in Ra's al-'Ayn, he sent word to Bohemond and Joscelin, who were attempting to besiege Harran, seeking their help and suggesting that they should now redirect their attack. After leaving a small group to protect Edessa, Baldwin went to Harran, leading a small group of knights and Armenians. Near Harran he was met by Joscelin the ruler of Turbessel (in Arabic, *Tel Bashir*), Bohemond the ruler of Antioch

and his nephew Tancred, the Patriarch of Antioch, an army composed of Crusader knights and princes, and a huge number of Armenians and clergymen. There were nearly three thousand cavalry and three times that number of foot soldiers. In fact this army represented the entire striking force of the Crusaders in northern Syria, apart from the garrisons in the fortresses. When this army gathered near Harran, Jekermish and his ally were still marching towards Edessa.<sup>177</sup>

The Crusaders almost captured Harran shortly after laying siege to it, but the conflict that arose between Baldwin of Bourcq and Bohemond, in which each insisted that his banner should be raised over the city after it was captured, helped Harran to withstand the siege and gave the Muslims the opportunity to move to fight the Crusaders before this territory fell into their hands. The two sides met at al-Balikh River on the ninth of Sha'ban; the Muslims pretended to flee, and the Crusaders pursued them for almost two leagues. Then the Muslims turned and attacked them, destroying most of their forces,<sup>178</sup> and seized a great deal of booty, both money and possessions.<sup>179</sup> Bohemond, the ruler of Antioch, and his nephew Tancred hid behind a hill, aiming to attack the Muslims from behind when the fighting intensified. When they emerged they witnessed the defeat of their companions and the plunder of their camp, so they stayed where they were until nightfall, then they slipped away and fled. They were pursued by the Muslims, who killed and captured many of their companions, but they themselves managed to flee to Edessa. Baldwin and Joscelin were taken prisoner; Baldwin, along with a group of his commanders, tried to flee by fording the Balikh, but the mud prevented them from moving quickly. A Turkmen commander who was one of Suqman's troops caught up with them and managed to capture them, and he took Baldwin to his master Suqman.<sup>180</sup>

## Jekermish and Suqman fall out

When the followers of Jekermish saw that Suqman's troops had seized the lion's share of Crusader booty, they said to their master, "What status will we have before the people when the Turkmens have taken the booty instead of us?" They urged him to take Baldwin, the Crusader prince, as a hostage, so Jekermish sent some of his troops who managed to kidnap Baldwin from Suqman's camp. When Suqman realized what had happened during his absence from his camp, he was very upset and his companions prepared to fight, but he soon called them back and told them: I do not want to assuage my anger by giving the enemy satisfaction at the Muslims' expense.<sup>181</sup>

Suqman led his troops and took the weapons and banners left by the Crusaders as they had fled; he dressed his troops in the Crusaders' clothing and put them on their horses, and marched to the fortresses in the region of Shabakhtan in Diyarbakir. The Crusaders came out to greet them thinking that their companions had been victorious. Suqman attacked them and finished them off, and seized the fortress. In this manner he was able to seize a number of fortresses in the region before he returned to his seat of power in Diyarbakir.<sup>182</sup>

## Jekermish's defeat

Jekermish decided to go ahead and fight after his ally returned. He attacked the Crusader citadels in the Shabakhtan region which lies to the east of Edessa, so as to protect his army's back, then he marched to Edessa itself. Whilst the slowdown in the Crusaders' progress meant that Harran stayed in Muslim hands, Edessa remained in Christian hands because of slow movement on the part of the Muslims. This gave Tancred enough time to renew his defences; hence he was able to repel the first attack undertaken by Jekermish. This was due in large part to the loyalty and courage displayed by the Armenians and local people. Nevertheless, the pressure that Tancred felt led him to seek help from Bohemond. Faced as he was with many problems, he decided to give priority to protecting Edessa. He took action to help his nephew but was slowed down by the bad state of the roads. Tancred felt

desperate so he ordered his troops to take up attack positions before dawn, under cover of darkness; his men attacked the Turks, who were fast asleep feeling no sense of danger. The Crusader victory was completed when Bohemond arrived. Jekermish fled in panic, leaving behind his camp which was filled with rich plunder. Thus the Franks got their revenge for the defeat at Harran, and also managed to keep Edessa.<sup>183</sup>

Among the prisoners who fell into Tancred's hands was a Seljuk princess, one of the ladies of the household of Jekermish. Jekermish was so enamoured of this lady that he was willing to pay a huge ransom of fifteen thousand bezants for her, or even to exchange Count Baldwin himself for her. News of this offer reached Jerusalem, and King Baldwin (Count Baldwin's cousin) wrote to Bohemond telling him not to let this opportunity escape to have Baldwin set free. Bohemond and Tancred, however, needed the money at a time when Baldwin's return would lead to Tancred losing his position as de facto ruler of Edessa and having to return to Antioch, so they responded to the king's letter, saying, "It is not good diplomacy to appear too eager to accept this offer, when showing some hesitation may lead to Jekermish increasing the ransom." At the same time, they agreed to accept Jekermish's offer of money, thus Baldwin remained in captivity.<sup>184</sup>

## The outcomes of the Battle of Balikh

The Battle of Balikh had a number of very important outcomes for both the Muslims and the Crusaders, the most important of which included the following:

- a)** It stopped the Crusader advance and prevented them expanding towards the east at the expense of the Muslims; it also put an end to their hopes of advancing towards Iraq and taking full control of Mesopotamia.
- b)** It dashed Bohemond's aspirations of controlling Aleppo and turning the principality of Antioch into a large state. Moreover, it destroyed the Crusaders' hopes of severing links between the Muslim forces in Syria, Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, which they had wished to achieve by capturing Aleppo.
- c)** It determined the fate of Edessa. This principality was faced with a great deal of internal troubles, especially from the Armenians who soon started to voice their complaints about the oppression of the Armenian church by the Latin rulers and their persecution of its clergy. This prompted the Armenians to make contact with the Turks, which in turn weakened Edessa, thus the possibility of its falling into Muslim hands became imminent.<sup>185</sup>
- d)** It gave the Muslims the opportunity to regain the possessions that had been joined to the principality of Antioch and which they had lost to the Crusaders earlier on.

After Baldwin's capture, Tancred took charge of the principality of Edessa and Bohemond became the strongest of the Crusader rulers in the north.

The circumstances of the victory led to a rapprochement between the Muslim and Byzantine forces against the common enemy. Ibn al-Qalanisi explained the consequences of these developments as follows:

- e)** It was a good victory for the Muslims; nothing like it had happened before. It weakened the morale of the Franks, reduced their supplies of weapons and equipment, and diminished their power. The Muslims' morale

was raised, and they became more determined to support the faith and fight the infidels.

f) People began to speak of defeating them [the invaders] and became certain that the Muslims would put an end to them.

g) It destroyed the myth that the Crusaders could not be defeated.<sup>186</sup>

h) The Byzantine Emperor Alexios took advantage of the weakness of Bohemond's position after criticism was directed against him for not ransoming his friend Baldwin. In addition, the treaty that Bohemond had made with the Emperor encouraged uprisings by the inhabitants of Cilicia against their Norman rulers. The Emperor also ordered his troops to capture a number of cities and positions which Tancred had captured previously, and the Byzantine fleet took part in the capture of some of the coastal cities between Latakia and Tartous. Furthermore, the Byzantines were able to use their naval bases in Cyprus to help Raymond de Aguilers — the sworn enemy of Bohemond — who was trying to establish a principality around Tripoli, parallel to and south of Antioch. Meanwhile, no one from Jerusalem offered Bohemond any help during this calamity.<sup>187</sup>

Thus Jekermish, by forming an alliance with Suqman, was able to play a major role in the history of the Crusades and, along with his allies, to present the Muslim world with its first decisive victory against the Crusaders. This was to pave the way for the emergence of leaders and Islamic alliances which would direct continual blows against the Crusader forces, starting with Mawdood, the Seljuk ruler of Mosul and ending with Salah ad-Deen, and including Ilghazi and Balak al-Artuqiyeen, Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqi, Imad ad-Deen Zangi and Noor ad-Deen Zangi.<sup>188</sup>

## Jekermish persists in Jihad

In spite of some negative signs that followed the Muslim victory in Balikh, Jekermish continued to aspire to achieve other victories in this field. Less than two years later that became possible for him, when at the end of 499 AH/1106 CE, he received instructions from Sultan Muhammad to launch a new campaign against the Crusaders. He contacted local rulers and was able to form an alliance which included Radwan the ruler of Aleppo, Ilghazi al-Artuqi the ruler of Mardin, Albi Timurtash the ruler of Sinjar and al-

Asbahadh Sawa, one of the rulers of Persia. However, what Ilghazi suggested to the aforementioned rulers delayed implementation of the suggested plan: he asked them to start their campaign by moving against Jekermish with the aim of capturing Mosul so as to earn the pleasure of Sultan Muhammad. This latter held a grudge against the ruler of Mosul because of his actions; moreover, there was the possibility of utilizing the financial and military resources of Mosul against the Crusaders. The leaders agreed to this and joined forces to attack Nusaybin, which belonged to the ruler of Mosul. However, the representatives of Jekermish in that city succeeded — with instructions from their master in Mosul — in provoking a rift between Radwan and Ilghazi. Radwan took the opportunity during a feast held before the walls of Nusaybin to kidnap Ilghazi and put him in chains. Ilghazi's Turkmen followers managed to release him, and they launched a surprise attack against Radwan's camp, forcing him to withdraw to Aleppo. The breakdown of this alliance began to show before even a single step was taken towards its original aim of fighting the Crusaders,<sup>189</sup> but none of that shook Jekermish's resolve to attack the real enemy. Once he had dealt with the efforts of these rulers allied against him, he hastened to launch an attack against Edessa. He overcame the attacks launched by the troops of Richard (of Salerno) who was ruling Edessa at that time on behalf of the imprisoned Baldwin. As soon as Jekermish returned to Mosul, however, he was faced with new troubles regarding the Seljuks. Only a short time passed before Kilij Arslan ibn Sulayman, the Sultan of the Seljuks of Rum, moved to attack Edessa, and the representatives of Jekermish in Harran took the opportunity to send word to him that they would surrender the city to him. Kilij Arslan arrived and entered Harran, and the people rejoiced at the Jihad against the Franks.<sup>190</sup> He stayed there for several days, after which he had to return to his own land because of a severe illness that struck him, but he left behind a group of commanders in Harran to protect it.<sup>191</sup> It seems that Kilij Arslan began to prevail because of the power, independence and influence over his counterparts among other Muslim rulers in the region that he enjoyed due to their ongoing disputes and conflicts aimed at achieving limited local victories. Moreover, the problems that Jekermish was facing in Mosul and the deterioration of his relationship with the Seljuks kept him from focusing fully on the Jihad against the Crusaders. This led to Kilij Arslan coming to the attention of Jekermish's representatives in Harran, who summoned him and surrendered the city to him. This explains what happened shortly

afterwards, when Kilij Arslan was summoned by the people of Mosul so that he could rule them as well, after their ruler, Jekermish, was killed.<sup>192</sup>

## Jihad of Jekermish and Suqman ibn Artuq

Crusader hordes in Syria and Palestine, the many princes who had not taken part became eager to go to the East, motivated by personal, worldly ambitions to acquire booty and land, above and beyond the religious motives of attaining reward and forgiveness. It is said that the Crusaders in the East were in urgent need of fighters and colonists, with the following aims:

- Continuing the war against the Muslims
- Further expansion
- Guarding what they had already gained
- Protecting these gains from any attempt on the part of the Muslims to recapture them.

Western society responded to this phenomenon with a wave of new Crusader energy, which led to the flow of more Crusader masses towards the East. The Lombards formed the first of these groups, setting out from northern Italy in 494 AH/1101 CE, led by Anselm of Buis, the Archbishop of Milan, and accompanied by a number of rulers, including Albert Count of Achen, Guibert Count of Parma, and Hugh Count of Montebello.<sup>193</sup> It seems that this Lombard group, despite the large number of its participants, was no different in quality from the masses that had gone before, because it included only a small number of fighting knights; the vast majority were common folk who did not know how to fight and were lacking in discipline. When they reached the outskirts of Constantinople, they committed acts of plunder and pillage which made the Byzantine Emperor hasten to send them on to Asia Minor. That occurred in Jumada I (March). They settled in Nicomedia, awaiting the arrival of other Crusader groups.<sup>194</sup> In fact, it was not long before another group arrived, composed of Frenchmen led by Stephen Count of Blois. He was joined by a number of other rulers, such as Stephen Count of Burgundy, Hugh Count of Varmandois, Baldwin Count of Hainaut and Hugh Pierrefond Bishop of Macon, in addition to a German expedition led by Konrad (Count of Luxembourg). This group crossed the Bosphorus and camped at Nicaea, close to the Lombard camp. The number of people gathered there was between two and three hundred thousand fighters. The



Byzantine Emperor Alexios Komnenos appointed his friend Raymond of Toulouse as their commander in chief, and they were joined by a number of Byzantine troops, led by Tzitas.<sup>195</sup>

## The battle of Merzifon

The huge Crusader army moved from Nicomedia to Dorylaeum with the aim of reaching the holy land, provided that during its march it would reopen the route through Asia Minor. Hence the Emperor ordered Stephen of Blois to take the army via the route that the previous Crusaders had taken, which passed through Dorylaeum and Konya. The Lombards refused to head towards the holy land until after Bohemond was freed, for they viewed him as an exemplary model and a hero, and the only warrior they trusted to lead them to victory. They insisted that the campaign head towards Cappadocia, and Ibn al-Atheer states that the aim of this Crusader campaign was to free Bohemond.<sup>196</sup> In spite of the arguments from some of the leaders, the campaign headed towards the Danishmend lands via Ankara, which belonged to Kilij Arslan, they then made their way to Gangra (ankr) which is located south of Paphlagonia, so as to take the main route leading to Amasya and Niksar. With the intent of slowing down the Crusaders' progress, Kilij Arslan resorted to a gradual withdrawal ahead of the Crusader forces, following a Bedouin-style method of destroying the land as he withdrew, burning everything that could be of benefit to the Crusaders, especially food supplies. At the same time, Turkish forces started gathering in a new alliance to confront the Crusader menace. Gumiishtigin Ahmad the Danishmend renewed his alliance with Kilij Arslan, and urged Radwan the ruler of Aleppo to send a number of troops.<sup>197</sup>

The Crusaders reached ankr where they found the Turks present in full force and were unable to capture the city because of its strong fortifications. They were forced to march on, after plundering neighbouring villages. They grew exhausted because of the lack of food supplies, extreme heat and pressure from the Turks. In order to avoid imminent destruction, Raymond suggested that the army should head north-east, towards Kastamonu, and thence towards one of the Byzantine cities on the Black Sea coast. The journey towards Kastamonu was very slow and hard, because of the lack of food, as the Turks had destroyed all crops and filled in the wells, and because the Crusaders were exposed to sudden Turkish attacks, so they

scattered, not caring about anything, before Raymond could bring them back together. When they reached the outskirts of Kastamonu, Raymond had to find a route among the masses of Turkish troops to the coast, but the Lombards again insisted on heading towards the East, and he gave in to them.<sup>198</sup> The Crusader army crossed the Halys river into the Danishmend lands, and some of them reached the city of Merzifon, located halfway between the river and Amasya.<sup>199</sup> When the Turks realized that the Crusader forces had become exhausted, they attacked them and it was not long before the Crusaders collapsed and fled the battlefield, under the pressure of the fighting, leaving behind their women and the monks. Raymond fled to a small hill where he hid until the French and Germans rescued him; he then fled during the night after having despaired of achieving any victory, leaving behind the Crusader camp and the non-combatants in it to fall into the hands of the Turks as booty.<sup>200</sup> The battle was followed by a chase in which no one escaped except the knights, and the Crusaders' losses amounted to four-fifths of the army.<sup>201</sup> The Turks seized a large amount of weapons and a great number of prisoners, whom they sold into slavery.

Raymond soon reached Bafra, the small Byzantine port on the Black Sea, near Sinop. From there he was taken by a Byzantine ship to Constantinople.<sup>202</sup> The Latin historian Albeit of Aix points out that Raymond received a bribe from the Turks to lead the army to Kastamonu, but this is unlikely, because anyone who studies the course of the campaign and the events that accompanied it will see how much effort Raymond put into trying to convince the Lombards not to head towards the lands of the Danishmend first of all, then how he tried to save the army from the dilemma into which he had fallen, and how he only chose the route to Kastamonu because of the troubles to which his army had been exposed. As for his flight from the battlefield, that was the result of his realization that there was no point in continuing after the Lombards had turned tail and fled, followed by the Pecheneg mercenaries.<sup>203</sup>

## The first battle of Heraclea

The disaster that befell the Crusaders at Merzifon erased the fame that they had acquired as the result of their victory at Dorylaeum. What made it worse was that this was not the last disaster. At the same time as the Lombards left Nicomedia, a French army of fifteen thousand knights and foot

soldiers, led by William Count of Nevers, arrived in Constantinople. William was eager to join the Lombards quickly, so he left Constantinople, heading for Nicomedia, where he found out that the Crusader hordes had left, heading for Ankara. He travelled to that city, which he reached easily, but no one knew in which direction those hordes had gone. All the count could do was head for Konya; when he reached it he besieged it, but a group of Seljuk Turkish troops defended it. All his attempts to capture it failed, so he left it.<sup>204</sup>

During the same period, the Seljuks and their allies finished destroying the Lombard army, and Kilij Arslan and Giimusstigin Ahmad the Danishmend learned of the approach of a new enemy whilst they were still savouring their victory. They headed south and beat William to Heraclea. William's troops travelled slowly from Konya, heading East, and when they came to place near Heraclea, utterly exhausted, the Turks attacked them. Their resistance collapsed after a battle which did not last long, and the entire French army met its end, apart from William and six of his followers.<sup>205</sup>

## The second battle of Heraclea

At the same time as William's campaign was marching through Asia Minor, the final group of these Crusaders, consisting of French and Germans led by William DC Duke of Aquitaine and Welf IV Duke of Bavaria, reached Constantinople. The number of their troops was sixty thousand. This horde set out from Constantinople, heading for Konya, following the same route that Bohemond had taken before. The Turks implemented the same plan as before, burning crops, destroying food supplies, and filling in wells. When the horde reached Konya, they found the city empty; the Seljuk garrison had vacated the city after resisting William's attack, carrying with them all the supplies in the city and even stripping its gardens and orchards of anything that could be of benefit to the Crusaders.<sup>206</sup> The Crusaders did not stay in Konya for long before heading towards Heraclea via a route that was fifty-five miles long. They suffered a great deal of hardship, with extreme hunger and thirst, enduring Turkish attacks from time to time in which some were killed. When they entered Heraclea, they found the city deserted.<sup>207</sup> The Muslims were lying in wait for the Crusaders, hiding in the forests around Heraclea, and they ambushed them when they were drinking water from the

river that emerges behind the city. The Crusaders fell into disarray and the Turks pounced on them and destroyed them utterly, except a very few who managed to escape with difficulty, among whom were William IX and Wolf IV; these headed for Tarsus and thence to Antioch.<sup>208</sup>

## Outcome of the battles of Kilij Arslan

Each of these three groups met a very sad end, which affected the course of the Crusader movement on one hand, and on the other hand, affected the Turks in general and the Seljuks in particular. The most important of these effects were as follows:

**a)** The Seljuks exacted revenge for what had befallen them at Dorylaeum. After that they would never again be expelled from Anatolia. These consecutive victories also raised their morale.

**b)** The route that crossed Asia Minor into Syria remained unsafe for both Crusader and Byzantine armies, despite the successes of the first Crusader groups in penetrating it. The Crusader migrants became afraid to take this land route, which led from Constantinople to Edessa, unless they were in huge armies. They were no longer able to come except by sea, which incurred huge expenses that few were able to afford. This land route remained closed to the Crusaders for several years.<sup>209</sup>

**c)** The Crusaders blamed the Byzantines for the calamities that had befallen them and held them responsible for what had happened. Rumours spread amongst them that Raymond had been acting on the Emperor's instructions when he took the army that he was leading away from the designated route so that the soldiers would meet their deaths in a previously-planned ambush. In fact, Rome wanted to find a scapegoat to bear responsibility for its mistakes, so they put the blame on the Byzantines and regarded them as responsible for the disasters that had occurred.<sup>210</sup>

**d)** Kilij Arslan's pride grew after these victories, and he was soon joined by the Turks of Anatolia; he was able to seize control of the interior, after which he stayed in his capital Konya, which lay on the main route connecting Constantinople to Syria.<sup>211</sup>

**e)** The Danishmend continued their conquests in the Euphrates valley with no obstacles, and they reached the edges of the kingdom of Edessa.

They also conquered Malatya (Melitene), capturing its ruler, on 23 Dhul-Hijjah 495 AH/18 September 1102 CE.

f) The Crusaders' departure to Syria led to a new round of disputes and competition between the Seljuks and Danishmend; the two great Turkish tribes fought to take possession of Malatya and take the ransom for Bohemond. Thus the Turkish front in that region disintegrated.<sup>212</sup>

## Consequences of the death of Kilij Arslan

Zangi ibn Jekermish contacted Kilij Arslan I asking him for help. At that time he was in Malatya, and he promised to hand Mosul and the surrounding area over to him. The Seljuk sultan Kilij Arslan took this opportunity to expand his territory at the expense of the warring rulers, so he hastened to help Zangi. When Jawali learned of his march, he withdrew from the city, especially since Jekermish had died suddenly in captivity, and he had intended to use him as a bargaining chip; he also realized that Kilij Arslan I was so powerful that he would not be able to confront him in battle face to face. Hence he decided to form an alliance against him so as to support his own position.<sup>213</sup> Despite this, Kilij Arslan I was able to enter Mosul where he was welcomed by the population; he promised to respect their freedom and made some administrative arrangements.<sup>214</sup> As for Jawali, he withdrew to Sinjar, where he held discussions with Ilghazi al-Artuqi and Radwan the ruler of Aleppo, at the end of which they agreed to drive Kilij Arslan I out of Mosul, then after that go to attack Antioch. The war against Kilij Arslan I ended with his defeat: he drowned in the Khabur River<sup>215</sup> in 500 AH/1107 CE.<sup>216</sup> Kilij Arslan I is regarded as one of the prominent figures produced by the Seljuks of Rum,<sup>217</sup> and the Near East was affected by his sudden death.

The Seljuks of Rum, among whom no strong leader appeared to take the place of Kilij Arslan, were subjected to increasing pressure from the Byzantine Empire, which resumed its interference in their internal affairs. Alexios Komnenos managed with ease to regain his control over the western parts of Asia Minor and along the southern coast.

The death of Kilij Arslan extended the life of the Great Seljuk state by nearly one hundred years: sharp divisions in the state between the sultans

and emirs fighting to gain the throne and the numerous civil wars among them, in addition to the external dangers surrounding them such as the dangers posed by the Assassins and Crusaders, encouraged Kilij Arslan to interfere in eastern affairs so as to gain authority and leadership, and to unite again all Seljuk power in the east. He would have been able to achieve this dream of his, because both internal and external political circumstances were favourable, but his death spared the Greater Seljuks and lengthened their lifespan.

The death of Kilij Arslan is regarded as a very important stage in the separation of the Seljuks of Rum from the Seljuks of the East, because the internal and external dangers surrounding the Greater Seljuk state prevented them from interfering in the affairs of the other Seljuk branches, especially in Syria and Asia Minor. It is worth mentioning that the state of the Seljuks of Rum still, up to this time, belonged nominally to the Greater Seljuks, and did not become completely independent until 552 AH/1157 CE.<sup>218</sup>

The death of Kilij Arslan deprived the Seljuks of Syria of a force which could have guaranteed unity among them, as Seljuk power in Syria began to shrink rapidly because the two sons of Tutush, Radwan and Daqaq, did not have the political acumen to enable them to confront the worrisome circumstances that Syria was going through at the end of the fifth century AH (eleventh century CE) and the beginning of the following century. Perhaps the greatest sign of diminishing Seljuk authority in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere was the emergence of a large number of dynasties which all had something in common — a connection to the Seljuk family name. From those families emerged political units headed by regents known as atabegs.<sup>219</sup>

The death of Kilij Arslan removed a serious danger from the Byzantine Emperor at a critical time, because Bohemond was preparing to attack the Balkans in 501 AH/1107 CE, starting out from the well-fortified fortress of Durazzo (Dyrrhachium, Durres), and Alexios Komnenos had sacrificed his southeastern border to save Durazzo. He had made a treaty with Kilij Arslan, according to which he got military aid from him, but his sudden death and the absence of any strong leader to take his place gave Alexios the opportunity to focus on confronting the danger of Bohemond, whom he defeated in 502 AH/1108 CE.<sup>220</sup>

The death of Kilij Arslan made the situation in Asia Minor volatile, because the oldest of his four sons, Malikshah, became a prisoner in the hands of Sultan Muhammad after the battle of al-Khaboor, whilst his widow gained control of Malatya and the eastern regions, with the help of the emir Aydbar, who acknowledged the authority of Tughrul Arslan, the youngest son of Kilij Arslan, over Byzantine territory. As for the other two brothers, Mas'ood and 'Arab, the former lived in the Danishmend region and the latter settled in Konya.<sup>221</sup>

The collapse of the central authority among the Seljuks of Rum was not to the advantage of the Byzantines, because the Seljuks continued to raid the Empire's lands. Despite that, the Byzantine Emperor was able to capture some fortresses in the border regions,<sup>222</sup> but he did not want to venture into Cilicia or Syria. This attitude of his worked in the favour of the Seljuks who were devoting their efforts to dealing with their internal problems.<sup>223</sup>

Jawali Saqawah: after the death of Kilij Arslan, who drowned in the Khabur River in 500 AH/1107 CE, it became possible for Jawali to enter Mosul, but because of the savagery that accompanied his rule, he soon became hated by its people. He did not do anything more than Jekermish had done with regard to outwardly accepting the authority of Muhammad, despite the fact that he delivered sermons in that ruler's name in Mosul,<sup>224</sup> as he declared his independence and cut off all ties with him. This prompted Sultan Muhammad in Dhul-Qa'dah 501 AH/June 1108 CE to give one of his men, Mawdood ibn al-Tuntash, the task of expelling Jawali from Mosul and taking his place as governor.<sup>225</sup> Thus Jawali was forced to flee from Mosul a second time; he went to Mesopotamia where all the enemies of the Seljuk state rallied around him, chief among whom was the Arab Banu Mazed tribe. He did not hesitate either in forming an alliance with neighbouring Crusader forces; he release Baldwin de Bourcq, the ruler of Edessa, and formed an alliance with him against the Seljuks.<sup>226</sup> Mawdood entered Mosul, where he was welcomed by the inhabitants, in Safar 502 AH/September 1108 CE.<sup>227</sup>

## **Mawdood ibn at-Tuntash (501-507 CE/1108-1113 CE)**

Sharaf ad-Dawlah Mawdood occupies a special place in the history of the Jihad against the Crusaders. A number of factors contributed to making his position prominent, the most important of which — undoubtedly — is the early stage at which he appeared. Also crucial were the profound Islamic nature of his character; his complete devotion to achieving the greater aims of the Muslims; his tolerant, just internal policies; his ability — on that basis — to lead the Jihad movement and create some sort of coordination, perhaps for the first time, between all the Islamic forces in the field of Jihad, which we do not find in such a crystallized, mature form except during the Artuqid and Zangid periods later on; and finally, his success in forcing the Crusaders into a defensive position and his achievement of a number of victories, one of which came in the hills of Tiberias in the heart of Palestine, far from the arena in which the battles between the rulers of Mosul and their enemies had usually taken place. Nonetheless, he was murdered soon after that in the Jami' mosque of Damascus at the hands of vicious enemies of the Jihad and resistance movement. The profound grief that enveloped the Muslim masses after his assassination and the sincere words that he spoke just before his martyrdom all confirm the position of Mawdood as one of the Islamic heroes of the wars against the Crusaders and one of the early pioneers of the Jihad.<sup>228</sup>

### **Mawdood's first campaign against Edessa**

In 503 AH/1109 CE, a few months after taking full control in Mosul, and after receiving instructions from the Seljuk sultan Muhammad ibn Malikshah to go ahead and fight the Crusaders, Mawdood began forming an Islamic alliance which included the Artuqi emir Ilghazi, the emir of Mardin, and his Turkmen troops; Suqman al-Qutubi who was known as the Shah of the Armenians; and a large number of volunteers.<sup>229</sup> This was the first time that such a number of Muslim rulers had come together to fight the



Crusaders; hence this campaign is regarded as the start of a new era in the fight against the Crusaders, and an important turning point from division and apathy to unity and attack.<sup>230</sup>

As soon as the Crusaders in Edessa became aware of the Muslims massing, Baldwin de Bourcq sent a messenger to Jerusalem, seeking immediate help from King Baldwin; he did not bother to seek help from Tancred the ruler of Antioch because he had doubts about his intentions, thinking that he may have come to some agreement with the Muslims against Edessa. At that time King Baldwin was besieging Beirut and did not move until he had captured that city; then he hastened northwards, accompanied by Bertram the ruler of Tripoli. Near Samosata he was joined by some Armenian leaders, headed by Kogh Basil, and he reached Edessa at the end of Dhul-Hijjah/August. Atabeg Mawdood continued to besiege Edessa for two months without being able to breach its fortified walls. When he saw the army from Jerusalem approaching at a distance, he lifted the siege and retreated to Harran, according to a precise military plan, where he was joined by Tughtigin, the atabeg of Damascus.<sup>231</sup>

King Baldwin decided to pursue the Muslim army, but he had to unite the Crusaders before he could do that. So he summoned Tancred, the ruler of Antioch, and managed to bring about reconciliation between him and the ruler of Edessa.<sup>232</sup> Mawdood retreated some distance, so as to entice the Crusaders to pursue him to a place that was far away from their base, and then surround them after turning suddenly northwards. The pursuit ceased suddenly, however, and the Crusader alliance disintegrated. A combination of many factors caused the Crusaders to give up the chase and leave the area, the most important of which may be:

- a) King Baldwin received early warning of Mawdood's plan, so he lifted the siege of the citadel of Shenaw, north-west of Harran. He had also received a warning from Jerusalem that the Fatimids were moving against Beirut, so he decided to give up the campaign.<sup>233</sup>
- b) Rumours were circulating among the Crusaders that Radwan, the ruler of Aleppo, was preparing to attack Antioch during its ruler's absence, so Tancred was forced to give up the campaign.
- c) Based on the king's advice that there was no point in attempting to protect the areas east of the Euphrates, Baldwin told the inhabitants to leave

and go to the areas on the right bank. He kept some garrisons in the large fortresses of Edessa and Surooj, and in some of the smaller citadels, and also reinforced their defences. Mawdood, however, was content to attack the passing Crusaders from the rear and return to Mosul.<sup>234</sup>

## Mawdood's second campaign against Edessa

The second round came less than two years later, as a result of the mobilization called for by a delegation from Aleppo who came to Baghdad to call for Jihad. They did so after seeing the extent to which Radwan was submitting to the Crusaders and the continuous defeats suffered by the Muslims of Syria, as a consequence of which many positions had fallen into enemy hands. The call of the Aleppan delegation motivated the masses and the scholars of Baghdad, and they held a huge demonstration in which they called upon the authorities — the caliphs and sultans — to realize the necessity of proclaiming a Jihad and sending armies to halt the Crusaders' march. The caliph hastened to notify the Seljuk sultan of what had happened, and asked him to pay attention to the matter and hasten to respond to the calls of the Muslims. The Seljuk sultan issued immediate orders to his governor in Mosul, the emir Mawdood, telling him to form a new Islamic alliance with his son, King Mas'ood, as commander in chief of the Muslims.<sup>235</sup> All the rulers of the Seljuk region — Suqman al-Qubuti, ruler of Khalat<sup>236</sup>, Tabriz<sup>237</sup> and part of Diyarbakir; Ilghazi al-Artuqi who sent his son Ayaz as his deputy; the two Kurdish emirs, Ahmadeel ruler of Maraghah<sup>238</sup> and Abul-Hayja' ruler of Irbil; in addition to some Persian emirs led by Ilkani and Zangi the two sons of Bursuq the emir of Hamadhan<sup>239</sup> — gathered under the leadership of Mawdood, the ruler of Mosul.

The allied forces began their military operation in Muharram 505 AH/August 1111 CE by conquering a number of Crusader sites east of the Euphrates, then they went and besieged Edessa, where the campaign spread panic among the inhabitants, but in fact it did not change a thing. Edessa wore the Muslims down because of its fortifications and the resilience of its inhabitants, at which point Mawdood decided to cross the Euphrates and attack Turbessel.<sup>240</sup> The Muslim forces hoped to tempt their enemy to cross the Euphrates, thus to get the better of them, but this was a mistake on the Muslims' part, because when they crossed the Euphrates, the Crusaders were

able to transfer a large amount of food, weapons and reinforcements to Edessa, which grew strong after it had been weak. It would have fallen into the Muslims' hands if they had continued their siege of the city.<sup>241</sup> It was not long before Joscelin, the ruler of Turbessel, who was under pressure from the Muslim forces, was able to bribe the Kurdish commander Ahmadeel, who with his troops formed a large part of the Muslim forces, to withdraw despite the objections of all the other leaders.<sup>242</sup> Soon after that, Radwan asked Mawdood for help and summoned his troops to Aleppo so that they could work together from there against the Crusaders. Mawdood left Turbessel and headed for Aleppo at the head of his forces, but he did not get far from Turbessel before Joscelin came out, leading his knights, and was able to attack the Muslim rearguard, killing nearly one thousand men and returning home laden with booty. Radwan's call to Mawdood was not genuine; hardly had the Muslim forces drawn close to Aleppo than he shut the city gates in their faces and took precautions to prevent any demonstrations by ordering the arrest of many prominent figures in the city, whom he took as hostages.

Mawdood had no option but to lead his army south to Shaizar, after raiding a number of Crusader sites in the north. In Shaizar he met with Tughtigin, who was heading towards Baghdad to seek help in taking back Tripoli, but he was afraid that Damascus would be taken from him, so he had started to negotiate with the Crusaders in secret. As for Tancred, who had camped in front of Shaizar, he retreated to Afamiyah, and sent word to King Baldwin asking him for help; the latter responded and sent for all the knights in the Crusader East to join him, and he was joined by a large number of them. Tancred also asked his followers from all parts of Antioch for help. Mawdood fortified himself behind the walls of Shaizar before the gathering of Crusaders — which grew to sixteen thousand fighters led by the King of Jerusalem and the rulers of Edessa, Antioch and Tripoli — was complete. Mawdood refused to be dragged by his enemies into a decisive battle, but things did not go well with regard to his army. Tughtigin did not want to offer him help until after Mawdood promised to go ahead with his campaign to the south to fight the Crusaders in Palestine, in spite of the riskiness of this attempt from a military viewpoint. The Kurdish commander Bursuq fell ill and wanted to return to his country, and Suqman died suddenly, so his troops withdrew northward, carrying his corpse with them. Ahmadeel hastened to withdraw his troops in an attempt to capture some of Suqman's possessions.

Mawdood was no longer able to launch an attack as the numbers of his troops were diminishing daily, and he did not want to spend the winter far from Mosul so he returned there.<sup>243</sup> This poor conduct on the part of some of the commanders had a direct impact on the possibility of achieving a decisive victory against the Crusaders like that achieved by Jekermish and Suqman in the Battle of al-Balikh. These events demonstrated the extent of the Muslim division and lack of unity, at a time when Crusader forces had gathered in the north and south of Syria, and Baldwin King of Jerusalem had achieved a kind of leadership over all the other Crusader rulers.<sup>244</sup>

The policies of Radwan in the emirate of Aleppo were all dreadful. He made a deal with the Ismailis and Crusaders, forming an alliance with them against their Muslim opponents. He joined forces with the Crusader ruler of Antioch against the ruler of Mosul, Jawali, in 501 AH, and when Mawdood, emir of Mosul, attacked Antioch and Turbessel, Radwan refused to help him and shut the city gates of Aleppo in his face. Instead, he formed an alliance with Tancred, ruler of Antioch, against the mujahideen, and the gates of the city remained closed to the Muslim army for seventeen days.<sup>245</sup> Despite this the Crusaders did not show any appreciation for his stance, as they besieged Aleppo in 504 AH, intensifying the siege until its inhabitants were forced to eat carrion and leaves, and they imposed upon Radwan the payment of an annual tribute.<sup>246</sup> The deviant, heretical Rafidi, Batini Ismailis attained a prominent position in Aleppo as Radwan embraced their ideas and helped them, then used them to assassinate his political opponents.<sup>247</sup> He was inclined towards the Fatimids, and prayers for al-Musta'li (the Fatimid caliph) and his vizier al-Afdal were offered in the Friday sermons in his land, and continued for two years in Aleppo. His conduct was deplorable; he brought the Batinis close to him and established a propagation centre for them in Aleppo so that their numbers increased. He died in 507 AH.<sup>248</sup> The historian Abul-Mahasin described Radwan in the following terms:

He was stingy and miserly, badly behaved, with no mercy in his heart towards his people. The Franks would raid and take prisoners, and he would not go out to confront them.<sup>249</sup>

Radwan was succeeded by his son Alp Arslan who was known as 'al-Akhras' (the mute), who persecuted the Ismailis and killed their leader, Abu Tahir as-Sa'igh, and the other leaders of that sect.

## Mawdood's third campaign against Edessa

Although Mawdood found himself alone in the Jihad movement, he nevertheless launched a sudden attack against Edessa in Dhul-Qa'dah 505 AH/March 1112 CE and besieged it. The city withstood the siege, so he decided to leave a military force around the city and attack Surooj in Muharram 506 AH/August 1112 CE, because it was the second Crusader fortress east of the Euphrates.

With this military plan, Mawdood divided his forces and weakened them, abandoning his cautious approach regarding the Crusaders. The outcome was that Joscelin, ruler of Turbessel, caught up with him and defeated him, killing a large number of his men, so he had no choice but to retreat towards Edessa. However, Joscelin got there first to help Baldwin de Bourcq defend it. Whilst these events were going on, the Armenians in Edessa conspired against Baldwin and contacted Mawdood to rescue them from Crusader rule, agreeing to help him to capture a citadel that controlled the eastern sector of the city, which would then enable him to capture the entire city with ease. The rapid arrival of Joscelin prevented any implementation of this agreement, however; the Muslims were driven back and did not manage to wrest the city from the hands of the Crusaders.<sup>250</sup>

## Mawdood's campaign — the Battle of Sannabra

Mawdood still clung to the idea of Jihad against the Crusaders; this was the mission that the Seljuk sultan Muhammad had entrusted to him as his representative in Mesopotamia and Syria. At the beginning of 507 AH (June 1113 CE), he moved at the head of an Islamic alliance to fight the Crusaders in Jerusalem, in response to the call for help from Tughtigin the atabeg of Damascus, after his emirate was subjected to fierce attacks from the Crusaders of Jerusalem who went through the valley of Taym to the Bekaa, and reached Baalbek. Tamerk the ruler of Sinjar and Ayaz ibn Ilghazi the emir of Mardin joined this alliance.<sup>251</sup> The goal of the Muslims was the region of Palestine, and they succeeded in drawing out King Baldwin to the lands around Damascus, as far as the bridge of Sannabra, which is located at the headwaters of the River Jordan. On the thirteenth of Muharram they met

in a battle which ended in victory for the Muslims and dealt a crushing blow to the Crusaders. The king of Jerusalem went back to Tiberias<sup>252</sup> and soon Roger of Antioch and Pons of Tripoli came to help him, whereas the ruler of Edessa could not come because his principality needed to be guarded constantly.<sup>253</sup> After the battle, the Muslims progressed as far as Tiberias, but they did not want to venture into confronting the Crusader alliance, especially since winter had begun, so they decided to withdraw to Damascus.<sup>254</sup> That was the first time that Mosul and Damascus cooperated in fighting the Crusaders in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The atabeg Mawdood played an important role in that he restored the Muslims' self-confidence, so they turned their strategy towards the Crusaders from a defensive one to an offensive one. He crystallized the idea of unity among Muslims, and gave it a political and a military dimension, so their leaders became ready to cooperate, with commitment and firm intentions.<sup>255</sup>

## The murder of Mawdood

Mawdood and his allies sent a messenger to the Seljuk sultan in Isfahan, telling him the good news of the victories that they had achieved, and sending some booty with the messenger, along with some of the Frankish prisoners and the heads of some of the slain. However, the fact that the Muslims were far from their homelands, had no supplies, and were suffering from the intense cold forced them to cease operations in the area and return to Damascus on the twenty-first of Rabee' I, with hopes of returning to fight the Crusaders when spring came. After Mawdood received the sultan's response to his message and his instructions concerning it,<sup>256</sup> he went to the Jami' mosque in Damascus on a Friday in Rabee' I to pray there with Tughtigin. When they had finished praying, Mawdood came out to the courtyard of the mosque, holding Tughtigin's hand, and a Batini heretic leapt on him and struck him, inflicting four wounds. The Batini was captured and his head was taken but no one recognized him, so it was burned. Mawdood had been fasting, and he was carried to the house of Tughtigin, who urged him strongly to break his fast, but he refused, saying, "I do not want to meet Allah except fasting," and he died that day, may Allah have mercy on him.<sup>257</sup>

The Muslims were saddened by the fall of one of the greatest heroes of Jihad, who was known for his sincerity, devotion and daring, and they

grieved deeply for his sudden disappearance after the great victory that he and his allies had achieved in the heart of Crusader territory. The masses of Damascus expressed their sorrow and anger, and the city witnessed turmoil such as had not been seen in a long time. Nothing calmed the people down except their hope that their leader would survive the wounds that had been inflicted on him, but as soon as they heard of his martyrdom a few hours later, their anguish and turmoil were renewed.<sup>258</sup> The Frankish king in Jerusalem wrote a letter to Tughtigin in which he said, "The nation that murdered its leader, on its feast day, in its house of worship, deserves to be destroyed by God!"<sup>259</sup> Nevertheless, the Frankish king and other Crusader leaders were unaware, or deliberately ignored, what was really going on at that time.

The greatest help to them and the greatest danger to every Muslim attempt to fight them was not the nation that they thought had killed its leader in its house of worship — and we know the attitude of this nation towards the murder of its mujahid hero — rather it was that hateful Rafidi Batini group which was based on unorthodox beliefs and had a strong inclination towards destructiveness, which was established in Persia by a man called al-Hasan ibn as-Sabbah, whom we have discussed previously. He was supported by the Rafidi Batini Fatimid state, and the hatred of these Assassins for the Christians was no greater than their hatred for the Sunni Muslims.<sup>260</sup> What we see today is the best evidence of that.

## Consequences of the campaigns led by Mawdood

Despite the failure that befell the campaigns of Mawdood, the hero of Islam, they led to many important consequences for the course of the Islamic Jihad movement against the Crusaders, which may be summed up as follows:

a) Mawdood's reign — although it was short — is regarded as a turning-point in the history of the Muslim-Christian conflict during that early stage, as the idea of Jihad became a reality<sup>261</sup> and found a loyal knight who carried its banner for nearly half of the period during which he was the emir of Mosul.<sup>262</sup>

**b)** The campaign of Mawdood exposed the weakness of the Muslim forces in Syria and Mesopotamia, and the apathy among some of them towards Jihad against the Crusader invaders.<sup>263</sup>

**c)** It is possible to regard the campaigns of Mawdood as a precursor to the campaigns of Imad ad-Deen Zangi, without minimising the chronological difference of three decades that separated the achievements of each of them, which then led to the fall of the Crusader principality of Edessa in 539 AH/1144 CE. Mawdood directed his early campaign against Edessa and Turbessel and worked to wear down their populace in a way which we would say paved the way for Zangi's efforts against Edessa, for the progress of Jihad is connected, with one leader paving the way for another..<sup>263</sup>

**d)** The campaign of Mawdood exposed the weakness of the Muslim forces in Syria and Mesopotamia, and the apathy among some of them towards Jihad against the Crusader invaders.<sup>263</sup>

**e)** Despite the pioneering role played by Mawdood, we find that some historians think that Imad ad-Deen Zangi was the one who laid the foundation for the Jihad movement against the Crusaders.<sup>264</sup> This is enormously unfair to the role of that Seljuk leader. In reality, the historians who recorded that stage in the history of the Islamic-Christian conflict were dazzled by the extent of what 'Imad ad-Deen al-Zangi achieved in causing the fall of the first Crusader principality to be established in the region, and they imagined that the previous stages were of no great importance, despite the fact that they had truly laid the foundations for the achievements of 1144 CE/539 AH. We should not overlook the fact that the effective, successful political propaganda that was introduced by the brilliant Iraqi historian Ibn al-Atheer in his excellent book about the founder of the Zangid dynasty influenced historians in one way or another in such a way that it made them give Imad ad-Deen al-Zangi that status in their evaluation of historical events. It is sufficient pride for Mawdood that he succeeded in striking at the Crusader presence in Galilee, which was an area that had not been reached by any Muslim initiatives for nearly two decades. Suffice it to say that he inflicted defeat on the founder of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem.



f) We may reach a specific conclusion from the fact that the leaders of the Islamic Jihad all complement one another and there is no conflict between them. What Mawdood did benefited the great leader Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi later on. Hence it may be said: Today Sannabra, tomorrow Hattin. This is what was proven by the general history of that region in the sixth century AH (twelfth century CE).<sup>265</sup> Whatever the case, when we compare the efforts of Mawdood with those who came before him, such as Kerbogha, Jekermish and Jawali Saqawah, it will become clear to us that their roles were gradual and complementary. All that Kerbogha did was send support to save Antioch. Jekermish added to that through his alliance with Suqman ibn Artuq in a way that led to victory in the battle of Harran in 498 AH/1104 CE. As for Mawdood, his role was more significant in that it led to the defeat of the Crusaders at Sannabra in 507 AH/1113 CE. This proves to us that in only nine years, two major defeats were inflicted on the Crusaders. But there remains the stubborn fact that the Muslims did not benefit from either victory by attacking the enemy's territory. Achieving swift victory made it hard for the Crusaders to compensate for their losses, but the remaining phenomenon of political division and grudges among the Muslim leadership formed an obstacle to achieving that goal.<sup>266</sup>

## Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi, ruler of Mardin

The Islamic Jihad movement against the Crusaders was strongly connected to the leaders of Mosul who were under Seljuk rule. The death of the sultan Muhammad ibn Malikshah in 512 AH/ 1117 CE led to the decline of the Seljuk position in Iraq. Sultan Mahmood ibn Muhammad ibn Malikshah tried to summon Ak Sunqur from Mosul in order to appoint him as governor of Shahankiyah in Baghdad,<sup>267</sup> which led to Mosul temporarily losing its leading position in reviving the Islamic Jihad movement against the Crusaders. Leadership of the Jihad passed to Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi, the ruler of Mardin. Ilghazi started his Jihad efforts by capturing Aleppo in 511 AH/1117 CE, because of its importance to any military or political leader who wanted to confront the Crusaders, due to its vital strategic position in terms of human resources and military, political and economic aspects. Aleppo lay between two Crusader kingdoms, Edessa and Antioch. At the same time it was able to establish contact with the Turkmen Muslim forces who were spread throughout the Mesopotamian region. Hence capturing Aleppo opened the way to leading the Jihad movement, and that is indeed what happened in the case of Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi and his nephew, Balak ibn Bahram, and after them, Ak Sunqur al-Bursuqi and Imad ad-Deen Zangi, and Noor ad-Deen Mahmood later on.<sup>268</sup> As for the details of Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi's capture of Aleppo in 511 AH/1117 CE, new developments took place which made the Crusaders hope to capture the city when it reached such a point of weakness and economic hardship that the people were unable even to feed their animals. However, its people's fear of falling into Crusader hands forced them to summon Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi and surrender Aleppo to him in that year. Ilghazi started his work in Aleppo by imposing his authority on some regions that belonged to it, such as Balis, and by detaining some of the men of Aleppo in order to get money to help him make a truce with the Crusaders. The people and soldiers of Aleppo disliked him, according to Ibn al-'Adeem, which forced him to leave the city and go to Mardin after leaving his son Hussam ad-Deen Timurtash in charge of Aleppo. The troops stationed in Balis took advantage of the high prices that they were faced with in the same year (511 AH/1117 CE) and sent word to the Crusaders that they would hand the city over to them, so Ilghazi was

forced to return to Aleppo at the head of a Turkmen force. When the Crusaders realized the danger, they withdrew and Ilghazi recaptured it, and went back to Mardin after working out a truce with them according to which neither side would transgress against the possessions of the other.<sup>269</sup>

## The Crusaders break the truce

The Crusaders found their opportunity after Ilghazi left, however, and they raided 'Azaz and intensified their siege until the Muslims in the city were forced to surrender. The people of Aleppo were forced to make contact with the Crusaders to ask them to adhere to the truce that Ilghazi had made with them, to hand Tel Hiraq over to them, and to pay the agreed-upon amount for four months, which was a thousand dinars, and they would have the north and west of Aleppo.<sup>270</sup> Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi grew angry when the news from Aleppo reached him, but he could not return and save it because he had too few troops. So he headed towards eastern Mesopotamia with the aim of gathering troops. At the same time, he told Dhaheer ad-Deen Tughtigin of his wish to meet with him in 512 AH/1118 CE, and they met at the citadel of Dawsar with the aim of pushing the Crusaders back from Aleppo. They did not manage to do that, but it prompted the Crusaders to impose tight controls on the entrances to Aleppo after taking over Bazaghah. The situation in Aleppo deteriorated to the point of devastation according to Ibn al-'Adeem,<sup>271</sup> so the people of Aleppo had no choice but to seek help from the Abbasid caliphate and the Seljuk state in Baghdad. They received no help though, because the Abbasid caliphate was too weak, and the Seljuks were preoccupied with family conflicts amongst themselves.

## Mobilization against the Crusaders

Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi did not manage to meet the Crusaders. Ilghazi left Tughtigin and went back to Mardin in order to gather troops in preparation for a renewed Jihad, intending to meet with the Crusaders in a decisive battle.<sup>272</sup> In Mardin, Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi gathered more than twenty thousand Turkmen<sup>273</sup> with the aim of fighting the Crusaders who had intensified their siege of Aleppo, which had almost run out of supplies. Ilghazi sent his messengers to Baghdad to announce this mobilization against the Crusaders and to inform the Abbasid caliph al-Mustarshid Billah and the

Seljuk sultan Mahmood ibn Muhammad ibn Malikshah of what the Crusaders had done in Mesopotamia, taking possession of a citadel near Edessa and killing its ruler Ibn 'Utayr.<sup>274</sup> Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi made arrangements with Dhaheer ad-Deen Tughtigin in 512 AH/1118 CE to meet the Crusaders in Syria, in Safar of the following year (513 AH/1119 CE). Before the appointed time, Ilghazi headed towards Edessa and besieged it fiercely, which forced the Crusaders in the city to ask him for a peace deal, offering to give him in return some of the Muslim prisoners who were being held there. Ilghazi responded to them and stipulated that they should not go to the aid of the king of Antioch in the event of any fighting with him, and they agreed. This was a sound step on Ilghazi's part, through which he was able to isolate one of the Crusader forces and prevent it from helping the other forces. This giving in to the Muslims rulers' demands is a clear indication of the weakness of the Crusaders in Mesopotamia.<sup>275</sup>

## **The Battle of Ager Sanguinis (the 'Field of Blood')**

After Ilghazi had ascertained that he would not be exposed to Crusader attack from the rear, he headed towards Syria, and was joined by Usamah ibn al-Mubarak ibn Shibl al-Kilabi and the emir Tughan Arslan the ruler of Badlees Warzan. He continued his march until he drew close to al-Atharib in the land of Sarmada in the spring of 513 AH/1119 CE. There he awaited the arrival of Dhaheer ad-Deen Tughtigin. The Crusaders, led by Roger the ruler of Antioch had camped in Tel 'Afreem where they began to build a fortress. It never occurred to them that Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi would take them by surprise in that place because the road was narrow, and because they thought that the Muslims would attack al-Atharib or Zerdana, so they were overconfident and thought that they were well fortified. They sent word to Ilghazi saying: Do not trouble yourself to come to us; we will come to you.<sup>276</sup> When Ilghazi felt he had waited too long for the arrival of his ally, he responded to the wishes of his commanders who were with him, and hastened to take the Crusaders by surprise. The Crusaders did not notice anything until the banners of the Muslims suddenly appeared and surrounded them on all sides. That occurred on Friday 16<sup>th</sup> Rabee' 1513 AH/1119 CE. The qadi of Aleppo, Abul-Fadl ibn al-Khashshab went out and delivered a very eloquent speech to the Muslims, urging them to engage in Jihad, and the Muslims attacked the Crusaders as one from all directions. Arrows rained

down on the Crusaders like locusts while swords were striking them from all directions. None escaped but a few; the rest were killed or wounded. Among the slain was Roger of Antioch, who had hastened to meet the Muslims in battle before his reinforcements from Jerusalem, Tripoli and elsewhere arrived. Over seventy Crusader knights and commanders were taken captive. They tried to ransom themselves with more than three hundred thousand dinars, but Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi did not accept it from them; he ordered that they all be killed.<sup>277</sup> This battle is known to medieval European the Latin historians and the modern historians who quote them as the Field of Blood, because so many Crusaders were killed there, and only a few Muslims were killed.<sup>278</sup>

## Consequences of the victory

The importance of what happened to the Crusaders does not stop with the military victory that Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi achieved over them, rather this victory resulted in the establishment of a united Islamic front which included Muslim emirs in Syria and Mesopotamia. In addition, it made Aleppo safe from Crusader danger, especially after Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi captured a fortress close to al-Atharib in the same year. Overall, it was a huge disaster which deprived Antioch of its ruler and its army, which made the Syrians and Armenians in Antioch rethink their position of supporting the Crusaders. This, it appears, is what prompted them to conspire to get rid of the Western Crusaders later on.<sup>279</sup> Ibn al-<sup>4</sup> Adeem states that after the battle ended, Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi went to Roger's tent so that the Muslims could give him all the booty that they had acquired, but he returned all the booty to the fighters and did not take anything from them except some weapons that he kept for the Muslim monarchs in order to revive in their hearts the love of Islamic Jihad against the Crusaders. Ilghazi managed to achieve a series of victories in northern Syria, which created for the Muslims an atmosphere of calm and stability; the Muslims managed to inflict a crushing defeat on the Crusader reinforcements which came, led by Baldwin King of Jerusalem, to save Roger.<sup>281</sup> Nonetheless, Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi was not content with that; he met in Artah with his ally Tughtigin, and they agreed to attack al-Atharib and Zerdana. They managed to capture both locations from the Crusaders; Ilghazi then went to Daneeth with a small group of Muslims, where he met Baldwin and Robert, ruler of Zerdana. A battle took place between the two

sides in Jumada 1513 AH/1119 CE, which resulted in victory for Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi and defeat for the Crusaders, who sought refuge in the fortress of Hab after being pursued by Najm ad-Deen.<sup>282</sup> Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi returned to Aleppo, whilst his men, on their way back, encountered the ruler of Zerdana, Robert the Leper, who was accompanied by a force of Crusaders. Ilghazi's troops attacked them, which forced those Crusaders who survived to go back to the fortress of Hab; Robert the Leper fell into the hands of the Muslims, who took their captive to Ilghazi in Aleppo, who in turn sent him to Tughtigin in Damascus, where he was killed in captivity.<sup>283</sup> At the end of Jumada I 513 AH/1119 CE, Ilghazi left Aleppo and went back to Mardin because of financial difficulties that he was facing, in addition to the fact that Aleppo was in a weak position which made him unable to stay there.<sup>284</sup>

## **The siege of Antioch and the truce with the King of Jerusalem**

Despite the fact that Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi was occupied with administrative matters in Mardin, he gathered an army of Turkmens and crossed the Euphrates with them to Syria in 514 AH/1120 CE, where he met Tughtigin. They went to Antioch, which they besieged but were unable to conquer. They then went to Qinassareen which they besieged for a day and a night, but they did not get anything from that, either. Dhaheer ad-Deen Tughtigin suggested to his companion that they should lift the siege and each go back to his own land. Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi accepted his advice and returned to Aleppo, after realizing the strength that the Crusaders had whilst his Turkmen troops dispersed. Ilghazi had no choice but to enter a truce with the King of Jerusalem, Baldwin II, according to which the Crusaders would take al-Ma'arra, Kafr Tab, al-Barah and some villages in Jabal as-Summaq, and this truce would last until the end of the year.<sup>285</sup>

## **The truce is broken**

The Crusaders did not adhere to this truce. In 514 AH/1120 CE, Joscelin the ruler of Turbessel raided some land that belonged to Aleppo, which forced the people of Aleppo to send a strongly-worded protest to Baldwin II, King of Jerusalem, telling him of Joscelin's aggression against

the Muslims. He responded by saying, "I have no control over Joscelin."<sup>286</sup> The Crusaders did not stop there; the Crusaders in Antioch also raided the city of Shaizar and captured a number of Muslims and made unreasonable demands of the Arab emir of Shaizar, Abul-'Asakir Sultan ibn Munqidh, which forced him to make a peace deal with them in return for tribute.<sup>287</sup> In addition to that, the Crusaders took advantage of Ilghazi's absence from Aleppo and launched an attack on al-Atharib in Safar 515 AH/ 1121 CE, burning its houses and crops, and even attacked Aleppo itself. Baldwin II laid siege to it, which resulted in fifty of its people being taken captive, but the Aleppans succeeded in rescuing their brethren and forcing the Crusaders to retreat to Antioch.<sup>288</sup> It appears that Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi was forced to stay in Mardin for some time. This led him to write to his son Sulayman, who was his representative in Aleppo, telling him to make a truce with the Crusaders as a result of which the Crusaders acquired Sarmeen, Baldat Layloon, some agricultural land around Aleppo, and al-Atharib.<sup>289</sup>

## Rebellion of Sulayman ibn Ilghazi against his father

The peace deal that Sulayman ibn Ilghazi made with the Crusaders was not in the Muslims' interests. Moreover, he did not try to deal with the disorder and chaos that prevailed in Aleppo, and instead he openly rebelled against his father and declared Aleppo's independence. This step taken by Sulayman encouraged the Crusaders to put pressure on Aleppo and capture some of the surrounding area in Jumada II 515 AH/1121 CE, and to demand that its ruler Sulayman surrender al-Atharib to King Baldwin. However, the Muslim inhabitants of al-Atharib refused to give in to the Crusaders, which forced Baldwin to retreat to Antioch and thence to Jerusalem.<sup>290</sup>

## Suppression of the rebellion

As soon as Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi heard of his son's insubordination in Aleppo, he came quickly and punished those who were behind his son's disobedience. When Sulayman saw the severe punishment that befell his supporters, he feared for his life and fled to Damascus, where he asked Tughtigin for asylum. Once Ilghazi had suppressed the rebellion in Aleppo, he put his nephew Badr ad-Dawlah Sulayman ibn 'Abdul-Jabbar ibn Artuq in charge of the city and formed a new truce with the Crusaders for a whole

year. Ilghazi's aim in forming this truce with the Crusaders was to get enough time to go back to Diyarbakir and gather as many troops as possible so that he could return to fight the Crusaders, in addition to the fact that he feared the Crusaders might attack Aleppo and his nephew might not be able to offer any resistance.<sup>291</sup> In Mardin, Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi managed to gather a large number of Turkmens, then he took them to Syria in Rabee' II 516 AH/1122 CE, taking advantage of the split that occurred between Baldwin King of Jerusalem and Pons of Tripoli. Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi was unable to achieve a decisive victory over the Crusaders, despite the fact that he was joined by Balak ibn Bahram ibn Artuq and Dhaheer ad-Deen Tughtigin, but the Crusaders were unable to spread their influence and domination to Aleppo, either.<sup>292</sup>

## The death of Ilghazi and its effect on the Muslims

In Ramadan 516 AH/1122 CE, Ilghazi felt that his health was deteriorating, so he went back to Mayafariqin (Silvan, in Turkey), where he died. A great a loss as the death of Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi was for the Muslims in Syria and Mesopotamia in general, the calamity was greater for the people of Aleppo, who were very saddened by his death, because Najm ad-Deen Ilghazi had dashed the Crusader leaders' hopes of capturing the city. The impact of Ilghazi's death went further; it led to the disintegration of his emirate as it was divided among his sons, Hussam ad-Deen Timurtash, who got Mardin and Sulayman, who got Mayafariqin. Aleppo remained the share of his nephew Sulayman ibn 'Abd al-Jabbar ibn Artuq, and Balak ibn Bahram ibn Artuq kept the citadel of Kharberd (Khartabart), to which Harran was added later on.<sup>293</sup> In addition to that, Aleppo, which used to rely on the Turkmen troops who were mobilized by Ilghazi from northern Mesopotamia, lost this resource which had often tipped the balance in favour of the Muslims against the Crusaders at the time of Ilghazi. This made Aleppo more vulnerable to Crusader raids and weakened the position of its ruler Sulayman ibn 'Abd al-Jabbar, which made him unable to ward off *the* Crusaders. These latter took advantage of Ilghazi's death to raid Baza'ah and Balis, on the Euphrates, led by Baldwin II, King of Jerusalem. The matter did not end there, however: the Crusader King managed to capture the citadel of Bira (al-Beerah), as a result of which Aleppo was now surrounded on all sides,



forcing Sulayman ibn 'Abd al-Jabbar to make a peace deal with the Crusaders in 517 AH/1123 CE, in which he ceded the fortress of al-Atharib.<sup>294</sup>

## Balak ibn Bahram ibn Artuq

Balak ibn Bahram, ruler of the citadel of Kharberd took up the banner of Jihad after his paternal uncle Ilghazi, the ruler of Mardin, died. He was a stubborn opponent of the Crusaders and hoped to eliminate them not only from the region of Mesopotamia but also from Syria. His military action began during his uncle Ilghazi's illness in Raj ab 516 AH/1122 CE, with the siege of Edessa, but he did not manage to capture it despite a lengthy siege, and was forced to withdraw. Hence the Crusaders in Edessa thought that they had no option but to seek help from Joscelin, whose desire to capture more land was great and who was a stubborn opponent of the Muslims; at that time he was with King Baldwin in Bira, taking advantage of the dispersal of the troops of Balak ibn Bahram ibn Artuq, following his return from Edessa. Nevertheless, Balak ibn Bahram managed to lay a trap for Joscelin and those Crusaders with him in a muddy area that was saturated with rainfall, where their horses were unable to move quickly because of the mud. Balak and his men, who numbered no more than four hundred horsemen, sent showers of arrows upon them; few escaped. Joscelin and his maternal cousin, Galeran ruler of Bira, were captured in 516 AH/1122 CE. The outcome of this victory which was achieved by Balak ibn Bahram against the Crusaders was the loss of Crusader troops and morale in Syria, as well as an increase in Muslim enthusiasm and hopes of pouncing upon the Crusaders from all sides.<sup>295</sup> Balak ibn Bahram ibn Artuq tried to negotiate a deal with Joscelin and his fellow Crusaders who had fallen captive whereby they would give up Edessa in return for their release, but they refused, saying, "We and the land are like camels; when a camel is killed, its saddle is transferred to another camel. What was in our hands is now in the hands of others."<sup>296</sup> Balak ibn Bahram transferred his prisoners to the citadel of Kharberd and appointed guards to keep watch over them, and headed in 517 AH/1123 CE for the fortress of Gargar, which belonged to the kingdom of Edessa, with the aim of capturing it.<sup>297</sup> King Baldwin, who was now in charge of Edessa as well as Antioch, realized that what he had to do was move to secure the release of Joscelin from captivity, prevent Gargar from falling into the hands of Balak ibn Bahram, and make the Muslims realise that the Crusader forces were still

strong. Baldwin set out, leading his army, until he reached the eastern bank of the Sanjah river, one of the tributaries of the Euphrates, opposite the camp of Balak ibn Bahram, who meanwhile had lifted the siege from Gargar and gone back to confront Baldwin. Fighting took place between the two sides on 19 Safar 517 AH/1123 CE, and the Crusaders were defeated despite the small numbers of the Muslim forces. The importance of this battle was not limited to the victory of Balak ibn Bahram, rather it went beyond that, as Baldwin King of Jerusalem fell captive to Balak ibn Bahram, in addition to which he captured the fortress of Gargar. Balak took his new captive to Kharberd and imprisoned him with Joscelin and the other Crusader leaders and knights.<sup>298</sup>

Thus the Crusader kingdoms of Edessa, Antioch and Jerusalem lost their leaders and defenders, which led to a destabilization of the Crusader position in Mesopotamia and Syria. Despite this, the Muslim forces in Syria at that time could not take advantage of this opportunity to attack their kingdoms and eradicate the Crusaders.<sup>299</sup>

## Crusaders besiege Aleppo

After collecting his prisoners in the citadel of Kharberd, Balak ibn Bahram ibn Artuq went to capture Harran in Rabee' I 517 AH/ 1123 CE, with the aim of strengthening his position thereby, and he managed to achieve this. Balak ibn Bahram hoped to capture Aleppo from Sulayman ibn 'Abd al-Jabbar following his capture of Harran, because he realized the strategic importance of Aleppo. He knew that he could never achieve any decisive result against the Crusaders unless he incorporated Aleppo into his emirate so as to have a base in Syria from which he could move into a vast arena and devote his time to fighting the Crusaders.<sup>300</sup> Balak thus laid siege to Aleppo until its inhabitants were forced to surrender to him on a Tuesday morning at the beginning of Jumada I 517 AH/1123 CE.<sup>301</sup> Balak ibn Bahram did not proceed further with his Jihad against the Crusaders in Syria before news reached him that Joscelin had managed to escape with the help of a group of Armenians whom Balak ibn Bahram had treated kindly in Kharberd. He returned quickly to Kharberd in Rajab of the same year, where he managed to restore order and transfer his remaining captives to Harran, after punishing the Armenians in Kharberd.<sup>302</sup>

As for Joscelin Count of Edessa, who had fled from captivity, he managed to form an army of Crusaders from Jerusalem and Antioch, and headed towards Aleppo in order to put pressure on the Muslims there. He did not stop at that; he also dug up the graves of Muslims in the surrounding area, and continued the siege until Ramadan of the same year (517 AH/1123 CE). When he failed to conquer it, he returned to Turbessel, but Aleppo was not safe from Crusader siege after Joscelin returned to Turbessel; it was faced with another siege by the Crusaders of Antioch, which led to the severing of communications between it and other Muslim cities in Syria, the land which had been supplying it with food.<sup>303</sup>

Balak ibn Bahram ibn Artuq found that he had no choice but to seek help from Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqi, ruler of Mosul, and Dhaheer ad-Deen Tughtigin, ruler of Damascus, to relieve the people of Aleppo of this humiliation and strike a blow at the Crusaders, after which Balak would be able to return to Aleppo and restore order there. The Emir of Mosul, Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqi, and the Emir of Damascus, Tughtigin, reached Aleppo in 518 AH/1124 CE, leading their forces across the Euphrates and camping in <sup>4</sup> Azaz. However, the Crusaders who were gathered there managed to drive the Muslims out and each of these rulers returned to his own country. Balak ibn Bahram entered Aleppo in 518 AH/1124 CE, eliminated some of his opponents and put an end to the chaos caused by bandits. He also married one of the daughters of Radwan ibn Tutush in order to strengthen his ties with the Seljuks. He made Aleppo his capital in Syria and used it as a base from which to launch strikes against the Crusaders. He did not stop there; he transferred his prisoners there from Harran, and detained them in the Citadel of Aleppo. It seems that Balak's transfer of his prisoners was done so that he could ensure that they did not attempt to escape when he was far away from them. The evidence for that is the fact that he prepared a military detachment in Safar 518 AH/1124 CE to fight the Crusaders in 'Azaz, but he did not go out with them lest some of the people of Aleppo who were opposed to him take that opportunity to free his 304 prisoners.

## Balak ibn Bahram is killed

Balak ibn Bahram did not live long after that. Whilst he was besieging the Franks in the citadel of Manbij, he was killed by a stray arrow, and no one knew who had shot it. His troops fell into confusion and dispersed. With his death, the Muslims lost a great man whose deeds proved that he was a leader and commander who tried to unite the Muslims in Syria and Mesopotamia against the Crusaders. It may be said that with the killing of Balak ibn Bahram in 518 AH/1124 CE, the Artuqi stage of the Islamic Jihad against the Crusaders came to an end. Although Hussam ad-Deen Timurtash ibn Ilghazi managed to capture Aleppo immediately after the killing of Balak ibn Bahram, Aleppo did not enjoy any stability during his era. Instead, things got worse and the situation of the Muslims in the city grew weaker; due to his young age he was distracted by his love of play from rolling up his sleeves and paying serious attention to the issues of ruling. Hussam ad-Deen's laziness and negligence towards the Jihad against the Crusaders went even further; he accepted the mediation of Abul-'Asakir Sultan ibn Munqidh, the ruler of Shaizar, concerning the release of Baldwin King of Jerusalem who had been the prisoner of Balak ibn Bahram,<sup>305</sup> an act which led to a surge of Crusader enthusiasm for attacking the Muslims. This naturally had a strong effect on the Crusaders' confronting the movement to revive the idea of Islamic Jihad in the following stage, which was led by Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqi, the ruler of Mosul, and Dhaheer ad-Deen the ruler of Damascus.<sup>306</sup>

## Emir of Mosul, Aq Sunqur, wages Jihad to save Aleppo

### Aleppo confronts the Crusaders

Aleppo was exposed to Crusader pressure and attacks many times, starting from the earliest days of the Crusader invasion of Mesopotamia and Syria. The most serious of these attacks was undoubtedly the siege of 518 AH. The invaders realized the city's vital strategic importance in human, military, political and economic terms, and in terms of transportation routes. It occupied a fortified position between two Crusader kingdoms: Edessa to

the east in Mesopotamia and Antioch to the west on the Mediterranean. At the same time it had contact with the Turkmen Muslim forces that were widespread in Mesopotamia, Anatolia and northern Syria, which may be regarded as a vital foundation for the continuation of the Jihad movement and achievement of decisive aims against the Crusaders. Consequently, capturing Aleppo and adding it to Crusader territory would secure transportation routes between Edessa and Antioch, and hasten the establishment of political and military unity between them, which would undoubtedly play a major role in the interests of the invaders.<sup>307</sup>

The Aleppans realized that there was no benefit in their city remaining in this unstable situation, and that it was essential to hand it over to a strong ruler. So they sent word to Ilghazi al-Artuqi, ruler of Diyarbakir, asking him to come so that they could hand it over to him. Ilghazi came to Aleppo in 511 AH and took control of the city, also imposing his authority on areas belonging to it. However, the fact that he was preoccupied with affairs in his own realm of Diyarbakir meant that he often had to be absent from Aleppo and turn his back on its problems. The Crusaders used to take advantage of that and intensified their attacks on Aleppo and its surrounding areas. When Ilghazi died in Ramadan 516 AH, the Crusaders hastened to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the division of his emirate among his sons and the fact that Aleppo was isolated from the forces that were fighting in Diyarbakir to achieve some swift victories in northern Syria. The appearance of Ilghazi's nephew Balak ibn Bahram and his taking charge of the Jihad against the invaders interrupted the invaders' plan, however, and saved Aleppo from this imminent danger. Nonetheless, the death of Balak two years after he took power, and the transfer of power to his cousin Hussam ad-Deen Timurtash, who was characterized by weakness and defeatism, opened the way again for the Crusaders to intensify their assaults on Aleppo and achieve their dream of taking control of it. The historian Ibn al-'Adeem describes how conditions deteriorated in Aleppo immediately after Timurtash came to power. He says:

As for Timurtash, when he took possession of Aleppo, he was distracted by his young age and love of play from rolling up his sleeves and being serious about paying attention to the issues of ruling, so things got worse and the Muslims became weaker as a result.<sup>308</sup>

Timurtash began his rule by releasing Baldwin II, who had been captured by Balak in one of his battles against the invaders, in return for a paltry sum of money. Timurtash released him and had him brought to his court, where they ate and drank, and Timurtash gave him a royal cloak and returned to him his horse which Balak had taken from Baldwin the day he captured him.<sup>309</sup> Soon after that, Timurtash withdrew to his province of Diyarbakir so that he could follow his policy of isolationism, and did not so much as shoot an arrow against the invaders. Thus the Crusaders got another opportunity to tighten their stranglehold on Aleppo and strive to achieve their goal which they had failed to accomplish in previous years. Hence in 518 AH Aleppo was subjected to one of the most intense sieges that it faced during the entire lengthy Crusader period.<sup>310</sup>

## Betrayal by the Emir of Hillah

The attempt to capture Aleppo began with an act of betrayal by one of the Arab emirs, Dabees ibn Sadaqah al-Mazeedi, the Emir of Hillah, which lay to the south of Baghdad. The emir was fleeing from the 'Abbasid caliphate and the Seljuk authorities because of his continual provocation towards them and his conspiracies against them. He told the Crusaders that he had followers in Aleppo, and that when they saw him at the head of the attacking army they would surrender the city to him. Among the things that he told the Crusaders was, "The people of Aleppo are Shiite and they are inclined towards me because of the sect. As soon as they see me they will surrender the city to me." In return for helping him, he offered to do a great deal for them, and he promised Baldwin, Count of Antioch, and Joscelin, Count of Edessa, that he would do many things for them if they helped him. He said to them, "I will be your representative in Aleppo and will obey you."<sup>311</sup> Finally he managed to reach an agreement with the Crusaders that Aleppo would be his, but the wealth would be theirs, in addition to some locations close to Aleppo.<sup>312</sup> Baldwin came at the head of his forces and camped beside the Quwayq river, close to Aleppo, and destroyed the surrounding agricultural areas. Then he went to Aleppo and camped outside the city at the end of Sha'ban 518 AH. Joscelin came accompanied by Dabees ibn Sadaqah<sup>313</sup> — who was a Shiite like his forebears<sup>314</sup> — from another direction to the outskirts of Aleppo, and his forces started to destroy another large agricultural area, causing losses estimated at one hundred thousand

dinars. They moved on and camped beside Baldwin outside Aleppo. They were joined there by other traitors whose aim was to serve their own interests and get their hands on some of the booty if Aleppo fell: Sultan Shah ibn Radwan as-Seljuki, 'Eesa ibn Salim ibn Malik al-<sup>4</sup>Aqeeli and Yaghi Sayan ibn 'Abdul-Jabbar al-Artuqi. They lay siege to Aleppo from all directions.<sup>315</sup> They prepared themselves for a lengthy stay, aiming not to leave until they had taken possession of the city, and they built houses to withstand the cold and heat,<sup>316</sup> in addition to three hundred tents. In Aleppo at that time there were no more than five hundred horsemen.<sup>317</sup>

## Crusaders provoke and taunt the people of Aleppo

The invaders began to launch regular attacks against Aleppo; they cut down its trees and destroyed its gardens and crops in an attempt to destroy its economy which relied primarily on agriculture. They also destroyed the shrines of the Muslims and dug up the graves of their dead, stealing the shrouds and using the coffins and vessels for their meals. When they found a body that had not yet disintegrated, they tied the legs together with a rope and dragged it within view of the Muslims who were besieged in Aleppo, shouting, "This is your (Messenger (SAAW) Muhammad)!" Some of them took a *mus-haf* (pure Arabic copy of the Qur'an) from one of the shrines surrounding Aleppo and shouted, "O Muslims, look at your Book!" Then one of them made a hole in it with his hand and tied it with two strings to the rear end of a nearby mule, which began defecating on it. When the mule's owner saw the dung falling onto the holy Book he began clapping and laughing with pride.<sup>318</sup>

## Popular resistance in Aleppo

The Crusaders did not stop there; they began to mutilate every Muslim who fell into their hands, which forced the Muslims to respond in kind. The Islamic resistance was led by al-Qadi Abul-Fadl ibn al-Khash-shab who had become experienced in defence activity over the last decade, and who was very popular in Aleppo. He issued orders to direct blows at the heart of the invaders' camps. Groups of Aleppan fighters would go out secretly to raid these camps, killing some, taking some prisoners and then

returning to the city. At the same time, messengers were going back and forth between the two sides seeking to reach an agreement, but to no avail.<sup>319</sup>

## The people of Aleppo ask for help from the Emir of Diyarbakir

The situation grew worse for the people of Aleppo and they became extremely exhausted and hungry. Their emir Badr ad-Deen al-Artuqi and a number of prominent officials agreed to send a delegation of Aleppan leaders to Diyarbakir to seek help from its emir Hussam ad-Deen Timurtash. The three members of this delegation sneaked out at night and went to Mardin, the capital of Diyarbakir, to seek help from its emir, hoping that he would pay attention to the sufferings of the people of Aleppo. When they reached Mardin, they found that Hussam ad-Deen was highly preoccupied with trying to capture the land of his brother Sulayman, who had died that year, which led him to ignore the affairs of Aleppo and not respond to the request of its delegation. The members of this delegation stayed in Mardin for some time, urging Hussam ad-Deen to go to Aleppo and save it from the siege, and he kept promising them and putting it off without taking any action. They told him that all they wanted was for him to come there himself and the Aleppans themselves would take care of the invaders,<sup>320</sup> but their efforts failed. In the end the delegation managed to free themselves from the watch that Hussam ad-Deen had imposed on them so that they would not leave Mardin to seek help from another emir, lest his position grow weak and he lose Aleppo, and the delegation managed to make contact with the Seljuk governor of Mosul, Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqi.<sup>321</sup>

## Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqi' s response to the Aleppans' call for help

At that time al-Bursuqi was ill and had grown very weak, so all were forbidden to visit him except his doctors. News of this reached Dabees, who announced the good news in his camp, raising cries of *takbeer* ("Allahu akbar!") and *tabled* ("La ilaha ilia-Allah!"), and some of his companions called out to the people of Aleppo, "The one whom you hope will help you has died." The Aleppans were so distraught that they almost died.<sup>322</sup> When permission was sought for the Aleppan delegation to enter upon al-Bursuqi,



he gave them permission, and they went in to him and sought his help, explaining to them the dangers that Aleppo was facing and the extent of the hardships suffered by the city's people. Aq Sunqur answered, "You see how sick I am now, but I vow to Allah that if He heals me from this sickness, I will do my best to help you, save your city and fight your enemies." Less than three days after this meeting, his fever left him and he started to recover. He soon set up some tents outside Mosul and called his troops to prepare to fight the Crusaders and save Aleppo. Within a few days his army was ready, so he left Mosul, heading for Rahbah, whence he sent word to Tughtigin, the Emir of Damascus, and Khayrkhan the Emir of Horns, asking them to help him in achieving his mission. Both emirs responded and sent their armies to join al-Bursuqi's army which had moved towards Balis, near Aleppo. From there al-Bursuqi sent word to the officials of Aleppo, stipulating in advance that they should surrender the Citadel of Aleppo to his deputies so that he could seek refuge there in the event of his being defeated by the Crusaders. They responded to his request, and as soon as his deputies got what they wanted and he was reassured that he would have secure protection in the event of a retreat, he began his march towards the Crusader positions surrounding Aleppo.<sup>323</sup>

Al-Bursuqi's vanguard reached Aleppo on Thursday 22<sup>nd</sup> Dhul-Hijjah 518 AH, and no sooner had he brought up his regular troops than the Crusaders hastened to move to an area that was more easily defended, and camped at Jabal Jawsan, on the way to Antioch. Thus the attackers now found themselves on the defensive, and the Aleppans came out to their camp and took whatever they wanted, whilst another group went out to welcome al-Bursuqi and celebrate his arrival. Al-Bursuqi realized what the Crusaders were aiming at with their withdrawal and taking up a defensive position, so he did not hasten to attack them before reorganizing his troops, for a fear of a huge defeat that might lead to the fall of Aleppo. He sent his scouts to tell his troops to return to Aleppo and said, explaining his plan, "How can we be sure that they are not going to turn and attack us, and the Muslims would be destroyed? But Allah has protected us against their evil, so let us go back to the city and strengthen it and try to put its affairs in order, and assemble an army to go out and meet them after that, if Allah wills."

Then al-Bursuqi entered Aleppo and began to sort out its problems and strengthen its economic and social situation. He administered justice and

issued decrees abolishing unfair taxes and financial wrongdoing, and cancelling confiscations. His justice encompassed all the Aleppans, after what they had suffered in terms of injustice, confiscation and the control of wrongdoers throughout the Crusader siege.<sup>324</sup> Al-Bursuqi did not stop there; he also did a lot of work to bring food supplies and grain into the city, so as to bring down the high prices and put an end to the hardships that the Aleppans were suffering. Soon agricultural activity in the region of Aleppo went back to normal, and the farmers resumed working the land from which they had been driven away. Trade also resumed and returned to normal levels, based on the security and stability that the region now enjoyed.<sup>325</sup>

Thus al-Bursuqi managed to rid this important site of the most dangerous calamity that it faced during the Crusades, and he united it with Mosul for the first time since these wars had begun, which gave this leader — and Imad ad-Deen Zangi after him — the opportunity to benefit from this unity in order to achieve several victories against the invaders.<sup>326</sup>

The modern English historian Steven Runciman states:<sup>327</sup>

The emirate that al-Bursuqi formed soon became a starting point for the united Islamic state that was subsequently established in Syria at the time of the Zangids, Ayubids and Mamluks. Prior to that, the Crusaders, who were united by the royal system in Jerusalem, had not faced anything but a country in which many forces and dynasties were fighting for control, which only made Syria even weaker. So what happened, when Aleppo was united with Mosul, may be regarded as the beginning of the unification of the Islamic front, which was later able to destroy the Crusader forces in Syria.<sup>328</sup>

We should also take note of the keenness of the Muslim masses to become part of a Sunni Islamic entity, regardless of whether its leadership was Turkish, Arab or anything else; what mattered was that they would undertake the duty of defending Islam and the Muslims under the banner of Ahl al-Sunnah.

## **The assassination of al-Bursuqi**

In 520 AH, on the 8<sup>th</sup> of Dhul-Qa'dah, Qaseem ad-Dawlah Aq Sunqur al-Bursuqi, ruler of Mosul, was murdered in Mosul. He was killed by religious deviants (Batinitis) on a Friday in the mosque, as he was praying

Jumu'ah (the Friday congregational prayer) with the people. The night before, he had seen in a dream that he was being attacked by a number of dogs, some of which he killed but the rest managed to harm him. He told his companions about this dream and they suggested that he should not go out of his house for a few days. He said, "I will never forsake Jumu'ah for anything." They tried to convince him not to go to Jumu'ah prayer, but he was determined to go. He picked up the mus-haf that he used to read from, and the first thing he read was, 'And the Command of Allah is a decree determined' (*Qur'an* 33: 38). He rode to the mosque as was his wont, and whilst he was praying in the front row, more than ten men — the same number as the number of dogs he had seen in his dream — jumped on him and stabbed him with their daggers. He wounded three of them himself, but he was killed, may Allah have mercy on him. Al-Bursuqi was a good Turkish Mameluke, who loved the righteous and those who had religious knowledge; he loved justice and acted justly. He was one of the best rulers, who always prayed regularly, on time, and would get up at night for devotional night 329 prayers.

## **Deviant groups were one of the greatest obstacles to the Jihad movement**

The Batinis proved their complete enmity towards the leaders of the Islamic Jihad at that time. It was as if their poisoned daggers were paving the way for the Crusaders to establish a foothold in Syria and Mesopotamia at the expense of the Muslims. Historical events confirmed this, as the leaders of the Islamic Jihad during that era had something in common-martyrdom. Sharaf ad-Deen Mawdood was assassinated. Now we find Aq Sunqur meeting the same fate. All of this reflects the fact that the Nizari Ismailis at that time formed one of the most serious obstacles to the Jihad movement against the invaders, because the Sunni leadership was facing two enemies at the same time, which reflected the great difficulties that they encountered in defending the beliefs, religion, honour and homeland of the Ummah.

However, even though Aq Sunqur was martyred, the list of mujahideen and those who were prepared to fight for the sake of Allah was still growing. In Rabee' II 521 AH/1127 CE, Sultan Mahmoud appointed 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi Emir of Mosul, and his emergence on the stage marked

the opening of a new chapter in the balance of power between the Muslims and the Crusaders.<sup>330</sup> Imad ad-Deen began to form a united Islamic front against the Crusaders, taking over the citadels located near him such as Jazeerat Ibn 'Umar, Nusaybin, Sinjar, Bilad al-Khaboor and Harran. After that he began to think about capturing Aleppo, the greatest Islamic centre in northern Syria. His opportunity came when he found out about the turmoil that was gripping that city, which was threatened by Joscelin II, Count of Edessa, and Bohemond II, Count of Antioch. So Imad ad-Deen Zangi hastened to Aleppo, where he was warmly welcomed by the people and entered the city on Monday 13 Jumada II 522 AH/ 1128 CE.<sup>331</sup> He took over the city, organized its affairs and appointed officials. Ibn al-Atheer confirms the importance of this conquest when he says, "Had Allah not blessed the Muslims with the governorship of this martyr (that is, Zangi), the Franks would have taken over all of Syria."<sup>332</sup>

## **The conquest of Edessa: The most important deed of Imad ad-Deen Zangi**

Imad ad-Deen Zangi was able to achieve a great deal of what he had planned and to acquire for himself a special position in Islamic history as a brilliant politician, a capable military man and an aware Muslim who understood the danger that surrounded the Muslim world due to the Crusaders. Thus he was able to make the best use of the historical circumstances in the Muslims' favour by bringing together the Muslim forces — after dealing with the factors that caused division — and uniting the various cities and emirates within the framework of a single state. He made brilliant use of all his abilities and the resources he had to offer in order to achieve his twin aims of forming an Islamic front and striking the Crusaders. I have discussed this in detail when speaking of Imad ad-Deen Zangi in my book on the Zangid state.

The conquest of Edessa is regarded as one of the most important achievements of Imad ad-Deen Zangi, because the County of Edessa was the first Crusader principality to be established in the East. It was founded in 491 AH/1097 CE, under the leadership of Baldwin I, who continued to rule this

principality until 494 AH/ 1100 CE when he left to rule Jerusalem following the death of Geoffrey, King of Jerusalem.<sup>333</sup> Edessa differed from the other Crusader principalities in that it was located in the Euphrates basin, where it carried the burden of defending all the other Crusader principalities in Syria because it was situated close to the 'Abbasid caliphate, and thus stood in the face of the Turkmens who had crowded into Mesopotamia following the disintegration of the Seljuk state in Syria and Iraq after the death of the sultan Malikshah in 485 AH/1092 CE.<sup>334</sup> The importance of Edessa was not limited to its strategic location and its being the first line of defence for the other Crusader principalities in Syria: it posed a fundamental danger to the Muslim transportation routes between Syria, Asia Minor, Iraq and Mesopotamia.<sup>335</sup>

Despite the fact that Edessa did not fall within the limits of the holy lands in Palestine, the Crusaders regarded it as one of the noblest of cities after Jerusalem, Antioch and Constantinople. It had abundant wealth which helped the rulers of Edessa to expand their territory, so the principality of Edessa, located on the two banks of the Euphrates, expanded from Ravendan and 'Ayn Thaniyah in the west to Mashariq in the east and from Behesni and Kesoun in the north to Manbij in the south.<sup>336</sup> Edessa attained special importance because of the strength and courage of its rulers, who managed to withstand the Islamic resistance despite the fact that it suffered two clear weak points: (i) its lack of natural borders to offer it protection or fortification; (ii) the lack of harmony among its inhabitants, who were a mixture of Eastern Christians (Syriacs and Jacobite Armenians) and Western Crusaders, in addition to the Muslims who were concentrated in entire cities such as Suruj and Bira which were under Crusader control.<sup>337</sup> Edessa was not important only to the Crusaders, however, as in the view of the Muslims it was one of the most vital positions where they needed to gain control. Ibn al-Atheer mentioned its importance to Mesopotamia because of its location between Mosul and Aleppo, and he described it as being of the utmost importance to Mesopotamia itself and to the Muslim lands because of its fortifications, which made the Islamic forces in both Iraq and Syria eager to gain control of it.<sup>338</sup>

## The internal situation in Edessa

The internal situation in Edessa was very favourable to Imad ad-Deen Zangi, as its ruler Joscelin II was a weak character who was swayed by emotions, whims and desires, and lacking in political ability and farsightedness. In fact, Joscelin II's inclination towards the Armenians was influenced by his upbringing, because his mother was Armenian, so he grew up with a fondness for the Armenians and other original inhabitants who were Eastern Christians, and he preferred them to the Western Christians, a fact which annoyed the Crusader knights and created a kind of instability in the principality. It was known that the ruler of Edessa was a person who preferred ease and comfort, to such an extent that when Imad ad-Deen Zangi attacked his kingdom, he chose to leave his city and stay in Turbessel on the west bank of the Euphrates. If we add to that the fact that the Muslims surrounded this principality on all sides, and that it was separated by the Euphrates from all the other Crusader principalities in Syria, we will be able to form a general idea of the factors which contributed to its downfall. It is worth mentioning that this principality posed a great danger to Muslim transportation routes between Aleppo, Mosul, Baghdad and the Seljuks of Rum in Asia Minor; it also formed an obstacle that prevented the establishment of Muslim unity in Syria and Mesopotamia because of its continual interference in favour of Imad ad-Deen Zangi's opponents among the Muslim emirs in the region. Thus conquering it became necessary in political, military, economic<sup>340</sup> and religious terms.

## Operations that led to conquest

Imad ad-Deen Zangi took advantage of the circumstances mentioned above and devised a trick that would allow him to reach his goal in the shortest way. He knew that he would never be able to achieve his aim in Edessa so long as Joscelin and his forces remained there. Hence he focused on finding a way to make his opponent leave that capital. He headed towards Amid, making a show of intending to besiege it, as if that was his only goal. At the same time, he sent his spies to the Edessa region, so that they could send him immediate information on the movements of its ruler. As soon as Joscelin realized that Zangi and his army were busy in Diyarbakir and did not

have time to attack the Crusader positions, he left his capital at the head of his troops,<sup>341</sup> after taking precautions by making a truce with Kara Arslan, the ruler of Hasankeyf who had sought refuge with him after Zangi threatened his emirate.<sup>342</sup> Then he headed to Turbessel, on the west bank of the Euphrates, where he set aside any sense of responsibilities and focused on his physical pleasures, leaving the defence of Edessa to its people, the Armenians, Syriacs, Nestorians and Jacobites, most of whom were merchants who had no experience of war and fighting, whilst mercenaries took on the task of defending the citadel.<sup>343</sup>

Imad ad-Deen Zangi's informants came and told him the news that he had been longing to hear, so he immediately headed towards Edessa, moving fast by riding camels, and mobilizing every Muslim in the region who could carry a weapon to join the Jihad to make the word of Allah supreme. He was soon joined by hordes of volunteers, with whom he surrounded Edessa from all four directions. In the beginning he tried to pursue all peaceful means, hoping to achieve his aim without being forced to brandish the sword. He made contact with the people of Edessa, offering them security and asking them to open the gates before he found himself forced to destroy the walls of their city and evict its people, but they refused to accept this offer of security.<sup>344</sup> At that point, Zangi intensified the siege, using huge siege engines which he had brought with him to destroy the walls in order to deny the Crusaders the opportunity to join forces to save this important position. When Joscelin heard the news, he sent word asking for help from all the Crusader principalities in Syria, but no one responded except Melisende, the heiress of Jerusalem, whose help came too late.<sup>345</sup> He also tried to enter the city, or send help to support its defenders, but he was prevented from doing so. On 26<sup>th</sup> Jumada II539 AH, twenty-eight days after the siege began, part of the fortress collapsed as the result of the concentrated strikes to which it had been subjected, and the Muslim forces entered the city.<sup>346</sup> The citadel surrendered two days later, and the Jacobite Bishop Basil handed Edessa over to Zangi.<sup>347</sup>

## **Imad ad-Deen Zangi's policies in Edessa**

After conquering Edessa, Imad ad-Deen Zangi did not think that it made political sense to destroy such a city.<sup>348</sup> He issued orders to his troops, telling them to stop killing, capturing and plundering, and to return whatever

prisoners and booty they had seized. They returned everything, and nothing worth mentioning was missing. After that he issued further instructions to restore order quickly to the city and to rebuild whatever had been destroyed during the long weeks of fighting. He appointed those whom he thought most qualified to organize the city's affairs, take care of it and strive hard to serve it, and he promised its people that they would be treated well and with justice, aiming to win over its original inhabitants, the Eastern Christians, against the Catholic Crusaders, which is confirmed by the fact that he ordered that a number of Catholic churches be destroyed but he left the Eastern churches alone.<sup>349</sup>

## Factors which helped 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi

There are a number of factors which helped Imad ad-Deen to liberate Edessa, among which were the following:

- a) The growth of the Islamic Jihad movement prior to his rule, which enabled him to learn from the experience of Muslims in this field. Undoubtedly previous experience had shown that the principality of Edessa was vulnerable enough to be the first Crusader principality to fall into the hands of the leaders of the Islamic Jihad at that time. It had become severely weakened due to the ongoing raids by the atabegs of Mosul in particular for more than forty years, which was like a slow death, until it was dealt the final blow in 539.
- b) In addition to that, the military genius of Zangi took that Crusader state by surprise, after the Crusaders had felt secure and thought that he would never attack them. He took advantage of the absence of its ruler Joscelin II and aimed the final blow at it which resulted in its fall. This proves that this great Muslim leader chose the right time for that important military action.
- c) Furthermore, the dispute between the principalities of Edessa and Antioch in turn affected Edessa, and exhausted it both politically and militarily<sup>350</sup> in a manner which proves that the differences that arose between the Crusader leaders had an impact on their political entities. Here we see the principality of Edessa — fortunately — paying the price by falling into the hands of the leaders of the Islamic Jihad who deserved it at that time.



**d)** On the other hand, we should not ignore the character of Edessa's ruler, Joscelin II, who was not of the same level of political and military competence as his father Joscelin I. He was more inclined to a life of promiscuity, immorality, and the pursuit of physical pleasures. He often left Edessa itself and went to Turbessel in search of various licentious activities. The Muslims discovered this weak point in him, and their leader made the most of it by attacking Edessa in the absence of Joscelin II, thus dealing it a fatal blow.<sup>351</sup>

It seems that the second Crusader generation, which succeeded the first generation that had established and protected the Crusader presence, was not able to preserve what their predecessors had built; indeed they did not realize the importance of their historical role in that highly sensitive situation in which they were surrounded by the Muslims on all sides. Hence Joscelin II, without realizing it, contributed to the success of the Islamic Jihad movement which at that time was led by 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi.<sup>352</sup>

Whatever the case, it seems that some western historians tried to highlight the factors of internal weakness in Edessa, and regarded these factors alone as what led to its downfall. Their aim in so doing is to undermine the Muslims' political and military actions. But historical logic dictates that we should think of both internal and external factors combined as playing a role in the victory of 539 AH/1144 CE. Regardless of the internal factors and their outcome in Edessa, the city would not have fallen without the military action of a gifted leader such as 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi and his troops.<sup>353</sup>

## **Anecdotes about the conquest of Edessa**

### **The scholar Moosa al-Armani's clever approach**

The Muslim scholar and muezzin Moosa al-Armani, who was a teacher in a *madrasah* (religious school) in Mosul, adopted a great approach to the conquest of Edessa, using psychological warfare to support the campaign of Imad ad-Deen Zangi against Edessa in 539 AH/1145 CE. The scholar joined the siege as a fighter, and a smart idea occurred to him during Imad ad-Deen's siege of the city. He went to the marketplace and bought some Armenian-style clothing, then he entered the city wearing them, and the

Crusaders did not recognize him or become suspicious about him.<sup>354</sup> He explains:

I went to the marketplace and bought some Armenian garments, and dressed as one of them.<sup>355</sup> I went to the city to see what I could find out about it. I came to the mosque and went in, and I saw the minaret and said to myself: Let me ascend the minaret and give the adhan and see what happens. So I ascended and gave the call to prayer, "Allahu akbar, Allah akbar!" I gave the adhan. The infidels were on the walls, and the cry went up in the city that the Muslims had attacked the city from the other direction. So the infidels stopped fighting and came down from the walls, and the Muslims climbed up and attacked the city.<sup>356</sup>

## In Sicily

At the time of the conquest of Edessa, the King of Sicily was a Frank. In Sicily there was a righteous Muslim man from North Africa, whom the king used to bring to his court, to honour him and listen to what he said, and he preferred him to the monks and priests in his court. At the time that Edessa was being conquered, this Frankish king had sent an army by sea to North Africa, where they raided, plundered and took prisoners. The news came to the king as he was sitting with this Maghrebi scholar, who was feeling drowsy and was almost asleep. The king woke him up and said, "O wise one, our companions have done such and such to the Muslims; why didn't Muhammad (SAAW) help them?" He replied, "He was attending the conquest of Edessa," — meaning the followers of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). The Franks who were present laughed, but the king said to them, "Do not laugh, for by God he is not speaking without knowledge." The king felt very distressed, and before long news reached them that Edessa had fallen to the Muslims, and this bad news made them forget that earlier good news, because of how important Edessa was to the Christians.<sup>357</sup>

## A martyr seen in a dream

It is narrated that a righteous man said, "I saw a martyr in a dream after he was killed, in the best shape. I asked him, 'What did Allah do to

you?' He said, 'He forgave me.' I said, 'In return for what?' He replied, 'In return for the conquest of Edessa.'<sup>358</sup>

## Conspiracy by the inhabitants of Edessa

The Armenian inhabitants of Edessa soon — in the following year — planned a conspiracy in which their aim was to attack the Muslims and return the city to Crusader control after summoning Joscelin, but Zangi quickly uncovered this dangerous plot and managed to capture and execute the plotters. After that he banished a number of Armenians so that they would not have the opportunity to try again to stab the Muslims in the back and hand over their most important position to the Crusaders for an easy gain.<sup>359</sup>

## Consequences of the conquest of Edessa

In conquering Edessa, Imad ad-Deen Zangi achieved his most important achievement against the Crusaders during his rule. This victory had important consequences for the Muslim and Christian worlds, among the most important of which were:

(a) The Muslims became certain that the Jihad movement had reached the stage of maturity in political and military terms, and this is not to downplay the achievements made by leaders before Zangi, especially Mawdood. It was the first Crusader state that fell into their hands, so it was a beginning: today Edessa, tomorrow the fall of the other alien Crusader states. This is indeed what came to pass. From this point onwards there was no turning back, rather they could move on with confidence and pride in their achievements.

(b) History confirms that entities such as this illegitimate Crusader presence could not last on Muslim soil, because the inhabitants of the region who had one religious identity would not accept this alien military and political situation. Thus harmony returned to northern Iraq, and Edessa no longer played the role of division or of a Crusader presence that acted as a buffer zone in preventing contact between the Seljuks of Asia Minor (Seljuks of Rum), the Seljuks of Iraq and those in Persia.<sup>360</sup>

(c) Pressure was put on the Crusader regions which stretched in a long line from Antioch in the north to Eilat (Rashrash) in the south, and from the Jordan River in the east to the Greater Syrian coast — with the exception of

Ascalon ('Asqalan). Tyre, which included the County of Tripoli and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, fell to the Muslims in 1124 CE/518 AH. Edessa, which was like the tip of the Crusader spear, fell forever, leaving the shaft of the spear-the other Crusader states. Hence the military pressure on them increased, in the form of the Muslim forces who were controlling the Syrian interior parallel to the coastline and coastal plain. In geographical terms, it is as if the battle was now between the coast and the interior; the former now relying basically on exterior European support, whilst the latter relied on plentiful local resources which became more abundant with the emergence of a Muslim leadership striving for unity among Muslims.

(d) In this manner the fall of Edessa led to the revival of a strategic, defensive alliance between the Crusader presence in the east and the motherland in Western Europe. The west could not allow its political and historical ventures in the east to fail one by one; it had to intervene in order to set things straight once more and put an end to the activities of the Emirate of Mosul. Hence it launched another Crusade (1147-1149 CE/542-544 CE), known as the Second Crusade. This was one of the direct consequences of the fall of Edessa, which clearly explains how the leaders of the Islamic Jihad fought off international forces. They were not simply local forces with limited influence and impact; they were part of a continental or global conflict, a fact which gives these leaders a prominent status in the history of the Muslims during the Crusades.

(e) One of the many consequences of this achievement was the great rise in status of Imad ad-Deen Zangi. After being merely a local ruler with limited influence, his name soon started to be mentioned in the annals of the Latin and Syriac peoples, to reflect the fact that he had a major impact on the course of events in the Latin East, in an unprecedented manner. With regard to the Muslims, he occupied a prominent position.<sup>361</sup> The conquest of Edessa raised Imad ad-Deen in status in the eyes of the Seljuk Sultan Mas'ood and the Abbasid caliph al- Muqtafi li Amrillah, who bestowed on him a number of titles that he had earned, such as *al-Ameer al-Muzaffar* (the Victorious Leader), *Rukn al-Islam* (the Pillar of Islam), *'Umdat as-Saldteen* (the Foremost among the Sultans), *Za'eem Juyoosh al-Muslimeen* (Commander of the Muslim Armies), *Malik al- 'Umara'* (the King of the Emirs) and *Ameer al- 'Iraqayn wash-Sham* (Emir of the Two Iraqs and Greater Syria).<sup>362</sup> The victory made Imad ad-Deen Zangi the foremost defender of the faith and

mujahid, who was striving to make the word of Allah supreme. In Muslim gatherings there was a great deal of talk centred on his character, which shows us the extent of the appreciation and admiration he garnered after achieving this great victory. This victory paved the way for Imad ad-Deen Zangi to complete the conquest of neighbouring fortresses and impose his authority completely on the possessions of his enemies in the area. The conquest of Edessa played a major role in saving the emirate of Imad ad-Deen Zangi from the danger of continual Crusader raids, and after living in fear its inhabitants found security.<sup>363</sup> This, in sha' Allah, was a sign of glad tidings (of the reward of paradise for him).

## John LaMonte's opinion of 'Imad ad-Deen

John L. LaMonte was regarded as one of the most prominent American historians during the first half of the last century. He wrote several books about the Crusades, most notably his comprehensive study of feudalism in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. But he wrote another study entitled "Crusade and Jihad"<sup>364</sup>. In this study, LaMonte focused on refuting the idea of Jihad among Muslims at that time, and depicted the actions of the leaders of the Islamic Jihad at that time as being motivated solely by political and economic factors. He asserts that Imad ad-Deen Zangi cannot be regarded in any way as a hero of Jihad, and that he had wanted to take back Edessa for a long time, as Kamal ad-Deen ibn al-'Adeem says, but he did not start to think seriously about it until a later stage, after he was urged to do so by the Emir of Harran, Jamal ad-Deen Abul-Ma'ali Fadl-Allah ibn Mahan, who explained to him how easy it would be to occupy the city.<sup>365</sup> LaMonte explains:

It seems that he himself regarded occupying Edessa as contrary to his policies and something that he did on the basis of the incitement of others.<sup>366</sup>

He also states:

Zangi's capture of Hama and Aleppo, and his wars against the Artuqids, were more important to him than fighting the Christians, and he did not object to forming an alliance with the Latins if he thought it was in his interest.<sup>367</sup>

It is possible to refute these views by noting the following points:

The fact that Imad ad-Deen Zangi delayed attacking Edessa does not diminish his role in Jihad at all, especially since he thought that he should use up the energy of this Crusader principality through his conflicts and attacks against its fortifications, after which he would go and attack the principality itself once he had acquired an understanding of its defences and found out its weak points as well as its strong points. On the other hand, it is natural to suppose that the advice of the Emir of Harran to Zangi to capture Edessa could not have changed the situation at all if Zangi had not planned previously for that. It is difficult to imagine the fall of that principality happening as depicted by LaMonte; rather it is most likely that it had been part of Zangi's plan for a long time.

As for the reason why Zangi did not capture it earlier, this was because during the early stages of his rule he did not want to exhaust his military forces in premature confrontations with the Crusaders when there was no guarantee of the outcome. Hence it is possible to regard the timing of Edessa's capture — based on what is explained in the Latin, Syriac and Arabic sources — as one of the greatest proofs of Zangi's political brilliance.

It seems that LaMonte's claim that the fall of Edessa was not part of the policy of 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi is a claim that has no historical support. It is well known that Zangi was a member of Mawdood's army, or as Ibn al-Atheer put it, "He was present with him during his wars."<sup>368</sup> No doubt Zangi understood the importance of capturing Edessa, and indeed this dream had been entrenched in his mind for a long time, and one would imagine that he wanted to succeed where Mawdood had failed before him. He thought that capturing Edessa was essential on the basis that it was the closest Crusader target to Mosul; achieving this goal would also make communication with northern Syria easier, especially given his strong belief in the importance of uniting the Muslims.<sup>369</sup>

John LaMonte's suggestion that Zangi could have formed an alliance with the Latin rulers to serve his political interests is a suggestion which confirms the political acumen of 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi. He resorted to making deals with the Crusaders occasionally in order to catch his breath and avoid being caught between two fronts: the eastern front where he had conflicts with other political forces, and the front which represented his

conflict with the Crusaders. Moreover, he wanted to put the minds of others at rest by means of such deals whilst concealing his intention to put an end to Edessa; hence his operations to lay siege to it came as a surprise to its inhabitants.<sup>370</sup>

With regard to the idea that the fall of Edessa was not Zangi's only goal, but that he was also trying to build his state at the expense of his neighbours, both Muslim and Christian, it should be noted that all the Muslim leaders who emerged during the two centuries of the Crusade period of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries CE (sixth and seventh centuries AH) and contributed to the cause of Jihad had some sort of political ambition. They certainly strove to establish their own states at the expense of neighbouring political forces, but the point here is that political ambition — as I pointed out above — may be used to serve the interests of the Ummah as a whole, and that is Jihad, because these leaders could have accepted a life of humiliation and giving in to the Crusaders, and not tried to expand (their own territory) at their expense, in order to avoid stirring up political trouble with them and to avoid bloodshed, not to mention exposing the regions of their original influence to Crusader attacks. They rejected that, though, and accepted the Crusader challenge, and demonstrated their ability to change the political map of the region by taking on Jihad missions.<sup>371</sup>

It is important to note that it is no secret to researchers of Muslim relations with the Christian forces during the Crusades that a number of Orientalists sought to deny Muslim achievements and cast doubts on the bright stages of their history. A sense of vengeance is always discernible among this group, especially when it comes to Jihad, which is the pinnacle of Islam. Hence they strove very hard to deny this idea and cast aspersions upon it, and to speak ill of all past experiences of Jihad so that Muslims would not adopt this idea in the present and in the future. Thus it is possible to state — objectively and without jumping to conclusions — that the era of the Crusades witnessed a quantum leap in the development of the idea of Jihad in Islam, because this time the Jihad was against an enemy that had settled in the Muslim lands as a result of Muslim weakness that was caused by internal conflicts. If we realize that their religious identity was at risk due to the Christianization project on which the papacy was pinning its greatest hopes, we will understand the great importance of the idea of Jihad during the Crusade era.<sup>372</sup> Consequently, western sources, both classical and modern,

have tried to distort the image of this great Mujahid. One of the most well known contemporary books is *Holy War: The Crusades and their Impact on Today's World*. The author of this book, Karen Armstrong, says of Imad ad-Deen Zangi, "(This man) was no paragon: he was often dead drunk and was as cruel and ruthless as most men of war at this time."<sup>373</sup> The biography of this man proves false what they say; our (Muslim) historians describe him as a martyr, which is the highest title that is bestowed only on those who deserve it. They have stated that he was one of the best kings in attitude, with the greatest resolve in dealing with matters; his subjects were safe and secure, and the strong were unable to transgress against the weak.<sup>374</sup> He venerated Islamic law, established it in his state, and appointed judges to implement it. The aims of some Orientalists include the following:

- a) Distorting the meaning of Jihad so that our generation will remain without examples to strengthen their resolve and motivate them.
- b) Weakening the spirit of sacrifice, martyrdom and Jihad in the Ummah so that they can drive the Muslims like cattle.
- c) Attempting to separate the Ummah from its history by means of fabrications and distortions so that Muslims will not refer to their history and learn lessons from it.
- d) Their writings stem from a hateful Crusader spirit which resents the heroes who contributed to the failure of the Crusader venture. It is for this reason that the Orientalists have tried to distort the image of Imad ad-Deen Zangi.

The biography of Imad ad-Deen Zangi and his dedicated supporters such as al-Qadi ash-Shahrazoori definitely expose, beyond any doubt, the lies of those Orientalists who have tried to erase the facts and make false accusations against that great man. His experience of Jihad deserves to be studied and analyzed in depth, and the conclusions drawn should be applied to our contemporary situation, so that we may benefit from them in a sincere effort to revive the Ummah.



## Poets praise for 'Imad ad-Deen after the conquest

Many researchers and writers have not paid attention to literature when it comes to the Crusades; indeed, many regard it as a literature of decline, following the statements and views of the Orientalists who want us to avoid studying the literature of those wars for many reasons, such as their desire that we should not learn of the viciousness and cruelty of the Crusaders, and so that we should not feel pride when reading of the history of Muslim heroes — Arabs, Kurds and Turks — who led armies under the banner of Islam, fighting, striving, prevailing and rising above ignorant tribalism and nationalism, united by their love for Allah and His Messenger and Jihad for the sake of Allah, seeking His pleasure. The literature of that period still needs comprehensive study, research and evaluation.

Then we will see a positive change in our views, because we will find much that needs to be researched, and we will find a wealth of refined poetry which speaks of zeal and describes the battles, praising the heroes; we will also find a great deal of sorrowful poetry which eulogizes the slain.<sup>375</sup> There is a substantial amount of poetry which speaks of the conquest of Edessa and praises Imad ad-Deen al-Zangi.

## Military events after the conquest

The conquest of Edessa was an introduction to the events that came after it, as it was not difficult for Imad ad-Deen Zangi to complete his mission by conquering the remaining Crusader fortresses belonging to this principality, taking advantage of the collapse of Crusader strength in this region.<sup>376</sup> He headed towards Suruj, which had been abandoned by its garrison, and captured it. Soon the neighbouring fortresses began to fall into his hands, one after another.<sup>377</sup> He did not pass by any of its towns or fortresses but it surrendered to him immediately.<sup>378</sup> He then proceeded to the citadel of Bira, overlooking the Euphrates, which was one of the most important fortresses still in the hands of Joscelin II, and one of the most strongly fortified, and laid siege to it, preventing food and supplies from reaching it, until it was about to surrender. At that point, news reached Zangi of the killing of his deputy in Mosul, so he was compelled to lift the siege

and hasten back to his capital in order to deal with the situation there. The Crusaders in the fort were afraid that he would return to attack them again, so they sent word to Hussam ad-Deen Timurtash al-Artuqi telling him that they wanted to surrender this position of theirs to him before it fell into the hands of their bitter enemy. Thus the Crusaders of Edessa lost all their fortresses east of the Euphrates,<sup>379</sup> as a direct result of their main base falling into the hands of Zangi. Joscelin had nothing left of his vast principality except a few scattered fortresses west of the Euphrates, such as Turbessel, Mar'ash, Duluk, Samosata, 'Ayntab and 'Azaz<sup>380</sup>, which Noor ad-Deen Mahmood was able to capture later on. Thus the first Crusader principality was wiped out.<sup>381</sup>

## Ways in which 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi fought the Crusaders

Imad ad-Deen Zangi did not limit his fighting with the Crusaders solely to regular warfare, because that would have required him to stay in Syria all the time, and his strength would all have been exhausted in fighting these enemies, with the result that he would not have been able to focus on sorting out his numerous problems in Iraq. He understood the importance of benefiting from raids, that is, attacks followed by a sudden withdrawal, especially during his periods of absence from Syria. That is because this type of fighting yielded good results: (i) it made the Crusaders anxious and did not give them room to reorganize their troops and draw up a plan of attack on Muslim locations in the area, thus enabling the Muslims to defend and retain their positions; (ii) it weakened the enemy's military and economic strength, because of the killing, capture of prisoners, plundering and destruction that these attacks wrought; (iii) it interrupted communications between the Crusader positions in northern Syria, and did not give them the opportunity to come together and direct a united blow against the Muslims.<sup>382</sup>

In this type of fighting Zangi relied on his Turkmen troops; he had paved the way for that by strengthening his ties with their leaders and giving them high military positions. Zangi appointed brilliant Turkmen commanders, such as Aytkeen, Lujat at-Turki, al-Yaruq and others, and courageous fighters, to launch what is known nowadays as a resistance struggle and guerrilla warfare. He made Aleppo a centre for them, because of its geographical importance in relation to both Crusader and Muslim

fortresses, as it lay between the Crusader states of Antioch and Edessa and controlled the transportation routes between them. It was also regarded as the best military base for launching rapid attacks against Crusader locations and movements, as well as against the caravans bringing them supplies and reinforcements. These groups of Turkmens launched many raids against the enemy's armies, camps, caravans and rendezvous. There was not one year during the years of conflict and guerrilla warfare in which these Turkmens did not in this manner inflict various losses on their enemies. In Rajab 524 AH, for example, Zangi prepared a force to attack 'Azaz.<sup>383</sup> In the following year, fighting broke out between Suwar and Joscelin north of Aleppo, which resulted in victory for the Crusaders and the killing of many Muslims. This prompted Suwar to attack Rabd al-Atharib and capture some of its property and crops soon afterwards. One year later, in 526 AH, he ambushed the Crusaders of Turbessel and killed many of them.<sup>384</sup> Suwar and his Turkmen troops continued to launch raids against the Crusaders every time they got the opportunity to do so. Safar 527 AH saw many fights between the two sides, one of which took place near Qinassareen when King Baldwin of Jerusalem attempted to attack the outskirts of Aleppo. He was confronted by Suwar and some of his troops, and the battle led to defeat for the Muslims and their withdrawal to Aleppo, but their brave leader soon led them out again and they attacked a group of Crusaders, killing many and taking many others captive. Those who escaped fled back to their own land and Suwar returned to Aleppo, carrying the heads of the slain and bringing captives, and that was a great day.<sup>385</sup> Only a few days passed before the Crusaders of Edessa tried again to attack areas outside Aleppo, but Suwar went out to meet them, accompanied by Hassan al-Balbeki, the Emir of Manbij, and took them by surprise; he managed to decimate them and take the rest captive, then he returned to Aleppo without any of his own soldiers being injured.<sup>386</sup> In Jumada II of the same year, Suwar, at the head of a detachment of horsemen, raided Turbessel and was confronted by the Crusaders of that county, but he managed to defeat them and harvested the heads of a thousand men, which he carried back with him to Aleppo.<sup>387</sup> In Rabee' I of the following year, the commander of the Crusader fortress of al-Qadmoos came to Qinassareen, leading a force of knights from Antioch, where they were met by the troops of Aleppo led by Suwar. The fighting resulted in a victory for the Crusaders, and Zangi's commander was forced to make a peace deal with them, but he soon took one of their brigades by surprise in a rapid attack and managed to

kill most of its soldiers. Then he went back to Aleppo, and the people were cheered by that after having been distressed. It was not long before the knights of Edessa attacked the northern outskirts of Aleppo on their way to one of the Crusader camps. Suwar and his ally the emir of Manbij counterattacked and killed many of them, whilst most of the rest were taken captive.<sup>388</sup> Soon after that, in the same year, Suwar launched a big raid against the Crusader positions in the region of al-Jazar<sup>389</sup> and Zaradna; he defeated his enemies at Harim then returned to Aleppo carrying booty and plunder.<sup>390</sup>

The range of raids and sudden attacks gradually started to increase, and in Rajab 530 AH, a great attempt was made by Suwar, who led three thousand Turkmen horsemen and launched a surprise attack on Latakia and its environs, which the Crusaders were not expecting. Thus he managed to capture seven thousand prisoners and seize a large amount of booty, and he swept aside dozens of Crusader villages and farmsteads, from which the Muslims filled their hands with booty and took many prisoners. The Muslims of the region were delighted with this great victory achieved by Suwar, which was a disaster for the Crusaders of the north who had never suffered anything like it.<sup>391</sup> In fact the internal strife witnessed by Antioch between 529 and 530 AH due to the contest for power contributed to a large extent to the inability of this county to defend itself against Muslim attacks.<sup>392</sup> This prompted the Muslim commander to take the opportunity to achieve a great victory against the Crusaders of the north.

At the end of the following year, Suwar launched a sudden attack against a large Byzantine expedition that was heading eastwards, and managed to kill and capture a number of its troops before heading back to his base in Aleppo.<sup>393</sup> No more than a few months had passed following this attack before the Crusaders and Byzantines sent a joint expedition to occupy the citadel of al-Atharib, near Aleppo. After these forces had achieved their goal, a garrison was appointed to guard the Muslim prisoners who had been brought together there. Suwar soon came out, leading his forces, and attacked the Crusader-Byzantine garrison, and he managed to free most of the Muslim prisoners and bring them back to Aleppo, where there was great rejoicing at this victory that had been achieved by its emir.<sup>394</sup> In 533 AH, Suwar attacked a number of Crusader sites and captured some booty, but the Crusader

knights managed to catch up with him and inflict a defeat on his forces that led to the capture of more than a thousand horsemen, and he withdrew to Aleppo with those of his troops who had escaped.<sup>395</sup>

The clashes between the two sides continued for the next few years and then slowed down somewhat during the period 534-535 AH, after Zangi failed to capture Damascus and the Damascenes and Crusaders formed an alliance against him. However, these clashes soon flared up again in 536 AH and the following years. In the first months of 536 AH, the Crusaders launched a swift attack against some Muslim sites west of Aleppo, and when they dispersed, Suwar sent a force of Turkmens, led by his son <sup>4</sup>Alam ad-Deen, who raided Crusader sites and reached as far as the walls of Antioch, then returned carrying a large amount of plunder and booty.<sup>396</sup> A short while later, Lujat at-Turki raided some Crusader territories in the north: killing, capturing prisoners and seizing booty. It was said that the number of slain was seven hundred.<sup>397</sup> In Ramadan of the same year, Suwar attacked a Crusader camp at Jisr al-Hadeed ('Iron Bridge'), northeast of Antioch, after crossing the Orontes river with his troops towards the enemy's gathering. He managed to kill most of the troops in the camp, and took the rest captive.<sup>398</sup>

The following year, the regent of Antioch went out and raided the valley of Baza'ah, near Aleppo, and was confronted by Suwar, who forced him to withdraw. Joscelin managed to take this opportunity to attack the Muslim camps on the banks of the Euphrates, and managed to capture nine hundred men. The two sides then decided to form a truce in which the regent of Antioch played no part. Hence the fighting continued between this county and the forces of Aleppo. When in Jumada I 538 AH a large group of merchants went out from Antioch, guarded by a number of knights and carrying a lot of wealth and goods on their way to one of the neighbouring Crusader areas, the Muslims launched a sudden attack and took them by surprise, and they managed to eliminate all the troops who had come out to protect them. They took as booty all the valuable goods that this party had been carrying.<sup>399</sup> At the end of Dhul-Qa'dah in the same year, a group of Aleppan horsemen attacked a group of Crusader knights who had come out from Basuta and destroyed them, and they captured the ruler of Basuta, whom Suwar detained in Aleppo<sup>400</sup>

Hence we see some of the methods that Zangi used in order to achieve his twin aims of forming an Islamic front and striking the Crusaders. By examining the relationship that 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi had with the Islamic forces such as the emirates of different cities and local emirates in Mesopotamia and Syria, and the Kurdish and Turkmen tribes, we can clearly see the extent of his political acumen and his brilliance in military planning in his relationships in war and peace with those forces located in the region. From an official standpoint, he received a letter from the Seljuk Sultan Mahmood ibn Muhammad ibn Malikshah in 522 AH confirming his legitimate authority in Mosul, Mesopotamia and Syria, and this position was confirmed again in the next few years. Nonetheless, this was not sufficient to prove his actual authority during that period, when many emirs were able to impose their authority on countless numbers of cities and regions, were largely independent of the Seljuk state, and benefited from a number of personal, political, geographical, economic and human factors. So it was essential for Zangi to subjugate the various powers concentrated in that region and to choose an offensive strategy from the outset. There were dangers surrounding such a strategy: the first of which was the possibility that a defensive alliance might be formed among the local emirs which could later on be turned into an offensive alliance, as happened in the case of the Artuqids; secondly, there was nothing to fall back on in the event of being defeated by or retreating before the local emirs who surrounded him on all sides. He paid no heed to these dangers, however, and started attacking the local emirs from the outset, prompted by his own ambition and courage, and his confidence that he had sincere support from a populace that loved him for his stance towards the Crusaders even before he was appointed as governor of Mosul. He was also helped by the sultan's letter of authority referred to above, which gave him authority to rule Mosul, Mesopotamia and Syria, for this implied that Zangi would have free rein to engage in fighting with local political entities and sweep them aside, using any means he saw fit to achieve this goal.<sup>401</sup> More important than all this was Imad ad-Deen Zangi's political acumen, military brilliance and farsightedness. He knew from the outset that if he adopted a friendly and peaceful approach towards the local emirs, their fortresses, cities and emirates would continue to pose a threat to his emirate because of their proximity to it and their strategic locations, as they were located on high land that sloped towards Mosul, and on their other side were mountain chains, interconnected rivers and strong fortresses. Moreover, the

isolationist policy followed by those emirs towards the Crusader threat that was advancing eastwards, and the resulting scattering of Muslim economic, military and human resources had rendered these emirates incapable of withstanding the encroaching Crusader threat. This was at a time when Zangi had to strive to remove the obstacles that stood in the way of uniting the divided and scattered emirates into one united Islamic front.

## **'Imad ad-deen's political and military role in Islamic history**

It may be said that Imad ad-Deen Zangi was able to fulfil a large part of his plan and carve out for himself a special position in Islamic history as a brilliant politician, capable military leader and wise Muslim who understood the danger posed to the Islamic world by the Crusaders. He managed to direct historical circumstances in the Muslims' favour by bringing together the Muslim forces after eliminating the factors that led to division and dissent, uniting the various cities and emirates within the framework of a single state, and making the most of what that state had to offer in terms of resources that could stop the Crusader advance. Once he had accomplished this he could organize attacks against the Crusader bases. These were the factors that prompted Zangi to form a policy of attack and occasionally interrupted the peaceful relations and truces that were dictated by circumstances. At the same time, Zangi strove to secure the borders of his emirate towards the east and north-east, where Kurds and Turkmen in these regions formed an element of grave danger to his emirate, especially when his relations with the western emirates were in crisis or when he ventured far from his base in Mosul.<sup>402</sup>

The importance of the role played by Zangi in Muslim history is clear to us because he is regarded as the first commander who brought the Muslim forces together in accordance with a specific plan to confront the increasing Crusader danger — a danger which had not been stopped by the previous attempts that had been made before Zangi, especially those which had been carried out by Mawdood ibn al-Tuntagin (502-507 AH) and by the Artuqids Ilghazi and Balak (512-518 AH).<sup>403</sup> It is most likely that if Zangi had been able to capture Damascus and his attempt to unite Syria had succeeded, and if

he had not been killed at the peak of his series of victories against the Crusaders, he would have been able to complete the remaining stages of his plan. The modern researcher would then have had a clear, complete picture of the role that Zangi played in Islamic history, which is a decisive role the significance of which becomes clear if we realize that the efforts of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood, and Salah ad-Deen after him, were no more than the completion of the work begun by Imad ad-Deen Zangi.<sup>404</sup>



## The Second Crusade

There was a violent reaction in western Europe to the fall of Edessa into Muslim hands, and it prompted Europe to send another Crusade quickly, for its fall instilled fear in the people's hearts, not only because of the religious status enjoyed by this city in Christian history, but also because it was the first state established by the Crusaders in the Near East. Thus its fall came as a warning that shook the structure that the Crusaders had set up in the Near East during the First Crusade, and Western Europeans realized that if they did not hasten to repair this structure, it would soon collapse.<sup>405</sup> The calls for help reached the Pope, Eugenius III, from the Franks in the east; the Queen of Jerusalem sent a high-level delegation to the Pope seeking help after the fall of Edessa,<sup>406</sup> and the Pope sent envoys to the Kings of Germany and France, urging them to hasten to save the Franks in the east from the Muslim danger. At the same time, he appointed one of the most influential clergymen of France, Bernard de Clairvaux, to promote the Crusade against the Muslims in the east, and this priest played the same role as had been played by Urban II in 488AH/1095 CE, when he had called for the first Frankish campaign.<sup>407</sup> The King of Germany, Konrad III and Louis VII, King of France, responded to the Pope's call; they each set out with their armies, crossing Europe towards Constantinople and thence across the Bosphorus to Asia

## The Seljuks destroy the German army

The German army set out a few days ahead of the French army. When it reached the area of Dorylaeum, east of Nicaea — the same site where the Franks of the First Crusade had defeated the Seljuks under Kilij Arslan fifty years before — the German army fell prey to the army of Sultan Mas'ood, the emir of the Seljuks of Rum in Asia. The sultan retreated in accordance with a smart military plan, until the German army continued its advance towards the heart of Phrygia. Sultan Mas'ood had spread his forces across the surrounding mountain peaks, and when the German soldiers reached the Batees river, near Dorylaeum, the Seljuk army attacked them. The Germans were overwhelmed with exhaustion and thirst, and their

commanders lost control of them. They tried to seek protection in the mountain passes, but the Seljuks surrounded them and rained down arrows upon them. The German troops lost the advantage of using arrows to keep the Turks away at the time when their horses needed to be fed and watered, at which point Konrad III decided to withdraw and return from whence he had come, but the Seljuks did not leave them alone; they attacked the rearguard, vanguard and core of his army. Chaos spread through the ranks and heavy losses were inflicted on the troops, with many being killed or taken captive. In fact the fighting was nothing more or less than an outright massacre in which nine-tenths of the German troops were killed. Konrad himself received two wounds, one of which was to his head.<sup>409</sup> Konrad III tried in vain to gather the remnants of his army, but fled the battlefield that evening with those of his men who remained, of whom there were few, heading back to Nicaea, whilst the Seljuks seized an unquantifiable amount of booty.<sup>410</sup> They seized everything in their camp, including supplies and horses, and took many of the men captive. The booty continued to be sold in the markets of Muslim cities for several months after that.<sup>411</sup> From this crushing defeat we may be certain that the German army failed to achieve the goal for which it had come to the east, and this had a negative effect on the Second Crusade.<sup>412</sup>

## **The Seljuks of Rum slow the advance of the French army**

The French army, led by King Louis VII, set out later than the German army. The French forces were more or less equal in number to the Germans, but were more organized, and Louis VII had brought his wife Eleanor (of Aquitaine) with him.<sup>413</sup> Whilst the fighting was still going on between the Seljuks and the German forces, the French forces crossed the Bosphorus into Asia Minor and reached Nicaea, where the French king learned of the defeat of the German king, so he hastened to console and help him. Despite the precautions taken by the French king, the Seljuk sultan Mas'ood caught him unawares in the town of Decerphios near Antioch, and started skirmishes with the Crusaders until he reached the bridge over the river, where a fierce battle took place. The Crusaders managed to fight their way across the bridge, whereupon Mas'ood retreated inside the walls of **the**

city, after which the Crusaders were able to continue on their way, and Mas'ood did not take the risk of coming down to the plain to pursue them. The Turkmen tribes who were spread throughout the border region confronted them, however, and rained down arrows upon them, and they pursued the French and killed some of the rearguard, stray soldiers and the sick; nothing saved them from complete annihilation except the fall of darkness, when the Turkmen withdrew.<sup>415</sup> The French army did not reach Antioch until after it had suffered huge losses. After the German king recovered from his illness, he completed his journey to Palestine by sea, courtesy of the Byzantine fleet.<sup>416</sup> The German and French kings met in Jerusalem with King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, his mother Melisande and senior commanders and clergy of the Kingdom of Jerusalem; they discussed the first territory which the campaign would seek to occupy, and they decided that their first target would be Damascus<sup>417</sup>

## The Crusader attack on Damascus

The allied Frankish armies headed towards Damascus, which was governed at that time by Mu'een ad-Deen Unur, the atabeg of king Mujeer ad-Deen Abiq ibn Muhammad ibn Buri. Mujeer ad-Deen was the closest of the Muslim emirs to the Crusaders and had cooperated with them,<sup>418</sup> hence he did not expect to be the first victim of this huge Frankish army. Nonetheless, when he found out about the Franks' intentions and their march towards Damascus, he took all necessary precautions to defend the city, and he sent word asking for help from Noor ad-Deen Mahmood and Sayf ad-Deen Ghazi.<sup>419</sup> It was the habit of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood to study the international and regional situation, to follow developments and analyze them deeply. Thus he would learn lessons which would help him to determine his future policies. The Second Crusade was the most significant event in the region — and in the whole world — in 543 AH/1148 CE, and for Noor ad-Deen Mahmood it was the first incident of its kind since he had come to power in 541 AH/1146 CE, and he practised the approach mentioned above whenever he could. Noor ad-Deen was expecting his emirate — Aleppo — to be the first target of this campaign, because the army had formed and headed east against the backdrop of the fall of the capital of the

Crusader principality of Edessa, in 539 AH/1144 CE, at the hand of 'Imad ad-Deen. What happened instead was that the campaign changed its expected goal and headed towards Damascus, which it besieged in an attempt to occupy it. This change was a great surprise to Noor ad-Deen, and an even greater surprise to Mujeer ad-Deen Abiq, the ruler of Damascus, and his atabeg Mu'een ad-Deen Unur, the de facto ruler who was in control of affairs in Damascus. The reasons for Noor ad-Deen's surprise have been mentioned; as for the ruler of Damascus, it came as a surprise to him because he was the only friend of the Franks among the Muslims in that region, and there had been strong cooperation between the two sides against 'Imad ad-Deen Zangi when the latter was attempting to capture Damascus. Mujeer ad-Deen was not expecting the Crusaders to attack their friends in Damascus and ignore their main enemy in Aleppo. Noor ad-Deen Mahmood learned a lesson from this sudden alteration in the campaign's target. This change did not take place spontaneously and was not an act of foolishness, as some historians have said.<sup>420</sup> Rather, it came after study and analysis of the situation in the region undertaken by the campaign leaders at the Council of Acre in which the King of Jerusalem and his commanders took part before the attack on Damascus.<sup>421</sup>

It became clear to Noor ad-Deen Mahmood that the true aim of the previous Frankish campaign in the First Crusade and in this (Second) Crusade had nothing to do with taking back the grave of the Messiah (the Holy Sepulchre) from the Muslims and securing the pilgrim routes to Jerusalem along the northern coast to Constantinople, as was claimed by the Christian religious leaders who had planned these wars. Rather the real aim of the second Frankish campaign was far removed from seeking revenge for the fall of Edessa, because the campaign targeted Damascus, the Franks' ally in the region, and did not head towards Aleppo or Edessa where there was someone on whom vengeance might be wrought. Noor ad-Deen Mahmood realized that the actual aim of the campaign was to occupy and dominate the Muslim east as the Roman Empire had dominated the region before Islam. In their efforts to achieve this goal they did not differentiate between the various Muslim emirates and states; in their view the ally who cooperated with them was the same as those who resisted their domination and expansion and engaged in Jihad to free the land from their occupation. Their aim was to occupy and dominate the entire land. For this reason, it was better for them to

start with Damascus, which was regarded as the heart of Greater Syria and the largest Islamic emirate in terms of area and resources, and as the weakest in military terms. After that they would move on to Aleppo, Edessa, Mosul and elsewhere. This would be a comprehensive war, from which the one who was watching from the sidelines thinking that danger was far away, would never be safe; his turn would come, even if it was after a while. As that was the case, Noor ad-Deen, with his usual farsightedness, had no choice but to get involved in this war from the outset. For him, Damascus was exactly the same as Aleppo, and in this situation it formed the first line of defence for Aleppo, Mosul and all other Muslim lands. Hence he decided to mobilize his army alongside that of his brother Sayf ad-Deen Ghazi the Emir of Mosul, near Horns and Baalbek, in order to coordinate with the ruler of Damascus and work out a joint plan of action for confronting the foreign invasion. This coordination was the main cause of the failure of the Crusaders' attack on Damascus. Noor ad-Deen Mahmood learned important lessons from this incident which supported his convictions and previous thinking, including: the extreme importance of unity among the Muslim emirates in order to confront the Frankish danger and liberate their lands from foreign occupation; the strategic importance of the emirate of Damascus in confrontations with the Franks; the necessity of capturing Damascus at all costs; and that European interference in conflicts with Frankish states must be taken into consideration.<sup>422</sup>

## How the Christian clergy viewed the Second Crusade

As soon as news of the fall of Edessa at the hand of Imad ad-Deen Zangi in 539 AH/1144 CE had been confirmed, it reverberated in the capitals of Western Europe until it had stirred up a great deal of fear and anxiety. The Crusaders realized that it represented the beginning of the end for the other Crusader states in the holy land, so the opinion formed that a delegation should be sent to Pope Eugenius III (540-548 AH/1145-1153 CE) asking him to call for a new Crusade. In fact a great movement developed in Europe which called zealously for this campaign to be started quickly, in order to regain the County of Edessa for the Christians. The pope Eugenius III hastened to summon Louis VII of France and Konrad III of Germany to lead

this campaign. Louis VII welcomed the pope's request and called his followers to meet him and discuss arrangements. When they did not show any enthusiasm for taking part in the campaign, King Louis VII decided to delay responding to the pope's call for three months, and he turned to a prominent Christian religious figure in his kingdom, Bernard, who was the Abbot of the Clairvaux monastery; he enjoyed great fame and his authority superseded that of the king, according to the English historian Steven Runciman. He had a great ability to convince and influence people, and as soon as King Louis VII and Pope Eugenius asked him to promote the new Crusade, Bernard responded to this request and strove to make this effort successful.<sup>423</sup> As Pope Urban II had stood at Clermont and called for the First Crusade fifty years earlier, Bernard stood outside the church of Vezelay in Shawwal 540 AH/March 1146 CE, calling for the second Crusade. With his eloquence he reached the hearts of those who were thirsting for war and adventure. When the people heard his eloquence they began to call out for crosses,<sup>424</sup> at which point St. Bernard took off his cloak and it was cut and turned into crosses and the Abbot and his aides sewed crosses for all of those who volunteered to take part in this campaign.<sup>425</sup> A few days later, Bernard wrote a letter to the Pope which demonstrated the extent of the clergy's influence on the people and the degree to which the people obeyed them at that time. In his letter he said:

I commanded them and they obeyed. The one who issued the order has no authority. The people's obedience to me bore fruit. Barely had I opened my mouth before the Crusaders began to gather with no limit to their numbers. The villages and towns have been deserted by their inhabitants and there is barely one man for every seven women. You see everywhere widows whose husbands are still alive.<sup>426</sup>

After the success that Bernard achieved in France, his zeal began to increase and he began to travel around Germany, hoping to attract the Germans to take part in this campaign, and he succeeded by and large in convincing Konrad III, King of Germany, to join the holy war. He asked the German nobility to explain the papal declaration that had been sent by the Pope to all the cities of Europe so that everyone would take on the responsibility of helping the holy land in Palestine and striving to liberate it.<sup>427</sup> The participants in this campaign agreed to attack and occupy Damascus, and the Christian clergy took part alongside the soldiers in

besieging Damascus. Konrad had with him an elderly priest called Elias who had a long beard, whom the people believed in. When they besieged Damascus, this priest rode his donkey, wearing a cross around his neck and carrying a cross in his hand. The priests gathered with the crosses, the kings and knights rode ahead of them, and none of the Crusaders stayed behind except those whom they left behind to guard the tents. This priest stood before the throng and said, "Christ has promised me that I will conquer Damascus today, and no one will repel me." However, his words were proven false when he was attacked by one of the young mujahideen who killed him and his donkey.<sup>428</sup>

## The Victory of Damascus in the Second Crusade

In Rabee' I 543 AH, the Franks besieged Damascus with ten thousand knights and sixty thousand foot soldiers. The Muslims of Damascus came out to confront them with one hundred and thirty thousand men and local troops, of whom nearly two hundred were martyred. Then they came out on the second day and some of them were martyred, and many of the Franks were killed. On the fifth day, Ghazi ibn Atabeg and his brother Noor ad-Deen arrived with twenty thousand men from Aleppo. The people of Damascus were beseeching Allah for help. They brought the 'Uthmani mus-haf out to the courtyard of the Grand Mosque, and the people, women and children, began crying out with their heads uncovered, calling upon Allah sincerely and expressing their need.<sup>429</sup> Allah says:

**'Is not He [better than your gods], Who responds to the distressed one, when he calls on Him...'** *(Qur'an 27: 62)*

One of the causes of victory which Allah granted to the people of Damascus was the arrival of the armies of Mosul and Aleppo at the right time. Both Sayf ad-Deen Ghazi and his brother Noor ad-Deen had contacted Mu'een ad-Deen Unur to coordinate with them against the Franks and Mu'een ad-Deen Unur, the ruler of Damascus, did not want Sayf ad-Deen and Noor ad-Deen to enter Damascus. At the same time, he was threatening the Franks that he would hand over Damascus to Sayf ad-Deen or Noor ad-Deen if the Crusaders tried to breach it, and yet he sent word to the Christian rulers of

Jerusalem and promised to hand over the fortress of Baniyas to them if they persuaded Konrad and Louis to withdraw from Damascus. This correspondence coincided with the dispute among the Franks themselves about who would rule Damascus after it was occupied.<sup>430</sup>

The ruler of Jerusalem accepted the offer of Mu'een ad-Deen Unur, and convinced King Konrad and King Louis of the necessity of withdrawing, lest the city be handed over to Sayf ad-Deen Ghazi, the 'King of the East'.<sup>431</sup> For if he captured it he would then have hopes of capturing Jerusalem and the other Crusader states later on, and the Christian presence would disappear from the east altogether. As a result the Frankish armies withdrew to Palestine, Konrad sailed to Constantinople on his way back to Germany, and Louis stayed on for a few months before setting sail for France.<sup>432</sup>

Thus the greatest Frankish venture ended in utter failure because of mutual support between the Islamic emirates Mosul and Aleppo with Damascus and the Seljuks of Rum in the face of aggression, and because the will to resist was present in the hearts of the leaders. This was in contrast to the situation during the first Frankish campaign in which the Europeans achieved their aim of occupying most of Syria because of the differences among these emirates, the lack of any will to fight, and the weakness of the spirit of resistance in the rulers' hearts. Noor ad-Deen Mahmood was the primary beneficiary of the failure of the second Frankish campaign, after the ruler of Damascus. The importance of the role played by him and his brother Sayf ad-Deen Ghazi in forcing the Franks to withdraw from Damascus became quite apparent, as did the significance of cooperation between the Islamic emirates in protecting it against the Frankish plans. This is what Noor ad-Deen Mahmood was striving to achieve as the first step towards unity, which represented his strategic aim of liberating the land from Frankish occupation. After the failure of the second Crusader campaign, Noor ad-Deen Mahmood realized the great importance of Damascus in confronting the Franks, due to its geographical location facing the largest and strongest Crusader principality (the Kingdom of Jerusalem) and to its potential and plentiful resources. Thus the idea of capturing it took root in his mind, and he began striving to achieve that aim by peaceful means, benefiting from his father's experience in this field.<sup>433</sup>



## Scholars from the Maghreb take part in defending Damascus

Actual participation in the fighting was not limited to the Syrian scholars alone; some reports indicate that Maghrebi and Andalusian scholars living in Syria also took part in those battles. When Damascus was exposed to Crusader attack in 543 AH/1147 CE, those scholars joined with the army of Damascus in confronting this invasion. Among them were the Maghrebi scholar of jurisprudence Hujjat al-Islam Abul-Hajjaj Yoosuf ibn Doonas al-Fandalawi al-Maliki and Shaykh 'Abdur-Rahman al-Halhawni.<sup>434</sup> Shaykh al-Fandalawi was an elderly ascetic and devoted worshipper.

Once he went out walking and Mu'een ad-Deen saw him; he went over to al-Fandalawi and said to him, "O Shaykh, you are excused; we will take care of it for you. You do not have the strength to fight." The shaykh replied, "I have sold (my soul) and He (Allah) has bought (it). We do not let Him off the deal and we do not ask Him to be let off." He was referring to the verse,

**‘Verily, Allah has purchased of the believers their lives and their properties for [the price] that theirs shall be the Paradise.’**

*(Qur'an 9: 111)*

He went out and fought the Franks until he was killed — may Allah have mercy on him — as a martyr.<sup>435</sup> Shaykh al-Halhawni was martyred as well, after fighting most courageously.<sup>436</sup> Shaykh al-Fandalawi was seen in a dream after his martyrdom and was asked, "Where are you?" He replied, "In the Gardens of Delight (paradise), facing one another on thrones."<sup>437</sup>

## Consequences of the Second Crusade

There are a number of consequences that resulted from the Second Crusade, including the following:

a) It led to an accumulation of hostility in Western Europe against the Byzantine Emperor, because the suffering faced by the German King Konrad III and the French King Louis VII during their overland journey in Byzantine

territory confirmed the well-entrenched hostility between the two sides. This enmity would continue to grow during the twelfth century CE (sixth century AH), until it reached its peak at the dawn of the thirteenth century CE (seventh century AH).

**b)** This campaign had an effect on the nature of the Crusader presence in the east. It may be noted that the Crusade movement was connected to a strategic defensive alliance with Western Europe, which gave it all kinds of material and moral support in order to establish this movement, develop it and help it to flourish. Indeed the European alliance gave it all possible protection in the midst of a hostile Islamic environment. Now, after the disasters with which the Second Crusade met, despite all the hopes that had been pinned on its success, it becomes very clear to us that the Crusaders' reliance on outside European support throughout that failed campaign did not help them in any way. It did not even guarantee to maintain the strength that had enabled them to occupy Muslim regions, so long as their greed had no limit, and it indeed had no limit. The Crusader presence in the East was more akin to an infant that was not destined to grow naturally through its problematic connection with the motherland in Europe; reliance on the motherland continued to be the weak point of that infant, for which there was no real solution in the mechanism of the Crusader-Muslim conflict.<sup>438</sup> The same could be said for the case of Israel in the modern age.

The Crusader presence, using its local resources, was unable to change the situation in 539 AH/1144 CE, and even its reliance on help from the motherland was not sufficient. That is largely due to mistakes made by the Crusaders, which were of such a serious nature that it became impossible to turn the clock back. From now on, one Muslim achievement would come after another until the Crusaders were finally expelled from the region, by means of correcting the mistakes of Muslim division which had paved the way for the invaders to come to the region.

The rise to prominence of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood: the Crusader campaign supported the presence of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood in Aleppo to a large extent. Despite the Damascenes' fears of his political ambitions, they developed friendly relations with him that were better than before these events took place.<sup>439</sup> They supported his political position in northern Syria more strongly, and the Damascenes implicitly acknowledged the strength of

his political influence, and asked him to help them against the Kingdom of Jerusalem, their former ally.<sup>440</sup>

The weakness of the rulers of Damascus: this second campaign of the Crusaders highlighted the degree of weakness that the atabegs of Damascus had reached, as they were unable to confront the Crusader advance towards them and were forced to ask for outside military help. No doubt this weakness was noticed by Noor ad-Deen Mahmood, and that deepened his resolve to unite the Islamic front by incorporating Damascus.<sup>441</sup>

The destruction of the fortress of al-'Uraymah: Noor ad-Deen Mahmood took advantage of the first opportunity he had to work with Mu'een ad-Deen Unur. Raymond, Count of Tripoli, had sought help from Noor ad-Deen against one of the Frankish princes who had joined the Second Crusade with the French army, Bertrand Count of Toulouse. Bertrand did not go back with the Franks after the campaign ended, but rather headed north by sea, parallel with the coast, until he drew level with the County of Tripoli, whereupon he came ashore with his knights and breached the fortress of al-'Uraymah, which belonged to Tripoli, and fortified himself therein, announcing his intention to capture Tripoli as he regarded himself as more entitled to it than was Raymond. Raymond was unable to defeat him, so he tried to seek help from the other Frankish states. When he got no response from them, he sent word seeking help from Noor ad-Deen and Mu'een ad-Deen, who hastened to besiege the fortress with their troops. They captured it, took everyone in it into captivity, and destroyed the fortress, levelling it to the ground; each then went back to his city.<sup>442</sup> This incident indicates the extent of the bad effect that the failure of the Second Crusade had on the situation of the Frankish states in the Islamic East.<sup>443</sup>

The Muslims lost their fear of the Crusaders. A number of historians regard the failure of the Second Crusade as a turning point in the history of the Muslim-Christian conflict. In Syria it led to a decline in fear of the Crusaders, which encouraged Muslim forces to launch audacious raids on the Crusader states. It also provided the opportunity for another star of Jihad against the Crusaders to emerge, namely Noor ad-Deen Mahmood Zangi, who revived his father's plan to unite the Islamic front against the Crusaders, which is the plan that would be completed by Salah ad-Deen and was to pave the way for the end of the Crusades. Noor ad-Deen succeeded in taking

advantage of circumstances following the failure of the Second Crusade to unite Syria under his leadership this time, at the expense of the Emir of Damascus. He then resumed his Jihad against the Crusaders with a success which encouraged other Muslim forces such as the Seljuks of Rum, the Artuqids and the Turkmens to confront the Crusaders, especially in Edessa and Antioch, and also to form alliances. In this way Noor ad-Deen Zangi was able to unite all of Syria under his leadership, from Edessa in the north to Harran in the south, and to establish a united Islamic state centred on Damascus. This was the first step towards forming the front that stretched from the Euphrates to the Nile, to truly confront the Crusade.

## CHAPTER IV Wisdom of Noor ad-Deen's Dealings with the Fatimid State

### Roots of the Ismaili Shiites and the Fatimid state

O'fter the death of Imam Ja'far ibn Muhammad as-Sadiq, the Shiites divided into two groups who both attributed themselves to Ja'far as-Sadiq. One group transferred the imamate to his son Moosa al-Kazim; they are the 'Ithna 'Ashari' Shiites. The other group denied that he was the Imam and said that the Imam after Ja'far was his son Isma'eel (or Ismail); this group is known as the Ismaili Shiites.<sup>445</sup> 'Abdul-Qahir al-Baghdadi said concerning the Ismailis, "They transferred the imamate to Ja'far and claimed that the Imam after him was his son Isma'eel."<sup>446</sup> Al-Shahrastani commented:

The Ismailis differ from the Moosawis (Musavis) and Ithna 'Asharis in that they attribute the imamate to Isma'eel ibn Ja'far, his oldest son who was mentioned in the texts initially. They said that as-Sadiq (may Allah have mercy on him) did not marry any woman after his mother — that is, the mother of Isma'eel — and he did not take any slave woman as his concubine, as was the way of the Messenger of Allah (SAAW) with Khadeejah and as was the way of 'Ali with Fatimah.<sup>447</sup>

The Ismailis are one of the branches of the Shiites and are named after Isma'eel ibn Ja'far as-Sadiq, but they are also known by names other than Ismailis, such as *al-Batiniyah*. They were given this name because of their belief that for every outward, visible manifestation (dhahir) there is an inward, invisible manifestation (batin), and for every revelation there is an interpretation. Among them are the Qaramitah and Mazdakiyah, by which two names they were known in Iraq. In Khorasan they were called at-Ta'leemiyah al-Mulhidah (Atheist Educationalists). They do not like to be known by these names, rather they say, "We are the Isma'eeliyah (Ismailis) because we are distinguished from the other Shiites by this name."<sup>448</sup>

The Rafidi Fatimid state was established in 296 AH/909 CE in North Africa by 'Ubayd-Allah the Shiite, after Qayrawan fell to his troops and Ziyadah at-Taghlibi fled to Egypt in Jumadah II 296 CE.<sup>449</sup>

The pledge of allegiance to 'Ubayd-Allah al-Mahdi took place in Qayrawan in 297 AH/910 CE and the rule of 'Ubayd-Allah the Shiite lasted for ten years, according to some historians.<sup>450</sup>

## 'Ubayd-Allah al-Mahdi

'Ubayd-Allah Abu Muhammad was the first of the Batini dissident 'Ubaydi caliphs who turned Islam upside down and declared themselves to be Rafidis. They concealed their Ismaili *madh-hab*<sup>451</sup> and sent preachers to deceive the hill folk and ignorant people.<sup>452</sup> Adh-Dhahabi mentioned what was said about his lineage, then he commented:

According to scholars, his father was not known, because when as-Sayyid ibn Tabataba asked al-Mu'izz, who was one of them, he said, "Tomorrow I will tell you about it." The next day, he heaped up a pile of gold then pulled his sword halfway out of its scabbard and said, "This is my lineage." Then he told them to plunder the gold and said, "This is my noble descent."<sup>453</sup>

The mufti of Libya, Shaykh Tahir az-Zawi (may Allah have mercy on him), said in his biography of 'Ubayd-Allah al-Mahdi:

He was the founder of the 'Ubaydi state and the first of its rulers. He was of Iraqi origin; he was born in Kufa in 260 AH, and hid in the city of Salamiyah, the centre of the Batini Ismailis in northern Syria. From the day he was born until he settled in Salamiyah he was known by the name of Sa'eed ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah ibn Maymoon al-Qaddah. It was in the region of Salamiyah, the focal point of the Ismailis, that 'Ali ibn Hasan ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Isma'eel ibn Ja'far as-Sadiq had died, and the Ismailis built a shrine to him in secret, and decided to transfer the imamate from the descendants of Isma'eel ibn Ja'far as-Sadiq to their son by means of a spiritual marriage.<sup>454</sup>

He added, "This is the origin of 'Ubayd-Allah al-Mahdi and this is the origin of the 'Ubaydis who are named after him."<sup>455</sup>

It is said that when 'Ubayd-Allah entered Ifreeqiyah ('Africa', meaning Tunis), he showed his Shiism and openly reviled the Companions of the (Messenger (SAAW) and his wives, except 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, al-Miqdad, 'Ammar ibn Yasir, Salman al-Farisi and Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, and he claimed that the Companions of the (Messenger (SAAW) after his death except for these few whom they mentioned.<sup>456</sup> People who followed the Sunnah in

Qayrawan at the time of Banu 'Ubayd (the 'Ubaydis) were subjected to extreme persecution and had to keep a low profile.<sup>457</sup> On many occasions they were put to severe trials. When Banu 'Ubayd prevailed and appointed Husayn al-A'ma ('the Blind'), he started the practise of open slander and insult in the marketplaces, in chanted verse, which indirectly reviled the Messenger of Allah (SAAW) in phrases which were recorded<sup>458</sup> such as, "Curse the cave and what it contained and the cloak and what it covered," and so on. What is meant by 'the cave' is the cave of Thawr where the (Messenger (SAAW) and Abu Bakr (‘) hid from the polytheists who were pursuing them during the Hijrah. These words revile the (Messenger (SAAW) (‘) and Abu Bakr equally; they also revile the (Messenger (SAAW)'s family who were "covered by the cloak".<sup>459</sup> Heads of rams and donkeys were hung up at the doors of shops with pieces of paper attached to them on which were written the names of the Companions. Times were very difficult for people who followed the Sunnah; anyone who spoke up or objected was killed and their bodies mutilated.<sup>460</sup>

### **'Ubaydi crimes in North Africa**

The Rafidi Shiites committed numerous abhorrent crimes, including the following:

### **Exaggerated claims about 'Ubayd-Allah al-Mahdi**

They raised him even to the level of divinity, saying that he had knowledge of the unseen, or that he was a Messenger. Badr ad-Deen ibn Qadi Shahbah explains:

He (al-Mahdi) had preachers in North Africa who called people to him and to obey him; they took covenants and pledges from people and told them different things about him according to their levels of understanding. They would tell some people that al-Mahdi was the son of the Messenger of Allah (SAAW) and the proof from Allah for His creatures; they told others that he was Allah, the Creator and Provider.<sup>461</sup>



The fact that they claimed that he was a god can be seen from the actions, words and poetry of his preachers. There was a man called Ahmad al-Balawi an-Nahhas, who prayed facing the direction of Ruqadah when 'Ubayd-Allah was there, and it was located to the west. When he moved to al-Mahdiyah, which was in the east, he prayed in that direction,<sup>462</sup> as if it were Makkah al-Mukarramah. This belief was prevalent among many people at that time.

Among the poems that spoke of his divinity were the lines of Muhammad ibn al-Badeel:

*The Messiah has come to Ruqadah.*

*Adam and Noah have come there.*

*Ahmad al-Mustafd<sup>463</sup> came there.*

*The ram and the sacrifice (Ismd'eel) came there.*

*Allah the Most High came there.*

*Everything else is as nothing.*

As for their claim that he had knowledge of the unseen, this is clear from the oaths sworn by some of them, as they used to swear "by the one who has knowledge of the unseen and the visible, our lord who is in Ruqadah."<sup>464</sup> Knowledge of the unseen is one of the unique characteristics of the divine, and no one has knowledge of the unseen except Allah, as He says:

**Say: None in the heavens and the earth knows the Unseen except Allah, nor can they perceive when they shall be resurrected.'**

*(Qur'an 27: 65)*

***And with Him are the keys of the Unseen [all that is hidden], none knows them but He. And He knows whatever there is in the land and in the sea; not a leaf falls, but He knows it. There is not a grain in the darkness of the earth, nor anything fresh or dry, but is written in a Clear Record.!'***

*(Qur'an 6: 59)*

Similarly, oaths should not be sworn upon any created being, rather they should be sworn upon the Creator. The Messenger of Allah (SAAW) said: «Whoever wants to swear an oath, let him swear by Allah or else remain silent.» There are also hadiths which forbid swearing by one's forefathers.<sup>465</sup>

## **Oppression of everyone who disagreed with their madh-hab**

This was in addition to everything mentioned above, quoting from the words of Qadi Tyad about their reviling the Companions and hanging up the heads of rams above the names of the Companions and other abhorrent and reprehensible acts that they used to do.<sup>466</sup> They would force people to join their madh-hab by threatening to kill them, and they did in fact execute four thousand men during one period. Al-Qabisi said:

Those who have died in Dar al-Bahr (the 'Ubaydis' prison) in al-Mahdiyah from the time when 'Ubayd-Allah entered the city until now is four thousand men; they died from torture, including scholars, devoted worshippers and righteous men.<sup>467</sup>

This is in addition to those whom they killed without imprisonment and mutilated their bodies in the streets of Qayrawan. This affected the course of academic life, but despite that these trials only led the people of Muslim North Africa to increase their resolve, patience, seeking (Allah's) reward and adhering to the Qur'an and the Sunnah.

## **Prohibition on issuing fatwas according to the madh-hab of Imam Malik**

They forbade the religious scholars to issue fatwas according to the madh-hab of Imam Malik, and regarded that as a crime punishable by beating and imprisonment, and even death on some occasions. They followed that with a type of psychological terrorism, whereby the body of the slain person would be carried around in the marketplaces of Qayrawan and they would call out, "This is the recompense of one who follows the madh-hab of Malik." They did not allow anyone to issue fatwas except those who followed their madh-hab. They did this to the juristic scholar known as al-

Huz'i, Abu 'Abdullah Muhammad ibn al-'Abbas ibn al-Waleed, who died in 329 AH.<sup>468</sup>

## Abolishing certain Sunnah practices and adding to others

They added the phrase '*hayya 'aid khayr al-'amal*' ('come to the best deed') to the *adhan*,<sup>469</sup> and they abolished *tardweeh* prayer,<sup>470</sup> after letting the people pray it for one year. For this reason most people stopped praying in the mosques, and woe betide anyone who omitted the phrase '*hayya 'ala khayr al-'amal*' from the *adhan*. An example of that is what was narrated from 'Aroos al-Mu'adh-dhin (d. 317 AH), who was a muezzin in one of the mosques. Some Shiites testified that he did not say '*hayya 'ala khayr al-'amal*' in his *adhan*. As punishment, his tongue was cut out and placed between his eyes, and he was paraded around Qayrawan, then killed.<sup>471</sup> Nevertheless, some scholars understood the plot of the 'Ubaydis and their evil aim, which was to empty the mosques of worshippers. In order to ward off this evil, they gave permission to the muezzins to add the phrase '*hayya 'ala khayr al-'amal*' to the *adhan*, because omitting it would lead to a greater evil. One of these scholars was Abul-Hasan 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Masroor al-'Abdi ad-Dabbagh (d. 359 AH),<sup>472</sup> who was a man of piety, worship and devotion. He understood the aims of the 'Ubaydis and said to the muezzins, "Recite the *adhan* according to the Sunnah in your hearts, then when you have finished, say, '*hayya 'ala khayr al-'amal*,' because Banu 'Ubayd want to empty the mosques, so you doing this — as you are excused — is better than emptying the mosques."<sup>473</sup>

## Banning gatherings

The Fatimid state was eager to ban gatherings for fear of revolution and rebellion against them. Hence they sounded a horn at nightfall, and anyone who was found on the streets after that would be beheaded. They would also break up any gathering for the funeral of any scholar who died.<sup>474</sup> Such actions are still perpetrated by oppressive police states which do not accept any view but that of their rulers, tyrants and 'pharaohs'.

**‘Pharaoh said: I show you only that which I see [correct], and I guide you only to the path of right policy!’** (*Qur'an* 40: 29)

## Destroying the books of those who followed the Sunnah

They destroyed the books of those who followed the Sunnah and forbade people to circulate them, as they did with the books of Abu Muhammad ibn Abi Hashim at-Tajeebi (d. 346 AH), who died and left behind dozens of books, all written in his own hand. They were taken to the sultan of Bani 'Ubayd who seized them and did not let people have any access to them, out of spite and hatred towards Islam.<sup>475</sup> preventing Sunni scholars from teaching.

They banned Sunni scholars from teaching in the mosques, spreading knowledge and meeting with students. The books of the Sunnah were only read in homes, for fear of Banu 'Ubayd. Abu Muhammad ibn Abi Zayd, Abu Muhammad ibn at-Tabban and others used to come to Abu Bakr ibn al-Labbad, the Sunni Shaykh of Qayrawan, in secret, hiding the books in cloths wrapped around their middles until they were soaked with sweat, out of fear of Banu 'Ubayd.<sup>476</sup>

## Abolishing sharia law

They waived all Islamic obligations for those who followed their call, whereby they would take them into a cellar and 'Ubayd-Allah would come in wearing an animal skin turned inside-out and crawling on all fours, saying "Bah" to them. Then he would let them out and explain these actions to them, "When I entered on all fours, what I meant by that was to teach you that you are like animals with nothing, no ablution, no prayer, no *zakdh*<sup>477</sup> no obligations at all; all of that is waived for you. As for the animal skin turned inside-out, what I meant by that was to teach you that religion has been turned upside-down. As for my saying 'Bah' to you, what I meant by that was to teach you that all things are permissible (in Arabic, *mubdh*) to you, including adultery, fornication, and drinking alcohol."<sup>478</sup>

## Forcing people to break the fast before the moon was sighted

They would often force the people to break the fast of Ramadan before the new moon of Shawwal was sighted.<sup>479</sup> They would even kill anyone who issued a fatwa stating that there was to be no breaking of the fast until the new moon was sighted, as they did with the juristic scholar Ibn al-Hubula, the Qadi of the city of Barqah. Adh-Dhahabi wrote in his biography:

The imam and martyr, the Qadi of the city of Barqah, Muhammad ibn al-Hubula. The Emir of Barqah came to him and said, "Tomorrow is *Eid* ." He said, "We should see the new moon (first); I will not tell the people to break the fast, and bear their sins." (The emir) said, "Instructions to that effect came in a letter from al-Mansoor." The view of the 'Ubaydis was that they should break the fast based on calculations, and should not pay any attention to the sighting of the moon. The moon was not sighted, but the next day the emir ordered that there be drums and banners and preparations for the Eid. The Qadi said, "I will not go out or pray (the Eid prayer)." So the emir ordered another man to deliver a *khutbah* <sup>481</sup> and he wrote to al-Mansoor, telling him what had happened. Al-Mansoor ordered that the Qadi be brought to him. He went to him and (Al-Mansoor) said to him, "Change your mind and I will pardon you," but he refused. So he ordered that (the Qadi) be hung out in the sun until he died. He kept asking for water because he was thirsty but was not given any. Then they crucified him. May the curse of Allah be upon the wrongdoers <sup>482</sup>

## Erasing all reminders of the Sunni caliphs

The rulers of the Fatimid state in the Maghreb strove to remove all reminders of the Sunni caliphs who had come before them. 'Ubayd-Allah issued orders that the names of the rulers who had built the fortresses and mosques be removed, and his name be put in their place. This Batini, Rafidi Shiite appropriated the endowment funds and the weaponry of the fortresses; he expelled the worshippers and Almoravids<sup>483</sup> from the castle of Ziyad al-Aghlabi and made it a storage facility for weapons.<sup>484</sup>

## Bringing their horses into the mosques

One of the many crimes of 'Ubayd-Allah was that his horses came into the mosques; when it was said to their owners, "How can you let them into the mosque?" they answered, "Their dung and urine are pure (tahir), because they are the horses of al-Mahdi." The caretaker of the mosque objected, so they took him to al-Mahdi, who killed him. Ibn 'Udhara commented:

At the end of his life, 'Ubayd-Allah was punished with an appalling disease: worms at the end of his anus that ate his intestines, which continued until he died.<sup>485</sup>

Modern Muslims who read the history of the 'Ubaydi Fatimid state do not know anything but that which is written for them of the political history of this state: "So-and-so died and so-and-so succeeded him, and it was a state which loved and propagated knowledge," — meaning books of philosophy. Few mention the way in which these Batinis oppressed the Sunni scholars. Even those who study Islamic history mention al-Mu'izz li Deen-Allah al-Fatimi as if he was one of the heroes of history. All of this is the result of a failure to interpret our history in the light of the proper Islamic creed. In fact, some of the historians who have written our history were influenced by the Orientalist schools or by Rafidi Shiite thought, and they were paid to erase the facts and distort history. The Batini-Islamic conflict is still ongoing nowadays. Ideas do not die; they only change their cloaks. The enemies of Islam are still teaching, in secret and openly, night and day, to put an end to the correct belief which the Ummah received from the beloved Messenger (blessings and peace of Allah be upon him), his noble Companions and unblemished members of his household, may Allah be pleased with them all.

## The Maghrebi people's resistance of the 'Ubaydi Fatimid state

The Sunni scholars in the Maghreb used various means of resisting Shiite influence, such as passive resistance, debate and dialogue, and armed resistance. There were also other types of resistance such as writing prose, poetry and so on.

### Passive resistance

The first method used by the Sunni scholars of the Maghreb in resisting Shiite trends was passive resistance: collective boycotts by means of which the Maghrebi scholars would have nothing to do with anyone who had any connection to Shiism or the ruling system. This was represented in their boycott of the judges and officials appointed by the state, and those who were able to do so refused to pay taxes to the state.<sup>486</sup>

Another manifestation of this boycott was their refusal to attend Friday congregational prayers, which had become an occasion when the Companions of the Messenger of Allah (SAAW) were cursed from the pulpit. For this reason, Friday prayers ceased altogether for a while in Qayrawan.<sup>487</sup> Some of the Sunnis thought that praying against the heretics was enough, as in the case of the preacher <sup>4</sup> Abd as-Samad,<sup>488</sup> and Abu Is-haq as-Siba'i az-Zahid. The latter used to recite a prayer for healing in which, after reciting al-Fatihah (the first chapter of the Qur'an), al-Ikhlās (*Qur'an 112*) and al-Mi<sup>4</sup>wadhatayn (*Qur'an 113 and 114*), he would say, "And by virtue of my hatred for 'Ubayd-Allah and his progeny, and my love for Your (MESSENGER (SAAW) and his Companions and the members of his household, heal everyone for whom I recite this prayer."<sup>489</sup>

Yet another example of passive resistance was the boycott and avoidance of everyone who was involved with the ruling powers, who had anything to do with the sultan or who tried to justify their rule, in accordance with the verse

**‘You [O Muhammad (SAAW)] will not find any people who believe in Allah and the Last Day, making friendship with those who oppose Allah and His Messenger, even though they were their fathers or their sons or their brothers or their kindred [people].’**

*(Qur'an 58: 22)*

One such person was Khalaf ibn Abil-Qasim al-Baradhi'i (d. 400 AH),<sup>490</sup> against whom the religious scholars of Qayrawan protested because of his connection to the rulers of Banu 'Ubayd. He used to accept gifts from them, and he even wrote a book to prove that their lineage was sound. Their anger against him increased when they found some poetry praising Bani 'Ubayd written in his own hand:<sup>491</sup>

*Those are people who, when they build, they build well and when they make a promise they fulfil it.*

Because of all that, the religious scholars of Qayrawan issued a fatwa stating that his books were to be rejected and were not to be read, and as a result he was forced to migrate to Sicily, where he attained a high status in its ruler's court.<sup>492</sup>



## Debate and dialogue

Resistance by means of debate and dialogue was the strongest and most prevalent means of opposition demonstrated by the Sunni scholars in the Maghreb against the Rafidi Shiites. Many scholars became famous in the field of these debates about the Islamic belief system. They acted as the voice of the Sunnis, speaking and defending the religion. Among those who featured prominently in the field of debate was Shaykh 'Abdullah ibn at-Tabban (d. 371 AH). He rose to fame because of his debates with Bani 'Ubayd. People travelled from all over to meet him because of his knowledge of how to defend the way of *Ahl as-Sunnah* (the 'People of the Sunnah'). In addition to his brilliance in debating, this imam was courageous and did not fear death. Al-Maliki and ad-Dabbagh mentioned that 'Abdullah who was known as al-Muhtal<sup>494</sup> the governor of Qayrawan, persecuted the scholars. They met in the house of Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, and Ibn at-Tabban said to them, "I will go to him (the governor) and sell my soul to Allah instead of you, because if you were to be killed, Islam will be greatly weakened."<sup>495</sup>

He did indeed go to the governor and establish proof against him and his group, whom he had brought to debate with at-Tabban. After he had defeated them in argument, they were not ashamed to suggest that he join their group, but he refused, saying, "A shaykh who is sixty years old and knows what Allah has permitted and what He has forbidden, and refutes the seventy-two sects,<sup>496</sup> and you say that to him? Even if you cut me in half with a saw I will never give up my madh-hab."

When he left after they had failed to defeat him, the spies of the 'Ubaydi Fatimid state followed him with their swords unsheathed so that the people who saw him would be afraid, but even under such pressure he still continued to guide and advise people, and say to them without any fear, "Adhere to the faith, for there is nothing between you and Allah except Islam, and if you leave it you will be doomed."<sup>497</sup>

He feared for the common people because of the *fitnah*<sup>498</sup> of Banu 'Ubayd and said, "By Allah, I do not fear sin for them, because their Lord is most kind, but I fear that they may doubt that Banu 'Ubayd are unbelievers and thus enter the Fire."<sup>499</sup>

Another of those who became famous for defending Islam and establishing proof against the preachers of the Fatimid state was Abu 'Uthman Sa'eed ibn al-Haddad (302 AH), the spokesman of Ahl as-Sunnah and the Tbn Hanbal of the Maghreb'. As-Sulami commented, "He was a scholar of the law, righteous, eloquent, a devoted worshipper, unique in his time in debating and refuting other sects."<sup>500</sup> Al-Khushani explained, "He refuted the innovators who went against the Sunnah, taking a famous stance, making a good effort and achieving great things on behalf of the Muslims, until the people of Qayrawan likened him to Ahmad ibn Hanbal."<sup>501</sup> Al-Maliki said of him, "He took issue with the unbelievers and apostates Abu 'Ubayd-Allah the Shiite and his brother Abul- 'Abbas and Abu 'Ubayd, concerning the faith, in which he highlighted their disbelief and heresy and their disbelief in the divine attributes."<sup>502</sup>

The Fatimid state in the Maghreb tried to force people to follow their madh-hab by means of debates and establishing proof sometimes, and by issuing death threats at other times. The people were terrified as a result and went to Abu 'Uthman Sa'eed to ask him to use taqiyyah (dissimulation), but he refused, saying, "I have passed the age of ninety and I do not need to live anymore. I have no option but to argue in defence of the faith."

He did so earnestly, and he was the one on whom people relied, after Allah; in debating with the Shiites.<sup>503</sup> Among the most famous of these debates were the following:

**a)** The first of these debates, as mentioned by the author of *al-Ma'dlim*, centred on which Companion, Abu Bakr or 'Ali (may Allah be pleased with them both), was superior. After the meeting between Ibn al-Haddad and Abu 'Ubayd-Allah the Shiite, Abu 'Abdullah the Shiite asked Ibn al-Haddad, "Do you give precedence to anyone else over the five 'companions of the cloak'?" By the 'companions of the cloak' he meant Muhammad (SAAW), 'Ali, Fatimah, al-Hasan and al-Husayn (may Allah be pleased with them), and what he meant by anyone else was Abu Bakr ('). Abu 'Uthman asked, "Who is better: five, the sixth of whom was Jibreel, or two, the third of whom was Allah?"<sup>504</sup> — and the Shiite was rendered speechless.

**b)** The loyalty of 'Ali (RA)). In this debate, 'Ubayd-Allah the Shiite wanted to prove that the word *mawld* (protector) in the hadith, "Whoever's mawla I am, 'Ali is also his mawla,"<sup>505</sup> meant that people should be slaves to

'Ali. He said to Ibn al-Haddad, "Why shouldn't the people be slaves to us?" Ibn al-Haddad replied, "He did not mean 'mawla' in the sense of slavery, rather he meant 'mawla' in the sense of closeness and protection," and he quoted the words of Allah:

***It is not for any human being to whom Allah has given the Book, the knowledge [and understanding of the laws of religion] and (Messenger (SAAW) would to say to the people: Be my worshippers rather than Allah's. On the contrary [he would say]: Be you learned people of religion [who practise what they know and also preach to others], because you teach the Book and you study it. Nor would he order you to take angels and Messengers as lords [gods]. Would he order you to disbelieve after you have submitted to Allah's Will?'***

*(Qur'an 3: 79-80)*

What Allah did not grant to the Messenger (SAAW). He would not grant to anyone other than a Messenger (SAAW). 'Ali was not a messenger he was a Companion of the (Messenger (SAAW)).<sup>506</sup>

These few quotations are just a small part of the debates that took place between the two sides.

## **Armed resistance**

The scholars of the Maghreb did not stop at the point of passive resistance and debates; some of them also took up arms and went out to fight them. Jablah ibn Hammood as-Sadafi left his home in Rabat and went to Qayrawan, and when he was asked about it he said, "We used to guard against an enemy who was separated from us by the sea, but now the enemy is in our homeland and he is an even worse enemy." He added, "Jihad against these people is better than Jihad against polytheists,"<sup>507</sup> and he quoted as evidence the words of Allah (§g):

***O you who believe! Fight those of the disbelievers who are close to you.. (Qur'an 9: 123)***

Another of these scholars was Imam Abul-Qasim al-Hasan ibn Mafraj (d. 309 AH), who was among the first to rebel against Banu 'Ubayd, and died

a martyr. He was killed and crucified — along with another man who was called Abu 'Abdullah as-Sidri who was a righteous person — by 'Ubayd-Allah al-Mahdi,. He had pledged to fight in Jihad against 'Ubayd-Allah and he urged the people to fight, too. News of this reached 'Ubayd-Allah, so he ordered that he be killed.<sup>508</sup>

Then the scholars took a step further by issuing a fatwa making it obligatory to fight the 'Ubaydi Fatimid state. This came after a meeting and discussions among the Sunni scholars, who formed an alliance with other Muslims (known as *ahl al-qiblah* — 'people of the qibla'<sup>509</sup>) against the Fatimids, whom they regarded as infidels because of their corrupt beliefs. The scholar of law, Shaykh Abu Bakr ibn 'Abd ar-Rahman al-Khawlani wrote:

Shaykh Abu Is-haq as-Siba'i (may Allah have mercy on him) went out with the scholars of North Africa to fight Banu 'Ubayd along with Abu Yazeed. Abu Is-haq used to say, pointing to Abu Yazeed's camp, "These are people of the qibla, and these" — pointing to the camp of Banu 'Ubayd — "are not people of the qibla. We must go out and fight alongside those who are people of the qibla against those who are not people of the qibla. If we prevail over them, we will not swear allegiance to Abu Yazeed, because he is a Kharijite.<sup>510</sup> May Allah cause a just imam to prevail over him, expel him from among us and put an end to his rule over us." Among the religious scholars and devoted worshippers who went out to fight alongside him were: Abul-'Arab ibn Tameem, Abu 'Abd al-Malik Marwan Nasrawan, Abu Is-haq as-Siba'i, Abul-Fadl, Abu Sulayman Rabee' ibn al-Qattan<sup>511</sup> and many others.<sup>512</sup> On the appointed date, the scholars and other prominent figures and their innumerable masses set out, and none of the scholars or righteous men stayed behind except those who were incapacitated and had a legitimate excuse. Rabee' al-Qattan rode his horse at the head of his ranks, wearing armour, holding a Qur'an and saying, "Praise be to Allah, Who has caused me to live until I see a group of believers uniting to wage Jihad against Your enemies and the enemies of Your (MESSENGER (SAAW))."<sup>513</sup>

The scholars put a great deal of effort into that confrontation and gave a real example of Jihad for the sake of Allah against the enemies of Islam. No less than eighty of these scholars were martyred, including Rabee' al-Qattan, al-Mamees and others, but they achieved a great victory and nearly captured

al-Mahdiyah, were it not that the moment of betrayal came and things turned against them when Abu Yazeed let them down and showed his ugly side and his hostility towards the People of the Sunnah; he ordered his troops to withdraw, saying, "When you meet the people in battle, withdraw your cover from the people of Qayrawan so that your enemy will be able to kill them and not us, and we will be rid of them."<sup>514</sup> His aim by means of this foul trick was to get rid of them, because he thought that if the scholars and religious leaders of Qayrawan were killed, he would be able to gain full control over their followers and call them to whatever he wanted, and they would follow him.<sup>515</sup> However, he was utterly defeated when a considerable number of his followers joined his enemy's ranks; only a few of the troops stayed with him, and he was killed horribly on 30 Muharram 336 AH.<sup>516</sup>

This confrontation between the Sunnis and Shiites had a great impact in the Maghreb later on, as the resistance was carried on among those who came after them, until after Banu 'Ubayd left the Maghreb. After that, they started seeking out the Shiite presence, and when they found them, they would kill them and seize their wealth. Ibn 'Adhari says in his book *Al-Bayan al-Maghrib* that in Qayrawan there were people who were outwardly following the Shiite madh-hab but were the worst of the Ummah. The masses began to pursue them, and they killed many of them, men and women. The people started attacking the Shiites, plundering their homes and wealth.<sup>517</sup> Qadi Tyad described this incident as follows:

That began on a Friday halfway through Muharram. The masses killed many of the Rafidis in Qayrawan in the worst manner, and burned them and took their wealth. They destroyed their houses and killed their women and children, and dragged them by their legs, and that was a punishment of Allah that was sent against them. The matter spread beyond Qayrawan to al-Mahdiyah and their other cities. They were killed and burned with fire, and not one of them was left in Ifriqiyah except those who hid.<sup>518</sup>

This kind of resistance was the toughest and most effective kind, by means of which Allah purified the Maghreb of innovation.

## Resistance through writing

Resistance through writing was one of the best and most beneficial means of resisting the Shiites. It was very effective in annoying and upsetting them, and it is the reason why they declared war on those who did so. It also had the effect of informing the masses about the truth and establishing the foundations of the Sunnah. These writings were of two types:

**i)** Books which dealt with issues of theology in general, according to the way of the 'People of the Sunnah and the Community'. Among the issues that they discussed was that of the caliphate according to the followers of the Sunnah and the superiority of Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman and 'Ali (may Allah be pleased with them), and the legitimacy of the caliphates of the first three, in contrast to the beliefs of the Shiites. A related issue was approval of all the Companions of the Messenger of Allah (MESSENGER (SAAW)) without differentiating between them, and regarding them all as being of good character, in contrast to the Shiites, who deemed them all to be unbelievers and evildoers except a few. This type of book was highly effective in informing the people about their religion and spreading the true madh-hab among them, until they began to regard anyone who went against it as being against Islam and outside the main body of Muslims, and to whom was due everything that was due to the unbeliever, namely enmity, fighting, boycotting and so on, in the hope that he might be deterred, and recant and repent.<sup>519</sup>

**ii)** Books which were specifically aimed at refuting the Shiites and their beliefs. This type of book — as previously mentioned — appeared as the result of particular circumstances which required a reaction from the People of the Sunnah and a specific refutation of falsehood. Among this type of book we may mention two, written by Imam Muhammad ibn Sahnun, on the topic of the imamate. They are the greatest books that have been written on this topic. 'Eesa ibn Miskeen commented, "Nothing like them has (since) been written on this topic."<sup>520</sup> Imam Ibraheem ibn 'Abdullah az-Zubaydi wrote a book called *Al-Imamah* ('The Imamate') and another called *Ar-Radd 'aid ar-Rdfidah* ('The Response to the Heretics'); these two books were the reason why he was tried, imprisoned and beaten by the Fatimid 'Ubaydi state.<sup>521</sup>

## Resistance by the Sunni poets

Alongside the writing of books such as those discussed above, another means of resistance was poetry which lampooned and criticized Banu 'Ubaydah. There were many prominent poets in this field, such as Abul-Qasim al-Fazari, who described them and their conduct as follows:

*They worshipped their kings and thought that by means of them  
they would be saved.*

*Satan took control of their actions  
and showed them their misguidance as guidance.*

*They turned away from the example  
of as-Siddeeq and al-Fdrooq in their rulings;  
may they never be safe.*

*They replaced them with the barking Ibn al-Aswad,  
Abu Qudrah and the accursed Tameem.*

*They followed the dogs of Hell and turned away  
from those whom Allah made stars.*

*Are they Jews? Or Christians?*

*Or atheists who regard the creation as the creator?*

*Or are they Sabaeans*

*or a group who worship stars and follow astrology? Or are they  
heretics who thought that there will be no punishment or blessing  
tomorrow?...*

*O Lord, curse them and inflict upon them great punishment at  
the hands of Abu Yazeed.<sup>522</sup>*

## Al-Mu'izz li Deen-Allah the Fatimid enters Egypt

Al-Mu'izz li Deen-Allah, ruler of the Fatimid state, was following news of the rulers and commanders of Egypt closely, and he began to think of capturing Egypt. With the death of Kafoor al-Ikh-sheedi in 355 AH, Egypt was thrown into turmoil. Al-Mu'izz took advantage of this opportunity and did not let it pass by. He decided, planned and went ahead with digging wells and building fortresses between Qayrawan and the Egyptian border. He assembled great armies and gathered a great deal of wealth, and selected Jawhar as-Siqilli to lead this army, which was composed of more than one

hundred thousand men. Al-Mu'izz ordered all his commanders to listen to, obey and follow Jawhar as-Siqilli. The 'Ubaydi army set out to transfer their Batini madh-hab to Egypt so as to free themselves of the crises, revolutions and fierce conflicts that had been led by the Sunni scholars for five decades in North Africa. As discussed above, the latter rejected the Batini madh-hab and proclaimed the beliefs of the People of the Sunnah and the Community.

Al-Mu'izz took advantage of al-Ikh-sheedi's weakness and shot his poisoned arrow, sending in his frenzied army as he sought to put an end to the Abbasid state. In Jumadah II 358 AH, the armies of al-Mu'izz managed to enter Egypt under the leadership of Jawhar as-Siqilli, who encountered no difficulty in annexing it to the 'Ubaydi possessions. This Jawhar as-Siqilli is the same one who built Al-Azhar, the construction of which was completed in 361 AH, to serve as a cradle for preparing batini Ismaili preachers. After Egypt was ready to receive al-Mu'izz the 'Ubaydi Fatimid, he prepared his armies, bodyguards, family and wealth, and began his march from Ifriqiyah to Egypt, coming to take it over. He left North Africa in the care of al-Ameer as-Sanhaji Balki ibn Zeeri and added Tripoli, Sirt and Barqah to Egypt's territory. With him was his poet Muhammad ibn Hani' al-Andalusi, who went to extremes in praising al-Mu'izz, saying:

*It is as if you are the Muhammad  
and as if your supporters are the Ansd.  
What you wish is not what the divine decree wishes,  
so rule, for you are the one, the subduer.  
This is the one whose intercession is hoped for tomorrow.  
The Fire will be extinguished when it sees him.*

### **Other examples of his odes to al-Mu'izz include:**

*You are the light and every light is darkness.  
You are supreme and every high is low.  
Grant your slaves the grace of your intercession  
and bring them close to you, for you are all powerful.*

*You call him an avenger, mighty,  
powerful, forgiving sin, pardoning.  
I swear that if you were not called caliph,  
you would be called a messiah after the Messiah.*



*The highest heaven bore witness to your glory  
and the Qur'dn came down praising you.*

*You know of the knowledge of Allah what the  
angel Michael did not know.*

*If Allah had granted to people the knowledge that He granted to you,  
He would not have had to use metaphors.*

Al-Mu'izz began his journey to Egypt in 362 AH. Ibn Hani' was killed in Barqah in Rajab 362 AH at the age of forty-two, and they found his body lying on the ground like that of a slain dog, on the shore at Barqah. Al-Mu'izz was grieved by his slaying, and said, "We were hoping that this man would compete for us with the eastern poets, but it did not come to pass."<sup>523</sup>

Al-Mu'izz continued his journey until he approached the Egyptian border; he reached Alexandria on 23 Sha'ban 362 AH, where he was welcomed by a huge delegation of prominent figures, leaders and rulers in Egypt. The kingdom of al-Mu'izz stretched from Sabta in Morocco to Makkah in the east, and the inhabitants of the Atlantic coast were also under his sway. Al-Mu'izz remained in Egypt for two and a half years, and died in Cairo on 7 Rabee' I 365 AH. His rule over Ifriqiyah and Egypt lasted for twenty-three years in total.<sup>524</sup>

Adh-Dhahabi noted:

During this time the Rafidis rose to power in Egypt, Syria, the Hijaz and Maghreb in the 'Ubaydi state. In Iraq, Mesopotamia and Persia there were the Banu Buwayh. The (Abbasid) caliph al-Mutee' was in a very weak position with Banu Buwayh, furthermore, he was physically weak; finally he became paralyzed and unable to speak, so they dismissed him and appointed his son at-Ta'i'lillah, who had coins minted and Friday sermons delivered in his name, as well as other things. Al-Mu'izz was (evidently) more powerful.<sup>525</sup>

## Demise of the Fatimid state in North Africa

Some Maliki scholars managed to attain positions of power and authority in the state of Sanhajah which belonged to the Fatimid state in Egypt, and were able to influence some of the viziers and emirs, and thanks to them — after Allah — there was some reduction in the pressure on the Sunni scholars. Al-'Allamah Abul-Hasan az-Zajjal was able to influence the emir al-Mu'izz ibn Badees as-Sanhaji by educating him in accordance with the way of Ahl as-Sunnah. This education bore fruit later on when al-Mu'izz took control of Ifriqiyah 406 AH. The actions of al-'Allamah Abul-Hasan were done in secret without any of the Rafidi Shiites knowing about them. This scholar was a man of virtue and good character, religiously committed, with sound beliefs and a great hatred of the Batini Shiite madh-hab. He was able to instil sound teachings in the heart, mind and thinking of al-Mu'izz ibn Badees, who put an end to the Shiite Ismaili madh-hab in North Africa. Adh-Dhahabi described al-Mu'izz ibn Badees as follows

He was a respected king, brave and with high ambitions, a lover of knowledge, very generous and praised by the poets. The madh-hab of Imam Abu Haneefah had become very widespread in Ifriqiyah, but he made the people in his land follow the madh-hab of Malik so as to put an end to dispute. His loyalty was to Islam, so he disregarded the authority of the 'Ubaydis and gave sermons in the name of al-Qa'im bi Amr-illah al-'Abbasi. Al-Mustansir sent him warnings but he was not afraid.<sup>526</sup>

Al-Mustansir said in his letter, "Why didn't you follow the example of your fathers and forefathers in obedience and loyalty?" Al-Mu'izz responded by saying, "My fathers and forefathers were kings of the Maghreb before your predecessors took control of it."<sup>527</sup> The history books explain to us that al-Mu'izz ibn Badees increased gradually in his hatred of the Batini, Rafidi Shiites and the rulers of Egypt. That was manifested in 435 AH when he expanded the numbers of Sunnis in his army, court and state. He began campaigns to purge Batini beliefs and anyone who took pleasure in reviling the Companions of the Messenger of Allah SAAW. He told the masses and the troops to kill anyone who openly reviled and insulted Abu Bakr and 'Umar (may Allah be pleased with them), and the masses in North Africa hastened to eradicate all traces of the 'Ubaydis so that the region would be

free from alien, corrupt beliefs. The scholars and fuqaha' praised these efforts which were supervised by al-Mu'izz ibn Badees (may Allah have mercy on him). The poets wrote lines of verse praising al-Mu'izz. Al-Qasim ibn Marwan said concerning these events:

*They will be killed in every land as they were killed in the land of Qayrawan.*

Al-Mu'izz ibn Badees continued to draw closer to the Sunni masses and their scholars and fuqaha', and he continued his plan to disconnect totally from the 'Ubaydis in Egypt. He made the Maliki madh-hab the official madh-hab of his state, and announced that it was joining the Abbasid state. He changed his flags and symbols to those of the Abbasids and banned the flags and symbols of the Fatimid state. He ordered the melting down of the dinars and dirhams which had the names of the 'Ubaydis on them and which the people had been using for 145 years, and ordered that new coins be minted; on one side of each coin was written the words *La ildha ill-Allah Muhammad Rasool Allah*, and on the other side was the verse:

‘And whoever desires other than Islam as religion — never will it be accepted from him, and he, in the Hereafter, will be among the losers.’ (*Qur'an 3: 85*)

Al-Mu'izz ibn Badees put an end to all the madh-habs that were opposed to Ahl as-Sunnah, such as the Safariyah, Nikariyyah, Mu'tazilah and Ibadiyah. In 443 AH, all of Barqah joined al-Mu'izz ibn Badees, after its ruler, Jabarah ibn Mukhtar, pledged obedience to him. The first one to lead the purge campaign against the Ismaili Shiite in Tripoli and fight their false traditions and misguided call was al-'Allamah 'Ali ibn Muhammad al-Muntasir, whose kunyah was Abul-Hasan (d. 432 AH).<sup>528</sup>

## The Seljuks work to protect Iraq against Batini, Rafidi Shiism

The Fatimid state was trying to gain power in Iraq and the East; hence it sent preachers to that area. The Fatimid caliphs continued their efforts to spread their message, taking advantage of the turmoil that prevailed in Iraq. The Fatimid caliph adh-Dhahir li I'zaz Deen-Allah sent preachers to Baghdad in 425 AH, and many people responded to them.<sup>529</sup> The preachers' activities in the Islamic east increased at the time of al-Mustansir Billah al-Fatimi, who told his preachers to go to Fars, Khorasan and Transoxiana. Among the most famous preachers and philosophers of the Fatimid Ismaili Shiite madh-hab was al-Mu'ayyad fi'd-Deen Hibbat-Allah ash-Shirazi, who is sometimes known simply as al-Mu'ayyad. This preacher succeeded in influencing al-Basasiri, one of the military leaders in the Abbasid state. Al-Basasiri managed to gain control of Baghdad and depose the caliph al-Qa'im bi Amr-Allah, and deliver khutbahs in the name of the Fatimids. The authority of Bani 'Abbas ceased in Baghdad, and the caliph was banished and taken to Anbar, where he was detained in Haditha in the palace of its ruler Maharish ibn Mujalli al-'Aqeeli, one of the prominent figures of Banu 'Aqeel, who served the caliph himself. Sermons were given in the name of Banu 'Ubayd — the Fatimids — for forty Fridays in Baghdad during the rule of al-Mustansir.<sup>530</sup> Al-Basasiri tried to break the deal that he had with Quraysh ibn Badran and resolved to take the Abbasid caliph and send him to Egypt, but Quraysh blocked this attempt and entrusted his cousin, the emir Muhiy ad-Deen ibn Maharish al-'Aqeeli — the ruler of Haditha — with the task of protecting the caliph and keeping him safe. Despite that, al-Basasiri did not allow the caliph al-Qa'im bi Amr-Allah to travel to Haditha until after he had forced him to write a document acknowledging that Banu 'Abbas had no right to the caliphate when Banu Fatimah az-Zahra' were present.<sup>531</sup> Al-Basasiri did not stop there, rather he took the cloak and turban and of the caliph and sent them to the Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir Billah. Al-Basasiri started to employ a group of the masses, giving them weapons from the caliph's armoury; he assembled some thugs and encouraged them to ransack the caliph's palace. The people of al-Karkh — Shiites — plundered the houses of the Sunnis at Bab al-Basrah. The house of the head qadi ad-Dumghani, was plundered and

most of the government records and books were destroyed or sold to the apothecaries. The houses of those with connections to the caliph were plundered and the Rafidis reinstated the words *Hayyd ild khayr il-'amal* to the adhan, and this altered adhan was used in all the mosques of Baghdad for Jumu'ah prayers and daily prayers in congregation, sermons in Baghdad were given in the name of the Fatimid caliph, and gold and silver coinage was minted in his name. The house of the caliph was besieged and the chief official Abul-Qasim ibn al-Muslimah was arrested and rebuked by al-Basasiri, who scorned him greatly then arrested him and humiliated him. The masses plundered the caliph's palace, taking untold amounts of jewels, precious items, silk, furniture, clothing and other things. On Eid al-Adha 450AH, al-Basasiri dressed the sermon-givers and muezzins in white, and he and his companions dressed likewise, carrying the banners of al-Mustansir and the flags of Egypt, and he delivered a khutbah in the name of the ruler of Egypt. The Rafidi Shiite rejoiced greatly, and the adhan throughout Iraq contained the words *Hayyd ild khayr il-'amal*. Al-Basasiri took revenge on the prominent people of Baghdad; he drowned many of those who had opposed him and gave generous gifts to others. On Monday 28 Dhul-Hijjah, the vizier Abul-Qasim ibn al-Muslimah, who was known as the Chief Vizier, was brought before him, wearing a woollen jubbah (nightshirt) and a long pointed cap of red felt, and around his neck was a leather rope. He was placed on a camel<sup>532</sup> and taken around the city, with someone behind him who was beating him with a leather strap. When he came to al-Karkh, they spread two worn-out doormats on him and spat in his face and reviled him — as is their custom when they gain power over their opponents at all times and in all places. He was reciting the verse:

**'Say [O Muhammad 'O Allah! Owner of Sovereignty, You give sovereignty to whom You will, and You take sovereignty away from whom You will. You honour whom You will, and You humble whom You will. In Your Hand is [all] good. Indeed, You are over all things competent.')** (*Qur'an* 3: 26)

He was made to stand next to the caliph's palace and the skin of a bull with its horns attached was placed over him. He was hung with hooks in his mouth and lifted up onto the wood (crucified) whilst still alive. He trembled in agony until the end of the day, then he died, may Allah have mercy on

him. His last words were: Praise be to Allah Who caused me to live blessed and caused me to die as a martyr.<sup>533</sup>

One of the main psychological characteristics of the Batiniheretical Shiites that has been proven throughout history is that they appear humble, pretend to be pitiful and act friendly when they are weak, but when they feel strong, they use the worst kinds of tyranny, force and vengeance. Tughril Beg, the Seljuk sultan who removed the Buwayhis from power, was outside Iraq with his army, fighting those who dissented with him and seeking to strengthen his state. When he had dealt with that problem, he returned to Baghdad with his army and restored the Abbasid caliph to his position after freeing him from prison. He managed to catch up with al-Basasiri and kill him, and Iraq was restored to the Sunni Abbasid caliphate once more. I have discussed these historical events in detail in my book *Dawlat as-Salajiqah wal-Mashroo' al-Islami li Muqdwimat al-Taghalghul al-Batini wal-Ghazw as-Saleebi*. The Seljuks realized the danger posed to them by the Fatimid message in the lands of the Abbasid caliphate, so they followed a wise policy after seizing the reins of power in Baghdad, in which they confronted the Fatimid message<sup>534</sup> and its preachers with firm resolve. They pursued the Fatimid preachers, who had spread the Fatimid message in Persia, and also removed Shiite state officials who followed the Ismaili madh-hab from government and religious posts, and appointed Sunnis in their place.<sup>535</sup>

## **The Nizami schools: Sunni revival and confrontation with Rafidi Shiite thought**

Serious thinking about establishing these Nizami schools to stem the tide of Rafidi Imami and Ismaili Shiism began following the succession of Sultan Alp Arslan to the Seljuk throne in 455 AH. This Sultan appointed as his vizier an enthusiastic, capable Sunni individual by the name of al-Hasan ibn 'Ali ibn Is-haq at-Toosi, who was given the title of Nizam al-Mulk. His vizier believed that merely resisting the political influence of the Imami and Ismaili Shiites would not be successful in the long term unless this political resistance was also accompanied by an intellectual effort, because the Shiites — whether of the Imami or Ismaili variety — had been very active at that time and prior to it in promoting their madh-hab by many intellectual means. Nothing could succeed in resisting this intellectual activity except similar

Sunni activity that could confront it with proof and evidence.<sup>536</sup> The Fatimid state had prepared preachers through al-Azhar which they had made into an educational institution that focused on spreading their madh-hab in 378 AH.<sup>537</sup>

This is in addition to the educational programs that they carefully prepared to train preachers, especially in the capital of the Fatimid state, giving them a comprehensive education in their madh-hab, before sending them to Muslim lands to spread the Ismaili madh-hab. This was effective in spreading this madh-hab in some parts of the eastern Muslim world as a result of these ongoing organized efforts to spread this message.<sup>538</sup> For all these reasons, Nizam al-Mulk decided to resist Shiite influence by means of the same methods by which it was being spread, by accompanying political resistance against the Shiites with intellectual resistance<sup>539</sup>, educating the Ummah about the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (SAAW) and the beliefs of Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah based on divine revelation. Hence he decided to establish the Nizami schools which were named after him, because he is the one who worked hard to establish them. He made plans for them, established endowments to support them and chose qualified teachers for them. So it was natural that they should be named after him and not the Seljuks.<sup>540</sup>

Allah helped and guided Nizam al-Mulk in a manner that is rarely paralleled in religious, academic and political history. His schools survived for a long time, especially the Nizamiyah in Baghdad, which flourished for four centuries. The last of those who we know studied there was the author of *al-Qamoos*, al-Fayroozabadi, who died in 817 AH, and the school closed at the end of the ninth century AH.<sup>541</sup> The school fulfilled its mission of producing scholars of the Sunni Shafa'i school and supplying government departments with officials for some time, especially the departments dealing with judicial matters, comptrolling (prices, weights and measures) and fatwas, which were the most important positions in the state at that time. These graduates spread throughout the Muslim world, until they penetrated the borders of the Batini state in Egypt and reached North Africa, where they supported the Sunni presence. These schools produced a generation who achieved most of the aims for which Nizam al-Mulk had planned. So we see many of those who graduated from these schools travelling to other regions to teach Shafa'i fiqh and Hadith. They spread the beliefs of ahl as-Sunnah

wal-Jama'ah in the regions to which they moved, taking up positions as qadis and muftis, or taking up important administrative positions in the state. As-Subki narrated that Abu Is-haq ash-Shirazi — the first teacher in the Nizamiyah in Baghdad — said, "I went out to Khorasan and I never came to any town or village but I found that its qadi, mufti or *khateeb*<sup>542</sup> was one of my students or companions."<sup>543</sup> These schools contributed to making the Sunni way strong again in the lives of the Ummah. Another of their most prominent effects was the reduction of Shiite influence, especially after they produced books that were opposed to it. Imam al-Ghazali was foremost among the thinkers who launched an all-out war against the Rafidi Shiites.<sup>544</sup> The Nizami schools and the legacy left by their scholars paved the way and made it easy for Noor ad-Deen Zangi and the Ayubids to fulfil the purpose for which these Nizami schools were established. Their aim was to strive to make true Islam prevail, especially in the regions which were under Shiite domination at that stage, such as Syria, Egypt and elsewhere.<sup>545</sup>

One of the greatest dangers that the Ummah is facing today is the new Batini project that is active throughout the world and which is targeting the beliefs of the Ummah, the Book of its Lord, the Sunnah of its (MESSENGER (SAAW), its history and its prominent figures. Will we learn from these lessons of history and be inspired by them to work in accordance with divine law to call people to true Islam as brought by the (Messenger (SAAW), so that some of our rulers will be like Alp Arslan in courage, some of our ministers will be like Nizam al-Mulk in ambition and protective jealousy (gheerah), some of our scholars will be like al-Juwayni, al-Ghazali, al-Baghawi, al-Jilani and the prominent Maghrebi scholars in defending the Qur'an and Sunnah and the Companions of the (Messenger (SAAW) and issues of sound Islamic thought? We need to use modern methods to disseminate sound Islamic beliefs, authentic Islamic history and brilliant ideas using satellites, the internet, the press, newspapers, magazines, books, conferences, seminars, curricula, schools, universities and all various means of disseminating knowledge of Islam, seeking thereby the Countenance of Allah and the Hereafter in the company of the (Messenger (SAAW), truthful ones, martyrs and righteous people.



## Al-Imam al-Ghazali's efforts in defeating the Batini Shiites

One of the beneficial effects of the Nizami schools was that they paved the way for the Sunni madh-hab to prevail. This was no easy task; rather it was the outcome of tremendous efforts, great sacrifices and remarkable cooperation. Another of its most prominent effects was the shrinking of Shiite influence, especially after the appearance of books refuting it which were produced by these schools. Imam al-Ghazali, the Sunni scholar, was foremost among the thinkers who launched an all-out war against the heretical Shiites through his writing. It was said that he wrote numerous books concerning that, the most famous of which was *Fadd 'ih al-Bdtiniyah*, which he was commissioned to write in 487 AH by the caliph al-Mustazhir.<sup>546</sup> But the most amazing thing is the courage shown by al-Ghazali in his campaign against the Batini Ismailis, at a time when their preachers were widespread in Persia and the danger they posed reached such a point that they established fortresses and citadels and threatened people's safety. They carried out assassinations on a wide scale, targeting many politicians and thinkers, foremost among whom was Nizam al-Mulk himself. Al-Ghazali began this campaign on the orders of the authorities, in addition to his own desire as a Sunni scholar to do his duty in defending true Islam.<sup>547</sup> This is something wonderful, when the efforts of the political authorities coincide with the efforts of the scholars to achieve the aims of Islam. Through institutions that benefit both society and the state, such as the role played by the Nizami schools in resisting Batini Shiite thought and influence, this is achieved. The Fatimid state had equipped itself with Batini philosophy and beliefs and emerged as a political and religious entity. It was, as Professor Nadawi states, more dangerous to Islam than philosophy, because philosophy was living in its ivory tower far away from the ordinary people and the masses.<sup>548</sup> But batiniyah was trying to spread in society and infuse it with its poison, and it offered powerful, material temptations. In the Muslim world at the end of the fifth century AH there was no one who was more able to refute it, expose its secrets and reject what this call was based on than al-Ghazali. The writings of al-Ghazali were very effective in refuting batiniyah. With his sharp mind and the fame that he had acquired, he was able to be a strong influence in resisting batiniyah and supporting the Sunni madh-hab. He was

able to use his Sharia knowledge and his rational knowledge of philosophy, logic and theology to blow away the roots of the Batini madh-hab. His comments about them were on everyone's lips and became like proverbs: Outwardly they are heretics but inwardly they are pure disbelievers. They hide behind Shiism but they have nothing to do with the Shiites; rather it is a mask behind which they hide their plots against the people of Islam.<sup>549</sup> Among the things that were said about al-Ghazali was that he was continually criticizing this group, uncovering the contradictions in its thought and exposing its scandalous deeds and bad intentions. Despite the fact that he was well known at this time, this criticism could have cost him his life. He himself witnessed the assassination of the great statesman Nizam al-Mulk. The Batini Shiites used to threaten everyone among those who were close to the king or among the scholars who they thought posed a danger to them. They threatened them with vengeance at the point of a dagger or in poisoned food or some other method which they were skilled in and carried out with all precision. If this proves anything, it proves the courage of al-Ghazali in speaking the truth out loud and confronting falsehood, regardless of the outcome, and his faith that nothing would befall him except that which Allah had decreed for him.<sup>550</sup> This is a lesson and reminder for contemporary scholars to be sincere towards Allah in resisting the new Batinis. I have seen some of those who are regarded as scholars showing their fear of them, being afraid of being killed or assassinated or accused of sectarianism. Some of them have succumbed to Batini influence and flattery that carries no weight in terms of Sharia or even in terms of transient worldly concerns. Thus they leave them to tamper with the beliefs of the Ummah and that which is holy to it. Some scholars have even contributed to deceiving the Muslim masses even though they are well aware of the danger that these people pose to the beliefs and morals of the Ummah. Do they not fear a Day when hearts and eyes will be overturned (*Qur'an* 24: 37) and Allah will ask the truthful (Allah's Messengers and His Messenger (SAAW) about their truth (i.e. the conveyance of Allah's Message that which they were charged with) (*Qur'an* 33:8)1

## Noor ad-Deen's military campaigns against Egypt

The Fatimid vizier Ibn as-Sallar, who followed the Sunni madh-hab, attempted to contact Noor ad-Deen in order to launch a joint attack in which Noor ad-Deen would come with his troops from the north and the Fatimid fleet would attack the Crusader cities on the Syrian coast. Usamah ibn Munqidh mediated between the two sides. Ibn as-Sallar offered to take money and gifts to the sultan of Aleppo, offering to besiege Tiberias; at the same time, the Fatimid fleet would attack Gaza. If Noor ad-Deen agreed to that, Ibn Munqidh would offer him money to help him, but if he refused, then Ibn Munqidh would use the money to sponsor a number of horsemen to fight the Crusaders at Ascalon. But when he reached Busra and met with Noor ad-Deen, he explained to him how preoccupied he was with Damascus, and that it formed an obstacle to his cooperating with the Fatimids, because Damascus had not yet fallen to him.<sup>551</sup> It may be noted that Ibn as-Sallar continued his fight against the Crusaders. In 546 AH/1151 CE, he spent a huge amount of money to prepare a fleet with which he attacked the coastal Crusader cities. Adh-Dhahabi spoke of Ibn as-Sallar, saying:

He was a courageous hero, brave, respected: a Shafi'i Sunni who did not follow the religion of the 'Ubaydis. He welcomed Salafis and built a school for them, but there was some injustice, transgression and tyranny in him.<sup>552</sup>

These attempts were repeated when TalaT ibn Ruzayk became vizier, as he contacted Noor ad-Deen Mahmood via Usamah ibn Munqidh, but Noor ad-Deen did not hasten to respond, as he thought that the right opportunity had not yet come. Usamah ibn Munqidh and the king as-Salih Abul-Gharat TalaT ibn Ruzayk exchanged poetry in which Jihad against the Franks was mentioned and encouraged.<sup>553</sup>

Noor ad-Deen did not enter into a military alliance with TalaY ibn Ruzayk, but he paid attention to diplomatic communications. In 552 AH/1157 CE, a delegation from Noor ad-Deen arrived, and the same thing happened again in 553 AH/1158 CE. The Fatimid state responded to those delegations by sending Noor ad-Deen's ambassador back to his country with gifts and weapons estimated at a value of thirty thousand dinars, and other kinds of supplies worth an estimated seventy thousand, to support Noor ad-

Deen's struggle against the Crusaders.<sup>554</sup> There was a further delegation from Noor ad-Deen in 554 AH/1159 CE. On the other hand, the Fatimid state showed a friendly face to him. In 555 AH/1160 CE, al-'Adid sent gifts to him. In fact the logical explanation for this is that after the Fatimids lost Ashkelon in 548 AH/1153 CE, they realized, more than before, the danger that the Crusaders posed to them and the necessity of benefiting from the strength of Noor ad-Deen's state and its political and military power.<sup>555</sup>

## Noor ad-Deen's motives for conquering Egypt

The conquest of Egypt was one of the greatest achievements of Noor ad-Deen (may Allah have mercy on him). He managed to bring down the 'Ubaydi Fatimid state which for more than two centuries had been spreading political corruption and false beliefs throughout the Muslim world. They were the ones who had helped the Crusaders to occupy Greater Syria by means of their alliances and conspiracies with them. They are the ones who adopted the Batini madh-hab and spread it among the Muslims. When chaos prevailed in the Fatimid administration and the viziers took control instead of the caliphs, the Crusaders began to hope that they could invade Egypt, so they attacked it time after time, whereupon Noor ad-Deen Mahmood sent a military campaign to save Egypt from their ambitions, bring it back to the madh-hab of Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah and unite the Muslims.<sup>556</sup> We may sum up the important motives that led to the conquest of Egypt as follows:

There was a state of chaos that prevailed in Egypt at the end of the Fatimidcaliphate. The state was suffering from many manifestations of disintegration and corruption. It had become something common for the caliph or vizier to be killed during the ongoing conflicts among the viziers themselves and between the viziers and the caliphs. Adh Dhahir was killed by his vizier, and the viziers took control after that and chose whomever they wanted, and the viziers killed one another. In one year, three different viziers were appointed to the post: al<sup>4</sup>Adil ibn Ruzayk, Shawar and Dirgham. The state grew weak and chaos prevailed throughout the land. At the end of his conflict, Shawar left Egypt after he was expelled by Dirgham, then he

sought help from Noor ad Deen Mahmood, who found his long-awaited opportunity to achieve Islamic unity between Syria and Egypt.

The Crusaders' hopes led the Mujahid commander Noor ad-Deen to think seriously about incorporating Egypt into the Islamic front. He also received confirmation from the Abbasid caliph giving him a free hand in Syria and Egypt in 549 AH, which reinforced his resolve to achieve this goal.<sup>557</sup>

One of the strongest reasons for the destruction of the 'Ubaydi Fatimid caliphate was the ideological factor. It was a state that was *Batini* in its belief and *Ismaili* in its *madh-hab*; it divided the Muslims and conspired repeatedly with their enemies.<sup>558</sup> So it was essential to form a united front that was strong in its belief and legitimate, incorporating both Egypt and Syria under the banner of the Abbasid caliphate.<sup>559</sup>

In these circumstances in which the martyr Noor ad-Deen was thinking of invading Egypt, the Fatimid vizier Shawar ibn Mujeer as-Sa'di arrived in Damascus in 559 AH, seeking his help against the one who had usurped his position by force. In return for Noor ad-Deen's help, Shawar promised him one third of the annual income of Egypt, after paying the soldiers' salaries, and to act as his deputy in Egypt, if he helped him to overcome his enemy Dirgham; Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh would stay with the troops in Egypt and run the country's affairs with Shawar under the authority of Noor ad-Deen.<sup>560</sup> But Noor ad-Deen was hesitant, taking one step forward and one step back, until he prayed to Allah for guidance concerning this matter, because there were great dangers, represented in the Crusader presence on the coast and in Jerusalem, in addition to his doubts about the sincerity of Shawar as-Sa'di.<sup>561</sup> Then Noor ad-Deen prepared a number of consecutive campaigns and sent them to Egypt between 559 and 564 AH, under the leadership of Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh.<sup>562</sup>

## The first campaign of Noor ad-Deen - 559 AH/1164 CE

Noor ad-Deen Mahmood decided to send a military campaign to Egypt under the leadership of Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh, to achieve two initial aims:

- a) To be able to examine the internal situation in Egypt closely as a first step towards incorporating it, especially since Shawar had promised him that if he returned to his post, he would bear the costs of the expedition and guarantee that Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh and his troops could stay in Egypt.
- b) Reinstating Shawar, the deposed Fatimid vizier.

Dirgham found out about the preparations that were being made in Damascus for a campaign to help Shawar, so he took precautions and sought the help of Amalric I in an attempt to enter the balance of power game. He made a deal with him for his help against Noor ad-Deen Mahmood, promising him in return that he would pay an annual tribute to be determined by the king; he also agreed that Egypt would become a vassal state of the Crusaders, and he forced the Fatimid caliph al-'Adid to sign this deal.<sup>563</sup> Naturally Amalric I accepted this offer, as it gave him the opportunity that he could not miss to enter Egypt, which was a goal for which the Crusaders had been striving for more than half a century. So he immediately prepared a military expedition to march on Egypt. Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh set out, leading the first campaign to Egypt, in Jumada al-Akhirah 559 AH/April 1164 CE, accompanied by his nephew Salah ad-Deen Yoosuf ibn Ayub, who was approximately seventeen years old. They followed the route already decided upon, which passed through lands under Crusader control.<sup>564</sup> In order to distract them from intercepting this campaign and to protect the soldiers' lives, Noor ad-Deen did two things:

- a) He accompanied the campaign with his own army as far as the outskirts of Damascus, to prevent anyone intercepting the troops.
- b) He launched attacks on the northern edges of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem which neighboured Damascus, to distract Crusader attention from Egypt.<sup>565</sup>

Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh led his huge army across the desert, accompanied by Shawar. They passed Kerak, then ash-Shawbak (Crac de Montreal) and Eilat, then they reached Suez and from there went on to Cairo. They travelled so quickly that they had passed the channel of Suez before the Crusaders were ready to intervene. Dirgham sent a military force led by a brother of his called Nasir ad-Deen, to confront them, but the encounter between the two sides ended in a clear victory for Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh, and Nasir ad-Deen returned to Cairo in defeat, pursued by Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh.

At the end of Jumada al-Akhirah he reached the Egyptian capital, and Dirgham came out to meet him with all the forces at his disposal, because he realized that this was the final battle. The battle took place under the walls of Cairo; it was a violent clash which ended in victory for Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh after the army, the people and the caliph abandoned Dirgham. Dirgham was killed near the supposed shrine of as-Sayyidah Nafeesah as he attempted to flee in Rajab 559 AH/June 1164 CE. Then his brother Nasir ad-Deen was killed, and Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh entered Cairo in victory, reinstated Shawar as vizier, and set up his camp outside the city.<sup>566</sup>

After his reinstatement was guaranteed, Shawar went back to his old ways of plotting and deceiving in order to start a new conflict with Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh. He mistreated the people and forgot the promises that he had made to Noor ad-Deen Mahmood. Indeed, signs of treachery soon appeared. He broke his treaty with him and asked Shirkuh to leave Egypt immediately, taking his troops back to Syria. But Shirkuh refused to do so and reacted to his about-face by hastening to capture Bilbeis and taking over the eastern part of the country.<sup>567</sup> Shawar had no choice but to seek help from King Amalric I, who was preparing to march on Egypt. He began to make him scared of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood and suggested the following to him:

- c) He would give him one thousand dinars for every stage of the journey from Jerusalem to the Nile; the number of stages was twenty-seven.
- d) He would give gifts to each of the Knights Hospitaller who accompanied him; they formed the backbone of the army of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. This was an attempt to entice these knights to take part in the campaign.

- e) He would pay for food for their horses, in return for help in expelling Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh from Egypt.<sup>568</sup>

Thus Shawar indulged in a political game between major enemies in an attempt to incite them against one another to serve his own interests. Undoubtedly Amalric I was watching political and military developments in Egypt at that time, and when he learned of Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh's march his fear increased. So when Shawar's invitation reached him, he welcomed it and did not waste this opportunity to enter Egypt, even though it was with a different ally. That did not bother him in the least; all that mattered to him was entering Egypt.<sup>569</sup>

## Amalric I's second campaign against Egypt

Amalric I's campaign against Egypt failed and he was forced to withdraw and return to Jerusalem. That was in 558 AH/1163 CE. When he got another opportunity to enter Egypt, as soon as he received Shawar's invitation, Amalric I hastened to hold a council in Jerusalem, summoning the barons of the kingdom. He decided to accept Shawar's invitation after explaining to the council that he was able to prepare a campaign to invade Egypt without weakening the kingdom's defences. At that time a number of pilgrims had arrived from Europe to visit Jerusalem, and he could make use of them in his war effort, in hopes of occupying Egypt for the Crusaders. He decided to appoint Bohemond III, ruler of Antioch, in charge of the kingdom's affairs in his absence.<sup>570</sup> The King of Jerusalem hastened to march on Egypt at the head of his forces for the second time, in Ramadan 559 AH/August 1164 CE. As soon as he arrived in Faqoos<sup>571</sup>, he hastened to contact Shawar and they agreed to besiege Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh in Bilbeis. This fortress withstood the siege for three months, during which Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh defended his position.<sup>572</sup> Then Amalric I suddenly decided to enter into negotiations with him for both parties to leave Egypt. What happened on the political level to make him take this step? Here we see the unique military genius of Noor ad-Deen. Amalric I had received the troubling news from Syria that his kingdom was being subjected to pressure by Noor ad-Deen Mahmood, and he preferred to go back and defend it. At the same time he realized that his campaign was doomed to failure because of Asad



ad-Deen Shirkuh's fortifications in Bilbeis. Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh was also in a difficult situation, because his food supplies had started to run out, in addition to the fact that the combined Crusader-Fatimid forces were superior in numbers and the military situation was not in his favour. Hence he agreed to enter into negotiations to leave Egypt.<sup>573</sup> The two men did indeed reach an agreement to leave Egypt in Dhul-Hijj ah/October. The Muslim and Crusader armies travelled along parallel routes across the Sinai Peninsula, after leaving Shawar in control of running affairs. Shirkuh was the last to leave the country and catch up with his troops.<sup>574</sup> Shawar was the real winner of this conflict, which ended in his favour. He got rid of both the Syrian Muslim and Crusader armies at the same time as he got rid of Dirgham, and over the next two years he became the man in control in the country.<sup>575</sup>

After his return from Egypt, Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh put himself at the disposal of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood, and Egypt became the focal point of Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh's thinking and talk in his meetings with others. He never stopped exchanging ideas about it with his friends who would keep him up to date with its news. During this period, Noor ad-Deen Mahmood sent him on a mission to Baghdad, where he made the most of his being in the capital of the caliphate to stir up the enthusiasm of the caliph al-Mustanjid Billah, as he started to tell him all about Egypt and what he himself had seen there. The caliph was moved by what he heard and encouraged him to return there.<sup>576</sup>

In spite of the fact that Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh's campaign did not achieve its aims in Egypt, the final outcome was that Noor ad-Deen Mahmood's power in Syria was reinforced and his status in the Muslim world was raised. He became the major local power in the region, whilst the area under Crusader control receded to the coast and they began to despair.<sup>577</sup> Whatever the case, both Shirkuh and Amalric I left Egypt, and each of them found out about its deteriorating political and economic situation, in addition to finding out about the abundant wealth and huge human resources that it enjoyed, which would tip the balance in favour of the one who took control of it. Shawar took the opportunity presented by the departure of both to go back to his original attitude, oppressing and killing and confiscating the people's wealth, to such an extent that the Fatimid caliph al-'Adid had no authority at all. When the situation got completely out of hand, al-'Adid wrote to Noor ad-Deen Mahmood seeking his help to get rid of Shawar.<sup>578</sup>

## Noor ad-Deen's second campaign

Noor ad-Deen Mahmood prepared the necessary forces and sent them to Egypt in Rabee<sup>4</sup> al-Awwal 562 AH/January 1167 CE, under the leadership of Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh, who was accompanied by his nephew Salah ad-Deen. He also sent a number of emirs with him,<sup>579</sup> and the number of these troops was two thousand horsemen.<sup>580</sup> Noor ad-Deen accompanied them to the edge of his land, for fear of Crusader interception.<sup>581</sup> The troops in this campaign followed a route that was surrounded with danger. The Crusaders in their path who were lying in wait in Kerak and ash-Shawbak could ambush them and wreak havoc when they were far away from their own territory, and the Bedouin were pursuing them to transmit information about them to the Crusaders. They had to change course occasionally to hide themselves. Nature also slowed their progress. A heavy sandstorm struck them, killing some of their men and destroying some of their provisions. Despite that, they reached Egypt. Shawar had enough time to seek help again from Amalric I, as he was certain, from his reading of events, that if Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh came to Egypt this time, he would stay and would not leave. Therefore he did not hesitate to contact the King of Jerusalem and negotiate with him, explaining to him the danger that Noor ad-Deen Mahmood would pose to the Kingdom of Jerusalem if he succeeded in taking possession of Egypt. Amalric I welcomed Shawar's invitation in hopes of taking control of Egypt and pushing away Noor ad-Deen Mahmood and his army from it so that they would not be able to surround his kingdom which would otherwise end up in the middle of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood's possessions.<sup>582</sup> But before the preparations were complete, news came that Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh was crossing the Sinai desert. Amalric I could do no more than send whatever troops he could find to slow down his progress, but this arrangement came too late.<sup>583</sup> Although Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh's army was hit by a sand storm that halted their progress and almost wiped them out, he arrived safely at the channel of Suez in Rabee' II/ early February. Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh learned that the Crusader army had started to march towards Egypt, at which point he crossed the desert heading south west, in order to avoid a premature confrontation with the Crusaders, until he reached the Nile at Itfeeh, forty miles south of Cairo.<sup>584</sup> Then he crossed to the west bank of the river, and stayed close to the river as he marched until he reached Giza, where he

camped opposite al-Fustat, and he gained control of the western side of the country and ruled it for fifty-odd days.<sup>585</sup>

## Amalric's third campaign and Crusader-Fatimid negotiations

Amalric I set out from Jerusalem in Rabee' al-Awwal 562 AH/ January 1167 CE, heading for Egypt in the third campaign against that land. He followed the usual route from Gaza to al-'Areesh, then he crossed the desert to Bilbeis. Shawar was surprised by his sudden appearance, and started to get worried because he had not coordinated with him. It seems that he did not know of Shirkuh's arrival in Itfeeh and was not certain until he sent his scouts to the desert to find out what was happening, at which point he went out to welcome the Crusader king and meet with him. He invited Amalric I to stay in his camp on the eastern bank of the Nile, one mile from the walls of Cairo.<sup>586</sup> He held discussions with Shawar in which Shawar agreed to pay four hundred thousand dinars in return for driving Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh out of Egypt, with half of this amount to be paid immediately and the other half to be paid later on. He also stipulated that Amalric I should swear to that<sup>587</sup>, in order to support this agreement and make it official. Amalric I sent Hugh, ruler of Caesarea, and Geoffrey, commander of the Knights Hospitaller, to the Fatimid caliph, to obtain from him his official agreement to this deal. The two envoys were warmly welcomed in the Fatimid palace and the deal was confirmed.<sup>588</sup> It was natural for the Crusaders to welcome this agreement, which made them the protectors of Egypt and the Fatimid caliphate, and pushed away Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh as he was their only competitor for control of this land.<sup>589</sup>

## The battle of Babayn

Asad ad-Deen and Noor ad-Deen's troops marched to as-Sa'eed (Upper Egypt) and reached a place called al-Babayn (Two Gates). The Egyptian and Frankish troops set out after them and caught up with them on 25 Jumada I. Shirkuh had sent spies to them, who came back and told him about their great numbers and equipment, and how persistent they were in seeking him. So he decided to meet them and fight, and let the sword judge between him and them. But he was worried that his companions' resolve

might be weakened in this dangerous situation in which destruction was more likely than safety, because of their lack of numbers and their being so far from home. So he consulted them, and they all advised him to cross the Nile to the eastern side and go back to Syria. They said to him:

If we are defeated — which there is no doubt about — where will we seek refuge and who will protect us, when everyone in this land, soldier, ordinary person or peasant, is an enemy to us and wishes to drink our blood? It is natural for an army of two thousand horsemen who are so far away from home and have no supporters to be afraid to meet tens of thousands in addition to knowing that the local people are also our enemies.

When they said that, one of Noor ad-Deen's Mamelukes, who was called Sharaf ad-Deen Buzghush — who was famed for his courage — stood up and said:

Whoever fears death and injury and capture should not serve kings, rather he should be a peasant or stay with the women at home. By Allah, if you go back to al-Malik al-'Adil (Noor ad-Deen) without gaining victory or doing your best to be free from blame, he will take away all the land that he has given you and will take back all that you have taken until today, and he will say to you: "Did you take the Muslims' wealth and then flee from their enemies, and leave this land of Egypt under the control of the disbelievers?"

Asad ad-Deen said, "This is my opinion and it is what I am going to do." Salah ad-Deen Yoosuf ibn Ayub agreed with him, then the number of those who agreed to fight increased and they all agreed to meet the enemy (in battle). This shows the esteem in which Noor ad-Deen was held in the hearts of the commanders and troops of his army. Shirkuh stayed put until the Egyptians and Franks caught up with him when he was fully mobilized. Here we see the military genius and expertise of Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh. He put all the wealth and food supplies in the middle, because he could not leave them in any other place lest the local people plunder them. Then he put Salah ad-Deen, his nephew, in the middle and said to him and those who were with him:

If the Franks and Egyptians think that I am at the heart of the army, they will intensify their attack on the heart and that will be the focus of their attack. If they attack you, do not try to withstand the attack and do not kill

yourselves; rather run away from them. If they give up and turn back, then chase them.

From among the most courageous of his companions he chose a group whom he trusted and knew of their patience and courage, and he stood with them on the right flank. When the two groups met, the Franks did what Asad ad-Deen had mentioned. They attacked the heart, thinking that he was among them. So they fought those who were in the heart lightly, then they fled before them and they followed them, at which point Asad ad-Deen and the men who were with him attacked the Franks in the rear of those who had attacked the heart. They defeated them and wielded their swords against them, killing and capturing a great number of them, and the rest fled. When the Franks who had fled came back to the heart of the battlefield to look for their companions they found no one there. So they fled again, and this is one of the most amazing things ever written in history: that two thousand horsemen defeated the armies of the Egyptians and the Franks of the coast.<sup>590</sup>

## The siege of Alexandria

Then Asad ad-Deen went back to Alexandria and collected taxes on the way from the towns and villages. Then he came to Alexandria and gained control of it without fighting; its people surrendered it to him. He appointed his nephew Salah ad-Deen as his deputy in the city, and returned to Upper Egypt where he gained control and collected taxes, and stayed there and fasted Ramadan there. The Egyptians and Franks went back to Cairo where they gathered their supporters and replaced those who had been killed. They collected more troops and mobilized, and marched to Alexandria where Salah ad-Deen was with his troops, protecting it from them, helped by its people who were afraid of the Franks. The siege intensified and food supplies ran low in the city, but its people persevered. Asad ad-Deen came towards them from Upper Egypt, but Shawar had corrupted some of the Turkmens who were with him. Then a messenger came from the Egyptians and Franks, seeking a peace deal.<sup>591</sup>

## Negotiations concerning withdrawal from Egypt

After negotiations between Noor ad-Deen Mahmood and the Crusaders, a peace deal was drawn up, based on the following:

- a) Lifting the siege of Alexandria
- b) Exchanging prisoners
- c) Letting the troops of Noor ad-Deen leave Alexandria
- d) Shirkuh and his troops would leave Egypt
- e) They were not to be intercepted en route by the Crusader forces.

From a careful reading of the course of events as they occurred on the ground, the exchange of offers with regard to making the truce and what happened after the agreement was concluded, we may note that the two sides, Noor ad-Deen's troops and the Crusader-Fatimid troops, agreed to the following:

- f) Noor ad-Deen's troops and the Crusaders would leave Egypt
- g) Prisoners would be exchanged

- h)** Shawar promised not to punish his people in Alexandria or elsewhere who had supported Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh.<sup>592</sup>

Whatever the case, Amalric entered the city of Alexandria in Shawwal/August whilst Salah ad-Deen left it in a splendid military procession, despite the sorrow that its inhabitants felt at his departure. The two men met and were impressed with one another to such an extent that the king of Jerusalem supplied Salah ad-Deen with some boats to transfer the wounded Muslim warriors to Syria.<sup>593</sup> But the problems of the city's inhabitants did not stop there; as soon as Shawar's followers entered the city they arrested everyone who was suspected of cooperating with Salah ad-Deen. The latter protested to Amalric I, who advised Shawar to let the prisoners go.<sup>594</sup> This was the second time that Shawar acted treacherously, and it taught Salah ad-Deen a harsh lesson, not to try it again. He himself settled the score with Shawar when the Syrian forces returned to Egypt in 564 AH/1168 CE.<sup>595</sup>

## Crusader protection for Egypt

Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh and Salah ad-Deen both left Egypt in Dhul-Qa'dah/September, whereas Amalric tarried for a few weeks because he went to Cairo to confirm the Crusader protection of the Fatimid state and Shawar. The most important implications of that were:

- o He would pay an annual tribute of one hundred thousand dinars to the Crusaders.
- o A force of knights would guard the gates of Cairo to ward off Noor ad-Deen Mahmood if he tried to attack again.
- o A representative of the Crusader king would stay in Cairo to participate in ruling the country.<sup>596</sup>

It seems that the idea of taking possession of Egypt was still alive in the mind of Amalric I and he was no longer able to give up this idea; he intended to come back after he had sorted out the situation in Syria, out of greed for its wealth and to protect his kingdom in Syria. Then the king returned to Palestine.<sup>597</sup> By means of these procedures he ensured protection

of Egypt, which resulted in ongoing competition between Noor ad-Deen Mahmood and Amalric.<sup>598</sup>



## Noor ad-Deen's third campaign against Egypt (564 AH/1169 CE)

The reason for this campaign was that the Franks had established a garrison in Cairo and were in control of the city gates, and they ruled the Muslims harshly. When they saw that there was no one in the land who could stop them, they sent word to their king, Amalric, in Jerusalem, calling him to come and take possession of Egypt, giving him the impression that it would be easy to capture. He hesitated, fearing negative consequences, then he set out reluctantly with his knights. When they reached Bilbeis at the beginning of Safar, they plundered it, killing and taking its inhabitants captive.

Then they went to al-Fustat and Shawar ordered that it be burned, and ordered its inhabitants to move to Cairo and that the land be plundered lest the Franks take possession of it. So the city was plundered and the fires burned for fifty-four days. Then the Franks besieged Cairo, putting pressure on its inhabitants. Shawar himself took charge of the troops and the fighting, but found himself under tremendous pressure and was unable to ward them off, so he resorted to trickery, sending word to their king Amalric, promising him a huge sum, a million Egyptian dinars, some of which was to be paid immediately. He gave them one hundred thousand dinars, and asked them to leave so that he could collect the rest of the money for them. So they left for a while, and he started to collect the money for them, but he only managed to collect five thousand dinars, because the Egyptians' homes had been burned and their property had been plundered.<sup>599</sup>

## Al-'Adid seeks the help of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood

Immediately after the fire of Egypt, the ruler al-'Adid sent word to Noor ad-Deen, seeking his help and telling him of the Muslims' weakness and inability to resist the Franks. With his letter he sent some women's hairs and said: "These are the hairs of my womenfolk in my palace, who are seeking your help to save them from the Franks."<sup>600</sup> In return for saving his country from the Franks, he offered Noor ad-Deen the following:

- o To give him one-third of the land of Egypt
- o To give allocations of land to his commanders
- o To allow Shirkuh to settle in Egypt.<sup>601</sup>

## Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh enters Cairo: making the most of opportunity

Noor ad-Deen started preparing the army and made thorough preparations. He gave the commander of the campaign — Shirkuh — two hundred thousand dinars, in addition to clothing, mounts and weapons, and gave him full authority over the troops and stores, to take whatever he needed. From among the troops he selected two thousand horsemen, and assembled six thousand Turkmen horsemen. Noor ad-Deen Mahmood and Shirkuh marched to the gate of Damascus, then they moved on to Ra's al-Ma'.<sup>602</sup> Noor ad-Deen gave each horseman twenty dinars as a bonus, and gave Shirkuh an additional group of emirs, among whom was Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi.<sup>603</sup> Asad ad-Deen travelled quickly, and when he drew near to Egypt, the Franks left and returned to their own country without having achieved anything and with their hopes dashed. Noor ad-Deen heard of their return, which cheered him, and he ordered that the good news be spread throughout the land. When Asad ad-Deen reached Cairo, he entered the city and met with al-'Adid, who gave him gifts, and the people of Egypt rejoiced at his coming, and his troops were given supplies and taken care of.<sup>604</sup>

## The slaying of Shawar

As for Shawar, he did not express what he was thinking. He delayed giving to Asad ad-Deen the money and soldiers' salaries he had promised him, and he resolved to betray him too. He decided to offer a feast for Asad ad-Deen and his commanders, then betray them and kill them, but his son al-Kamil told him not to do that, and said to him, "By Allah, if you resolve to do that, I will inform Asad ad-Deen." His father said to him, "By Allah, if I do not do that, we will all be killed." He said, "That's right, but to be killed when we are Muslims and the land is in Muslim hands is better than to be killed when the Franks have taken over. There is nothing standing between you and the return of the Franks except their hearing of the arrest of Shirkuh.

Then, if al-'Adid turns to Noor ad-Deen for help, he will not send him a single horseman, and they (the Franks) will take over the land." So Shawar gave up the idea he was thinking of.<sup>605</sup>

Finally, Salah ad-Deen and some of the other emirs decided to get rid of the deceitful traitor Shawar, so they took him captive. Al-'Adid heard of that and sent word to Shirkuh asking for his head. Asad ad-Deen gave permission to kill him, so he was killed and his head was sent to al-'Adid on 17<sup>th</sup> Rabee' ath-Thani 643 AH.<sup>606</sup>

## Asad ad-Deen becomes al-'Adid's vizier

Asad ad-Deen entered Cairo and went to the palace of al-'Adid, who bestowed upon him the position of vizier and the title of al-Malik al-Mansoor and Ameer al-Juyoosh. He appointed officials from among those whom he trusted and allocated land to his troops. The poets praised Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh for the victories he had achieved.

## Death of Asad ad-Deen

But Shirkuh's viziiership did not last long, as he died on 22<sup>nd</sup> Jumada 11/564 AH. So his time as vizier lasted only two months and five days. May Allah have mercy on him. He was succeeded as vizier by his nephew Salah ad-Deen.<sup>607</sup> Asad ad-Deen was one of the greatest commanders of Noor ad-Deen, who was saving him for the next step for which he was paving the way, which was incorporating Egypt into Syria. He (may Allah have mercy on him) was generous to his troops but also strict; he knew how to bring about order. So his troops respected and loved him, and they engaged in dangerous missions with him during important campaigns. Allah benefited Islam and the Muslims through him, and he contributed to the resistance movement against the Crusaders which was led by Noor ad-Deen then after him by Salah ad-Deen. Shirkuh was brave, brilliant, strong, patient for the sake of Allah, and harsh towards the disbelievers; he did great acts of worship for the sake of Allah; he was chaste, religiously devoted, did many good deeds, loved the people of religion and knowledge, very selfless, compassionate towards his relatives and family, but somewhat cautious in spending. He left behind a great deal of wealth and he left behind a large

number of horses, mounts and camels. He also left behind five hundred Mamelukes,<sup>609</sup> the Asadis who played a role in building the Ayubid state.<sup>610</sup>

## Salah ad-Deen as Vizier in Egypt

Salah ad-Deen had demonstrated his capability during the time spent with his uncle, Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh, during his campaigns against Egypt, and he became vizier at the age of thirty-one, after his uncle died. Al-'Adid chose him because he was the youngest of the emirs, and he hoped that he would be more obedient to him, but al-Malik an-Nasir (the Victorious King) — which is the title that al-'Adid bestowed on Salah ad-Deen — dashed the hopes of the Fatimids, and the people's hearts began to incline towards him as he spent on them from the wealth that his uncle had acquired. The people inclined towards him and loved him, and he had full control over his troops.<sup>611</sup> The missions achieved by Salah ad-Deen at the time of Noor ad-Deen were immense, and he managed to put an end to the centres of power.

## The conspiracy of the Caliph's confidant

There were many incidents in Egypt following Salah ad-Deen's appointment to the position of vizier, when the country was going through a dangerous stage of its history. The Fatimid state still existed, supported by the Fatimid army and senior men of state. The Crusader menace still lay in wait near the eastern gates of Egypt. Salah ad-Deen had to reinforce his position in authority so that he could focus on confronting any political developments that might arise. He soon demonstrated great capability in running the affairs of the state. It seems that he was determined to keep for himself all other kinds of authority, even those that were connected to the position of caliph, and he implemented many measures that guaranteed him full control, including:

- a) Causing the hearts of the Egyptian population to incline towards him by means of the money that he spent on them, so they loved him.
- b) Subjugating Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh's Mamelukes to his authority, and taking full control of the troops after treating them well.

c) Strengthening his position by means of the military help supplied to him by Noor ad-Deen Mahmood. His brother Shams ad-Dawlah Turanshah ibn Ayub arrived with some of these military reinforcements.<sup>612</sup>

The arrangements that Salah ad-Deen made led to him tightening his grip on the affairs of the state, and further weakened al-'Adid's authority, thus undermining the position of the caliph and disappointing Kabeer at-Tawashiyah (the chief eunuch), the caliph's confidant, who was a Nubian and commander of the Sudanese troops. He realized that Salah ad-Deen's policy in ruling, if it continued, was going to destroy the Fatimid state sooner or later, and it seems that he was one of those who had hoped to take over Shawar's position. When he did not succeed in doing so, he started plotting to topple Salah ad-Deen. He tried to make contact with Amalric I, King of Jerusalem, to incite him to attack Egypt in the hope that if he responded, Salah ad-Deen would go out to confront him, and he would be able to capture those of his companions whom he left behind in Cairo, gain the position of vizier and share the country with the Crusaders. But Salah ad-Deen learned of the conspiracy when one of his followers became suspicious about the shape of the shoes worn by the messenger of the caliph's confidant to Amalric I. He took the shoes, undid their stitching, and found a letter inside.

So Salah ad-Deen arrested the caliph's confidant and took this opportunity to get rid of him. But the news that Salah ad-Deen's position in Egypt had been shaken encouraged the Christians to try again to attack the country.<sup>613</sup> Salah ad-Deen fired all the Sudanese servants from the caliph's palace and appointed Baha' ad-Deen Qaraqoosh in charge of everyone in the palace, so that nothing happened in the palace, major or minor, without his command.<sup>614</sup>

## The battle with the Sudanese troops

When at-Tawashi,<sup>615</sup> the caliph's confidant and Abyssinian servant, was killed and the other servants were dismissed, their Sudanese compatriots became angry, and nearly fifty thousand of them gathered and fought with the army of Salah ad-Deen, in between the two palaces. Large numbers on both sides were killed. Al-'Adid watched the battle from the palace, and the Syrian army was struck with stones and arrows coming from the direction of

his palace. It was said that this happened on al-'Adid's orders, and it was said that this was not the case. Then Salah ad-Deen's brother, Shams al-Dawlah Turanshah — who had come to fight and had been sent by Noor ad-Deen to help and support his brother — ordered that al-'Adid's balcony be burned. Then the door was opened and a voice called out: Ameer al-Mu'mineen commands you to expel these Sudanese people from among you, and from your land. The morale of the Syrians was strengthened whilst the resolve of the Sudanese troops grew very weak. Salah ad-Deen sent troops to their place, which was known as al-Mansoorah, where they had their houses and families, near Bab Zuwaylah, and burned it. At that point they turned and fled, with swords hitting them from all directions, and many of them were killed. Then they asked Salah ad-Deen for protection and he granted it to them, and banished them to Giza. Then Shams al-Dawlah Turanshah, the brother of Salah ad-Deen, went out to them and killed most of them, and only a few of them were left.

Those are their houses, desolate because of the wrong they had done  
*(Qur'an 27: 52)*

It seems that the Fatimid ruler of Egypt at that time, al-'Adid, was aware of the conspiracy of the caliph's confidant, because it is impossible to imagine all of that happening in his palace without his knowledge. This is supported by the fact that as they were trying to eliminate the conspirators, Salah ad-Deen's troops were exposed to attacks with stones and arrows coming from the direction of the ruler's palace and, indeed, al-'Adid watched the battle from the palace.<sup>616</sup>

Discovery of the conspiracy was the responsibility of the intelligence department, and specifically of al-Qadi al-Fadil, who was the brains behind the demise of Fatimid influence in Egypt and the establishment of the Sunni madh-hab. We will discuss him in detail insha' Allah when we discuss the Ayubid state. Al-Qadi al-Fadil was watching the scribes of the intelligence department, especially those among them who had been laid off.

Spies were everywhere, in the palaces, among the troops, along the border, at every stage along the roads, watching communications between Egypt and the Franks. These spies were in direct contact with al-Qadi al-Fadil, sending him reports via messengers and carrier pigeons.<sup>617</sup>

## Dealing with the Armenians

But Salah ad-Deen's victory did not stop with his putting an end to the Sudanese troops' influence; rather he followed that by putting an end to the Armenians' influence too. They were second to the Sudanese in strength and numbers. He burned the Armenian houses between the two palaces, where there was a large number of Armenian troops, most of whom were archers who had salaries from the government. They had tried to block Salah ad-Deen's forces during the battle with the Sudanese by shooting arrows, so they now got their just desserts. Salah ad-Deen banished those of them who were left to Upper Egypt.<sup>618</sup> By putting an end to the influence of the Sudanese and the Armenians, Salah ad-Deen weakened the Fatimid state to a large extent, and it became clear that the end of the Fatimid state itself was not far off.<sup>619</sup>

## Salah ad-Deen strengthens his army

As soon as he became vizier, Salah ad-Deen started working to prepare an Ayubid army to form the core of a new Egyptian army, to defend his rule and to defend Egypt from Frankish attacks. He was well aware of the deterioration of the Fatimid army, because he had learned a great deal through his three trips to Egypt between 559 and 564 AH (1163 and 1168 CE). He learned a great deal about the Fatimid army in terms of its human, financial and military resources, and the way in which it was organized and how its battalions were formed on the basis of ethnicity, such as the Sudanese, the Armenians, the Egyptians, the Daylam, the Turks and the Bedouins, and he knew in great detail about each of these battalions.<sup>620</sup> Al-Qadi al-Fadil had worked in the administration of these forces at the time of Ruzayk ibn al-Salih, and he had participated with them in some battles during the second Frankish campaign against Egypt, as we referred to above. He saw the leaders of these various groups within the forces competing for power, which explains the deterioration of the troops and the weakening of Egypt to the point where it became unable to defend its independence or even to survive. Al-Qadi al-Fadil learned a great deal about the Egyptian troops through his work with them in the military department and the intelligence department which worked with the military department and was in charge of

spies and messengers. He had a deep knowledge of these forces and their inner workings, and he knew each battalion among them and the intentions of each commander. He did not withhold any of this information from Salah ad-Deen, rather he advised him how to organize and run his Ayubid army. During the time he spent with Salah ad-Deen, he was supervising his troops, keeping an eye on them, organizing them and their financial resources, accompanying them from Egypt to Syria to fight alongside Salah ad-Deen and then from Syria to Egypt in order to prepare for future campaigns against the Franks. At the beginning of his period as vizier, Salah ad-Deen established a huge army which increased in numbers and resources with the passage of time and broadened its war efforts against the Franks. The main element of this army in Egypt was the elite guard and the regular army in Egypt, then the popular army which was composed of feudal emirs and their troops, and the Bedouin, especially in Syria and Mesopotamia after 570 AH/1174 CE. This will be discussed in detail insha' Allah when we look at the Ayubid state and Salah ad-Deen.

## **Confronting the joint Crusader-Byzantine attack: the siege of Damietta (565 AH/1170 CE)**

The Franks realized the seriousness of their situation after the conquest of Egypt and after Salah ad-Deen became the vizier of that land. The king of Jerusalem, Amalric, agreed with the Byzantine Emperor to attack Egypt using their fleets, and to besiege Damietta in accordance with that agreement.<sup>621</sup> Salah ad-Deen sent his forces, led by his maternal uncle Shihab ad-Deen Mahmood and his nephew Taqi ad-Deen 'Umar. He also sent word to Noor ad-Deen, expressing his concerns, saying:

"If I do not go to Damietta, the Franks will take it over, but if I go the Egyptians will take advantage and spread mischief; they will rebel against me and pursue me, and with the Franks ahead of me we will be utterly destroyed."<sup>622</sup>

Noor ad-Deen played the role that was expected of him; he took a sound decision and sent troops to Salah ad-Deen, then he went himself to the Frankish territory in Greater Syria and launched raids against the Frankish fortresses and citadels, and his troops reached a point that they had never



reached before in their land, so as to reduce the pressure against Egypt and support Salah ad-Deen, thus enabling him to gain a tight grip on Egypt, after which he would be free to help in achieving the greater strategic goal of liberating the Greater Syrian coast from Frankish occupation.<sup>623</sup> The garrison of Damietta played a heroic role in defending the city. They spread huge chains across the river to prevent the Greek ships from approaching, and the Muslims who were defending the city inflicted huge casualties on the Greek-Byzantine fleet. Heavy rain turned the Crusader camp into a swamp, so they prepared themselves and left after a siege of fifty days. When the Byzantine fleet sailed off, a violent storm came and the navy that was half-dead from starvation could not control their ships, so most of them drowned, and Allah granted the Muslims a decisive victory.<sup>624</sup>

## Reasons for the failure of the campaign against Damietta

The failure of the Byzantine-Crusader attack against Damietta was due to a number of factors connected to the Muslims, Crusaders and Byzantines, and to both the Crusaders and Byzantines as a combined force.

### Factors affecting the Muslims

- ❖ Perseverance of the inhabitants of Damietta in withstanding the aggressors.
- ❖ Salah ad-Deen's swiftness in supplying the city with food and weapons, which raised the morale of its inhabitants.
- ❖ Sincere cooperation between the Muslim forces in both Syria and Egypt, with the aim of resisting the aggressors.
- ❖ The fighting skills, good planning and precise organization of the Muslim forces.<sup>625</sup>
- ❖ The supportive attitude of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood, who sent many delegations one after another, then Noor ad-Deen took advantage of the Franks' absence from their land to head towards them with his huge army, who wreaked havoc in their land, seizing their wealth as booty, killing many of their men and taking many of their women and children captive. When news reached the Franks in Damietta of what Noor ad-Deen had done, they

had no choice but to leave Damietta.<sup>626</sup> The Muslims making good use of the opportunities that were available to them. They took advantage of the fact that the Byzantines were suffering starvation and launched attacks against them that proved effective. They also took advantage of the wind blowing from the south to set fire to the Byzantine fleet.<sup>627</sup> More important than all of that was the help and protection of Allah, Who was with them and bestowed His support upon His fighting slaves.

### Factors affecting the Crusaders

- ❖ King Amalric I delayed his attack on the city for three days, until the Byzantine fleet arrived, which gave the Muslims ample opportunity to fortify the city and bring in men and supplies.<sup>628</sup>
- ❖ The Crusader forces failed to supply the Byzantine forces with food when they were exposed to Muslim attacks, during which they stood watching and waiting.<sup>629</sup>

### Factors affecting the Byzantines

- ❖ The commander Contostefanos did not make proper military use of the Byzantine fleet. It seems that he knew how to lead on land but not at sea.
- ❖ The role of the Byzantine fleet was limited to transferring troops to the coast of Damietta.
- ❖ The Byzantine commander was lacking in sound military skills, as he left the Byzantine ships next to one another in the Nile, which made it easy for the Muslim forces to set fire to a number of them.
- ❖ The Byzantine commanders' negligence in applying military principles which would have guaranteed the safety of their ships when their crews stayed away from the ships overnight during the days of military operations.
- ❖ Starvation in the Byzantine ranks.

## Factors common to both the Crusaders and Byzantines

- ❖ Bad timing for the campaign to set out and lay siege, as both occurred during the winter, when the allied forces were exposed to floods which swamped their camp and storms which pushed the fleet away from the shore.
- ❖ Poor choice of location for the joint forces' camps, which was a region stretching along the shore for a distance of one mile. This area could not contain all the forces of the expedition who numbered fifty thousand. They were crowded into this narrow area and had no freedom to move and spread out in order to start a successful battle.
- ❖ Poor choice of location in which the allied forces became easy targets for the arrows of the Muslim archers.
- ❖ Lack of unified leadership and lack of coordination between the Crusader and Byzantine commanders, which led to the failure of their attacks on the city and the spread of rumours within their camps, in which each side accused the other of being the cause of the campaign's failure.<sup>630</sup>

## Outcomes of the attack on Damietta

After the failure of the joint Crusader-Byzantine attack on Damietta, this incident became an important turning point in the history of the Near East, because if the Christian alliance had succeeded in achieving its goals, it would have been possible to prevent the union of Syria and Egypt, which formed a direct threat to the Crusader locations in Greater Syria, and it would have placed an obstacle in the way of Muslim efforts to resist the Crusaders and kick them out of the region.

The failure of this Christian campaign is also regarded as an important turning point for the future of Salah ad-Deen, who emerged as capable of defending Egypt and convinced the dwindling Fatimid state that he was capable of defending the land against the attacks of aggressors as well as defending it against the plots of conspirators. Thus he gained the admiration of many.

The Muslims started to threaten the Crusader principalities directly, as the Crusaders began to see an increase in Muslim pressure day after day.

After having focused their attention on the threat of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood in the north, they started to split their forces between the north and the south, to confront both Noor ad-Deen Mahmood and Salah ad-Deen.<sup>631</sup>

Salah ad-Deen's appointment as vizier marked the beginning of the end for the Fatimid state. The defeat of the Christians at Damietta was another nail in the coffin of this state, as the caliph al-'Adid was hoping to escape the influence of Salah ad-Deen, but the deterioration in which his state ended up dashed his hopes and gave Salah ad-Deen the opportunity to be in sole authority in Egypt and to focus his attention on weakening the Shiite Ismaili madh-hab. Thus the Fatimid state lost its last hope of freeing itself from his strong grasp, and he became the sole master of Egypt, with no contender.<sup>632</sup>

## Najm ad-Deen Ayub arrives in Egypt

Salah ad-Deen asked Noor ad-Deen to send his father to him, and Noor ad-Deen agreed to do so. He asked Najm ad-Deen Ayub to make preparations to travel to Egypt, and he gave him a message to take to Salah ad-Deen, telling him to hasten to wipe out the Fatimid caliphate and to ensure that the Jumu'ah khutbahs were delivered in the name of the Abbasid caliph.<sup>633</sup> The caravan in which Najm ad-Deen Ayub set out also contained a large number of merchants and others who had interests in Egypt. Noor ad-Deen feared that the Franks might attack the caravan, so he marched with his army to al-Karak and besieged it, until he was reassured that the caravan had passed the danger zone, then he left it and went back to Damascus.<sup>634</sup> The father of Salah ad-Deen, Najm ad-Deen Ayub, reached Cairo on 24 Rajab 565 AH, and al-'Adid, the one who dwelt in this palace, went out to meet him, welcoming him with a great show of respect. Ayub's meeting with his son Salah ad-Deen Yoosuf was akin to Ya'qoob's meeting with his son Yoosuf (peace be upon them), when he came to his son in Egypt and found him in charge of the country, and Yoosuf said:

‘Enter Egypt, Allah willing, safe [and secure].)’

(*Qur'an 12: 99*)

When his son al-Malik an-Nasir Salah ad-Deen and the caliph al-'Adid came out to meet him, some of the reciters recited:

‘And he raised his parents upon the throne, and they bowed to him in prostration. And he said: ‘O my father! This is the explanation of my vision of before!’  
(*Qur'an 12: 100*)

When Salah ad-Deen met his father, he observed the usual etiquette and delegated all affairs to him, but his father refused that and said, "O my son, Allah has chosen no one but you for this role, and you are fit for it, so you should not change the causes of happiness." He put him in full control of the storehouses and accommodated him in the palace of al-Lu'lu'ah, which overlooks Khaleej al-Qahirah.<sup>636</sup>

It was narrated that when Salah ad-Deen met his father in the vizier's palace, they sat down upon a single carpet and Najm ad-Deen said that Salah ad-Deen was born on the night when he was expelled from the citadel of Tikrit. He said:

I felt pessimistic about him and thought that he brought bad luck because of what happened to me. I had a Christian scribe with me and he said: 'O my master, who knows? Perhaps this child will be a great king with a great reputation and greatly respected.' His words made me feel compassionate towards the child. And everyone was impressed by this coincidence. May Allah have mercy on them all.<sup>637</sup>

Najm ad-Deen Ayub died in 568 AH. He was riding and his horse threw him, in Cairo at Bab an-Nasr, on Monday 18 Dhul-Hijjah. He was carried to his home and lived for eight days and he died on Tuesday 27 Dhul-Hijjah. He was noble, merciful, compassionate and forbearing; there were always crowds of people at his door, and he would always spend all that he had because he was very generous.<sup>638</sup> Najm ad-Deen was held in high esteem by the people because of his religious commitment and his good attitude and conduct and his good manners. He never heard of any man of knowledge or religious commitment in the vicinity but he would give him money and hospitality. He never heard of anyone who was religiously committed in a city but he would send for him.<sup>639</sup> Salah ad-Deen was absent on a campaign in the Levant when his father died. Najm ad-Deen was buried beside the grave of his brother Asad ad-Deen in the sultan's palace, then several years later they were both moved to Madinah, the city of the (Messenger (SAAW)). Their graves are in the graveyard of the vizier Jamal ad-Deen al-Isfahani, the

vizier of Mosul. Najm ad-Deen was eulogized in verse by 'Amarah al-Yamani.

Najm ad-Deen was survived by his sons, Salah ad-Deen Yoosuf al-Nasir, Sayf ad-Deen Abu Bakr al-'Adil, Shams ad-Dawlah Turanshah, Shahinshah, Sayf al-Islam Tughtigin and Taj al-Mulook Boori; and by his daughters Sitt ash-Sham and Rabee'ah Khatoon.<sup>641</sup>

## Abolition of the 'Ubaydi Fatimid caliphate

This step is regarded as one of the most important missions achieved by Salah ad-Deen. Noor ad-Deen was very keen to put an end to this dynasty, so he wrote to his deputy Salah ad-Deen, ordering him to give Friday khutbahs in the name of the Abbasid caliph al-Mustadi'. Salah ad-Deen excused himself from doing so, for fear that the people of Egypt might turn against him because of their inclination towards the Fatimids, and because he was not yet ready to do that. But Noor ad-Deen sent word to his deputy obliging him to do that in no uncertain terms. The Abbasid caliph had sent word to Noor ad-Deen rebuking him for the delay in promoting his cause in Egypt. He summoned al-Malik al-'Adil Najm ad-Deen Ayub and gave him a message which said:

This is a command which must be implemented immediately, so that we may attain this great virtue and noble task before death comes and we miss out on rewards, especially when the caliph of our era — al-Mustanjid — has pinned great hopes on it and it is one of his most important wishes.<sup>642</sup>

Salah ad-Deen was anxious and hesitant to bring about the downfall of that caliphate, because the 'Ubaydi legacy in Egypt had lasted for more than two hundred years. But Noor ad-Deen regarded the conquest of Egypt as a blessing from Allah for him and the Muslims, for the sake of uniting the land on the way of Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah and removing innovation (bid'ah) and Shiism (al-rafd).<sup>643</sup> Noor ad-Deen understood Salah ad-Deen's situation and he addressed him as an emir. If he had wanted to, he could have sent a letter dismissing him from his post in Egypt and appointing him elsewhere. This is what Najm ad-Deen stated frankly to his son Salah ad-Deen in Egypt, "If he wanted to he could dismiss you... He could send a letter with the camel-driver to summon you and appoint over this land whoever he

wanted."<sup>644</sup> Among the signs of the respect that Noor ad-Deen had for Salah ad-Deen is what he said in his letter to Ibn Abi <sup>4</sup> Asroon, appointing him as qadi (judge) of Egypt, in which he said: Come, you and your sons, so that I might send you to Egypt, with the consent and approval of my companion Salah ad-Deen, may Allah support him, for I am very, very, very grateful to him. May Allah reward him and preserve him among the righteous and good.<sup>645</sup> In fact the relationship between the two leaders was one of mutual respect. We will discuss their relationship below insha' Allah, and refute those writers who narrated the words of Ibn Abi Tayyi' ar-Rafidi who was keen to distort and misrepresent the relationship between the two men and slander them as much as possible.

## Phasing out sermons in the name of the Fatimid caliph

Salah ad-Deen benefited from this great and brilliant judge, who helped him to draw up a well-drawn plan to put an end to the Fatimid state and the Ismaili Rafidi Shiite madh-hab. Salah ad-Deen started to implement the plan very carefully. After he had prepared the Egyptians for this coup and taken power away from the Fatimid institution, he dismissed the Shiite qadis, banned the propagation of Shiite ideas and removed all Shiite symbols and principles. In 565 AH/1169 CE, he banned the adhan containing the words "*Hayya 'aid khayr il- 'amal, Muhammad wa 'Ali khayr al-bashar* (come to the best of deeds; Muhammad (SAAW) and 'Ali are the best of mankind)". Al-Maqreezi commented that this was the first step towards abolishing the state.<sup>646</sup> Then after that, on Friday 10 Dhul-Hijjah 565 AH/1169-1170 CE, he ordered that mention be made in the khutbah of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman and 'Ali. After that he ordered that al-'Adid be mentioned in the khutbah in ambiguous terms, so as to confuse the Shiites and not provoke them. So the khateeb would say, "O Allah, guide the supporter (al-'Adid) to Your religion."<sup>647</sup> He appointed as qadi of Cairo the Sunni *faqeeh* 'Eesa al-Hakari, and he appointed Shafi'i judges throughout the land, and established schools to teach the Sunni madh-habs. At the same time, he was tightening his grip on al-'Adid: he cancelled his privileges, deprived him of money, horses and slaves, and banned the pomp and ceremonies of the caliphate, meaning the official celebrations that were held on Eids and other occasions. He detained the caliph in his palace and did not

allow him to leave except on rare occasions, such as when he went out to welcome Najm ad-Deen Ayub, the father of Salah ad-Deen, on the day he came to Cairo. He implemented the same plan with regard to the army commanders; he started to limit their power gradually, until he arrested them all on a single night, and allocated their houses and lands to his 648 companions.

Al-'Adid watched all of that with a heavy heart filled with despair after all the hopes that he wished Salah ad-Deen would fulfil for him were dashed. He retreated into his room and fell prey to worries and sickness.<sup>649</sup> Salah ad-Deen realized that the opportunity had come to put an end to the dying Fatimid state, so he held a great council that was attended by the commanders of his army, the Sunni fuqaha' and the Sufis. He asked for their opinions and advice, and they were all agreed that he should take this decisive step in the country's life.<sup>650</sup> At the beginning of 567 AH/1171-1172 CE, Salah ad-Deen issued orders stopping the khutbahs in the name of the Fatimids. This was also done gradually. On the first Friday of Muharram 567 AH/1171-1172 CE, the name of al-'Adid was omitted from the khutbah. On the second Friday, the khutbah was given in the name of the caliph al-Mustadi' bi Amr-Illah Abu Muhammad al-Hasan ibn al-Mustanjid Billah, and khutbahs were no longer given in the name of al-'Adid li Deen-Illah; khutbahs were no longer given in the name of the Fatimids and that has remained the case until today.<sup>651</sup> It may be noted that khutbahs in the name of the Abbasids were given in Alexandria two weeks before Cairo and the rest of Egypt. That is because Alexandria remained Sunni throughout the Fatimid era.<sup>652</sup> Al-'Adid died on 10 Muharram 567 AH/1171-1172 CE.<sup>653</sup> It was said that Salah ad-Deen was told of al-'Adid's death a few days later, and he regretted having hastened to stop the khutbahs being given in his name. He said that if he had known that he — meaning al-'Adid — would die within a few days, he would not have omitted his name from the khutbahs. Al-Qadi al-Fadil laughed and replied, "O my master, if he knew that you would not erase his name from the khutbahs, he would not have died!"<sup>654</sup> Everyone present smiled at this word play between the vizier Salah ad-Deen and his scribe and adviser, which concluded the final page of the history of the 'Ubaydi Fatimid state.<sup>655</sup>



## The death of al-'Adid 567 AH/1171 CE

Ibn Katheer said:

Al-'Adid in Arabic means 'the chopper'. The Messenger of Allah (SAAW) said concerning Makkah: 'Its trees are not to be chopped down (*la yu'dad*)' i.e., they are not to be cut down, and with him their state was cut off. His name was 'Abd-Allah and his kunyah was Abu Muhammad ibn Yoosuf al-Hafiz ibn Muhammad ibn al-Mustansir ibn adh-Dhahir ibn al-Hakim ibn al-'Azeez ibn al-Mu'izz ibn al-Mansoor ibn al-Qa'im ibn al-Mahdi, and al-Mahdi was the first of their kings. Al-'Adid was born in 546 AH and lived for twenty-one years. His attitude and conduct were bad. He was an evil Shiite and if it had been possible for him to kill everyone he could of Ahl as-Sunnah, he would have done so.<sup>656</sup>

## Muslims rejoicing at the end of the Fatimid state

When news reached the king Noor ad-Deen in Syria, he sent word to the Abbasid caliph with Ibn Abi 'Asroon, telling him of that. Baghdad was decorated, its gates were locked, tents were set up and the Muslims rejoiced greatly, sermons in the name of the Abbasids had ceased in Egypt in 359 AH, during the caliphate of the Abbasid al-Mutee', when the Fatimids took control during the days of the Fatimid caliph al-Mu'izz, the builder of Cairo, until this day, two hundred and eighty years later.<sup>657</sup> The poets reacted to this momentous event that had reverberations throughout the world. Al-Imad al-Isfahani said in verse:

*Al-'Adid the impostor has died and no man of  
innovation can open his mouth in Egypt.  
The age of the pharaoh has ended and  
its Joseph is now in control of its affairs.  
The burning coal of the misguided has been extinguished  
And all the fires of shirk have been put out...<sup>658</sup>*

Noor ad-Deen Mahmood thought that eliminating the Fatimid state was a strategic step towards putting an end to the Christian (Crusader) presence and Batini influence in Syria. Hence he was keen to restore Egypt to

true Islamic rule. He set out the necessary plans, prepared the necessary armies and appointed commanders with the right qualifications, and Allah granted him what he wanted to achieve at the hands of his sincere soldier and trustworthy commander Salah ad-Deen, who implemented the wise policies of Noor ad-Deen. The Muslim Ummah and its leaders had the right to rejoice at this great news of the fall of the Batini state.

## Lessons from the fall of the Fatimid state in Egypt

The Fatimid state lasted for a little more than two hundred and eighty years, then became a thing of the past, as if they had never dwelt or flourished there. The first of their rulers was al-Mahdi, who was one of the people of as-Salamiyah; he was a blacksmith whose name was Sa'eed, and he was a Jew. He went to the Maghreb and called himself 'Ubayd-Allah, and claimed to be a descendant of the Messenger (SAAW) through 'Ali and Fatimah, and he said that he was the Mahdi. This was mentioned by more than one of the prominent scholars, such as al-Qadi Abu Bakr al-Baqillani, Shaykh Abu Hamid al-Isfarayeeni and others. The point is that the fabrications of this impostor and liar found a receptive audience in that land and he was supported by a group of ignorant ascetics and he gained power and authority. He managed to build his city, which he called al-Mahdiyyah, after himself, and he became a king who made an outward display of being Rafidi but inwardly it was pure disbelief. He was succeeded by his son al-Qa'im, then came al-Mansoor, then al-Mu'izz — who was the first of them to enter Egypt and for whom Cairo was built — then al-'Azeez, then al-Hakim, then adh-Dhahir, then al-Mustansir, then al-Musta'li, then al-Amir, then al-Hafiz, then adh-Dhafir, then al-Fa'iz, then al-'Adid, who was the last of them. There were fourteen kings in total whose dynasty lasted for approximately two hundred and ninety years. The Fatimids were the richest and wealthiest of caliphs, and the most tyrannical and oppressive, the worst of kings in conduct and the most inwardly evil. Innovations and evils appeared during their rule, the numbers of evil people became greater and the numbers of righteous people, scholars and ascetics declined. The numbers of Druze, Nusayris and Assassins in Greater Syria increased, and the Franks took over the entire coast of Greater Syria, capturing Jerusalem, Nablus, 'Ajloun, al-Ghawr, Gaza, Ascalon, Crac de Montreal (Shawbak), Tiberias, Baniyas,

Tyre, 'Ashleeth, Sidon, Beirut, Acre, Safad, Tripoli, Antioch and all the land connected to these cities, as far as Ayas<sup>659</sup> and Sis<sup>660</sup>. They gained control of Amid, Edessa, Ra's al-'Ayn and other cities; they killed only Allah knows how many people and captured unlimited numbers of Muslim women and children. They almost took over Damascus, but Allah protected it and saved its people. When their power waned, Allah restored the land to the prominent Muslims among its people. Allah humiliated the disbelievers and will cast them into Hell on the Day of Judgement because of what they earned in this world.<sup>661</sup>

## Attempted revolt aimed at restoring the Fatimid state

At that time, the state and society in Egypt was undergoing major historical changes which affected its caliphate, systems, institutions and the men who had ruled it and influenced every aspect of its society for more than two centuries. Now there was a new rule, a new state, with its own systems, institutions and men in charge. It started with a gradual change. Salah ad-Deen tried to win over the common people, and succeeded to a large extent, but some thinkers and officials of the Fatimid state, and some groups who had lost their influence and privileges remained loyal to the ideas represented by the former state.<sup>662</sup> These forces who were loyal to the Fatimids, composed of soldiers, commanders, scribes, court officials and the families of previous viziers, such as Banu Ruzayk and Banu Shawar, started planning to put an end to the rule of Salah ad-Deen and restore the Fatimid state.<sup>663</sup>

Imad ad-Deen al-Isfahani described them as follows: A group of supporters of the fanatical, rigid state came together and consulted and met one another in secret, hoping for something that led to their doom. They appointed a caliph and a vizier, and drew up a precise plan, which they kept secret.<sup>664</sup> It seems that their conspiracy was well organized, as they appointed a caliph and a vizier, then they wrote to the Franks more than once, calling on them to invade Egypt at a time when Salah ad-Deen was away in Kerak. They rallied around 'Amarah al-Yamani, the faqeeh and man of letters who was a Sunni but loyal to the Fatimids; he took on this mission of corresponding with the Franks. The conspirators thought that their completely secret plan would lead to success, but they did not realize that

through intelligence reports, al-Qadi Fadil was watching them very closely until the right time came to expose their secrets. The sources tell two stories about the uncovering of the conspiracy that differ somewhat in their details. The first version states that one of the scribes in the court, whose name was 'Abd as-Samad al-Katib, showed a great deal of humility to al-Fadil; he served him and tried to draw close to him, and went to extremes in showing humility towards him. He met him one day and he did not pay any attention to him. Al-Qadi al-Fadil thought that there must be a reason for this, and he was afraid that he had some private connection with Salah ad-Deen. He summoned Ibn Naja, the preacher, and told him about the situation, and he asked him to find out what was going on, but he could not find anything out from Salah ad-Deen's side. So he went to the other side and found out what was going on. Al-Qadi al-Fadil sent him to Salah ad-Deen, telling him, "Go now to Salah ad-Deen and tell him what is happening." So he went to Salah ad-Deen, who was in the mosque, and told him what was going on, at which point Salah ad-Deen summoned them and interrogated them. They confessed to their conspiracy, so he had them arrested and ordered that they be crucified.<sup>665</sup> The second report suggests that the preacher Zayn ad-Deen ibn Naja was actually one of the conspirators, and he appeared to support them in the beginning, then he informed Salah ad-Deen about what they were doing and asked him to give him wealth equivalent to that of Ibn Kamil. Salah ad-Deen agreed and told him to mix with them and find out more about them. So he started to tell him the latest news of them. Then an envoy from the Franks came to Salah ad-Deen with a gift and an open letter, and also a secret letter for the conspirators, and news of that reached Salah ad-Deen.<sup>666</sup> Al-Qadi al-Fadil himself referred to the details of this conspiracy in a letter that he wrote on behalf of Salah ad-Deen to Noor ad-Deen in Damascus, which indicates that he was well informed about the conspiracy and that he played a part in causing it to fail. Perhaps he is the one who planted an informer to tell him the details of the conspiracy, as he indicates in his letter to the spies of the Egyptian intelligence department among the Franks and others who were in touch with the department.<sup>667</sup>

In the letter that was written with the pen of al-Qadi al-Fadil from Salah ad-Deen to Noor ad-Deen after the completion of the investigations carried out by Salah ad-Deen, the beginnings and development of the conspiracy are highlighted with comprehensive focus, as is the way it was

discovered and the crucifixion of the leading conspirators in front of their homes.<sup>668</sup>

1- Salah ad-Deen still, after he put an end to the Fatimid caliphate, regarded the Egyptian soldiers and the inhabitants and workers of the Fatimid palace as enemies of his state and opponents of his presence in Egypt, and he expected them to take action against him. Hence he was very cautious with them and sent spies and men whom he trusted to keep an eye on them at all times. Despite that their activity continued in secret, using all available means.

2- From the time when khutbahs began to be delivered in the name of the Abbasid caliphate until they were caught, not one month went by when they did not plot, hold meetings and send envoys to the Crusaders to obtain their support. "What gave them the greatest comfort and hope was the ongoing correspondence with the Franks, with which they tried to entice them with the hoped-for gains and encourage them to march."<sup>669</sup> But the Franks did not respond at first, because they were afraid of Salah ad-Deen, but at the same time they promised that they would help when the time was right.

3- Matters reached a point where they wrote to the Crusader king, when Salah ad-Deen launched his second attack against Kerak and Shawbak with a large number of his forces, asking him to play the agreed-upon role. They said in their letter: "He is far away and the opportunity has come. If Amalric comes with his forces to Tyre or Aylah, he will be able to block the way for Salah ad-Deen and prevent him from returning. If you do that, the former courtesans in Cairo will revolt, along with all the former Fatimid troops in Egypt, the Sudanese troops, all the Armenians and all the Ismailis. They will kill the family of Salah ad-Deen and his supporters and the officials of his state."<sup>670</sup> But Salah ad-Deen was alert and the tactics and manoeuvres that he carried out confused Amalric, who was trying hard to find out about Salah ad-Deen's movements in the Naqab (Negev) in the south of Jordan, and made him unable to move from the waters of Carmel in the mountains of al-Khaleel, because he was afraid that Salah ad-Deen would take advantage of any wrong move on the king's part and head to the region west of the River Jordan and the Dead Sea.

**4-** The conspirators did not despair. When the so-called George (Georgios), the scribe of Amalric, reached Cairo with a letter to Salah ad-Deen — and it seems that letters were continually exchanged at times of peace — they (the conspirators) contacted him and sent a letter with him to King Amalric, saying: The troops are scattered in the allocated pieces of land, and it is close to their harvest time; only a few of them are left in Cairo. If you sent the fleet close to the border region, that would make so-and-so leave him (leave Salah ad-Deen) and Salah ad-Deen would be alone in the land. Then we could do what we mentioned previously and stage a revolt.<sup>671</sup> This is a further indication that they were trying to take advantage of all appropriate circumstances. The time of harvesting the crops from the land was the time when the commanders who owned land and their troops would go to their land to take their share of the harvest and distribute it. This was a regular situation that was well known in the history of that region in the middle ages.<sup>672</sup>

**5-** Every time King Amalric wanted to find out about the situation in Egypt and contact and negotiate with the conspirators, he would send George as an envoy to Salah ad-Deen.

He was sent ostensibly to us but secretly to them, showing to us a friendly face that we never trusted, and discussing with them offers of help in doing evil of which we were always aware. The Fatimids and Egyptian troops at that time exchanged many messengers and letters with the Franks.<sup>673</sup>

**6-** Salah ad-Deen's policy during this period, if one of his helpers had some doubts about some group, was to arrest them, and if he could not prove anything at all against them, he would let them go, but this pardon only increased them in viciousness, and kind treatment only increased them in hardheartedness.<sup>674</sup>

**7-** At the same time, the conspirators made contact with Shaykh al-Jabal Sinan (the "Old Man of the Mountain"),<sup>675</sup> the leader of the Nizari Ismailis of Syria, seeking his help on the basis that their cause was the same and there should be unity, and that the differences between them should not cause division or make them refrain from supporting one another.<sup>676</sup> They asked him in particular to assassinate the "kings" as was their custom, or to plot against them. The messenger who went to them was the maternal uncle

of Ibn Qarjalah,<sup>677</sup> one of the former officials of the Fatimid state. It seems that both men were with Shaykh al-Jabal when the conspiracy was discovered, and they sought refuge with the Crusaders.<sup>678</sup>

**8-** We do not know whether the conspirators contacted the king of Sicily to send the fleet directly, or via the king of the Crusaders, but the fleet came to Alexandria after the conspiracy had failed; it was composed of 200 ships which were carrying a large number of cavalry and infantry, and was subjected to heavy losses, especially since King Amalric did not come by land as agreed because the conspirators had all been captured.<sup>679</sup>

**9-** On the final occasion, George brought a letter to the court of Salah ad-Deen and a letter came to the intelligence department, from a trusted Crusader source, mentioning that he (George) was a messenger of deceit and not a messenger of diplomacy. Salah ad-Deen's officials took the appropriate precautions and kept watch on him without him realizing, and without them making him feel that he was under any suspicion. George started contacting the group from the Fatimid palace, conspirators and commanders of the former Fatimid troops, and some of the Christians and Jews. Then the officials of Salah ad-Deen's state managed to plant a spy in their group, one of their sect who was an insider,<sup>680</sup> and he began to "transmit information to us about them and keep us up to date about their situation."<sup>681</sup>

**10-** Rumours began to spread among the people about the conspiracy and Salah ad-Deen's officials were worried that the matter would be discovered and the main players would flee, so they decided to arrest them. Then they were brought before Salah ad-Deen, one by one. He asked them to admit what they were doing, and they admitted it, giving as their excuse the fact that their provision had been stopped and their wealth taken away.<sup>682</sup>

**11-** It became clear — from investigations and confessions — that they had appointed a caliph and vizier, and that there was a dispute among them about the caliph and vizier (whether or not they should be from the family of Ruzayk or the family of Shawar).

**12-** Salah ad-Deen consulted the scholars about them, and they ruled that they should be executed. When Salah ad-Deen hesitated to carry out this ruling, the muftis and consultants asked him to hasten the execution. So he issued orders that they be killed and crucified, "so they were hung at the gates of their palaces and crucified on trees in front of their houses."<sup>683</sup>

Among the well known people who were executed were the poet 'Amarah ibn 'Ali al-Yamani, 'Abd as-Samad al-Katib, al-Qadi al-'Uwayris and the chief preacher Ibn 'Abd al-Qawy. Al-Qadi al-Fadil made a sincere effort to intercede with Salah ad-Deen for 'Amarah, despite the previous enmity that had existed between them, but 'Amarah thought it was a trick and refused to accept it, so he was crucified like the others.<sup>684</sup>

**13-** The people of the palace were arrested initially, then transferred to various locations, and he gave the palace to his brother al-'Adil. That was because Salah ad-Deen thought that "so long as they stayed there, the palace would become a symbol that raised their hopes and a focal point for the misguided, and a concealed place for swearing allegiance to innovation (bid'ah)."<sup>685</sup>

**14-** The Ismaili sect was banished from Egypt. As for the others involved, it was announced in Cairo that all the troops and courtesans of the palace and the Sudanese troops were to be exiled to the farthest region of Upper Egypt.<sup>686</sup>

**15-** Research and investigation into this issue has shown that there was a preacher called Qudayd al-Qaffas in Alexandria, where most of the population was Sunni. His call spread throughout Syria and Egypt; artisans and craftsmen at the border point of Alexandria took part of their earnings to him, and women sent some of their wealth to him.<sup>687</sup> Books and writings were found in his possession that were indicative of blatant disbelief.<sup>688</sup> Thus Salah ad-Deen — by the grace of Allah and then by virtue of his patience and strong leadership — was able to put an end to this conspiracy which finally prompted him to make a decisive move with regard to the remnants of the Fatimid state, namely the caliph's family, the senior officials, the courtesans and the Sudanese troops.<sup>689</sup>

## The poet 'Amarah ibn 'Ali al-Yamani

Adh-Dhahabi said concerning him that (his name was) Abu Muhammad 'Amarah ibn 'Ali ibn Zaydan al-Hakami al-Madhhabi al-Yamani ash-Shafi'i al-Fardi, the poet and author of the famous *Diwdn*. He was born in 515 AH and studied Islam in Zubayd for a while. He performed Hajj in 549 AH, and the emir of Makkah, Qasim ibn Faleetah, sent him as a messenger to al-Fa'iz in Egypt, whom he praised in verse. He had a clear and strong belief



in Abu Bakr and 'Umar, and 'Amarah narrated that Salih ibn Ruzayk debated with him and said, "What do you believe concerning Abu Bakr and 'Umar?" 'Amarah said, "I believe that were it not for them, there would be no Islam for us and for you, and that loving them is obligatory," and he laughed. He was kind and smart, and learned from the Sunni scholars. Adh-Dhahabi said, "This is a sign of patience on Salih's part, despite the fact that he was a Shiite."<sup>690</sup>

Ibn Wasil said concerning the reason for 'Amarah al-Yamani's loyalty to the Fatimids:

'Amarah ibn 'Ali al-Yamani was fanatically devoted to them, because he came to them from Yemen and they treated him well and gave him many gifts. So he never forgot that and tried to repay them. As they say, man is beholden to good treatment. He did not follow their madh-hab; rather he was a Shafi'i and Sunni. When their state ended, he eulogized them in the best poetry and defended them verbally, because he was not able to defend them physically. Then when a group took action in an attempt to restore them, he was one of the people who helped that effort, out of gratitude to them for their kind treatment. That led to him being hanged.<sup>691</sup>

— As we have seen above. 'Amarah mentioned his inclination towards the Fatimids in an ode in which he said:

*Their generous deeds were like those of the Sunnis,  
even though they differed from me by holding Shiite beliefs.*<sup>692</sup>

Adh-Dhahabi commented on this poetry, saying: "Would that it had only been Shiism; rather would that it had been only Rafidism. Rather his attitude was one of utter heresy."<sup>693</sup> 'Amarah said, eulogized the Fatimids and al-'Adid:

*I grieve for the time of Imam al- 'Adid  
as the barren woman grieves  
for the death of her only child.  
I sat with his viziers and accompanied his emirs,  
those who deserve eternal praise.  
I feel sorry for the rooms of your palace which are now devoid, O son of the  
(Messenger (SAAW), of the crowds of delegates. And for your separation  
from your troops who were like the waves on the calm sea...*<sup>694</sup>

I am astonished by 'Amarah al-Yamani's eulogy for the Fatimids and his nostalgia for their innovations, festivals and palaces, his challenge to the new Sunni state in Egypt and his defence of the Fatimids and their lies and false claims to be descended from the (Messenger (SAAW) . Does love for the transient conveniences of this world do to sound belief what it did to 'Amarah al-Yamani? Do gifts, status and position make a man give up his sound belief and weep for the demise of the Rafidi, Shiite Fatimid state and get involved with a conspiracy against the Islamic mission to resist the Crusaders in the Muslim lands? This is incomprehensible.

## The siege of Alexandria

The people of Alexandria played a role in the success of the Sunni venture in Egypt and defended Salah ad-Deen when he was besieged there. They defended the city with outstanding bravery and unparalleled courage. The Muslims of Egypt in general and of Alexandria in particular were forever in the trenches, defending the issues of Islam, then as now. They have intellectual and material resources, prolific pens and sound character, which made them stand alongside those who confronted the Batini, Rafidi Shiite venture and the western, American venture of today. The Egyptians in the past resisted the Batini Shiite influence and Crusader attacks, and cooperated with their Sunni brethren, intellectually, ideologically, politically and economically, as well as through the media of the era, until they put an end to the Batini, Shiite venture. Hence we find that the Rafidi Shiite writers hate Egypt and say of its people things like,

"The people of Egypt were cursed on the lips of (the (Messenger (SAAW)) Dawood (peace be upon him), so Allah made monkeys and pigs of the people of Egypt,"<sup>695</sup> and, "When Allah was angry with the Children of Israel, He sent them to Egypt, and when He was pleased with them He brought them out and sent them elsewhere."<sup>696</sup> They also said, "What a bad land Egypt is; it was a prison for those of the Children of Israel with whom Allah was angry,"<sup>697</sup> and, "Avoid Egypt and do not seek to stay there, because it turns a man into a cuckold."<sup>698</sup>

They have a number of reports which condemn Egypt and slander its people, and warn against staying there; they attributed these reports to the Messenger of Allah (SAAW) and to Muhammad al-Baqir and 'Ali al-Baqir.

This was the Rafidi Shiite view of Egypt during the era when Islam flourished. The Rafidi Shiite al-Majlisi commented on these texts by saying that Egypt became one of the worst lands at that time, because its people became the most wretched of people and the worst of disbelievers.<sup>699</sup> It seems that these texts are an expression of the Rafidis' hatred and resentment against Egypt and its people because of the fall of their Ismaili 'Ubaydi brethren at the hand of Salah ad-Deen, who purified the land of Egypt from their filth. What comparison can there be between these unjust words about Egypt and its beloved people and the recommendation of the Messenger (SAAW) concerning the people of Egypt?<sup>700</sup>

This is what the people of Alexandria did to defend Islam and the new Sunni state in Egypt. Alexandria was exposed to Sicilian attack from the sea during the last days of 569 AH/end of July 1174 CE. The Norman fleet was composed of two hundred <sup>701</sup> ships — or it was said that there were one hundred and eighty — carrying fifty thousand men, among whom were thirty thousand fighters, ready to carry out the comprehensive plan that had been drawn up by elements loyal to the Fatimids with the kings of Jerusalem and Sicily, with the aim of reviving the Fatimid caliphate<sup>702</sup> in Egypt and restoring the Rafidi Shiite madh-hab to its former position. The Norman campaign arrived off the coast of Alexandria on 16 Dhul-Hijjah, after the conspiracy had been discovered and the conspirators had been wiped out, and after the death of Amalric I king of Jerusalem. The Normans began their attack on Alexandria and succeeded in sinking some of the Egyptian boats which were moored along the coast.<sup>703</sup> The Ayubid army and the people of Alexandria displayed great courage. They burned the testudos<sup>704</sup> of the enemy which had been set up near the wall "and they did well in fighting and remaining steadfast. Salah ad-Deen was absent from Alexandria. When he reached it, the fighters' tiredness and pain from wounds disappeared and each of them thought that Salah ad-Deen was with him, so each of them fought as if he wanted to show how well he could fight."<sup>705</sup>

The Crusaders had no option but to surrender, and they were all either killed or taken captive.<sup>706</sup> Thus the army of Salah ad-Deen and the people of Alexandria dealt a crushing blow to those who had had the idea of invading Egypt, and they did not think of making a second attempt during the lifetime of Salah ad-Deen, even though they never gave up the idea completely, as they tried again a quarter of a century after the death of Salah ad-Deen.<sup>707</sup>

## The conspiracy of Kanz ad-Dawlah

One of the conspiracies faced by Salah ad-Deen in Egypt was that which was plotted in Aswan and Qoos in 570 AH. Kanz ad-Dawlah, the governor of Aswan, assembled the Arabs and the Sudanese people, and headed to Cairo, seeking to restore the Fatimid state. He spent a great deal of wealth on his hordes and was joined by a group of others with similar inclinations. He killed ten of Salah ad-Deen's emirs. There emerged in the village of Tood a man who was known as Qiyas ibn Shadi, who seized the land of Qoos and plundered its wealth. Salah ad-Deen prepared his brother al-Malik al-'Adil and a huge army, and they attacked and dealt a heavy blow to Shadi, scattering his troops and killing him. Then he marched on and met Kanz ad-Dawlah in the vicinity of Tood. There were battles between them, and Kanz ad-Dawlah fled after most of his troops were killed. Then Kanz ad-Dawlah was killed, and al-Malik al-'Adil returned to Cairo on 18 Safar.708 Thus Salah ad-Deen managed to put an end at an early stage to the turmoil caused by these thugs and 709 gangsters.

## How Salah ad-Deen put an end to the Fatimid madh-hab and legacy

It is not easy to uproot a madh-hab or way of thinking merely by changing the political system in some land or other. Such a change takes many years and needs arrangements that are not based on force alone.<sup>710</sup> Thus it may be noted that Salah ad-Deen used many means and methods to put an end to the Fatimid cause in Egypt. Some of these means involved the use of force, violence and immediate direct action, and others used subtlety and a gradual approach. Some used military strength whilst others used means of propagation, teaching and conviction, seeking to attract people's hearts by means of charitable, religious and social institutions which were connected to endowments to spend on them.<sup>711</sup> Here follows some of the means that were used:

## Humiliating the Fatimid caliph al-'Adid

Salah ad-Deen started by humiliating the Fatimid caliph al-'Adid, so as to put an end to the idea of *wildyah*<sup>712</sup> on which all the Ismaili theories and beliefs were based and from which the Fatimid rulers derived their sanctity. He forced the caliph to go out himself to welcome his father Najm ad-Deen Ayyoob when he arrived in Cairo. This was contrary to custom, as the Fatimid ritual was that the caliph should remain aloof and remote from the people and not appear before them frequently; this lent him an aura of holiness and awe. Abu Shamah tells us that al-'Adid did come out to meet him, going all the way to Bab al-Futooh, which was something that had never happened before, so it was the most amazing thing the people had ever witnessed.<sup>713</sup> Indeed, al-'Adid was forced to go against all customs, traditions and state protocols, and bestow various titles upon Salah ad-Deen, such as the title of 'al-Malik al-Afdal' ('the preferred monarch'), and to send all kinds of gifts and presents to him from the palace.<sup>714</sup> Then Salah ad-Deen continued to humiliate the caliph and undermine his spiritual position among his followers and the supporters of his state. He started to confiscate his personal property and horses, on the grounds that there was a great need for them for Jihad purposes. In the end, the caliph asked Salah ad-Deen to let him keep his own horse, as he did not have anything else, but Salah ad-Deen answered that this was not possible, because the horse was needed.<sup>715</sup> It is obvious that this deliberate, repeated humiliation was aimed at keeping the caliph away from the people and preventing him from appearing on public occasions, so that the Egyptians would forget him.<sup>716</sup>

## Degrading the palace of the Fatimid caliphate

Salah ad-Deen strove to disgrace the palace of the Fatimid caliphate by housing the Kurdish officials of his state there. This action was a confirmation of the fall of the Fatimid state, because that state had been known throughout the period when it flourished as "the palace state"<sup>717</sup>, referring to the fact that its caliphs dwelt in palaces in their capital, Cairo. In 566 AH/1170 CE, Salah ad-Deen seized the Fatimid palaces and handed them over to his Mameluke Qaraqoosh al-Khadim, then he used them to accommodate his troops and his family; he accommodated his father in the

Qasr al-Lu'lu'ah (the Pearl Palace) at al-Khaleej. Al-Malik al-'Adil Iban lived in the Fatimid palaces when he stayed behind in Egypt as the deputy of his brother Salah ad-Deen.<sup>718</sup>

## **Cancelling the Friday khutbah in al-Azhar Mosque and abolishing the teaching of Fatimid thought there**

In 567 AH/1171 CE, Salah ad-Deen dealt a lethal blow to the Fatimid madh-hab in Egypt, which undoubtedly finished it off. That was when he stopped the Jumu'ah khutbah in the Mosque of al-Azhar, which the Fatimids used as a means of spreading Ismaili Shiite beliefs.<sup>719</sup> That took place after Sadr ad-Deen 'Abd al-Malik ibn Darbas was appointed as qadi. He acted in accordance with his madh-hab, which says that it is not allowed to have two Jumu'ah sermons and prayers in one city, as is the view of Imam ash-Shafa'i. So he cancelled the khutbah in al-Azhar Mosque, and approved of the khutbah in al-Jami' al-Hakimi, because it was bigger. Al-Azhar Mosque remained idle, with no Jumu'ah prayers held there, for a hundred years after that, until the khutbah was restored at the time of al-Malik adh-Dhahir Baybars.<sup>720</sup> Salah ad-Deen followed this courageous step by eliminating the Shiite rituals that had been introduced to Egypt by the Fatimids and which had continued throughout their era, with regard to the adhan and the iqamah for prayer. He abolished from the adhan the words *Hayyd 'aid khayr il-'amal*, and the adhan continued to be given in Egypt in accordance with the Sunni way.<sup>721</sup> Salah ad-Deen also abolished the custom that the muezzins were used to during the Fatimid era, of sending blessings upon the Fatimid caliph in the adhan.<sup>722</sup> The main Jumu'ah prayer was established in Jami' al-Hakim according to the Sunni way, which included saying supplications for the Companions (may Allah be pleased with them), the students of the Companions and others, and for the Mothers of the Believers, the wives of the (Messenger (SAAW), and for his two paternal uncles Hamzah and al-'Abbas (may Allah be pleased with them both). The khateeb would come to the khutbah wearing black in accordance with Abbasid tradition.<sup>723</sup> There can be no doubt that stopping the Jumu'ah khutbah in Jami' al-Azhar, along with stopping the teaching of Shiite madh-habs in al-Azhar, which throughout the Fatimid era had been the greatest centre of Ismailism in Egypt and the

world<sup>724</sup> led to the propagation of Sunni knowledge. Turning al-Azhar into a Sunni university to teach Sunni knowledge — as it has continued to do until the present — as well as bringing in Sunni scholars to teach there, likewise played a part in the propagation of Sunni knowledge in Egypt and in most regions of the Muslim world.<sup>725</sup>

## **Destruction and burning of Shiite Ismaili books**

Salah ad-Deen turned his attention to the royal symbols of the Fatimids and the treasures of the Fatimid palace. He destroyed some, and gave some to Noor ad-Deen Zangi, and gave others to the Abbasid caliph, then he put the rest up for sale, and they continued to be sold for ten years.<sup>726</sup> They were transferred to other countries by travellers who were coming and going.<sup>727</sup> He seized the books of Ismaili teachings which were contained in the library of the Fatimid palace, then he burned them and threw them in Jabal al-Muqattam; and he distributed the non-sectarian books that had been confiscated from the palace library among the senior scholars and supporters of his state, such as al-Imad al-Isfahani, al-Qadi al-Fadil and Abu Shamah al-Isfahani, which confirms that Salah ad-Deen's aim was to burn the books of Rafidi Shiite teachings only.<sup>728</sup> In fact the books of Ismaili Shiite teachings were the most important means of influence used by the Fatimid preachers to propagate their message. The Ayoobid sultans burned the books of the Ismailis until there was nothing left of the Ismaili books except a few books that were kept by the supporters of the Fatimids in Yemen and India after the fall of their state in Egypt.<sup>729</sup>

## **Abolishing all sectarian festivals of the Fatimids**

Salah ad-Deen was not unaware of the serious effect that the sectarian Shiite mourning festivals and *Husayniydt* had in propagating their madh-hab and instilling their beliefs in the Egyptians' hearts. So he abolished all the sectarian festivals of the Fatimids, which led to them becoming extinct in Egypt from that time. With political acumen based on sound belief, which dictated fighting Rafidi Shiite innovation, he put an end to sectarian festivals that went against the Qur'an and Sunnah, and in order to complete this step,

the Ayubids gave a Sunni character to Eids and festivals in Egypt, which remains to this day.<sup>730</sup>

## Erasing the Fatimid symbols and currency

As well as erasing the Fatimid symbols in Egypt, use of Fatimid currency was also abolished, especially since it bore inscriptions of Fatimid beliefs which supported their claim to the caliphate such as, "There is no god but Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah (SAAW),<sup>4</sup> Ali is the close friend of Allah," and it also bore the names of Fatimid caliphs. Some of it was commemorative coins which were distributed on special occasions and sectarian Shiite festivals to those who were close to the court, to attract them to the state madh-hab.<sup>731</sup>

## Isolating members of the Fatimid dynasty

Sultan Salah ad-Deen kept the family and children of al-'Adid in a place outside the palace which he allocated exclusively to them. He gave them enough supplies to suffice them and put Qaraqoosh al-Khadim in charge of them. He separated the men and women so as to hasten their demise.<sup>732</sup> In accordance with smart policy and the natural conduct of kings, the Ayubids kept tabs on all members of the Fatimid dynasty, lest there emerge among their preachers those behind whom their supporters would rally and seek to restore their

## Weakening the Fatimid capital

After the Ayubids moved the seat of power in Egypt to the fort of al-Jabal, which was dictated by far-sighted military reasons aimed at fortifying Egypt against Frankish attacks, they made the most of this opportunity to bring low the city of Cairo, the Fatimid capital, which throughout the life of their state had been a royal city where only the caliphs, troops, prominent figures and court officials lived, as well as being a military fortress at the same time; most of the Egyptians lived in the city of al-Fustat.<sup>734</sup> Al-Maqreezi commented on the abasement of the Fatimid capital by saying: Cairo became a residential city after it had been a mighty fortress



and the seat of a caliphate where refuge was sought. It became humiliated after being glorified; it was brought low after being respected. This is what happens with kings; they always erase the legacy of those who came before them and erase the memories of their enemies.<sup>735</sup> But what Salah ad-Deen did was for the sake of Allah and in support of His religion.

## **The Fatimids' false claim of descent from the (Messenger (SAAW))**

As well as destroying the Fatimid legacy, the Ayubids also revived the issue of the Fatimids' false claim of descent from the (Messenger (SAAW)) by highlighting the fact that the Fatimids were descended from a Jewish or Magian lineage, and the Ayubids continued to expose the false basis on which the Fatimid caliphate claimed legitimacy. The prominent scholars, such as Ibn Khallikan, Ibn Abi Shamah (al-Maqdisi), Ibn Wasil and others, undertook praiseworthy efforts to expose them, and they gave the Fatimids the name of Banu 'Ubayd, to reflect the fact that they were descended from 'Ubayd-Allah ibn Maymoon al-Qaddah al-Majoosi. Indeed, Ibn Abi Shamah wrote in his books about this issue, in which he proved the falseness of the Fatimids' lineage.<sup>736</sup> In his book *ar-Rawdatayn*, Ibn Abi Shamah al-Maqdisi devoted many pages to proving false their claim to be descendents of the (Messenger (SAAW)).<sup>737</sup>

## **Pursuit of the remnants of Shiism in Syria and Yemen**

Thus the Sunnis, led by Noor ad-Deen Mahmood, put an end to the Fatimid state and destroyed its legacy. They pursued its followers in Egypt, and Shiism shrank and entered a stage of hiding and concealment. The decline of the Ismaili Shiite madh-hab in Egypt began with the settlement of Noor ad-Deen's troops in Egypt in 564 AH/1168 CE, and the Ayubids, led by Salah ad-Deen, continued to destroy the Ismaili madh-hab in Egypt, Yemen and Syria. They completed what had been begun by the Ghaznavids, Seljuks and Zangids who fought the Ismaili Shiite madh-hab and spread the Sunni madh-hab in Iran and Syria. Shiism continued to weaken in Egypt, little by

little, until the people began to follow the madh-hab of Ahl as-Sunnah wal-Jama'ah.<sup>738</sup>

In fact the arrangements made by the Sunni leaders, such as Noor ad-Deen and Salah ad-Deen, to fight the spread of Rafidi Shiite ideas, bore fruit. The Rafidi Shiite madh-hab became totally extinct in Egypt, which is a sign of deep understanding — something which the Ummah is in the greatest need of. The great lesson we learn from this is that eradicating innovation from Muslim communities requires a comprehensive outlook and integrated plan which encompasses sound Islamic revival, confronts Batini ideas, and directs the Ummah to demand its rights and resist crusader attacks. We have already discussed some of the methods that Salah ad-Deen used to put an end to this madh-hab and the 'Ubaydi Fatimid legacy.

Salah ad-Deen and the Ayubids benefited from the experience of Noor ad-Deen in the Sunni revival, confronting the Rafidi Shiites, and preparing the Ummah to resist and wrest its rights from its enemies. Hence Salah ad-Deen did not start from scratch; rather he benefited from the methods of Noor ad-Deen, among the most important of which was the setting up of Sunni schools and schools of Hadith, making sure that the judiciary system was based on the Sunni madh-habs, putting the schools under his own supervision, using the system of *hisbah*<sup>739</sup> to restore the Sunni madh-hab, encouraging Sunni asceticism, setting up endowments to support civil, non-governmental institutions and propagating the beliefs of Ahl as-Sunnah. This will be discussed in detail insha' Allah when we discuss the Ayubid state. Muhammad Hamdan Khalid al-Qaysi, in his Master's thesis submitted to the University of Yarmook in Jordan, discussed the effects of Salah ad-Deen's educational efforts in changing the reality of Egyptian society; this is a useful reference on this topic.

In 569 AH/1174 CE, the kingdom of Noor ad-Deen included Sudan, the Hijaz and Yemen. The entire Muslim east was one state with one leader, looking to the strategic goal that he sought to achieve from the beginning of his rule, which was the liberation of Greater Syria from the occupying Franks.<sup>740</sup> Now this goal was at hand, so he ordered the manufacture of a beautiful minbar for Masjid al-Aqsa so that he could take it with him when he conquered Jerusalem.<sup>741</sup> He wrote to Salah ad-Deen, instructing him to march at the head of the Egyptian army and meet him at the Frankish citadel

of Kerak.<sup>742</sup> Salah ad-Deen marched, as ordered by Noor ad-Deen, and besieged the citadel of Crac de Montreal, south of Kerak. When Noor ad-Deen heard of that, he set out from Damascus, heading south to meet Salah ad-Deen, but he received a message from him before he reached him, telling him that there were some troubles in Egypt and he was afraid that his opponents might take over, so he had no choice but to go back and get things under control, and he would come back again the next year to engage in Jihad alongside Noor ad-Deen.<sup>743</sup> Noor ad-Deen was very eager to uproot the disbelievers from Syria, so when he received some of the treasure from the palaces of the Fatimids, and some of the amazing things made of gold and pearls, he said: By Allah, we have no need of this wealth and we do not need it to meet our needs. He — meaning Salah ad-Deen — knows that we did not spend gold in Egypt when we were in need of gold, but he knows that the border of Syria needs to be supplied with wealth, men and help, to uproot the disbelievers from Syria. In other words, he only wanted the wealth and men in order to uproot the disbelievers from the coastal regions.<sup>745</sup> As for Salah ad-Deen, he agreed with Noor ad-Deen with regard to strategic goals, but he was afraid of turmoil in Egypt; his main concern was to put things in order in Egypt first and to focus on that, hence he had no choice but to return. It seems that Noor ad-Deen thought of entering Egypt with his army and catching the Crusaders in a pincer movement from that direction, under his command, but Salah ad-Deen realized what Noor ad-Deen's intentions were, so he summoned his family in Egypt, including his father Najm ad-Deen and his maternal uncle Shihab ad-Deen al-Harimi<sup>746</sup>, as well as some of the army commanders, and consulted them with regard to what he had heard about Noor ad-Deen's intention to head towards Egypt and dismiss him from his post there. One of his nephews, whose name was 'Umar, suggested that he should make preparations to fight Noor ad-Deen if he came to Egypt, and some of the people present agreed with him. But Najm ad-Deen the father of Salah ad-Deen hastened to rebuke them and denounce their opinion. He said to Salah ad-Deen:

I am your father and this is your paternal uncle Shihab ad-Deen; we love you more than everyone whom you see. By Allah, if your uncle and I saw Noor ad-Deen, we could do no more than kiss the ground before him, and if he ordered us to behead you with the sword, we would do it. If this is our attitude, then how about others? All of these commanders whom you see,

if they saw Noor ad-Deen on his own they would not be able to remain seated firmly in their saddles. This land is his, and we are his Mamelukes and deputies here. If he wanted to dismiss you, we would hear and obey. We think that you should send a letter with a messenger, and say, 'I have heard that you want to come to the country (Egypt); what need is there for that? His highness could send any messenger to put a rope around my neck and take me to you, and there is no one here who would disobey you.'<sup>747</sup>

And he said to all of them, "Leave us, for we are the Mamelukes and slaves of Noor ad-Deen and he does with us what he wants."

So they dispersed, and most of them wrote to Noor ad-Deen informing him of what had happened.<sup>748</sup> When Najm ad-Deen was alone with his son Salah ad-Deen, he said to him:

You are ignorant and have little knowledge. You gathered together this horde and told them what you were thinking about. If Noor ad-Deen hears that you were determined to stop him from coming here, he would make you his primary concern and the first one he would tackle. If he headed towards you, you would not find anyone with you from this army; they would have surrendered you to him. But now, after this gathering, they will write to him and tell him what I said. You must also write to him and send him a letter conveying the same meaning. Say, 'Why do you need to come to me? Any man you send could bring me to you with a rope around my neck.' If he hears that, he will change his plan to come to you and will focus on something more important to him.<sup>749</sup>

Najm ad-Deen Ayub loved Noor ad-Deen Zangi very much and was very sincere and devoted to him, so Salah ad-Deen did what his father suggested. When Noor ad-Deen (may Allah have mercy on him) saw that this was the case, he changed his mind, and things were as Najm ad-Deen had said.<sup>750</sup>

At the beginning of 568 AH/1173 CE, after Noor ad-Deen returned from Azerbaijan and Armenia, he received a letter from the caliph appointing him over Mosul, Mesopotamia, Irbil, Khallat, Greater Syria, the land of Kilij Arslan and Egypt. In Shawwal of the same year, Salah ad-Deen set out with his army and besieged Kerak, and told Noor ad-Deen that he had set out in accordance with what had been agreed upon the previous year. Noor ad-Deen

set out from Damascus and when he reached ar-Raqeem (in central Jordan) he received a letter from Salah ad-Deen telling him that his father in Egypt was sick, and he was afraid that if he died, the Egyptians would take this opportunity to seize the land and fortify themselves, so he had no choice but to return to Egypt.<sup>751</sup> When Noor ad-Deen learned of that, he said, "Protecting Egypt is more important to us than anything else."<sup>752</sup> Soon events confirmed Salah ad-Deen's fears. A major revolt was staged against him, led by the caliph's confidant Jawhar, then after that there was a huge conspiracy in which 'Amarah al-Yemeni and the remnants of the Rafidi Shiite madh-hab took part, as I have explained above. In 568 AH, Noor ad-Deen launched campaigns against the Crusaders. Al-Imad al-Isfahani was riding with al-Malik al-'Adil and he said to him: How would you describe what has happened? His response was to praise him in a lengthy ode about Noor ad-Deen's defence of Harran.

## **Incorporation of the eastern Maghreb**

Salah ad-Deen strove to consolidate the achievements he had made in Egypt by securing the borders of his country so that he would not be caught unawares. His efforts resulted in the incorporation of the eastern Maghreb. North Africa had been geographically connected to Egypt since the early Islamic conquests, so it was natural that Salah ad-Deen should turn his attention to incorporating this region in order to benefit from its resources, and to benefit from its good location for defending the western border of Egypt. In 568 AH/1173 CE, Salah ad-Deen sent a military force to the eastern Maghreb, led by Sharaf ad-Deen Qaraqoosh, the slave of al-Muzaffar Taqi ad-Deen 'Umar ibn Shahinshah ibn Ayub. He entered Tripoli, Barqah and some other areas of the eastern Maghreb, as far as Qabis, with the exception of al-Mahdiyah, Safaqa, Qafsah and Tunis.<sup>753</sup>

## **Incorporation of Yemen**

The incorporation of Yemen became part of Noor ad-Deen's plan that was aimed at uniting a single Islamic front to resist the Crusader invasion.<sup>754</sup> Salah ad-Deen's policy in incorporating Yemen led to:

- i. Increased pressure on the supporters of the Fatimids, especially since the governor of Yemen, 'Abdan-Nabi ibn Mahdi was a Rafidi who had connections to the Fatimid caliph of Egypt.
- ii. Salahad-Deen managed to secure the southern border of Egypt. Incorporating Yemen, which was regarded as the key to the Red Sea in the south, guaranteed him military and commercial control of the southern region and reduced the possibility of any alliance between the Crusaders, who wanted to dominate the Red Sea, and the Abyssinians, who were also Christians, so that he would not end up trapped between the Crusaders on the Mediterranean coast to the north and the Abyssinians on the coast of the Red Sea to the south.
- iii. At that time Yemen was going through a period of instability, caught between various political, religious and sectarian inclinations, especially between Zubayd and Sanaa. There emerged an impostor, 'Abd an-Nabi ibn Mahdi, who claimed that he was the awaited Mahdi. He gained control over Yemen and sermons were delivered in his name once he stopped the sermons in the name of the Abbasids. He gave himself the title of imam, and built a huge dome over his father's grave; he ordered the Yemenis to perform pilgrimage to this grave and forbade them to go on Hajj to Makkah.

iv. Salah ad-Deen wanted to put an end to these transgressions and negative actions that posed a threat to Muslim unity, especially after the people of Yemen sent a message to him seeking his help to save them.<sup>755</sup> Whatever the case, Salah ad-Deen sent an expedition, led by his older brother, Shams ad-Dawlah Turan Shah, who went to Makkah and performed 'Umrah, then moved on to Zubayd and seized control of it, then he went to Aden and seized control of it, and forbade the army from plundering it, saying: We have not come to destroy the land; rather we have come to bring prosperity to it and take control of it. Then he went to the other fortresses and citadels and took control of them, so he gained control of the entire region of Yemen, and gave sermons in the name of the Abbasid caliph.<sup>756</sup> He killed the impostor who was called 'Abd an-Nabi, and all turmoil ceased in Yemen, and the country went back to the way it used to be.<sup>757</sup> Shams ad-Dawlah wrote to his brother al-Malik an-Nasir Salah ad-Deen, telling him

of the conquests that Allah had granted him and the favour that He had bestowed upon him. Salah ad-Deen wrote to Noor ad-Deen telling him the news, and Noor ad-Deen wrote in turn to the caliph, telling him the good news that Yemen had been conquered and sermons were now being delivered in his name there.<sup>758</sup>

## Conquest of Nubia

At that time, Nubia was a Christian kingdom; its capital was the city of Danqalah which was located at the headwaters of the Nile. It had had a strong connection to Egypt since the Islamic conquest. When the Ayubid state was established in Egypt, Salah ad-Deen wanted to conquer Nubia in order to protect Egypt from any aggression coming from the south. He sent his brother Turanshah, in Jumada II 568 AH/January 1173 CE to Nubia. He conquered Ibreem, capturing prisoners and booty, then he went back to Qaws, and Islam entered regions where the Muslim army had never been before. He appointed Ibraheem al-Kurdi as its governor.<sup>759</sup> This conquest removed the barriers that had been preventing the spread of Islam in that region.<sup>760</sup>

## The real story behind the alienation between Salah ad-Deen and Noor ad-Deen

Historians have discussed the relationship between Noor ad-Deen and Salah ad-Deen. Ibn al-Atheer narrated the reasons for the alienation between Noor ad-Deen and Salah ad-Deen, as did Abu Shamah, quoting from Ibn Abi Tay. It started in 567 AH, when they agreed to besiege Kerak, but Salah ad-Deen went back to Egypt before meeting Noor ad-Deen.<sup>761</sup> A number of other historians<sup>762</sup> narrated from Ibn al-Atheer and Ibn Abi Tay', and they were followed in turn by some modern historians, without checking the facts, who went to extremes in explaining the reasons for this alienation and its consequences. They described the relationship between Noor ad-Deen and Salah ad-Deen as if it were a hostile relationship in which each feared the other, so Salah ad-Deen started trying to get rid of Noor ad-Deen's authority and he preferred to leave Kerak as a buffer zone between him and Noor ad-

Deen; Noor ad-Deen also thought that he had made a mistake by sending Asad ad-Deen and Salah ad-Deen to Egypt. Noor ad-Deen is described as a serious opponent to Salah ad-Deen, and so on.<sup>763</sup> This false analysis has no basis except the reports of Ibn Abi Tay' and Ibn al-Atheer:

As for Ibn Abi Tay' he tried, using the skills of fabrication and lying in which he was proficient, to discredit the relationship between the two men. He is to be regarded with suspicion when it comes to what he attributed to Noor ad-Deen of unbecoming attitudes and deeds. Noor ad-Deen had humiliated the Shiites in Aleppo, abolished their symbols and made Ahl al-Sunnah stronger. The father of Abu Tay' was one of the Shiite leaders who had been banished from Aleppo. Hence we see that Ibn Abi Tay' was very biased against Noor ad-Deen and he tried to distort the relationship between these two great men with his lies.<sup>764</sup>

As for Ibn al-Atheer, he is to be regarded with suspicion when it comes to what he wrote about Salah ad-Deen. He sometimes looked for opportunities to criticize Salah ad-Deen and undermine his reputation, especially when comparing him with Noor ad-Deen.<sup>765</sup> In his books *Al-Kamil fit-Tareekh* and *Al-Bahirfee Tdreekh ad-Dawlah al-Atabekiyah*, the historian of the Zangid dynasty mentions his views concerning this issue, and this was quoted from him by a number of historians. He concluded that Salah ad-Deen was not sincere to his master Noor ad-Deen; rather, from the time he established his authority in Egypt, he was striving to become independent of him, and he was competing with him for political dominance in Syria. All of these opinions<sup>766</sup> were written by Ibn al-Atheer after the death of Salah ad-Deen. Salah ad-Deen had to go out to Syria at the head of his troops and annex the possessions of his master Noor ad-Deen to his own possessions in Egypt, because Salah ad-Deen's going out to Syria was aimed at reuniting the Islamic front, which was the aim which Imad ad-Deen Zangi and his son Noor ad-Deen had themselves striven to achieve for a long time. After the death of Noor ad-Deen, the Islamic front was about to split and the situation would have gone back to the way it was before, namely division and weakness, after the division of the Zangids into two factions, one in Damascus and the other in Aleppo. His son, at-Tifl as-Salih Isma'eel, was not able to reunite the kingdom of his father.<sup>767</sup> Salah ad-Deen wrote to the Abbasid caliph and to the son of Noor ad-Deen, telling them that he was setting out for Syria in order to unite the Muslims against the Franks. It is



most likely that the comments narrated by Ibn al-Atheer, which were transmitted from him by some historians, speaking of Salah ad-Deen's disloyalty to the Zangid dynasty, and other reports on this matter, were made up by historians, foremost among whom was Ibn al-Atheer, to explain Salah ad-Deen's actions after the death of Noor ad-Deen. This was due to Ibn al-Atheer's loyalty to the Zangid dynasty, and his lack of sympathy towards Salah ad-Deen, who put an end to this dynasty and its possessions, especially since modern historians have noted that Ibn al-Atheer was biased against Salah ad-Deen in his books *Al-Kdmil* and *Al-Bahir*, and he actively sought out his errors and mistakes.<sup>768</sup> In fact Salah ad-Deen was the best soldier in terms of hearing and obeying his leader Noor ad-Deen Zangi. There follows the evidence which proves this:

1- Al-'Imad al-Isfahani said: Salah ad-Deen did not disobey Noor ad-Deen. He worked for him as one who is capable and sincere, and he based all his decisions on the well-founded advice of Noor ad-Deen.<sup>769</sup>

2- Abu Shamah refuted Ibn al-Atheer's accusations against Salah ad-Deen with regard to his disobedience towards Noor ad-Deen. In Abu Shamah's view, Noor ad-Deen never criticized Salah ad-Deen for extravagance in spending and disposing of wealth as he saw fit, without consulting him.<sup>770</sup> Abu Shamah supported his view with a document that he himself saw, written in Noor ad-Deen's hand and addressed to the qadi Sharaf ad-Deen ibn Abi 'Asroon, who was appointed as Noor ad-Deen's qadi in Syria and then as Salah ad-Deen's qadi in Egypt. This letter expressed his deep admiration for what Salah ad-Deen had done in support of the Sunni madh-hab in Egypt, and for his putting an end to the Fatimid caliphate and the Shiite madh-hab, and he asked Abu 'Asroon to support Salah ad-Deen with regard to this serious matter.<sup>771</sup>

3- In fact all the decisive steps that Salah ad-Deen took to bring about the fall of the Fatimid state in Egypt and put an end to the Ismaili madh-hab there were carried out on direct orders from Noor ad-Deen. That was not done until Najm ad-Deen Ayub, the father of Salah ad-Deen, arrived in Egypt, sent by Noor ad-Deen to supervise and help his son to put an end to the Ismaili Shiite madh-hab.<sup>772</sup> Nothing is more indicative of Salah ad-Deen's complete obedience to Noor ad-Deen and his being Noor ad-Deen's

representative in Egypt than the fact that sermons were given from the minbar in Noor ad-Deen's name.

**4-** Throughout the Fatimid state whilst he (Salah ad-Deen) was the vizier of the Fatimid caliph al-'Adid.<sup>773</sup> After the sermons began to be given in the name of the Abbasids, sermons in Egypt contained prayers for Noor ad-Deen after the caliph, and currency was minted in the name of al-Mustadi' bi Amr-Illah and in the name of al-Malik al-'Adil Noor ad-Deen. Their names were engraved on either side of each coin.<sup>77</sup>

**5-** The coming of Ibn al-Qaysarani, the vizier of Noor ad-Deen, to Egypt in 568-569 AH to examine the land and check the financial situation in order to determine the annual payment that Salah ad-Deen should make to Noor ad-Deen was something natural which confirmed that Noor ad-Deen had authority over Egypt.<sup>775</sup>

**6-** The Abbasid caliphate realized this essential fact and clearly distinguished between the cloaks and gifts given by the caliph to Noor ad-Deen and those given by the caliph to Salah ad-Deen; the gifts given to Salah ad-Deen were smaller than those given to Noor ad-Deen, when Noor ad-Deen was given two swords as an indication of the authority that he was given over Syria and Egypt. At the same time, Noor ad-Deen also sent cloaks and gifts from Syria to Salah ad-Deen and his family and commanders in Egypt<sup>776</sup>, as confirmation of his direct authority over him.

**7-** Salah ad-Deen paid attention to protocol with regard to symbols of power and authority. He did not regard himself as equal to his master Noor ad-Deen. He sent messengers from Cairo to Noor ad-Deen to tell him that Salah ad-Deen had worn the cloak and was fully committed to continuing to send wealth (tributes) as agreed upon to Noor ad-Deen every year.<sup>777</sup>

**8-** All the actions that Salah ad-Deen took to bring about the fall of the Fatimid caliphate, ensure that sermons were given in the name of Banul-'Abbas and put an end to the Ismaili madh-hab in Egypt were done on direct instructions from Noor ad-Deen. After Noor ad-Deen sent Najm ad-Deen to him, the latter annexed Yemen with the permission of Noor ad-Deen in order to put an end to the Shiite Ismaili madh-hab there, so he annexed Yemen into the resistance front, and Noor ad-Deen himself sent this good news to the Abbasid caliph. The same was true with regard to the incorporation of

eastern North Africa, the invasion of the kingdom of Nubia and the conveying of the good news to the Abbasid caliph that the conquest of Constantinople and Jerusalem was at hand.<sup>778</sup> Noor ad-Deen wrote to the Abbasid caliph, saying: Constantinople and Jerusalem will be the ultimate goal for conquest. May Allah bring near the goal of conquest to the people of Islam and help al-Khadim (the servant) to attain the pleasure of the caliph. One of the good things of these glorious days was what happened at this stage of the conquest of part of Nubia and reaching parts of it where the Muslim cavalry had never trod. The Egyptian troops have also captured

**9-** Barqah and its fortresses, and reached the borders of the Maghreb.<sup>779</sup>

**10-** From the time when Salah ad-Deen settled in Egypt, until the death of Noor ad-Deen, Salah ad-Deen continued to send the treasures of the Fatimid palace to his master Noor ad-Deen as a symbol of loyalty, and Salah ad-Deen continued to inform Noor ad-Deen of everything, great and small, that went on in Egypt. So we see him, for example, sending a letter to him in which he mentioned the revolt by the remnants of the Fatimids, among whom was 'Amarah al-Yemeni.<sup>780</sup> Nothing is more indicative of the cooperation between Salah ad-Deen and Noor ad-Deen than their strategic agreement against the Franks. Abu Shamah states that in 568 AH/1172 CE, the two sultans, Noor ad-Deen in Syria and Salah ad-Deen in Egypt, started a Jihad against the Crusaders. Al-Imad describes this incident as the: Jihad of the Two Sultans Against the Franks.<sup>781</sup> This was also confirmed by Salah ad-Deen in a letter that he sent to the Abbasid caliph, telling him that there was an agreement between him and Noor ad-Deen (may Allah have mercy on him) to attack the invaders from two sides, from Egypt and Syria: the Mameluke (Salah ad-Deen) with his troops by land and sea, and Noor ad-Deen from the plains and rugged terrain of Syria.<sup>782</sup>

**11-** Salah ad-Deen expressed his loyalty to the dynasty of Noor ad-Deen after the latter's death in 569 AH/1173 CE, when he delivered the khutbah in the name of his son as-Salih Isma'eel, and minted coins in his name.<sup>783</sup> He also sent letters of condolence on the death of Noor ad-Deen.<sup>784</sup> On this basis we can say that until the death of Noor ad-Deen, Egypt and Syria were united under the leadership of Noor ad-Deen,<sup>785</sup> and Salah ad-Deen was no more than Noor ad-Deen's agent in Egypt.

Whatever the case, Noor ad-Deen's relationship with Salah ad-Deen never reached the level of enmity, and there is no justification for regarding their differences of opinion as alienation, as a number of historians and writers have stated. All that can be said is that Noor ad-Deen thought of Egypt as a source of income to cover the expenses of the Jihad against the Crusaders in Syria, and as a source of human resources from whom he could recruit mujahideen, whereas Salah ad-Deen was more aware than Noor ad-Deen of what was going on in Egypt and of the dangers posed by the preparations of the Fatimids' supporters to join the Franks. So he focused his efforts on building a strong army so that he would be able to dominate Egypt, and he thought that consolidating the position of the new state in Egypt was more important than focusing on the affairs of Syria.<sup>786</sup> This is in accordance with what Noor ad-Deen said to the messenger whom Salah ad-Deen sent with apologies for his decision not to join him in the siege of Kerak, when he said: Protecting Egypt is more important to us than anything else.<sup>787</sup> Salah ad-Deen followed the same methods as Noor ad-Deen in supporting the Sunni venture. Leadership in Islam is not a monopoly for the Zangid family or the Ayubid family or for any particular family, no matter what their status. Rather, whoever has that potential — with the help of Allah — and is loved, respected and supported by the Muslims, is the one who should be put forward to lead the Ummah. Abu Bakr ((RA)‘) was put forward by the Ummah to lead after the (Messenger (SAAW) died, and they swore allegiance to him. The same was true of 'Umar, who completed the course, and of 'Uthman and 'Ali after him (may Allah be pleased with them all). Serving Islam and the Muslims took precedence over everything else in the mind of Salah ad-Deen.

## The death of Noor ad-Deen Mahmood

Imad al-Isfahani noted:

Noor ad-Deen (may Allah have mercy on him) ordered the circumcision of his son al-Malik al-Salih Isma'eel on the day of Eid al-Fitr, and we celebrated this event; the stores in Damascus were closed for several days and an ode was composed to celebrate Eid and the circumcision.<sup>788</sup>

He described it thus:

On the day of Eid, which was a Sunday, Noor ad-Deen rode in the usual manner, surrounded by the protection of Allah and by happiness, guarded by the troops of heaven and earth. But Fate said to him, "This is the last Eid for you." He stood in the northern green field to practise archery and spear throwing, and his tent had been set up in the southern green field. He ordered that the minbar be set up, and al-Qadi Shams ad-Deen ibn al-Farrashi, the qadi of the army, gave a khutbah for him after leading him in prayer. He visited the citadel, happy and cheerful, and set up his public table in the manner of the Turks and great kings; then we joined him at his private table.<sup>789</sup> On Monday, the prominent figures were walking alongside him and the wise men were discussing with him, among whom was Humam ad-Deen Mawdood, who was one of the prominent people; in the past, in the early stages of the Zangid state, he had been the governor of Aleppo; he was smart and had experience in life. He said to Noor ad-Deen by way of a reminder to one who may be deceived by times of ease, "Will we be here on a day like this next year?" Noor ad-Deen said, "Will we be here in a month's time? One year is too far away." And fate materialized in accordance with what they said. Noor ad-Deen did not live for another month and Humam ad-Deen did not live for another year. Then Noor ad-Deen started to play ball with his inner circle; he was intercepted whilst playing by another emir whose name was Yaranqushi, who said to him '*BashV*<sup>790</sup> That made him angry and sad, and he felt outrage that was contrary to his forbearing attitude. He rebuked him and scolded him, then left and went to the citadel, where he stayed, keeping away from people and isolating himself. He remained in his house for a week, more preoccupied with what had befallen him and what might happen than with what was going on around him as people celebrated the

circumcision. All these celebrations only ended with sadness and grief, and authority was not restored after him until as-Salih was appointed.<sup>791</sup> Noor ad-Deen's sickness continued and the doctors advised him to undergo phlebotomy, but he refused; he was a man with whom no one argued. On Wednesday 11<sup>th</sup> Shawwal he passed from this transient world to the eternal realm. He was one of the close believing friends of Allah and one of His righteous slaves.<sup>792</sup> The death of Noor ad-Deen (may Allah have mercy on him) was due to difficulty in breathing that the doctors could not treat.<sup>793</sup> He died on Wednesday 11 Shawwal 569 AH, and was buried in the citadel of Damascus, then he was transferred to a graveyard near his school that he had built for the followers of Abu Haneefah (may Allah have mercy on him), near a place called al-Khawwaseen on the western road. May Allah have mercy on him.<sup>794</sup> He was eager for martyrdom and used to say, "How often I exposed myself to martyrdom but did not attain it."

Adh-Dhahabi commented, "It caught up with him in his bed and on people's lips: Noor ad-Deen ash-Shaheed (Noor ad-Deen the martyr)."<sup>795</sup> He was eulogized by the poets in lengthy odes.

After the death of Noor ad-Deen, the banner of Jihad was taken up by his smart student and sincere soldier Salah ad-Deen Ayub, who based his Jihad on the Jihad that Noor ad-Deen had managed to wage against the polytheists, and he did so in the best and most perfect manner.

## Notes

All translations of the meanings of the verses of the Qur'an have been adapted from the English translation by Saheeh International, Abul Qasim Publishing House, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. (Translator)

<sup>2</sup> *Sunnah*: the practice and collected sayings of Muhammad that together with the Qur'an forms the basis of Islamic law

<sup>3</sup> *Jihad (Jihad)*: struggle or striving (in Allah's cause)

<sup>4</sup> *Ummah*: community or nation: *usu*. used to refer to the entire global community of Muslims

<sup>5</sup> *madh-hab*: school of juristic thought/jurisprudence

<sup>6</sup> *sharia (shari'ah)*: Islamic law derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah

<sup>7</sup> *Hadith (hadeeth)*: the collected sayings and actions of (Messenger (SAAW)

Muhammad (ﷺ) that with the Qur'an form the basis of Islamic law

<sup>8</sup> *fiqh*: Islamic jurisprudence; understanding or interpreting Islamic law

<sup>9</sup> *dinar (deendr)* and *dirham*: dinars were gold coins and dirhams silver coins; they were both common units of currency

<sup>10</sup> cf. Qur'an 2: 251

<sup>11</sup> *asr*: mid-afternoon; the obligatory prayer at that time

<sup>12</sup> Abu Faris, *Duroos wa Ta'ammuldi fil-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, p. 30

<sup>13</sup> Khaleel, 'Imad ad-Deen, *Hajamdt Muddah fit-Tdreekh al-Islami*, 1st ed., 1407 AH/1986 CE, p. 26

<sup>14</sup> Khaleel, op. cit., p. 26

<sup>15</sup> Khaleel, op. cit., pp. 26-27

<sup>16</sup> Khaleel, op. cit., p. 37

<sup>17</sup> As-Sallabi, 'Ali Muhammad *Ad-Dawlah al-'Uthmdniyah*: 'Awdmil an-Nuwouldwa Asbdb as-Suqoot, pp. 125-140

<sup>18</sup> Khaleel, op. cit., p. 28

<sup>1</sup> Khaleel, op. cit., pp. 383-384

- <sup>20</sup> Khaleel, op. cit., p. 38
- <sup>21</sup> Khaleel, op. cit., p. 28
- <sup>22</sup> Husayn, Mamdooh, *Al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah fee Shimdl Ifreeqiyah wa Atharuha al-Haddri*, 1989, p. 10
- <sup>23</sup> 'Imran, Mahmood Sa'eed, *Tdreekh Al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, 3rd ed., 1413 AH/1993 CE, p. 10
- <sup>24</sup> Khaleel, op. cit., p. 32
- <sup>25</sup> 'Ashoor, Sa'eed, *Al-Harakah as-Saleebiyah*, 4th ed., 1986, vol. 1, p. 26
- <sup>26</sup> *mujdhid* (pi. *mujdhidoon/-een*): one who strives in the way of Allah; a fighter in Jihad
- <sup>27</sup> Khaleel, *HajamdtMuddah fit-Tdreekh al-Islmi*, p. 3
- <sup>28</sup> Khaleel, op. cit., p. 37
- <sup>29</sup> Al-Jundi, Anwar, *Al-Islm wa Harakat at-Tdreekh*, pp. 393-394
- <sup>30</sup> Khaleel, *Hajamdt Muddah fit-Tdreekh al-Islmi*, p. 40
- <sup>31</sup> Fans, Abu, *Duroos wa Ta'ammuldt fil-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, p. 35
- <sup>32</sup> *ibid.*, p. 434
- <sup>33</sup> Khaleel, *Hajamdt Muddah fit-Tdreekh al-Islmi*, p. 41
- <sup>34</sup> *ibid.*, p. 41
- <sup>35</sup> *ibid.*, p. 41
- <sup>36</sup> Barker, Earnest, *Al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah* [The Crusades], pp. 21 & 24
- <sup>37</sup> 'Ashoor, Sa'eed, *Al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, vol. 1, p. 32
- <sup>38</sup> Naqli, Asiya, *Dawr al-Fuqahd' wal-'Ulamd' fil-Jihad didd as-Saleebiyeen khildl al-Harakah as-Saleebiyah*, p. 32
- <sup>39</sup> Tawfeeq, 'Umar Kamal, *Mamlakat Bayt al-Maqdis as-Saleebiyah*, pp. 18-19, 32-33
- <sup>40</sup> Nawwar, Salah ad-Deen, *Al-'Udwdn as-Saleebi 'aid al-'Alam al-Islmi*, p. 22
- <sup>41</sup> Abu Zayd, Shakir Ahmad, *Al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah wal-Ushrah az-Zinkiyah*, p. 17
- <sup>42</sup> 'Ashoor, Sa'eed, *Al-Harakah as-Saleebiyah*, vol. 1, p. 20; An-Nasir, Muhammad Hasir, *Al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed fil-Qarn as-Sddis al-Hijri*, p. 80
- <sup>43</sup> An-Nasir, *Al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 80
- <sup>44</sup> Ar-Rubay'i, 'Abd-Allah, *Athar ash-Sharq al-Islmi fl-Fikr al-Urubbi khildl al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, p. 81
- <sup>45</sup> Al-'Urayni, Dr. as-Sayyid al-Baz, *Ash-Sharq al-Adnd fil-Usoor al-Wustd al-Ayoobiyoos*, pp. 13-14
- <sup>46</sup> Durant, Will, *Qissat al-Haddrah* [The Story of Civilization], vol. 4, p. 16
- <sup>47</sup> An-Nasir, *Al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 81



- <sup>48</sup> Mahmood, Dr. Ali 'Abd al-Haleem, *Al-Ghazw as-Saleebi wal-Alam al- Islmi*, p. 108
- <sup>49</sup> 'Ashoor, Sa'eed, *Al-Harakah as-Saleebiyah*, vol. 1, p. 30
- <sup>50</sup> 'Abd al-Haleem, 'Ali, *Al-Ghazw as-Saleebi wal-Alam al-Islmi*, p. 109
- <sup>51</sup> Sa'eed, *Al-Harakah as-Saleebiyah*, vol. 1, pp. 26 & 28
- <sup>52</sup> Shalabi, Dr. Ahmad, *At-Tdreekh al-Islmi wal-Haddrah al-Islmiyah*, vol. 5, p. 438
- <sup>53</sup> Ar-Rubay'i, *Athar ash-Sharq al-Islmi fil-Fikr al-Urubbi*, p. 26
- <sup>54</sup> *Al-Waseet fee Tdreekh Filasteen fil-Asr al-Islmi al-Waseet*, p. 152
- <sup>55</sup> Fawzi, Farooq 'Umar, *Al-Waseet fee Tdreekh Filasteen*, p. 152
- <sup>56</sup> Al-Ma'adeedi, Khashi', Muhammad ,Sawadi 'Abd, and Noori, Durayd 'Abd al-Qadir, *Tdreekh al-Waian al-Arabi wal-Ghazw as-Saleebi*, p. 22
- <sup>57</sup> Al-Wakeel, *Asbdb ad-Da f fil-Ummah al-Islmiyah*, p. 157
- <sup>58</sup> 'Abd al-Haleem, 'Ali, *Al-Ghazw as-Saleebi wal-Alam al-Islmi*, p. 110
- <sup>59</sup> 'Ashoor, Sa'eed 'Abd al-Fattah, *Urubbd fd-Usoor al-Wustd* vol. 2, p. 49; Fawzi, op. cit., p. 154
- <sup>60</sup> Fawzi, op. cit., p. 155
- <sup>61</sup> *Al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in Fawzi, *Al-Waseet fee Tdreekh Filasteen*, p. 154
- <sup>62</sup> Fawzi, op. cit., p. 156
- <sup>63</sup> the 'Farthest Mosque', mentioned in the Qur'an (17: 1)
- <sup>64</sup> 'Ashoor, Dr. Fayad Hammad, *Jihad al-Muslimeen fil-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, p. 86
- <sup>65</sup> Al-Ma'adeedi et al, op. cit., p. 24
- <sup>66</sup> An-Nasir, *Al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 84
- <sup>67</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>68</sup> Al-Ma'adeedi et al., p. 24
- <sup>69</sup> Ar-Rubay'i, op. cit., p. 138
- <sup>70</sup> Ar-Rubay'i, p. 34
- <sup>71</sup> 'Ashoor, Sa'eed, *Al-Harakah as-Saleebiyah*, vol. 1, pp. 30-32
- <sup>72</sup> Al-Janzoori, Dr. 'Aliyah, *Al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah al-Muqaddimdt as-Siydsiyah*, p. 249
- <sup>73</sup> An-Nasir, Muhammad Hamid, *Al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 83
- <sup>74</sup> Husayn, Mamdooh op. cit., pp. 11-13
- <sup>75</sup> *ibid.*, p. 12
- <sup>76</sup> The word 'Maghreb' here applies to Andalusia and the Muslim islands in the western Mediterranean, in addition to the lands of the Arab Maghreb.
- <sup>77</sup> Husayn, Mamdooh op. cit., p. 13
- <sup>78</sup> *ibid.*, p. 14

- <sup>79</sup> *ibid.*, p. 15
- <sup>80</sup> Lewis, Archibald, *Naval Power and Trade in the Mediterranean* (Princeton 1951, 1970), p. 372; Title in Arabic: *Al-Quwwah al-Bahriyah wal-Tijriyah fil-Bahr al-Mutawassit*
- <sup>81</sup> Husayn op. cit. p. 16 *Al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in Husayn, *Al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah fee Shimdl lfreeqiyah*, p. 17
- <sup>83</sup> Husayn op. cit., p. 18
- <sup>84</sup> Al-Janזורi, Dr. 'Aliyah op. cit., p. 253
- <sup>85</sup> Yoosuf, Joseph Naseem, *Al-Arab war-Room al-Lateen fil-Huroob as-Saleebiyah al-Oold*, vol. 1, p. 150
- <sup>86</sup> Al-Janזורi, Dr. 'Aliyah op. cit., p. 254
- <sup>87</sup> *ibid.*, p. 254; Yoosuf, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 56
- <sup>88</sup> 'Awad, Dr. Muhammad *Al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah wal-'Alaqdt bayn ash-Sharq wal-Gharb*, p. 63
- <sup>89</sup> 'Awad, op. cit., p. 65
- <sup>90</sup> *ibid.*, p. 65
- <sup>91</sup> Hadarat al-'Arab [La Civilisation des Arabes], quoted in Naqli, A., *Dawr al-Fuqahd' wal-'Ulamd' al-Muslimeen fish-Sharq al-Adnd*, p. 237
- <sup>92</sup> Durant, Will, *Qissat al-Haddrah* [The Story of Civilization], vol. 15, pp. 15-16; Hamada, Muhammad Mahir, *Wathd'iq Al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, pp. 99-100
- <sup>93</sup> Naqli, Asiya, *Dawr al-Fuqahd' wal-'Ulamd' al-Muslimeen fish-Sharq al-Adnd*, p. 237
- <sup>94</sup> *ibid.*, p. 237
- <sup>95</sup> Barker, Earnest, *Al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, p. 51; Naqli, op. cit., p. 238
- <sup>96</sup> 'Awad, Muhammad Mu'nis, *Dirdsd't fee Tdreekh: al-Aldqdt bayn ash-Sharq wal-Gharb*, p. 67
- <sup>97</sup> Armstrong, Karen, *Holy War: The Crusades and their Impact on Today's World* (Random House, 2001), p. 35; Title in Arabic: *Al-Harb al-Muqaddasah al-Hamaltd as-Saleebiyah wa Athruha 'aid al-Alam al-Yawm*
- <sup>98</sup> 'Awad op. cit., p. 68
- <sup>99</sup> Bible verses in English taken from the King James Version (Translator)
- <sup>100</sup> 'Awad, op. cit., p. 69
- <sup>101</sup> 'Awad, op. cit., p. 69
- <sup>102</sup> 'Abdullah, Dr. Qasim, *Al-Khalafiyah al-Eediyulujiyah lil-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, pp. 24-25
- <sup>103</sup> Fans, *Duroos wa Ta'ammuldt fil-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, p. 18
- <sup>104</sup> 'Awad op. cit., p. 69
- <sup>105</sup> *ibid.*, p. 70
- <sup>106</sup> 'Awad op. cit., p. 70
- <sup>107</sup> Naqli, op. cit., p. 239
- <sup>108</sup> *La Civilisation des Arabes*, original quote translated in Naqli op. cit. p. 239

- <sup>109</sup> 'Awad op. cit., p. 21
- <sup>110</sup> Naqli op. cit., p. 240
- <sup>111</sup> *ibid.*, p. 240
- <sup>112</sup> *ibid.*, p. 240
- <sup>113</sup> Naqli op. cit., p. 241
- <sup>114</sup> Naqli op. cit., p. 241
- <sup>115</sup> *ibid.*, p. 241
- <sup>116</sup> *in shd'Allah*: God willing
- <sup>117</sup> 'Awad op. cit., p. 71
- <sup>118</sup> Naqli op. cit., p. 37
- <sup>119</sup> *ibid.*, p. 27
- <sup>120</sup> *Rdfidi* is a term used by Sunni scholars to refer to particularly deviant Shiite sects. (Editor)
- <sup>121</sup> As-Sallabi, *Dawlat as-Saldjiqah*, pp. 550-525
- <sup>122</sup> Salim, as-Sayyid 'Abd al-'Azeez, and Salim, Sahr 'Abd al-'Azeez, *Dirdsdt fee Tdreekh al-Ayubiyeen wal-Mamdleek*, p. 27
- <sup>123</sup> *ibid.*, p. 28
- <sup>124</sup> Salim & Salim op. cit., p. 31
- <sup>125</sup> *Batini* is a term (a pejorative one) used to refer to certain groups, such as the Alawis, the Ismailis, and the Sufis, who place great emphasis on the esoteric (batini or inner) meanings of the Qur'an. Al-Batiniyah is the term for the groups and the philosophy they espouse. (Editor)
- <sup>126</sup> *ibid.*, p. 31
- <sup>127</sup> Khaleefah, Jamal, *Mawqif Fuqahdd ash-Shdm wa Quddihd min al-Ghazw as-Saleebi*, p. 68
- <sup>128</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 93
- <sup>129</sup> *ibid.*, p. 93
- <sup>130</sup> Ibn al-Atheer, *Al-Kdmilfit-Tdreekh*, vol. 8, p. 397
- <sup>131</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 94
- <sup>132</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 95
- <sup>133</sup> *ibid.*, p. 95
- <sup>134</sup> *ibid.*, p. 96
- <sup>135</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 96
- <sup>136</sup> *ibid.*, p. 97
- <sup>137</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 97
- <sup>138</sup> *ibid.*, p. 98

- <sup>139</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 98
- <sup>140</sup> *jdhiliyah*: lit. 'ignorance'; the age of spiritual darkness before Islam
- <sup>141</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 98
- <sup>142</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 98
- <sup>143</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 99
- <sup>144</sup> ulema: Arabic plural form meaning 'scholars'
- <sup>145</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 93
- <sup>146</sup> *ibid.*, p. 93
- <sup>147</sup> *Al-Kamil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in Khaleefah op. cit.
- <sup>147</sup> *Al-Kamil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in Khaleefah op. cit.
- <sup>148</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 120
- <sup>149</sup> *Al-Kamil fit-Tareekh*, quoted in Khaleefah op. cit., p. 120
- <sup>150</sup> Sha'ban: the eighth month of the Islamic lunar calendar
- <sup>151</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 120 *ibid.*, p. 121 *ibid.*, p. 121
- <sup>154</sup> Ibn al-Atheer, *Al-Kamil fit-Tareekh*, vol. 8, p. 425
- <sup>155</sup> Khaleefah op. cit., p. 122
- <sup>156</sup> *ibid.*, p. 129
- <sup>157</sup> As-Sareesi, 'Umar, *Nusoos min Adah Asr al-Hurooh as-Saleebiyah*, p. 26
- <sup>158</sup> *al-Jazeerah*: the island
- <sup>159</sup> al-Ghamidi, Musfeer ibn Salim ibn 'Urayj, *Al-Jihad didd as-Saleebiyeen fish-Sharq al-Isldmi*, p. 123; Habashi, Hasan, *Noor ad-Deen Mahmood was-Saleebiyeen*, p. 11
- <sup>160</sup> Khaleel, 'Imad ad-Deen, *Al-Imdrdt al-Artuqiyah fish-Sham wal-Jazeerah*, p. 201
- <sup>161</sup> al-Ghamidi, M. op. cit., p. 137 *ibid.*, p. 138 *Ibid.*, p. 138
- Ibn al-Atheer, *Al-Kamil fit-Tareekh*, vol. 8, p. 400 Ibn al-Atheer op. cit., vol. 8, p. 400
- <sup>166</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>167</sup> Ibn al-Atheer op. cit., vol. 8, p. 400
- <sup>168</sup> al-Bayshawi, Sa'eed 'Abdullah & 'Awad, Muhammad Mu'nis, *Tdreekh Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, vol. 2, p. 328
- <sup>169</sup> *ibid.* vol. 2, p. 350 al-Ghamidi, M.,
- <sup>170</sup> *Al-Jihdddiddas-Saleebiyeen*, p. 140

- <sup>171</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>172</sup> al-Ghamidi, M. op. cit., p. 140
- <sup>173</sup> adh-Dhahabi, *Duwal al-Islam*, vol. 2, p. 250
- <sup>174</sup> Taqqoosh, Muhammad Suhayl, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawasil wa Bildd ash-Sham*, p. 62
- <sup>175</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>176</sup> p. 63 Khaleel
- <sup>177</sup> Imad ad-Deen, *Al-Muqdwamah al-Islamiyah lil-Ghazw as-Saleebi*, p. 95
- <sup>178</sup> Barker, Earnest, *Al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, vol. 2, pp. 71-72;
- <sup>179</sup> Khaleel op. cit., p. 96
- <sup>180</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>181</sup> p. 96 Khaleel op. cit., p. 97
- <sup>182</sup> Ibn al-Atheer, *Al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, vol. 8, p. 466
- <sup>183</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>184</sup> vol 8, p. 466; Khaleel
- <sup>185</sup> *Al-Muqdwamah al-Islamiyah lil-Ghazw as-Saleebi*, p. 97
- <sup>186</sup> Barker op. cit., p. 98
- <sup>187</sup> Khaleel op. cit., p. 99
- <sup>188</sup> Taqqoosh op. cit, p. 65
- <sup>189</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>190</sup> Khaleel op. cit., p. 100
- <sup>191</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>192</sup> p. 102
- <sup>369</sup> Mu'nis, op. cit., p. 167
- <sup>370</sup> Mu'nis, op. cit., p. 167
- <sup>371</sup> op. cit., p. 168
- <sup>372</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>373</sup> Armstrong, *al-Huroob al-Muqaddasah al-Hamaldt as-Saleebiyah wa Atharuha 'ala al-Alam al-Yawm*, p. 245  
[*Holy War: The Crusades and their Impact on Today's World*, p. 129]

- <sup>374</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 1, p. 157
- <sup>375</sup> Abu al-Hayja', *Shi'r al-Jihad ash-Shdmifee Muwdjahat as-Saleebiyeen*, p. 10
- <sup>376</sup> Taqqoosh, op. cit., p. 156
- <sup>377</sup> al-Qalanisi, op. cit., p. 280; Khaleel, op. cit., p. 156
- <sup>378</sup> op. cit., p. 157
- <sup>379</sup> Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij al-Kuroob fee Akhbdr Bani Ayyoob*, vol. 1, p. 96; Khaleel, op. cit., p. 157
- <sup>380</sup> Khaleel, p. 157
- <sup>381</sup> op. cit., p. 157
- <sup>382</sup> op. cit., p. 4
- <sup>383</sup> Ibn Wasil op. cit., vol. 1, p. 4; Khaleel op. cit, p. 159
- <sup>384</sup> Khaleel op. cit, p. 160
- <sup>385</sup> al-Qalanisi op. cit., p. 240, 241; Khaleel op. cit., p. 160
- <sup>386</sup> Khaleel op. cit, p. 160
- <sup>387</sup> Khaleel op. cit, p. 161
- <sup>388</sup> al-'Adeem, *Zubdat al-Halab*, vol. 2, p. 252
- <sup>389</sup> al-Jazar: an area on the outskirts of Aleppo; *Mu'jam al-Bulddn*, vol. 2, p. 71
- <sup>390</sup> al-'Adeem op. cit., vol. 2, p. 254; Khaleel, *Imddad-Deen Zanki*, p. 161
- <sup>391</sup> al-Qalanisi op. cit., p. 255-256; Khaleel, *Imdd ad-Deen Zanki*, p. 161
- <sup>392</sup> al-Urayni, *al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, vol. 1, p. 510; Khaleel op. cit., p. 161
- <sup>393</sup> Khaleel, *Imdd ad-Deen Zanki*, p. 162; al-'Adeem op. cit., vol. 2, p. 263
- <sup>394</sup> Ibn al-Atheer, *Al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in, Khaleel op. cit., p. 162
- <sup>395</sup> al-'Adeem op. cit, vol. 2, p. 271; Khaleel op. cit, p. 162
- <sup>396</sup> al-'Adeem op. cit., vol. 2, p. 275; Khaleel, *Imddad-Deen Zanki*, p. 162
- <sup>397</sup> Khaleel op. cit., p. 163; al-'Adeem op. cit., vol. 2, p. 275
- <sup>398</sup> al-'Adeem op. cit., vol. 2, p. 276; Khaleel op. cit., p. 163
- <sup>399</sup> al-Qalanisi op. cit., p. 278; al-'Adeem, *Zubdat al-Halab*, vol. 2, p. 277, 278
- <sup>400</sup> al-'Adeem op. cit., vol. 2, p. 278; Khaleel, *Imdd ad-Deen Zanki*, p. 163
- <sup>401</sup> Khaleel, *Imdd ad-Deen Zanki*, p. 165

- <sup>402</sup> Khaleel, *'Imdd ad-Deen Zanki*, p. 166
- <sup>403</sup> Khaleel op. cit.
- <sup>405</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mosul wa Bildd al-Shdm*, p. 171
- <sup>406</sup> Boosayni, 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad, *Dawr Noor ad-Deen fee Nahdat al-Ummah*, p. 94
- <sup>407</sup> Boosayni op. cit., p. 94 *ibid.* Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh Saldjiqah ar-Room fee Asiya as-Sughrd*, p. 146 *ibid.*
- <sup>411</sup> al-Qalanisi, *Dhayl Tdreekh Dimashq*, p. 197
- <sup>412</sup> Taqqoosh op. cit., p. 146
- <sup>413</sup> op. cit., p. 147
- <sup>414</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>415</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh Saldjiqah ar-Room fee Asiya as-Sughrd*, p. 147
- <sup>416</sup> Boosayni op. cit., p. 95
- <sup>417</sup> op. cit., p. 95 op. cit., p. 96 op. cit., p. 96
- <sup>420</sup> *ifaeefa al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, p. 523
- <sup>421</sup> Habashi, *Noor ad-Deen Mahmood*, p. 212-213 Boosayni op. cit., p. 151
- <sup>422</sup> Runciman, *Tdreekh al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, vol. 2, p. 407-409
- <sup>424</sup> The crosses were to be sewn on to their clothes as a sign that they had 'taken up the cross' and had vowed to make the pilgrimage-cum-crusade. (Editor)
- <sup>425</sup> Naqli, *Dawr al-Fuqahd' wal-'Ulamd' fil Jihad*, p. 254
- <sup>426</sup> op. cit., p. 255
- <sup>427</sup> <sup>428</sup> *ibid. ibid.*
- <sup>429</sup> al-Hanbali, Ibn al-'Imad, *Shadhardt al-Dhahab*, vol. 6, p. 219
- <sup>430</sup> <sup>431</sup> *Tdreekh al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, vol. 2, p. 255
- Ibn al-Atheer, *At-Tdreekh al-Bdhir fid-Dawlah al-Atdbikiyah bil-Mawsil*, p. 89; Boosayni op. cit., p. 96
- <sup>432</sup> Mu'nis, Husayn, *Noor ad-Deen Mahmood*, p. 96
- <sup>433</sup> Boosayni, *Dawr Noor ad-Deen fee Nahdat al-Ummah*, p. 97
- <sup>434</sup> Khaleefah, *Mawqif Fuqahd' ash-Sham wa Quddiha min al-Ghazw as-Saleebi*, p. 125
- <sup>435</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 1, p. 190
- <sup>436</sup> Naqli op. cit., p. 117

- <sup>437</sup> cf. Qur'an 37: 44; 'Adan = Eden, or paradise (Translator)
- <sup>438</sup> Mu'nis, *al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah al-'Aldqdt bayna ash-Sharq wal-Gharb*, p.184
- <sup>439</sup> op. cit., p. 184
- <sup>440</sup> op. cit., p. 185
- <sup>441</sup> Mu'nis op. cit., p. 185
- <sup>442</sup> Boosayni, *Dawr Noor ad-Deen Mahmood fee Nahdat al-Ummah*, p. 97
- <sup>443</sup> op. cit., p. 98
- <sup>444</sup> Ghanaya, Maraji' 'Aqeelah, *as-Suqooty* p. 136
- <sup>445</sup> as-Sallabi, *ad-Dawlah al-Fatimiyah al-'Ubaydiyyah*, p. 35
- <sup>446</sup> al-Baghdadi, 'Abd al-Qahir, *al-Faraq bayna al-Firaq*, p. 62
- <sup>447</sup> Shahrastani, Muhammad 'Abd al-Kareem, *al-Milal wan-Nihal*, vol. 1, p. 191
- <sup>448</sup> op. cit., vpl. 1, p. 192
- <sup>449</sup> al-Ghunaymi, 'Abd al-Fattah, *Mawsoo'ah al-Maghrib al-'Arabi*, vol. 2, p. 60
- <sup>450</sup> op. cit., vol. 2, p. 70
- <sup>451</sup> *madh-hab*: school of juristic thought
- <sup>452</sup> adh-Dhahabi, *Siydr A'ldm an-Nubala* vol. 15, p. 141
- <sup>453</sup> op. cit., vol. 15, p. 142
- <sup>454</sup> az-Zawi, at-Tahir Ahmad, *Tdreekh al-Fath al-'Arabi fee Leebya*, p. 253
- <sup>455</sup> as-Sallabi, *ad-Dawlah al-Fatimiyah al-'Ubaydiyyah*, p. 47
- <sup>456</sup> at-Tihami, Ibraheem, *Juwould 'Ulamd' al-Maghrib fid-Difd' 'an 'Aqeedat Ahl as-Sunnah*, p. 291
- <sup>457</sup> <sup>458</sup> Qadi 'Iyad, *Tarteeb al-Maddrik*, vol. 2, p. 318
- <sup>460</sup> <sup>461</sup> ibid. at-Tihami op. cit., p. 291
- ibid. Shahbah, Taqi ad-Deen, *al-Kawakib ad-Durriyah fis-Seerah an-Nooriyah*, p. 204-205
- <sup>462</sup> al-Marakashi, *al-Baydn al-Mugharrib*, vol. 1, p. 258, 259
- <sup>463</sup> al-Mustafa: the chosen one
- <sup>464</sup> al-Marakashi, *al-Baydn al-Mugharrib*, vol. 1, p. 221
- <sup>465</sup> Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad *Kitdb at-Tawheed*, p. 90
- <sup>466</sup> at-Tihami op. cit., p. 312



- <sup>467</sup> Shawat, al-Husayn, *Madrasat al-Hadeeth bil-Qayrawdn*, vol. 1, p. 76
- <sup>468</sup> al-Maliki, *Riydd an-Nufoos fee Tabaqdt 'Ulamd' al-Qayrawdn wa Ifreeqiyah*, vol. 2, p. 56
- <sup>469</sup> *adhnd*: the call to prayer
- <sup>470</sup> at-Tihami, *Juwould 'Ulamd' al-Maghrib fid-Dijf' 'an 'Aqeedat Ahl as-Sunnah*, p. 309
- <sup>471</sup> al-Marakashi, *al-Baydn al-Maghrib*, vol. 1, p. 182-183
- <sup>472</sup> Qadi 'Iyad, *Tarteeb al-Maddrik*, vol. 2, p. 525-528
- <sup>473</sup> op. cit., vol. 2, p. 526
- <sup>474</sup> al-Maliki, Abu Bakr, *Riydd an-Nufoos*, vol. 2, p. 29
- <sup>475</sup> op. cit., vol. 2, p. 423
- <sup>476</sup> Shawat, *Madrasat al-Hadeeth bi'l-Qayrawdn*, vol. 1, p. 76
- <sup>477</sup> *zakah*:
- <sup>478</sup> al-Maliki, *Riydd an-Nufoos*, vol. 2, p. 504
- <sup>479</sup> Shawat, *Madrasat al-Qayrawdn*, vol. 1, p. 73
- <sup>480</sup> *Eid (eed)*: lit. festival; the two celebrations: one at the end of Ramadan and the other at the culmination of the Hajj
- <sup>481</sup> *khutbah*: sermon or speech; specifically, the sermon given during the Friday congregational prayer
- <sup>482</sup> adh-Dhahabi, *SiydrA'ldm an-Nubald'*, vol. 15, p. 374
- <sup>483</sup> Almoravids were from a Berber dynasty that organised itself around military preparedness and discipline, especially for Jihad. Their Arabic name, al-murabit(oon), means 'ready for battle'. (Editor) al-Maliki, *Riydd an-Nufoos*, vol. 2, p. 29
- al-'Abdah, Muhammad *Ayu'eedat-TdreekhNafsahu?*, p. 39 Mu'nis, Husayn, in his Introduction to al-Maliki's *Riydd an-Nufoos*, p. 17 al-Marakashi op. cit., vol. 1, p. 277
- ad-Dabbagh, 'Abd ar-Rahman, *Ma'dlim al-Eemdn*, vol. 3, p. 237 op. cit., vol. 3, p. 71 at-Tihami op. cit., p. 324
- ibid. ibid.
- Iyad, *Tarteeb al-Maddrik*, vol. 2, p. 517-524; Makhloof, Muhammad *Shajarat an-Noor az-Zankiyah*, vol. 1, p. 95-96 one of the officials of the 'Ubaydi state ad-Dabbagh, *Ma'dlim al-Eeman*, vol. 3, p. 113 i.e., he accepts only the orthodox version of Sunni Islam (Editor)
- ibid. *fitnah*: lit. trial, temptation; (attempting to sow) discord between Muslims ad-Dabbagh, *Ma'dlim al-Eemdn*, vol. 3, p. 91 at-Tihami op. cit., p. 328 *Tabaqdt al-Khushani*, p. 199; ad-Dabbagh, *Ma'dlim al-Eemdn*, vol. 2, p.
- 209 Al-Maliki, *Riydd an-Nufoos*, vol 2, p. 75
- Ad-Dabbagh, *Ma'dlim al-Eemdn*, vol. 2, p. 298; at-Tihami, *Juwould 'Ulama' al-Maghreb*, p. 329

- Sunan at-Tirmidhi wa Tuhfat al-Ahwadhi*, hadith no. 3797, an odd but reliable hadith
- <sup>507</sup> *Ibid.* at-Tihami, *Juwould 'Ulama' al-Maghrib fil-Difd' an 'Aqeedat Ahl as-Sunnah*, p. 331
- <sup>507</sup> ad-Dabbagh, *Ma'dlim al-Eemdn*, vol. 2, p. 185; at-Tihami, *Juwould 'Ulama' al-Maghrib*, p. 337
- <sup>508</sup> al-Maliki, *Riydd an-Nufoos*, vol. 2, p. 169-172
- <sup>509</sup> *qibla (qiblah)*: the bearing from the Kaaba to any point on Earth; the direction that all Muslims must face in prayer
- <sup>510</sup> Kharijites were originally supporters of the fourth caliph, 'Ali ibn Abi Talib. However, his submission to an arbitration in 657 CE when confronted with the refusal of the governor of Syria, Mu'awiyah, to pledge him allegiance was considered proof of his forfeiture of the caliphate. They subsequently withdrew to Nahrawan, east of the Tigris, thus earning the name *khariji*, 'one who goes out'. <sup>4</sup>Ali himself was killed by a Kharijite in 661. (Editor)
- <sup>511</sup> as-Sallabi, *ad-Dawlah al-Fatimiyah al-'Ubaydiyyah*, p. 78
- <sup>5.2</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>513</sup> ad-Dabbagh, *Ma'dlim al-Eemdn*, vol. 3, p. 37-43
- <sup>514</sup> al-Marakashi op. cit., vol. 1, p. 218
- <sup>5.5</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>516</sup> at-Tihami, *Juwould 'Ulama' al-Maghrib fil-Difd' an 'Aqeedat Ahl as-Sunnah*, p. 344
- <sup>517</sup> al-Marakashi op. cit., vol. 1, p. 268
- <sup>518</sup> Qadi 'Iyad, *Tarteeb al-Maddrik*, vol. 2, p. 625
- <sup>519</sup> at-Tihami op. cit., p. 349
- <sup>520</sup> <sup>521</sup> *ibid.* *ibid.*
- <sup>522</sup> al-Maliki, *Riydd an-Nufoos*, vol. 2, p. 494, 495
- <sup>523</sup> al-Muzayni, Salih, *Leebyd mundhu al-Fath al-'Arabi hatta Intiqdl al-Khildfah al-Fatimiyah ild Misr*, p. 362 *ibid.*
- <sup>525</sup> adh-Dhahabi, *Siydr A'ldm an-Nubald*, vol. 15, pp. 113-114 <sup>526</sup> adh-Dhahabi op. cit., vol. 18, p. 140
- <sup>527</sup> az-Zawi, Tahir, *Tdreekh al-Fath al-'Arabi fee Leebyd*, p. 289
- <sup>528</sup> az-Zawi op. cit., pp. 290-291
- <sup>529</sup> as-Sallabi, *Dawlat as-Saldjiqah*, p. 54
- <sup>530</sup> Akhbar ad-Duwal al-Munqati'ah, vol. 3, p. 430
- <sup>531</sup> al-Maqreezi, *Al-Mawd'idh wal Vitidr hi Dhikr al-Khutat waUthdr*, vol. 1, p. 439

- <sup>532</sup> Ibn Katheer, *al-Biddyah wan-Nihdyah*, vol. 15, p. 759
- <sup>533</sup> as-Sallabi, *Dawlat as-Saldjiqah*, p. 82
- <sup>534</sup> as-Sallabi, *Dawlat as-Saldjiqah*, p. 68
- <sup>535</sup> op. cit., p. 68
- <sup>536</sup> op. cit., p. 291
- <sup>537</sup> op. cit., p. 291
- <sup>538</sup> Abul-Futooh, 'Abd al-Majeed, *at-Tdreekh as-Siydsi wal-Fikri*, p. 179
- <sup>539</sup> Abul-Futooh, *at-Tdreekh as-Siydsi wal-Fikri*, p. 179
- <sup>540</sup> ibid.
- <sup>541</sup> Mahboobah, 'Abd al-Hadi, *Nizam al-Mulk*, p. 401
- <sup>542</sup> *khateeb*: sermon-giver; the person who gives the weekly sermon at the Friday congregational prayer, and leads that prayer
- <sup>543</sup> *Tabaqat ash-Shdfi'iyah*, vol. 3, p. 89
- <sup>544</sup> as-Sallabi, *Dawlat as-Saldjiqah wal-Mashroo' al-Isldmi li Muqdwamat al-Taghalghul al-Bdtini wal-Ghazw as-Saleebi*, p. 203
- <sup>545</sup> as-Sallabi, *Dawlat as-Saldjiqah*, p. 304 op. cit., p. 380
- <sup>547</sup> An-Nadawi, Abul-Hasan, *Rijdl al-Fikr wad-Da'wah*, vol. 1, p. 204; al-Qaradawi Yoosuf, *Al-Imam al-Ghazdli: bayna Mddiheehi*
- <sup>548</sup> *wa Ndqideehi*, p. 57
- <sup>549</sup> *Al-Jihdd: min al-Hijrah ild ad-Da wah wad-Dawlah*, p. 147 Al-Qaradawi op. cit., p. 60 op. c it., p. 62
- <sup>550</sup> 'Awad, *Farm as-Sird' al-Islami*, p. 83 al-Maqreezi
- <sup>551</sup> , *Itti'dz al-Hunafa'*, vol. 3, p. 202
- <sup>552</sup> adh-Dhahabi
- <sup>553</sup> , *Siydr A'ldm an-Nubald'*, vol. 20, p. 282
- <sup>555</sup> 'Awad cit., p. 84 ibid.
- <sup>556</sup> an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 195
- <sup>557</sup> an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 196
- <sup>558</sup> op. cit., p. 197
- <sup>559</sup> al-Huwayri, Mahmood Muhammad. *Misr wash-Sham fee 'Ahd al-Ayyoobiyeen wal-Mamdleek*, p. 13
- <sup>560</sup> *al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in: an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 198
- <sup>561</sup> ibid.

- <sup>562</sup> an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 198
- <sup>563</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil wa Bildd ash-Sham*, p. 328
- <sup>564</sup> Ibn Shaddad, Baha' ad-Deen, *an-Nawddir as-Sulddniyah wal-Mahdsin al-Yoosufiyah*, p. 76
- <sup>565</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil wa Bildd ash-Sham*, p. 329
- <sup>566</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil wa Bildd ash-Sham*, p. 329
- <sup>567</sup> Ibn al-Atheer, *At-Tdreekh al-Bdhir*, pp. 121-122; Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 330
- <sup>568</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 330
- <sup>569</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>570</sup> *Al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in: Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 331
- <sup>571</sup> Faqoos: a city in eastern Egypt
- <sup>572</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 331
- <sup>573</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>574</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>575</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 332
- <sup>576</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 332
- <sup>577</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>578</sup> Ibn Tagharri, Yoosuf, *An-Nujoom adh-Dhdhirah fee Mulook Misr wal-Qdhirah*, vol. 5, p. 348
- <sup>579</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 342
- <sup>580</sup> Al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 13
- <sup>581</sup> *al-Kdmil fVt-Tdreekh*, quoted in: Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 342
- <sup>582</sup> Ibn Wasil, Jamal ad-Deen Muhammad Mufarrij al-Kuroob, vol. 1, p. 149;
- Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 343
- <sup>583</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zangiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 343
- <sup>584</sup> *al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 343
- <sup>585</sup> *al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 344
- <sup>586</sup> William of Tyre, *Tdreekh al-A'mdl al-Munjazah [Gesta Orientalum]*, vol. 2, p. 896
- op. cit., *al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 344
- <sup>587</sup> op. cit., vol. 2, p. 899; Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 344

- <sup>590</sup> Ibn al-Atheer op. cit., pp. 132-133; al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 13
- <sup>591</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 14
- <sup>592</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil*, p. 350
- <sup>593</sup> op. cit., p. 351
- <sup>594</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh al-Fdtimiyeen*, p. 494
- <sup>595</sup> op. cit., p. 495
- <sup>596</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh al-Fdtimiyeen*, p. 495
- <sup>597</sup> Ibn Tagharri op. cit., vol. 5, p. 349 Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh al-Fdtimiyeen*, p. 495
- an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 202. Ra's al-Ma' is in the region of Hawran.
- al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 55 al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 56
- <sup>598</sup> Taqqoosh, Muhammad Suhayl, *Tdreekh al-Fdtimiyeen*, p. 504
- <sup>599</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., quoted in: an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 202
- <sup>604</sup> *al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in: an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 202
- <sup>605</sup> *Al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in: an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 202
- <sup>606</sup> an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 203
- <sup>610</sup> Zakkar, Suhayl al – Mawsoo'lah Vol 24, P. 23
- <sup>608</sup> ibid.
- <sup>609</sup> The Mamelukes were a military slave caste, mainly of Turkish origin, who served the Abbasids, and then the Ishkidids and the Fatimids. They at one point in history became the rulers of Egypt. (Editor) Zakkar, Suhayl, *al-Mawsoo'ah ash-Shdmilah*, vol. 24, p. 73 op. cit., p. 205
- <sup>612</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh al-Fdtimiyeen*, p. 509; al-Qurashi, *al-Biddyah wan-Nihdyah*, vol. 16, p. 433
- <sup>613</sup> *al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*, quoted in: Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh al-Fdtimiyeen*, p. 510
- <sup>614</sup> Ibn Katheer, *al-Biddyah wa'n-Nihdyah*, vol. 16, p. 434
- <sup>615</sup> *at-Tawdshi*: the Tawashiyah were eunuchs who served the sultan's womenfolk, and they were widely respected.
- <sup>616</sup> 'Abd al-Hadi, Jamal, and Rif at, Wafa' Muhammad *Ar-Tareeq ild Bayt al-Maqdis*, p. 91
- <sup>617</sup> Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, *Al-Qadi al-Fadil 'Abd ar-Raheem al-Baysdni*, p. 130, 131
- <sup>618</sup> op. cit., p. 133
- <sup>619</sup> ibid.

<sup>620</sup> al-Asqalani op. cit., p. 126

<sup>623</sup> an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 207 ibid.

Boosayni, *Dawr Noor ad-Deen Mahmood fee Nahdat al-Ummah*, p. 160

624 an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 208

625 Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil wa Bildd ash-Sham*, p. 379

626 Ibn Katheer, *al-Bidyyah wan-Nihdyah*, vol. 16, p. 440

627 Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh az-Zankiyeen fil-Mawsil wa Bildd ash-Sham*, p. 380;

628 'Imran, Mahmood, *Ma'dlim Tdreekh al-Imbirdtooriyah al-Bayzantiyah*, p.330

629 Taqqoosh op. cit., 380

630 ibid.

631 Taqqoosh op. cit., p. 381

632 Taqqoosh op. cit, p. 381

633 op. cit., p. 382 Boosayni op. cit., p. 115

634 Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij al-Kuroob*, vol. 1, p. 186

635 op. cit., p. 116

636 Ibid

637 al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 1, p. 304

638 al-Maqdisi op. cit, vol. 2, p. 248

639 op. cit., vol. 2, p. 252

640 op. cit., vol. 2, p. 249

641 Zakkar, *al-Mawsoo'ah ash-Shdmilah fi Tdreekh al-Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, vol. 24, p. 146

642 al-Maqdisi op. cit., quoted in: an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 209 al-Maqdisi op. cit., quoted in: an-Nasir, *al-Jihdd wat-Tajdeed*, p. 215  
ibid.

649 quoted in Qal'aji, Qadri, *Saldh ad-Deen al-Ayyoobi*, p. 161

650 ibid.

651 al-Asqalani, p. 137

652 Sayyid, Ahmad, *Tdreekh Misr al-Isldmiyah zamdn Saldteen Bani Ayyoob*, p. 59

653 al-Asqalani, p. 139  
654 ibid..  
655 ibid  
656 Ibn Katheer, *al-Bidyyah wan-Nihdyah*, vol. 16, p. 451  
646 al-Maqreezi op. cit., vol. 3, p. 317  
647 al-Asqalani op. cit., p. 137  
648 Al-Maqreezi, *Al-Mawd'idh wal Tiibr bi Dhikr al-Khutut wal Athdr*, Qal'aji op. cit., p. 161  
657 op. cit., vol. 16, p. 451  
658 *Al-Maqdisi op. cit. Al-Maqdisi op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 195  
704 A siege device comprising a movable arched screen that protects the besiegers' approach to a wall.  
705 *al-Kdmilfit-Tdreekh*, quoted in: Husayn, *al-Jaysh al-Ayyoobi*, p.383  
679 ; al-Asqalani op. cit., p. 137  
<sup>659</sup> Ay as: a city in Armenia on the coast Sis: the capital of Armenia.  
<sup>660</sup> *Subh al-A'sha*, vol. 4, p. 134 Ibn Katheer, *al-Bidyyah wan-Nihdyah*,  
<sup>661</sup> vol. 16, p. 457 al-Hayara, Mustafa, *Saldh ad-Deen al-Qd'id wa*  
<sup>662</sup> *Asruhu*, p. 168 al-Maqdisi op. cit, vol. 2, p. 282 ibid.  
<sup>663</sup> al-Asqalani op. cit., p. 146 <sup>666</sup> ibid; Ibn Wasil  
<sup>664</sup> op. cit., vol. 1, p. 244, 245 al-Asqalani, p. 146  
<sup>665</sup> al-Hayara op. cit, p. 169 al-Maqdisi op. cit., 667vol. 2, p. 278 al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 287 668op. cit., vol. 2, p. 288 al-Hayara op. cit.,  
p. 170 669al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 287 ibid.  
670 al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 287  
<sup>677</sup> ibid.  
<sup>678</sup> ibid.  
al-Hayara op. cit., p. 172  
al-Hayara, *Saldh ad-Deen al-Qd'id wa 'Asruhu*, quoting from al-Maqdisi op. cit., p. 172  
ibid.  
<sup>683</sup> ibid  
al-Maqdisi op. cit. *Al-Maqdisi op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 289

- <sup>684</sup> al-Hayara op. cit., p. 173
- <sup>685</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 290
- Al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 290
- ibid.
- <sup>686</sup> al-Hayara op. cit., p. 173
- <sup>689</sup> al-Hayara op. cit., p. 173
- <sup>690</sup> adh-Dhahabi, *Siydr A'ldm an-Nubald* vol. 20, pp. 594, 595 Ibn Wasil op. cit., vol. 1, p. 212 adh-Dhahabi op. cit., vol. 20, p. 596
- ibid. al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 293
- Bihar al-Anwdr*, vol. 60, p. 208; *Tafseer al-Qummi*, p. 596 *Tafseer al-'Aydshi*, vol. 1, p. 304; *al-Burhdn*, vol. 1, p. 456
- Tafseer al-'Aydshi*, vol. 1, p. 305; *al-Burhdn*, vol. 1, p. 457 *Bihar al-Anwdr*, vol. 60, p. 211; al-Qifari, 'Ali, *Usool Usool ash-Shee'ah*, vol. 2, p. 900
- Bihar al-Anwdr*, vol. 5, p. 208
- Muslim, vol. 2, p. 2970
- Husayn, Muhsin Muhammad *al-Jaysh al-Ayyoohi fi 'Ahd Salah ad-Deen*, p. 382 as-Sayyid, Mahmood, *Tdreekh al-Qabd'il al-'Arabiyah fi 'Asr ad-Dawlatayn al-Ayyoobiyah wal-Mamlookiyah*, p. 80 op. cit., p. 81
- <sup>706</sup> ibid.
- <sup>707</sup> ibid.
- <sup>708</sup> Ibn Shaddad, *Seerat Salah ad-Deen*, p. 47, 48; *al-Kdmil fit-Tdreekh*,
- <sup>710</sup> 'Alwan, *Salah ad-Deen*, p. 38
- <sup>712</sup> 'Alwan, 'Abd-Allah, *Salah ad-Deen*, p. 38 Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah Zaman Saldteen Bani Ayub*, p. 56 ibid.
- Wilalyah was the concept that the caliph was the divinely-ordained ruler, who was carrying out God's commands. (Editor)
- <sup>713</sup> Al-Maqdisi op. cit., quoted in: Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah*, p. 56
- <sup>714</sup> op. cit., p. 57
- <sup>715</sup> ibid.
- <sup>716</sup> ibid.
- <sup>717</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., quoted in: Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah*, p. 185
- <sup>718</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah Zaman Saldteen Bani Ayub*, p. 60, 61



- <sup>719</sup> op. cit., p. 93
- <sup>720</sup> al-Maqreezi, *al-Khutat*, vol. 4, p. 53
- <sup>721</sup> al-Maqreezi, *al-Khutat*, vol. 4, p. 46; Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah*, p. 93
- <sup>722</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah*, p. 93
- <sup>723</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah*, p. 94 op. cit., p. 97
- <sup>724</sup> ibid.
- <sup>725</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 210;
- <sup>726</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah*, p.61
- <sup>727</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah*, p. 61 op. cit., p. 62
- <sup>728</sup> ibid.
- <sup>729</sup> Brockelmann, Carl, *Tdreekh ash-Shu'oob al-Islamiyah*, pp. 63-65
- <sup>730</sup> op. cit., p. 66
- <sup>731</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 210 Brockelmann,
- <sup>732</sup> *Tdreekh ash-Shu'oob al-Islamiyah*, p. 66
- <sup>733</sup> al- 'Imdrah al- Arabiyah fee Misr al-Islamiyah, pp. 324-326
- <sup>734</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah*, p. 68
- <sup>736</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., quoted in: Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah*, p. 70
- <sup>737</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 214-223
- <sup>738</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah*, p. 76
- <sup>739</sup> "The institution of the hisbah has been generally understood as oneseekingto ensure correct economic and commercial practices among the Muslim." Muhammad 'Umar Memon. 'Review of *Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of the Hisba* by', (trans.) *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Feb., 1985), pp. 141-142. (Translator)
- <sup>740</sup> Boosayni, *Dawr Noor ad-Deen fi Nahdat al-Ummah*, p. 118
- <sup>741</sup> *Hdkadhha Dhdhara J eel ad-Deen Salah ad-Deen*, quoted in: Boosayni, *Dawr Noor ad-Deen fee Nahdat al-Ummah*, p. 118
- <sup>742</sup> Boosayni, *Dawr Noor ad-Deen fi Nahdat al-Ummah*, p. 118
- <sup>743</sup> *al-Bdhir*, p. 158; Boosayni, *Dawr Noor ad-Deen fi Nahdat al-Ummah*, p. 118
- <sup>744</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., quoted in an-Nasir, *al-Jihad wat-Tajdeed*, p. 213

- <sup>745</sup> an-Nasir, *al-Jihad wat-Tajdeed*, p. 213 Boosayni, *Dawr Noor ad-Deen fi Nahdat al-Ummah*, p. 118 al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 228
- <sup>746</sup> ibid.
- <sup>747</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 229
- <sup>748</sup> op. cit., vol. 2, p. 228
- <sup>749</sup> ibid. ibid.
- <sup>750</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh al-Ayyoobiyeen fee Misr wal Bildd ash-Sham*, p. 46
- <sup>751</sup> as-Saroori, Muhammad *Tdreekh al-Yaman al-Isldmi*, p. 211 Taqqoosh,
- <sup>752</sup> *Tdreekh al-Ayyoobiyeen fi Misr wa Bildd ash-Sham*, p. 48
- <sup>753</sup> 'Abd al-Hadi, Jamal, and Rif at, Wafa' Muhammad *At-Tareeq ild Bayt al- Maqdis*, p. 96
- <sup>754</sup> ibid. ibid.
- <sup>755</sup> Taqqoosh, *Tdreekh al-Ayyoobiyeen fee Misr wa Bildd ash-Sham*, p. 49
- <sup>756</sup> Mara'i, Farast, *Jihad al-Ayyoobiyeen wal-Mamdleek didd as-Saleebiyeen wal- Maghool*, p. 52
- <sup>757</sup> Ibn al-Atheer, op. cit., p. 158, 159;
- <sup>758</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p.227
- <sup>759</sup> as-Sartawi, Mahmood, *Noor ad-Deen Zanki fil-Adab al-Arabi fee 'Asr al- Huroob as-Saleebiyah*, p. 116
- <sup>760</sup> as-Sartawi op. cit., p. 117
- <sup>761</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 117, 118
- <sup>762</sup> Jibrān, Mu'man Mahmood, and al-'Imadi, Muhammad Hasan, *Dirdsah fee Tdreekh al-Ayyoobiyeen wal-Mamdleek*, p. 62
- <sup>763</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Isldmiyah zamdn Saldteen Bani Ayyoob*, p. 22
- <sup>764</sup> ibid.
- <sup>765</sup> Ibn al-Jawzi, Sibṭ, *Mar'dt az-Zamdn*, vol. 8, pp. 327, 328;
- <sup>766</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Isldmiyah*, p. 22
- <sup>767</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., quoted in: Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Isldmiyah*, p. 23
- <sup>768</sup> ibid.
- <sup>769</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., quoted in: Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Isldmiyah*, p. 23
- <sup>770</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Isldmiyah*, p. 24
- <sup>771</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., quoted in: Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Isldmiyah*, p. 24

- <sup>772</sup> al-Maqreezi, *as-Sulook*, vol. 1, p. 45;
- <sup>773</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islmiyah*, p.24
- <sup>774</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islamiyah*, p. 24
- <sup>775</sup> Ibn Wasil, vol. 1, p. 219
- <sup>776</sup> Sayyid, p. 25
- <sup>777</sup> al-Maqreezi, *as-Sulook*, vol. 1, p. 47;
- <sup>778</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islami*, p. 26
- <sup>779</sup> Ibn Wasil op. cit., vol. 1, p. 235;
- <sup>780</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islmiyah*, p. 27 Ibn Wasil op. cit., vol. 1, p. 235
- <sup>781</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islmiyah*, p. 27 Ibn Wasil op. cit., vol. 1, p. 235;
- <sup>782</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islmiyah*, p. 27 Ibn Wasil op. cit., vol. 1, p. 228;
- <sup>783</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islmiyah*, p. 27 al-Maqdisi op. cit., quoted in: Brockelmann, *Tdreekh ash-Shu'oob al-Islmiyah*, p. 27
- <sup>784</sup> as-Sulook, vol. 1, p. 55; Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islmiyah*, p. 28 al-Maqdisi op.
- <sup>786</sup> cit., quoted in: Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islmiyah*, p. 28
- <sup>787</sup> Sayyid, *Tdreekh Misr al-Islmiyah*, p. 28
- <sup>788</sup> Ibn al-'Adeem, *Zubdat al-Halab*, vol. 2, p. 339
- <sup>789</sup> as-Sartawi op. cit., p. 119
- <sup>790</sup> ; as-Sartawi op. cit., p. 119
- <sup>791</sup> al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 308
- <sup>792</sup> ibid. ibid. al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 309
- op. cit., vol. 2, p. 310 op. cit., vol. 2, p. 313 al-Maqdisi op. cit., vol. 2, p. 313 adh-Dhahabi, *Siydr A'ldm an-Nubald* vol. 20, p. 537

**Bibliography of Salahudeen can be found in Volume 3.**

# Appendix A

## Timeline of Major Events

**296 AH:** Ubayd-Allah al-Mahdi sets up Shiite Fatimid

Caliphate in North Africa death of Abul Hasan al-Ash'ari — the scholar whose Sunni beliefs were followed by the Ayubid state

**358 AH:** Fatimids enter Egypt

**443 AH:** Demise of Fatimid State in North Africa title of Manzikert —  
Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan deals a blow to the Byzantine forces

**479 AH:** The Battle of Sagrajas — Almoravids victory against Spanish Christians in Andalusia

**488 AH:** Pope Urban II's speech that roused support for the first crusade  
Beginning of the first crusade 490 AH: Franks seize Antioch

**492 AH:** Jerusalem occupied by Crusaders title of Merzifon — Seljuk Turks victory over the Crusaders

**494 AH:** The first Battle of Heraclea — William, Count of Nevers, was dealt a total loss by the Seljuk Turks  
The second Battle of Heraclea — French and German armies led by William IX Duke of Aquitaine and  
Welf IV Duke of Bavaria are defeated by the Seljuks.

**497 AH:** The Battle of Balikh — The Principality of Antioch and the County of Edessa under Crusader rule fought against the  
Seljuk Turks. The outcome was victory for the Muslims.

**500 AH:** The death of Kilij Arslan, the ruler of the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum

**513 AH:** The Battle of Ager Sanguinis (The Field of Blood)

— Muslim victory over the Crusaders. The sheer amount of deaths on the side of the Crusaders inspired the name, 'Field of Blood.'

**532 AH:** The birth of Salah Ad Deen Al – Ayubi

**539 AH:** The conquest of Edessa by Imad ad Deen Zangi

Jacobite Bishop Basil handed the city over to Zangi after 30 days of siege.

**542 AH:** Beginning of 2<sup>nd</sup> Crusade

The Seljuks destroy the German army — Sultan Mas'ood, Emir of the Seljuks of Rum, handed defeat to the Germans under Konrad III.

**543 AH:** Muslim victory of Damascus against Frankish forces of King Louis VII

**559 AH:** -Deen Zangi's first campaign against Egypt

— to secure Egypt from Fatimid control (Salah ad-Deen, at age 17, joined this venture)

adDeen Zangi's second campaign against Egypt — Shawar, vizier of Cairo, sought help from Amalric I,

King of Jerusalem against Noor ad-Deen, but help did not come and Noor ad-Deen took control of western part of the country.

**562 AH:** The Battle of Babayn — The Franks and the Egyptians were defeated by the cunning military expertise of

Noor ad-Deen's commander, Salah ad-Deen's uncle, Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh. The siege of Alexandria — Asad ad-Deen gained control without fighting. Salah ad-Deen appointed deputy in Alexandria

**564 AH:** Noor ad-Deen Zangi's third campaign against Egypt resulting in control of Egypt by Noor ad-Deen. Salah ad-Deen becomes vizier in Cairo

**565 AH:** The siege of Damietta — Franks besiege the city and Salah ad-Deen defends it ending in the defeat of the Franks.

**567 AH:** The death of the Fatimid ruler of Egypt, al-'Adid Abolishment of the Shiite Fatimid Caliphate Salah ad-Deen becomes ruler of Egypt Revival of Abbasid caliphate by Salah ad-Deen

**568 AH:** The death of Najm ad-Deen Ayub, Salah ad-Deen's father

**569 AH:** The death of Noor ad-Deen Zangi Salah ad-Deen conquers Yemen

**570 AH:** The Ayubid state begins First Shiite attempt to assassinate Salah ad-Deen 570572 AH: Crusader raids against Salah ad-Deen's possession

**571 AH:** Peace deal between Salah ad-Deen and the Crusaders. Salah ad-Deen's annexation of Damascus.  
Second Shiite attempt to assassinate Salah ad-Deen

**573 AH:** Battle of ar-Ramlah — Salah ad-Deen was defeated by Reynald de Chatillon.

**575 AH:** The death of the Abbasid caliph al-Mustadi bi Amr- Illah The Battle of Tell al-Qadi — Victory by Salah ad-Deen over Raymond III and Baldwin IV. Truce between Salah ad-Deen and Baldwin IV calling for 2 years of peace

**576 AH:** The death of the scholar Hafidh Abul-Tahir as-Salafi al-Asbahani Salah ad-Deen enters Armenia

**577 AH:** The death of al-Malik as-Salih, the son of Noor ad- Deen Zangi

**578 AH:** Andronikos Komnenos becomes emperor of Byzantine state

**579 AH:** Salah ad-Deen's annexation of Aleppo

**581 AH:** Salah ad-Deen's annexation of Mosul Isaac Angelos becomes emperor of Byzantine state upon Komnenos' deposition and death

**582 AH:** Astrologers foretold that the world would end this year. The death of Baldwin V, which led to internal conflict between princes for the throne of Jerusalem Reynald de Chatillon breaks truce with Salah ad-Deen

**583 AH:** The Battle of Hattin — Salah ad-Deen's decisive victory over the Crusaders in which the King of Jerusalem, Guy de Lusignan was captured as well as Reynald de Chatillon, who was beheaded for his treachery

-The Battle of Sefhoria — Huge losses for the Crusaders dealt by Salah ad-Deen

-The Liberation of Jerusalem by Salah ad-Deen

-The siege of Tyre — Salah ad-Deen besieged the city but the King, Conrad de Montferrat, had fortifications and would not surrender, resulting in Salah ad-Deen lifting the siege.

**585 AH:** The death of 'Abd-Allah Ibn Abi 'Asroon, scholar judge under Salah ad-Deen.

Beginning of the third crusade as a result of the loss at Hattin and the loss of Jerusalem

Germans enter Armenia

**586 AH:** Death of German Emperor, Fredrick Barbarossa, resulting in the fleeing of the Germans Crusaders besiege Acre



**587 AH:** The fall of Acre to the kings of England and France, Richard the Lionhearted and Philip Augustus.  
The Battle of Arsuf — Between Richard the Lionhearted and Salah ad-Deen resulting in victory for Salah ad-Deen  
The Destruction of Ascalon by Salah ad-Deen so that the Crusaders could not take it

**588 AH:** The Battle of Jaffa — Salah ad-Deen attacked Jaffa, the headquarters of the Crusaders, when Richard the Lionheart was absent. The Muslims took the city and the Crusaders had to seek a peace deal. The Treaty of ar-Ramlah — Between Richard the Lionheart and Salah ad-Deen; Richard leaves the Middle East for England.

**589 AH:** The death of Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi

**596 AH:** The death of Qadi al-Fadil (Abu 'Ali 'Abd ar-Raheem al-'Asqallani), trusted advisor to Salah ad-Deen

# Appendix B

## Dynasties Mentioned in *Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi*

### Muslims

Abbasid Caliphate — This dynasty traces its genealogy to al-Abbas, the son of Abd al-Muttalib. Al-Abbas was the brother of 'Abd-Allah, father of the Muhammad (SAAW). It ruled much of the Arabian Peninsula and had its territory expanded under Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi's leadership. Salah ad-Deen pledged allegiance to the caliph al-Mustadi and upon his death, his son, the caliph Abul-'Abbas Ahmad ibn al-Mustadi, also known as an-Nasir li Deen-Allah.

Shiite Fatimid Caliphate — This dynasty began with 'Ubayd-Allah al-Mahdi. He claims descent from 'Ali and Fatimah, the cousin and daughter respectively of the Muhammad (SAAW). The last ruler of this dynasty was al-'Adid, who was succeeded by Salah ad-Deen as the ruler of Egypt.

The Great Seljuk Empire — This Empire of Seljuk Turks was divided into the Sultanate of Rum (Anatolia), the Sultanate of Syria, and the Sultanates of Kerman (Southern Persia) and Hamadan (Western Persia). Sulayman ibn Kutalmish established the Sultanate of Rum. He was a distant cousin of Malikshah, the son of Alp Arslan, the first of the sultans of the entire Seljuk state. Sulayman's son, Kilij Arslan I, became the Sultan of Rum upon his father's death. Kilij Arslan fought the French and Germans in the first crusade. His brother, Malikshah succeeded him. Malikshah was succeeded by Rukn ad-Deen Mas'ood, Kilij Arslan's son, who defeated the Germans in the second crusade. Tzz ad-Deen Kilij Arslan II became sultan after his father Mas'ood. Kilij

Arslan II fought the Byzantine army led by Manuel Komnenos during the second crusade and achieved a decisive victory. He also had conflicts with Salah ad-Deen over territory.

Zangid Dynasty — This dynasty branched from the Seljuk Turk dynasty. It reached its extent under Noor ad-Deen Zangi. His father was Imad ad-Deen Zangi, the regent of Aleppo and Mosul, and one of the great military leaders of the Seljuk Turks. Noor ad-Deen's brother was Saif ad-Deen Ghazi. Upon Noor ad-Deen's death, his son, al-Malik as-Salih took the reigns until his death when Salah ad-Deen united Muslim lands under his own leadership.

Ayubid Dynasty — This dynasty began with Salah ad-Deen Yusuf ibn Ayub in 570 AH. It paid allegiance to the Abbasid caliphate. Salah ad-Deen was the son of Najm ad-Deen Ayub. Najm ad-Deen and his brother, Asad ad-Deen Shirkuh, both served under Noor ad-Deen Zangi. The Ayubid family was of Kurdish origin.

## Crusaders

Kingdom of England — William the Conqueror's son, Henry I had a daughter named Matilda the Empress. She married Geoffrey I Plantagenet and their son, Henry II, was the father of the famed Richard the Lionhearted. Richard fought Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi in the third crusade. The end result of their contest was a draw, with Richard leaving the Middle East. Kingdom of France — King Louis VI's son, Louis VII took part in the second crusade. His son, Philip Augustus, joined forces with Richard the Lionhearted during the third crusade against Salah ad-Deen.

Roman Empire of the German Nation (known as the Holy Roman Empire) — Henry III, the King of Germany and the Emperor of the 'Holy' Roman Empire had Henry IV, who was the father of Agnes of Germany. She married Frederick I, Duke of Swabia, and their son Konrad III fought in the second crusade against the Seljuk Turks. His brother was Frederick II, whose son, Frederick Barbarossa, took part in the third crusade against Salah ad-Deen. He drowned in a river while campaigning and his

army fled as a result.

Byzantine Empire — The line of Byzantine emperors who ruled during, and took part in, the first three crusades is: Alexios I Komnenos, John II Komnenos (the son of Alexios I), Manuel I Komnenos (son of John II), Alexios II Komnenos (son of Manuel I), Andronikos Komnenos (Manuel's cousin and son of Prince Isaac Komnenos), Isaac I Angelos (great grandson of Alexios I).

Kingdom of Jerusalem — King Fulk's son Baldwin III became king after his father and was succeeded by his brother, Amalric I. Amalric sided with the Fatimids against Noor ad-Deen Zangi. Amalric's son Baldwin IV, who was a leper, fought Salah ad-Deen in the second crusade. Upon Baldwin IV's death, his nephew Baldwin V became king. He was known as the child-king because he was only 6 years old. He died only a year later and upon his death, Baldwin IV's sister, Sibylla, who was Baldwin the V's mother, insisted that her husband, Guy de Lusignan take over as king. Guy was captured by Salah ad-Deen at the Battle of Hattin.

# Appendix C

## Map of the Empire of Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi (see next page)

EMPIRE OF SALAH AD-DEEN AL-AYUBI Late 12<sup>th</sup> century CE (6<sup>th</sup> century AH)

*The Empire of Salah ad-Deen al-Ayubi*

